Bava Kamma 23a — the Talmud in English

A beraita

supports it:

For it is taught: The verse began ![](pamud.bmp "

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with damage caused by his property,

as it is stated, “When a fire goes out,” whose meaning is that the fire went out by itself and burned that which belonged to another,

and concluded

the verse

with damage caused by his person,

as the verse called him “the one who kindles” it with his hands,

to tell you:

that he is liable for

his fire

that caused damage

because

it is considered

his arrows

and as though he caused damage with his person.

Rava said: It was difficult for him

[it was difficult for him]

to Abaye: According to the one who says

[Rabbi Yohanan,] who holds that for

his fire

that caused damage he is liable

because

it is considered

his arrows,

if so,

a concealed object in a fire, from which the Merciful One exempted

[which the verse exempted]

how can you find it

[how is it applicable]?

And it was resolved for him

[and it settled for him]:

For example, a fire broke out in that courtyard

his,

and a wall fell

that separated between his courtyard and his fellow’s courtyard,

not on account of the fire, and it went

the fire

and ignited and caused damage in another courtyard, for there

[there,] in the other courtyard, already

his arrows had been exhausted,

for at the time he ignited the fire—that is, the throwing of the arrow—the wall separating between his courtyard and his fellow’s courtyard was standing, and there was no possibility that the fire would go and cause damage to that which belonged to his fellow; only afterward did the possibility arise that it could go and cause damage. If so, what the fire passes into the other’s courtyard is not considered his arrows.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if it is speaking of this case, then

with regard to exposed objects

that are not concealed,

also

[also]

his arrows had been exhausted!

And he should also be exempt for what was exposed.

Rather,

the Gemara retracts this and says:

According to the one

[Rabbi Yohanan]

who has

[who has] the reasoning that he is liable for his fire

because of his arrows, he also has

[he also has] the reasoning that he is liable for his fire

because of his property,

and therefore he is liable for the exposed object that was burned after the wall fell,

and for example, it was incumbent upon him to rebuild it

before the conflagration passed there, for he had time and could rebuild it

but he did not rebuild it,

and although he cannot be held liable for the initial kindling, he is liable for not guarding his ember by building a wall before it, so that it would not pass into the other courtyard.

For there it is his ox, and he did not raise a barrier before it

[which is considered as though he brought his ox into an enclosure but did not lock it before it,] and it went out and caused damage, for he is liable for not preventing the ox from going out and causing damage.

And we examine this:

But since the one who holds that it is because of his arrows also holds that it is because of his property, what is the difference between them

[what is the difference between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish]? Granted, until now, when we thought that according to Rabbi Yohanan he is liable for his fire only because of his arrows and not because of his property, there is a difference between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish in a case where the wall fell: the fire whose arrows had been exhausted, and for which Rabbi Yohanan exempts, Rabbi Yohanan; whereas according to Resh Lakish he is liable, since it is still considered his damaging property.

But now that we say that Rabbi Yohanan concedes that there is also a reason to hold him liable for his fire because of his property, then what difference is there between Rabbi Yohanan, who holds him liable on account of two reasons, and Resh Lakish, who holds him liable only on account of one reason, in a case where the ember belongs to him? For they must necessarily disagree in a case where the ember belongs to him, since Rabbi Yohanan said above, “his fire” because of his arrows; this implies that they disagree with regard to his fire.

And we answer:

There is a difference between them

[there is a difference between them] with regard to

holding him liable for the four matters

according to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds him liable also because of his arrows: if his fire burned a person’s hand, he is liable for the four matters, as the law of one who causes damage with his person—damage, pain, medical care, and loss of work. Whereas according to Resh Lakish, who holds that he is liable only because of his property, he is exempt from paying the four matters.

We learned in the Mishna: A dog that took a cake and went to a stack, ate the cake and ignited the stack—

for the cake he pays

full damage, and for the stack he pays half-damage.

And we examine this:

Who

[who]

is liable

to pay half-damage for the stack?

The owner of the dog!

And we raise an objection: Be it according to Rabbi Yohanan or according to Resh Lakish, his fire is considered his property, and if it caused damage he is liable because he was negligent in guarding it. If so,

the owner of the ember should also be liable

for having been negligent in guarding the ember!

For according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said above that the owner of the dog pays half-damage for the stack because it caused damage through pebbles, the owner of the ember should pay the other half, since it was his property that caused damage; and according to Resh Lakish, who said above that the owner of the dog is liable only for the damage at the place of the ember and exempt for the entire stack, the owner of the ember should pay all of it. [And now the Gemara assumes that the ember belongs to one person, while the cake and the stack belong to another.]

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking

when the owner of the ember guarded

his

ember,

for he properly locked the doors of his house; therefore he is exempt for what the ember damaged.

And we raise an objection:

If

it is speaking

when the owner of the ember guarded

his

ember, what is the dog doing there

How did the dog get there to take the ember?

And we answer: It is speaking

when it breached

the dog under the door and entered through the breach.

Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: That is to say:

From the fact that the Mishna obligates the owner of the dog to pay full damage for the cake, it follows that the dog’s breaching under the door is not unusual, and it is demonstrated that

ordinary doors are considered breached for a dog,

and it is not unusual, so as to make him liable only for half-damage.

And we examine this:

Where did it eat it,

in whose stack did it eat the cake

? If you say

[if it is said]

that it ate it in an ordinary stack

[belonging to another] and not the owner of the cake, it is difficult: Why does the owner of the dog pay for the cake? For eating the cake is damage caused by the tooth, and

we require, “And it shall consume in another’s field

in the injured party’s domain,

but there is none

[and it is not] eating the cake in the injured party’s domain, but in the domain of the owner of the stack.

And we answer:

It is not necessary

[there is no need] to establish the Mishna except in a case

where it ate

the cake

in the stack belonging to the owner of the cake,

so that the eating of the cake took place in the injured party’s domain.

From the discussion here it is proven that for the tooth of the damaging party one is liable only in a case where it both took the object from the injured party’s domain and ate it and destroyed it in the injured party’s domain.