Bava Kamma 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

Consecrated property without awareness

is considered like an ordinary person with awareness,

that is: It is not applicable to say “without awareness” with regard to consecrated property, since the awareness of the Divine Presence exists; and it is therefore as though one dwells in another person’s courtyard with the awareness of an ordinary person, in which case he must pay him rent.

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda sent word to Mari bar Mar: “Ask Rav Huna”

go and ask Rav Huna:

Does one who lives in another’s courtyard without his awareness have to pay him rent, or not?

Meanwhile,

before Mari bar Mar had time to come to Rav Huna to ask him,

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda sent word to Mari bar Mar: Ask Rav Huna

[Go and ask Rav Huna]:

Does one who dwells in another’s courtyard without his awareness have to pay him rent, or not?

Meanwhile,

before Mari bar Mar had time to come to Rav Huna in order to ask him,

Rav Huna died

[Rav Huna passed away], and he presented the question to his son Rabba.

Rabba son of Rav Huna said

to Mari bar Mar:

This is what my father said

[Rav Huna]

in the name of Rav:

One who dwells in another’s courtyard without his awareness

does not have to pay him rent—

and Rabba further said in his father’s name:

But one who rents a house from Reuven must pay rent to Shimon.

The Gemara is astonished:

What is Shimon’s involvement?

[What is Shimon doing here?] That is, why should he pay rent to Shimon for having rented a house from Reuven!?

And we answer:

This is what he is saying:

If

it is found that the house

—which Reuven rented to him—

belongs to Shimon,

he must pay him

—the renter must pay Shimon—

rent.

And we challenge this:

Are there two separate laws!?

But the two laws that Rabba stated in his father’s name contradict one another. Since one who dwells in another’s courtyard without his awareness does not have to pay him rent, the case concerning Shimon is likewise only a case of renting without awareness; if so, why must he pay Shimon!?

And we answer:

This—the case in which he must pay rent to Shimon—is when the house

is suitable for rental

[is designated for rental], and Shimon thereby suffers a loss. This—the case in which he does not have to pay him rent—is when the house is not suitable for rental [a house not designated for rental]. Since the owner of the house suffers no loss, the person dwelling in the house does not have to pay him rent, for “the one who benefits while the other suffers no loss is exempt.”

”

It was also stated: Rabbi Chiyya bar Avin said in the name of Rav—and some say

that it was not said in Rav’s name, but rather:

Rabbi Chiyya bar Avin said in the name of Rav Huna:

One who lives in another’s courtyard without his awareness need not pay him rent; but one who rents a house from townspeople must pay rent to the owners.

The Gemara was puzzled:

What is the involvement of the owners

that is, which owners must he pay, and why must he pay them

It was also stated:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav said—and some say

that he did not state it in the name of Rav, but rather:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said:

One who dwells in another’s courtyard without his awareness does not have to pay him rent; but one who rents a house from the townspeople must pay rent to the owners.

The Gemara is astonished:

What is the involvement of the owners?

That is: To which owners must he pay, and why must he pay them!?

And we answer:

This is what he is saying: Owners were found for it,

that is: If it is found that the person who rented it out was not the owner of the house, but that other owners were found for it,

he must pay

[the renter must pay]

them rent.

The Gemara is astonished: But

are these not two laws

[that contradict one another]!?

And we answer:

This—the case in which he pays rent to the owners—is when the house is suitable for rental; this—the case in which he does not pay rent to the owner of the courtyard—is when the courtyard is not suitable for rental. Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said that Rav: One who dwells in another’s courtyard without his awareness does not have to pay him rent, as it is stated: “ And desolation shall smite the gate.” The meaning is: A demon called “Desolation” strikes the gate of a house in which no people dwell. Therefore he does not pay him rent, because it turns out that he benefited him by sitting in his house.

Bar Rav Ashi said:

I myself saw it, and it butts like an ox

I saw that demon named “Sha’aya,” and it butts like an ox, that is, it destroys and damages.

Rav Yosef said

another reason why one who lives in another’s courtyard is exempt:

Therefore, one who lives in another’s courtyard without his awareness does not pay rent, because he benefits the owner by doing so, since

“a house is settled by its inhabitants”

that is, a house inhabited by people remains in good condition, because those who live in it notice what the house needs and repair it.

We explain:

Bar Rav Ashi said:

I saw it myself, and it butts like an ox

[I saw that demon called “Desolation”;

it butts like an ox], that is, it destroys and damages.

when he uses it—

the courtyard’s owner—

for wood and straw

Rav Yosef said

another reason for exempting one who dwells in another’s courtyard:

One who dwells in another’s courtyard without his awareness does not pay rent because he benefits the owner by doing so, for:

A house becomes settled by being inhabited

[the house is settled by its inhabitants]. That is: A house inhabited by people remains settled, because those who dwell in it see what the house requires and repair it.

And we explain:

What is the difference between them

between Rav, who said “Desolation shall smite the gate,” and Rav Yosef, who said “A house becomes settled by being inhabited”?

There is a difference between them,

for example:

when the owner of the courtyard uses it

—

for wood and straw

[for timber and straw]. The owner himself uses it, and this person then enters and dwells there. Thus, the consideration of “Desolation shall smite the gate” does not apply, since the owner also uses it; nevertheless, it is still beneficial for the house to be inhabited, so that the inhabitants will maintain it.

There was an incident involving

a certain man who built a mansion on a garbage site belonging to orphans

[an incident involving a man who built a house on a garbage lot belonging to orphans].

Rav Naḥman collected his mansion from him

[Rav Naḥman collected the house as rent from him].

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that Rav Naḥman holds that one who dwells in another’s courtyard without his awareness must pay him rent,

and for this reason he required him to pay, even though the courtyard was not designated for rental? We explain: In fact, Rav Naḥman holds that one who dwells in another’s courtyard does not pay him rent. However,

that

[that plot of land]

was originally occupied by Carmanaeans [the name of a nation],

who paid the orphans a small sum

[before this man came, members of that nation lived on the plot and paid rent to the orphans]. This man, by building the mansion there, deprived them of that rent—

and therefore

he said to him

Rav Naḥman said to that man:

Go appease them

—the orphans

[go and pay the orphans],

but he paid no heed

[the man did not comply], and therefore: Rav Naḥman collected his mansion from him.

And Shmuel said: Even when it turns its head, it is exempt

because it is normal for an animal to turn its head and eat, and this is therefore damage under the category of Tooth, for which one is exempt in the public domain.

The Gemara now returns to explain what we learned in the Mishna:

How does it pay for what it benefited? If it ate from the middle of the public thoroughfare, it pays for what it benefited;

[the public domain]

it pays for what it benefited;

if it ate

from the sides of the public thoroughfare, it pays for what it damaged.

Rav said:

This law—that if it ate from the sides of the public thoroughfare it pays for what it damaged—applies only when the animal is walking in the public thoroughfare

and turns its head

toward the sides of the public thoroughfare and eats fruit there, which is not its usual manner; therefore it is liable as keren

even in the public domain.

thoroughfare,

And Samuel said: Even if it turns its head, it is also exempt

because it is usual for an animal to turn its head and eat, and this is shen, for which one is exempt in the public domain.

And we challenge this:

But according to Samuel,

who exempts it even when it turns its head,

how can you find a case in which it is liable

in the Mishna’s statement that if it ate from the sides of the public thoroughfare it pays for what it damaged?

And we answer:

For example, when it left the public thoroughfare,

the animal left the public thoroughfare,

and went and stood

and was now walking

at the side of

the

public thoroughfare,

which is not a place where oxen walk, and is therefore like the injured party’s courtyard; consequently, it pays for what it damaged.

And some teach this statement as an independent matter.

Some do not teach this tradition as an explanation of the Mishna, but as an independent dispute:

An animal walking in the public thoroughfare, which

turns its head

toward the sides of the public thoroughfare and eats fruit from there,

Rav said it is liable, and Samuel said it is exempt.

And we ask:

But according to Samuel,

who exempts it, regarding what we learned—that if it ate from the sides of the public thoroughfare

it pays for what it damaged, how can you find a case in which it is liable?

How can we find a situation in which it is liable if one that turns its head is exempt?

And we answer:

For example, when it left the public thoroughfare. And it went

and stood at the side of the public thoroughfare.

In this case Samuel too agrees that it is liable.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak challenged

[he raised an objection]

the statement of Rav

from the Mishna.

We learned: An animal walking in the public thoroughfare that ate

from the opening of a shop pays

only

for what it benefited

and not for what it damaged.

But the opening of a shop is located at the side of the public thoroughfare, and if so,

how can you find a case

in which it ate from the opening of the shop?

It is obvious

that this can only be

when it turns its head

toward the opening of the shop.

And the tanna says

that it pays

for what it benefited,

and one may infer from this:

For what it benefited, yes,

it is liable only for what it benefited, but

for what it damaged, no,

and this must be because when it turns its head it is exempt, in accordance with Samuel; this is difficult for Rav, who holds that it is liable.

He raised the objection

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised the objection,

and he

himself

resolved it

[answered it].

The tanna exempts it in a case

where it is standing at a corner,

where the opening of the shop is situated at a corner and projects into the public thoroughfare, so that the animal can reach the fruit without turning its head. This is shen in the public domain, for which it is exempt. Therefore it pays only for what it benefited.

Some say: Everyone agrees that when it turns its head,

there is no dispute in this matter, and everyone holds

that it is liable.

They disagree

rather, about

one who sets aside a place from his own domain

the private domain

for the

use of those in

the public domain,

by building the partition separating his courtyard from the public domain within his own property, leaving the area he demarcated available for public passage.

And this is how it was stated,

and this is the subject of their dispute:

Rav said: They taught that it is liable when it eats from the sides of the public thoroughfare only when the animal turns its head toward the sides of the public thoroughfare, but if one sets aside a place from his own domain for the public domain, and the animal eats from there, it is exempt. And Samuel said: Even if one sets aside a place from his own domain for the public domain, it is liable. And we explain: Shall we say that they disagree about a pit in one’s own domain? Apparently, one might say that this dispute depends on the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva below (49b), concerning one who dug a pit in his own domain and subsequently renounced ownership of his domain but did not renounce ownership of his pit. Rabbi Akiva holds him liable because he is the owner of the hazard, while Rabbi Yosei exempts him because the pit is in his domain. In our case, too, the place that he set aside for the public domain still belongs to him, except that the public has permission to use it. When he places fruit there, if others are harmed by it, it is like a pit in the public domain: According to Rabbi Akiva he is liable, while according to Rabbi Yosei he is exempt. And since we hold, in chapter “The One Who Places” [30a], that with regard to all objects that cause damage in the public domain, whoever takes possession of them acquires them, if the fruit has the status of a pit, an animal that eats it is exempt. But if one is not liable for damage caused by the fruit, the animal is liable for eating it. Therefore.

Rav, who said

when one designates a place, if an animal eats produce from there, its owner

is exempt,

this is because Rav

holds that one is liable for a pit in his own domain,

and therefore, although the produce is in his domain, it nevertheless has the status of a pit, and consequently the animal is exempt for eating it.

And Shmuel, who said

that if an animal ate from a place that one designated for the public domain, its owner

is liable, holds that one is exempt for a pit in his own domain,

and the produce that is in his domain does not have the status of a pit, so one who damages it is liable for it.

And we reject this:

Rav could say to you: In fact, I can tell you

that this law is not dependent on the dispute concerning a pit in one’s own domain,