Bava Kamma 21a — the Talmud in English

Consecrated property without awareness ![](pamud.bmp "

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is considered like an ordinary person with awareness,

that is: It is not applicable to say concerning consecrated property “without awareness,” for there is the awareness of the Divine Presence, and it is therefore as though he dwells in his fellow’s courtyard with the awareness of an ordinary person, in which case he must raise rent for him.

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda sent to Mari bar Mar: Ask him from Rav Huna

[Go and ask Rav Huna]:

“One who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his awareness—must he raise rent for him, or not?”

Meanwhile,

while Mari bar Mar had time to come to Rav Huna in order to ask him,

Rav Huna’s soul came to rest

[Rav Huna died], and he presented the question before Rabbah, his son.

Rabbah son of Rav Huna said

to Mari bar Mar:

“Thus my father said

[Rav Huna]

in the name of Rav:

One who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his awareness

does not need to raise rent for him.”

And Rabbah further added, saying in his father’s name:

“And one who rents a house from Reuben raises rent for Simeon.”

The Gemara was astonished:

“What is Simeon’s involvement?”

[What are Simeon’s actions here?] That is: Why would he raise rent for Simeon, for having rented a house from Reuben!?

And we answer:

“This is what he is saying:

if

the house is found—

the one that Reuben rented to him—which is

Simeon’s, he raises for him—

the renter raises for Simeon—

rent.”

And we ask:

“Two [laws]!?”

But the two laws that Rabbah stated in his father’s name contradict one another, for since one who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his awareness does not need to raise rent for him, and regarding Simeon this is surely only renting without awareness, why, then, must he pay Simeon!?

And we answer:

“This”—

that he raises rent for Simeon—is in a house

that stands for renting

[that is designated for renting], and Simeon is found to have suffered a loss.

“This”—

that he does not need to raise rent for him—is in a house

that does not stand for renting

[a house that is not designated for renting]. Since the owner of the house does not suffer a loss, the one dwelling in the house does not need to raise rent for him, for “this one benefits and that one does not suffer a loss is exempt.”

[is designated for rental], and Shimon thereby suffers a loss. This—the case in which he does not have to pay him rent—is when the house is not suitable for rental [a house not designated for rental]. Since the owner of the house suffers no loss, the person dwelling in the house does not have to pay him rent, for “the one who benefits while the other suffers no loss is exempt.”

”

It was also stated:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abin said that Rav said, and some say,

there are those who say that he did not state it in the name of Rav, but rather:

“Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abin said that Rav Huna said:

The Gemara was astonished:

“What is the involvement of the owners?”

That is: To which owners will he pay, and why will he pay them!?

And we answer:

“This is what he is saying: Owners were found for him”,

that is: If it is found that the renter is not the owner of the house, but other owners were found for it,

they raise

[the renter raises]

rent for them.

The Gemara was astonished: And yet

“two [laws]”

[these two laws contradict one another]!?

And we answer:

“This”—

that he raises rent for the owners—is in a house

that stands for renting; this”—

that he does not raise rent for the owner of the courtyard—is in a courtyard

that does not stand for renting.

Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his awareness does not need to raise rent for him, as it is stated:

“And desolation

shall strike the gate”

—that is: A demon whose name is “Sha’iya” strikes the gate of a house in which people do not dwell. Therefore he does not pay rent for it, because it is found that he benefited him by sitting in his house.

Bar Rav Ashi said:

“I myself saw him, and he butts like an ox”

[I saw that demon whose name is “Sha’iya”], and it butts like an ox; that is: It destroys and damages.

Rav Yosef said

another reason for exempting one who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard:

For this reason, one who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his awareness does not pay rent, because he benefits him through this, for

“a house inhabited is indeed inhabited”

[the house settles through its inhabitants]; that is: A house inhabited by human beings has its settlement maintained, since those dwelling inside it see what the house needs, and they repair it.

And we explain:

“What is the difference between them

between Rav, who said “And desolation shall strike the gate,” and Rav Yosef, who said “A house inhabited is indeed inhabited”:

There is a difference between them,

for example:

when he is using it—

the owner of the courtyard—

for wood and straw

[and this one comes and enters to dwell inside it]. For because of “desolation shall strike the gate” there is no [benefit] here, since the owner of the courtyard also uses it; nevertheless, it is beneficial for the house that they dwell in it, so that they will repair it.

An incident involving

a certain man who built a mansion on the refuse heap of orphans

[an incident involving a man who built a house on a garbage site belonging to orphans].

Rav Naḥman collected his mansion from him

[Rav Naḥman collected the house as rent].

The Gemara asks:

“Should we say that Rav Naḥman holds that one who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his awareness must raise rent for him”,

and for this reason he made him pay, even though the courtyard was not designated for renting? And we explain: In truth, Rav Naḥman holds that one who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard does not raise rent for him, but

that

[that plot]

originally belonged to the Karmanaeans

[the name of a nation],

who dwelled there and gave the orphans a small sum

[before this man came, members of that nation dwelled on that plot and paid rent to the orphans]. This one who built the mansion there caused them to lose that rent.

And therefore

he said to him

Rav Naḥman said to that man:

“Go appease them”

the orphans

[go and pay the orphans],

but he paid no attention

[that man did not comply], and therefore:

Rav Naḥman collected his mansion from him.

was originally occupied by Carmanaeans [the name of a nation],

The Gemara now returns to explain what we learned in the Mishna:

And now the Gemara returns to explain what we learned in the Mishna:

“How does she pay for what she benefited? If she ate from the open area”

[the public domain],

“she pays for what she benefited; if she ate

from the sides of the open area, she pays for what she damaged.”

Rav said:

This law—that if she ate from the sides of the open area she pays for what she damaged—applies only when the animal is walking in the open area

and turns back

its head toward the sides of the open area and eats fruit there, which is not its ordinary manner, and she is liable on account of keren even in the public domain.

And Shmuel said: Even if she turns back, she is also exempt,

because it is the ordinary manner of an animal to turn back its head and eat, and this is shen, which is exempt in the public domain.

And we challenge:

“But according to Shmuel,

who exempts even when she turns back,

how can you find a case in which she is liable

in the Mishna’s statement that if she ate from the sides of the open area?”

And we answer:

“For example, when she left the open area,

the animal left the open area,

and went and stood

and is now walking

at the sides

of the

open area,

which is not the place where oxen walk, and it is therefore like the injured party’s courtyard; consequently, she pays for what she damaged.

And some teach this statement independently.

There are those who do not teach this tradition as an explanation of the Mishna, but as an independent dispute:

An animal that walks in the open area and

turns back

its head toward the sides of the open area and eats fruit from there:

Rav said she is liable, and Shmuel said she is exempt.

And we ask:

“But according to Shmuel,

who exempts her, if so, that which we learned: If she ate from the sides of the open area,

she pays for what she damaged—how can you find a case in which she is liable?”

In what manner can we make her liable if, when she turns back, she is exempt?

And we answer:

“For example, when she left the open area. And she went

and stood at the sides of the open area.”

In this, too, Shmuel agrees that she is liable.

He raised an objection

[he challenged]

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

from the Mishna against Rav.

For we learned: An animal walking in the open area and eating

from the opening of a shop pays

only

for what she benefited

and not for what she damaged.

But the opening of a shop is located at the side of the open area, and if so,

how can you find a case

in which she eats from the opening of the shop?

It is obvious

that this can only be

when she turns back

her head toward the opening of the shop.

And the tan[nay] said

that she pays

for what she benefited,

and one should infer from this:

“For what she benefited, yes,

she is liable only for what she benefited, but

for what she damaged, no,”

and necessarily this is because when she turns back she is exempt, in accordance with Shmuel; and it is difficult for Rav, who says she is liable.

He raised it as an objection,

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak challenged,

and he

himself

resolved it

[answered it].

The reason the tan[nay] exempts her is in a case

where she is standing at a corner,

where the opening of the shop is at a corner and projects into the open area, so that the animal can reach the fruit without turning back her head; this is shen in the public domain, and she is exempt. Therefore, she pays only for what she benefited.

Some say: Everyone agrees concerning turning back,

there is no dispute about this, and everyone holds

that she is liable.

When they disagree,

rather, the dispute is

when he sets aside a place from his domain

the private one

for

the use of those in

the public domain,

by building the fence separating his courtyard from the public domain within his own property, leaving the place that he set aside free for the public’s passage.

And this is how it was stated,

and this is in what they disagreed:

Rav said: They taught

that when she eats from the sides of the open area she is liable

only

when the animal

turns back

its head toward the sides of the open area,

but when he sets aside a place from his domain for the public domain,

and the animal eats from there,

she is exempt.

And Shmuel said: Even when he sets aside a place from his domain for the public domain, she is liable.

And we explain:

“Let us say that they disagree concerning a pit in his domain.”

Apparently, one can say that this dispute depends on the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva below (49b) concerning one who dug a pit in his domain and afterward rendered his domain ownerless but did not render his pit ownerless: Rabbi Akiva holds him liable because he is the owner of the hazard, while Rabbi Yosei exempts him because the pit is in his domain.

And in our case, the place that he set aside for the public domain still belongs to him, except that the public has permission to use it; and when he places his fruit there, if others are damaged by them, it is like a pit in the public domain, for according to Rabbi Akiva he is liable, while according to Rabbi Yosei he is exempt.

And since we hold in the chapter “The One Who Places” [30a] that concerning all objects that cause damage in the public domain, whoever takes possession of them acquires them, if the fruit has the status of a pit, an animal that eats it is exempt. But if one is not liable for them when they cause damage, the animal is liable for eating them.

Therefore.

Rav, who says

in a place that he set aside, if an animal eats produce from there, its owner

is exempt,

this is because Rav

holds that a pit in his domain is liable,

and therefore, even though the produce is in his domain, nevertheless it has the status of a pit, and therefore the owner of the animal is exempt for its eating it.

And Shmuel, who says

if an animal ate from a place that he set aside for the public domain, its owner

is liable, for he holds that a pit in his domain is exempt,

and the produce that is in his domain does not have the status of a pit, and one who damages with it is liable for it.

And we reject this:

Rav can say to you: Actually, I will say to you

that this law does not depend upon the dispute concerning a pit in his domain,