Bava Kamma 20b — the Talmud in English

In the end,

he did benefit

[after all, he benefited].

He said to him

Rami bar Hama said to Rav Hisda:

It is a Mishna

[this is a Mishna], that is: this law is explained from the Mishna.

Rav Hisda asked Rami bar Hama:

Which Mishna

[which Mishna]?

He said to him

Rami bar Hama said to Rav Hisda: I will answer you

when you serve me

[after you serve me].

Rav Hisda took

the

kerchief

of Rami bar Hama and

wrapped it for him

[folded his kerchief] for Rami bar Hama, in order to serve him with this.

He said to him

Rami bar Hama said to Rav Hisda: It is our Mishna, in which we learned:

“If he benefited, he pays what he benefited,”

and he proceeds to explain it.

Rava said

about Rami bar Hama:

How untroubled and unfeeling is the man whose Master assists him

[how secure and confident, and not required to fear any evil, is one whom the Holy One, blessed be He, assists], that is: heavenly assistance was granted to Rami bar Hama,

for even though it does not resemble

Rav Hisda’s question

the Mishna,

nevertheless

he accepted it from him

Rav Hisda, and did not reject Rami bar Hama!

For behold,

this

of our Mishna:

this one

the owner of the animal

benefits

from his animal’s eating,

and this one—

the owner of the barley—

is lacking from

the benefit of the animal’s owner, for it ate his barley—

but

if

this one

of Rav Hisda:

this one

who dwells

benefits, and

if

this one—

the owner of the courtyard, who had not been meant to rent out his courtyard—

is not lacking,

and Rav Hisda’s entire uncertainty is only because this one is not lacking; but when this one benefits and this one is lacking, it is obvious that he is liable to pay for his benefit.

And Rami bar Hama,

who brought proof from our Mishna, held:

ordinary produce in the public domain—

in the manner of our Mishna—

its owner abandons it

and it follows that he is not lacking.

The Gemara resolves the uncertainty from that which

we learned

in Bava Batra 2b:

One who surrounds his fellow on three sides,

that is: Reuven has three fields on three sides of Shimon’s field, and his three fields were fenced on the outside, adjacent to the public domain—

and Reuven went

and fenced

the

first

field between it and Shimon’s field,

and

likewise

the second, and

likewise

the third;

still

they do not obligate him

[Shimon] to participate in the expenses of the fence, for he does not benefit from Reuven’s fences, since it remains open on the fourth side.

It follows:

indeed,

if Reuven also fenced the

fourth

field—which too had belonged to him, and Shimon had already benefited from the fence, for his field was fenced on all its sides—

they obligate him

[Shimon, the one surrounded] to participate in the expenses of the entire fence—

thus

learn from it: this one—

Shimon, the one surrounded—

benefits, and this one—

Reuven, the one surrounding—

is not lacking

on account of Shimon, for even without Shimon he would have had to fence his fields, and nevertheless Shimon

is liable

to pay for his benefit.

And we reject this:

There it is different, for he said to him

Reuven said to Shimon:

You caused me an additional surrounding

[your field, which is inside my fields, caused me to make an additional enclosure of partitions], that is: Reuven is lacking on account of Shimon, for if Shimon had not had a field inside his fields, Reuven would have sufficed with the outer partitions that he made; and it follows that this one benefits and this one is lacking.

Come and hear

from the continuation of that same Mishna, that “this one benefits and this one is not lacking” is exempt:

For we learned there:

Rabbi Yose said: If the one surrounded arose

[Shimon] after Reuven had fenced three sides of Shimon’s field,

and fenced

himself

the

side

fourth

of his field,

they impose upon him—

upon Shimon—

the whole, that is: he must participate in the expenses of the first three fences, because he revealed that he is interested in fences around his field.

meaning that he must participate in the expenses of the first three fences, because he thereby revealed that he wanted fences around his field.

It follows:

the reason is that the one surrounded fenced,

then they obligate him to participate;

indeed,

if the

one surrounding

fenced the fourth side—for example, he acquired an additional field on the fourth side and fenced it—

he is exempt,

Shimon, the one surrounded, from participating in the expense of the fences; and although he benefited from Reuven’s fences, nevertheless he is exempt when Shimon did not reveal that he was interested in fences—

thus

learn from it: this one

Shimon

benefits, and this one

Reuven

is not lacking, he is exempt.

That is: certainly this is the dispute between the Sages, who obligate Shimon when Reuven fenced the fourth side, and Rabbi Yose, who exempts [when he did not reveal his intention]. The Sages hold: “this one benefits and this one is lacking,” for Shimon caused him an additional surrounding; whereas Rabbi Yose holds that this is not considered a deficiency sufficient to obligate Shimon for his benefit. But according to everyone: “this one benefits and this one is not lacking” is exempt. And we reject this: forever, “this one benefits and this one is not lacking” is liable, but there it is different

And we reject this: In fact, one who benefits while the other does not suffer a loss is liable, but

concerning a fence, where Shimon is not obligated to participate even though he benefited, because

he said to him

Shimon said to Reuven:

For me, a guard worth a zuz is sufficient

[I cannot make such an expensive stone fence as the one you made, and a thorn fence whose price is only one zuz is sufficient for me], that is: lesser and cheaper protection is sufficient for me to separate me from you, and I do not wish to participate in the expenses of an expensive stone fence.

Come and hear

from a Mishna in Bava Metzia 117a, that “this one benefits and this one is not lacking” is exempt:

For we learned:

the house and the upper story belonging to two

[Reuven has the house, and Shimon has the upper story]

that fell,

and

the owner of the upper story said to the owner of the house to build

his house so that he could build his upper story upon his house,

but he—

the owner of the house—

does not wish

to build:

The owner of the upper story builds

[a

house, and dwells in it]

the house

up to the lower ceiling,

and dwells

the owner of the upper story

within it,

until he gives him—

the owner of the house to the owner of the upper story—the

expenses

that he spent on building the house; then the owner of the upper story leaves the house and builds his upper story.

And from here the Gemara learns that “this one benefits and this one is not lacking is exempt,” for:

It is his expenses that the owner of the house obligates himself to him, but not his rent.

That is: the owner of the house must pay the owner of the upper story all his expenses, and he does not deduct from him rent for the time the owner of the upper story dwelled in his house; thus

learn from it:

this one—

the owner of the upper story—

benefits

from dwelling in the house, for otherwise he would have had to rent another dwelling,

and

if

this one—

the owner of the house—

is not lacking,

for he had no interest at all in building the house,

the beneficiary

is exempt.

And we reject this:

there it is different

concerning the house and upper story, where the owner of the upper story does not pay for his dwelling in the house because

the house is subordinated to the upper story

[the house is mortgaged to the upper story] to build it upon the house and support it; therefore the owner of the upper story has the right to dwell in the house.

Come and hear

from the continuation of that Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda—

who disputed the Sages, who hold that the owner of the upper story need not pay the owner of the house rent—

says:

Even this one

[the owner of the upper story]

dwells in his fellow’s courtyard

[the owner of the house]

without his knowledge,

he must pay him rent.

Thus

learn from it: “

this one benefits and this one is not lacking,”

is liable.

That is: certainly this is the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda: according to the Sages, he is not liable to pay rent because the house is subordinated to the upper story, whereas Rabbi Yehuda disputes this reasoning; but according to everyone, “this one benefits and this one is not lacking” is liable.

And we reject this:

there it is different

in a new house in which the owner of the upper story dwelled, for he is liable to pay

because

the owner of the house is lacking the

blackening of the walls

[the blackening of the walls], since initial use of a new house blackens the walls and diminishes them.

But Rav Hisda’s doubt was concerning one who dwelt in an old house belonging to his fellow, which he did not diminish in any way, and this doubt still remained unresolved.

They sent it -

Rav Hisda’s doubt -

to the house of Rabbi Ami,

and

he said:

Rabbi Ami: He is certainly exempt from paying, for:

And what did he do to him,

the dweller to the owner of the courtyard,

and what did he diminish for him, and what damage did he cause him!?

And

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba -

to whom as well they had sent Rav Hisda’s doubt -

said: Let the matter settle

[let us examine the matter], then

they sent it before Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba

[they returned and sent the question to Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba],

he said,

Rabbi Hiyya was astonished:

They have sent all this to me and gone on

[they send so much to me]!? For

Had I found a reason for it, would I not have sent it to them

[had I been certain about the matter, would I not have sent it to them]!?

It was stated,

that the amoraim disputed the view of Rabbi Yohanan regarding Rav Hisda’s doubt:

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

One who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his knowledge

does not need to pay him rent,

because “this one benefits and that one does not lose, he is exempt.”

Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: He needs to pay him rent,

because “this one benefits and that one does not lose, he is liable.”

Rav Pappa said:

That statement of Rabbi Abbahu

in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

was not stated explicitly,

Rabbi Yohanan did not say this explicitly,

but it was stated by implication,

that is: Rabbi Abbahu understood that this was Rabbi Yohanan’s view;

for we learned

in tractate Meila:

There are two ways in which a person commits meila with consecrated property:

The first: by transferring it from one domain to another.

The second: by deriving benefit.

He took

the treasurer

a stone or a beam belonging to consecrated property for himself, he has not committed meila.

He gave it

the treasurer

to his fellow, he

the treasurer

committed meila

through giving it to his fellow,

and

if

his fellow did not commit meila

when he uses it, for consecrated property had already become ordinary property through the meila of the giver.

He built it

the treasurer -

into his house, he has not committed meila until he dwells beneath it for the value of one peruta,

for anyone who derives benefit from consecrated property commits meila.

And Shmuel said:

This that we learned, “He built it into his house, he has not committed meila,”

is when he placed it

as it was

upon the opening of a skylight

to seal it, and did not affix it there, for there is no change here.

And Rabbi Abbahu was sitting before Rabbi Yohanan,

[Rabbi Abbahu was sitting before Rabbi Yohanan],

and was saying in the name of Shmuel:

This indicates,

from what we learned: one who dwells beneath a stone or beam belonging to consecrated property has committed meila - one can learn:

one who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his knowledge needs to pay him rent,

for if this were not so, this one who dwelt and benefited from consecrated property would not have committed meila.

And he was silent to him

[Rabbi Yohanan was silent and did not answer him].

He -

Rabbi Abbahu -

thought: Since he was silent,

Rabbi Yohanan to him, certainly

he agreed with him

that indeed there is proof from here that one who dwells in his fellow’s courtyard without his knowledge needs to pay him rent, and therefore Rabbi Abbahu said that this was Rabbi Yohanan’s view.

And

however, the Gemara explains that

it is not so

[this is not the case], for Rabbi Yohanan’s silence was not an admission of Rabbi Abbahu’s words, but rather

he simply paid no attention to him

Rabbi Yohanan [Rabbi Yohanan did not address Rabbi Abbahu’s words], and because in his view there is no proof from here,

as with Rabbah; for Rabbah said: