Bava Kamma 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

The baraita

supports this:

As it is taught:

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The verse began with damage caused by one's property, as it is stated: “When a fire goes forth,” which means that the fire went forth on its own and burned another person's property,

and

the verse concluded

with damage caused by one's person,

as the verse calls it “the one who kindles,” by hand,

as the verse calls him “the one who kindles,” meaning that he did so directly,

to tell you:

that one is liable for

his fire

that caused damage

because

it is considered

his arrows

and as though he caused the damage with his person.

Rava said: It was difficult for him

this was difficult for him

to Abaye: According to the one who says

Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that for

his fire

that caused damage renders him liable

because

it is considered

his arrows,

if so,

concealed property in a fire, for which the Merciful One exempted

as the verse exempts him

how can it be found

?

And this was resolved for him

:

For example, a fire broke out in that courtyard

of his,

and a wall fell

that separated his courtyard from his fellow's courtyard,

not as a result of the fire, and the fire proceeded

and burned

and ignited and caused damage in another courtyard, for there

in that other courtyard,

his arrows had already been exhausted,

since at the time he kindled the fire—that is, when he shot the arrow—there was a wall separating his courtyard from his fellow's courtyard, and there was no possibility that the fire would proceed and damage his fellow's property. Only afterward did the possibility arise that it could proceed and cause damage; therefore, the fire's passing into the other's courtyard is not considered his arrows.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the case is speaking of this situation, then

with regard to exposed property

that is not concealed,

also

as well

his arrows had already been exhausted!

And he should likewise be exempt for what was exposed.

Rather,

the Gemara retracts this answer and says:

According to the one

Rabbi Yohanan

who holds

that he is liable for his fire

that his fire is liable because of his arrows, he also holds

that he is liable for his fire

that his fire is liable because of his property,

and therefore he is liable for the exposed property that was burned after the wall fell,

and for example, he had the opportunity to rebuild it

before the fire passed there, as he had sufficient time and could have rebuilt it,

but he did not rebuild it,

and although he cannot be held liable for the initial kindling, he is liable for failing to guard his ember by rebuilding the wall to prevent it from passing into the other courtyard.

There, it is his ox, and he did not shut it in before it

it is considered as though he brought his ox into a pen but did not close the door before it, and it went out and caused damage. He is liable because he failed to prevent the ox from going out and causing damage.

And we examine this:

But once the one who holds that it is because of his arrows also holds that it is because of his property, what difference is there between them

? Until now, when we thought that according to Rabbi Yohanan he was liable for his fire only because of his arrows and not because of his property, there was a difference between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish in the case where the wall fell: The fire, whose arrows had been exhausted, would be exempt according to Rabbi Yohanan, whereas according to Reish Lakish he would be liable, since it would still be considered his damaging property.

But now that we say that Rabbi Yohanan concedes that there is also a rationale for holding him liable for his fire because of his property, what difference is there between Rabbi Yohanan, who holds him liable on two grounds, and Reish Lakish, who holds him liable on only one ground, in a case where the ember is his? For they must necessarily disagree in a case where the ember is his, since Rabbi Yohanan said earlier that “his fire” is because of his arrows, implying that they disagree with regard to his fire.

And we answer:

There is a difference between them

there is a difference between them with regard to

with regard to holding him liable for the four payments.

According to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that he is also liable because of his arrows, if his fire burned a person's hand, he is liable for the four payments, as one who causes damage with his person: damage, pain, medical expenses, and loss of work. According to Reish Lakish, who holds that he is liable only because of his property, he is exempt from paying the four payments.

We learned in the Mishna: A dog that took a piece of bread and went to a grain pile, ate the piece of bread, and ignited the grain pile—

for the piece of bread he pays

full damages, and for the grain pile he pays half-damages.

And we examine this:

Who

who

is liable

to pay half-damages for the grain pile?

The dog's owner!

And we raise an objection: Whether according to Rabbi Yohanan or according to Reish Lakish, his fire is considered his property, and if it caused damage he is liable because he was negligent in guarding it. If so,

the owner of the ember should also be liable

for having been negligent in guarding the ember!

According to Rabbi Yohanan, who said above that the dog's owner pays half-damages for the grain pile because the damage was caused by pebbles, the owner of the ember should pay the other half, since it was his property that caused the damage. And according to Reish Lakish, who said above that the dog's owner is liable only for the damage at the place of the ember and exempt for the entire grain pile, the owner of the ember should pay the entire amount. [The Gemara now assumes that the ember belonged to one person, while the piece of bread and the grain pile belonged to another.]

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking

when the owner of the ember guarded

his

ember,

as he properly locked the doors of his house; therefore, he is exempt for the damage caused by the ember.

And we raise an objection:

If

the case is speaking

when the owner of the ember guarded

his

ember, what was the dog doing there

? How did the dog reach that place to take the ember?

And we answer: The case is speaking

when the dog breached

the door and entered through the breach.

Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: This indicates:

Since the Mishna makes the dog's owner liable to pay full damages for the piece of bread, it follows that the dog's breaching the door is not considered unusual, and it is demonstrated that

ordinary doors are regarded as breached with regard to a dog,

and it is not unusual, such that he would be liable only for half-damages.

And we examine this:

Where did it eat it,

in whose grain pile did it eat the piece of bread

? If you say

if it is said

that it ate it in another person's grain pile

and not in the owner's grain pile, there is a difficulty: Why does the dog's owner pay for the piece of bread? Eating the piece of bread is damage of the tooth category, and

we require “and it consumes in another's field

”

and this is not so

: It did not eat the piece of bread in the injured party's domain, but in the domain of the grain-pile owner.

And we answer:

It is not necessary

to establish the Mishna except in a case

where it ate

the piece of bread

in the grain pile belonging to the owner of the piece of bread,

so that the eating of the piece of bread took place in the injured party's domain.

It is evident from the discussion here that one is liable for damage of the tooth category only when the damaging animal both took the object from the injured party's domain and ate it and caused it loss in the injured party's domain.