Bava Kamma 18b — the Talmud in English

But

with

a damager that is

forewarned from its inception,

such as these pebbles, whose occurrence is customary.

do you hear him

who holds that the side of tameness remains in its place?

Yet these pebbles never had the status of tameness! Therefore, once again, it is impossible to establish the beraita at all as referring to pebbles whose occurrence is customary, and thereby resolve Rava’s uncertainty—that he pays from its body—for if so, Rabbi Elazar’s position would be difficult for you, since he pays full damages from its body. For we have not found a case of full damages that one pays from its body.

Rather,

if you wish to establish the beraita as referring to pebbles whose occurrence is customary, and to resolve Rava’s problem, that he pays from its body, we shall have to explain Rabbi Elazar’s position, who holds that he pays full damages from its body, as meaning that both of them agree that for pebbles one pays half-damages.

And

when Rabbi Elazar says that he pays full damages

, it is speaking

of a case where it was forewarned

concerning pebbles—for example, where the dog damaged three times with pebbles in its customary manner.

And in this they disagree: one Master holds that there is forewarning for pebbles, and one Master holds that there is no forewarning for pebbles.

The Rabbis hold that there is no forewarning for pebbles, and he always pays only half-damages. And Rabbi Elazar holds that there is a rule of forewarning even for pebbles, like the other half-damages [of a horn], which, through forewarning, become full damages; and pebbles too, whose initial status is half-damages—when the animal has been forewarned, he pays full damages. And the reason that, according to Rabbi Elazar, he pays from its body is that he holds in accordance with Rabbi Judah, who says that the side of tameness remains in its place, and therefore, although it has been forewarned, nevertheless the law of tameness has not been removed from it. And for the half-damages he pays only from its body [this is Rashi’s explanation of the Gemara according to one interpretation].

And we object:

Rather,

if so, that they disagree concerning the law of forewarning for pebbles, it is not understood

this

—that

Rava asked

whether

there is forewarning for pebbles.

For Rava was uncertain: since the first time one pays half-damages for pebbles, as in the law of a horn, it is logical to compare them to a horn also with regard to forewarning, so that after three times one pays full damages for pebbles.

Or

perhaps

there is no forewarning for pebbles,

and he always pays half-damages, since it is a derivative of a foot, and its occurrence is customary, and forewarning does not apply to them, for the animal is already forewarned from the first time with regard to pebbles, in the manner of a foot [for we do not find tameness except with a horn]; and even so he pays only half-damages. If so, what difference is there with regard to forewarning when it damaged additional times?

And if you say that the Rabbis and Rabbi Elazar in the beraita disagree concerning the law of forewarning for pebbles, it is difficult: according to whom was Rava uncertain?

If according to the Rabbis,

they hold

that there is no forewarning for pebbles.

And

if

according to

Rabbi Elazar,

he holds

that there is forewarning for pebbles.

And we answer:

Rava could say to you: My uncertainty as to whether there is forewarning for pebbles

is

according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Sumchos,

and hold that he pays half-damages.

But here, both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Elazar, they hold like Sumchos, who says: For pebbles, one pays full damages!

And it is never speaking of a case where the animal was forewarned concerning pebbles.

And what is the reason, then, that the Rabbis say that he pays half-damages?

It is because the case is speaking

of an unusual act

with a coal: the dog threw the coal with its mouth onto the grain pile, which is unusual, and it is a derivative of a horn,

and it was not forewarned. And Rabbi Elazar and the Rabbis disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis

: the Rabbis hold that a tame horn always pays half-damages from its body, while Rabbi Elazar holds like Rabbi Tarfon, that for an unusual act in the injured party’s courtyard one pays full damages, and from its body.

And since this is so, one cannot resolve from this beraita the uncertainty whether for pebbles one pays from its body, and likewise one cannot resolve the uncertainty whether there is forewarning for pebbles.

And we object:

You may say that you hear Rabbi Tarfon

say that for a horn in the injured party’s courtyard

one pays full damages

which are paid.

but that he pays it

from its body—do you hear that from him!?

But perhaps Rabbi Tarfon holds that in the injured party’s courtyard, where one pays full damages, he pays from the superior property and not from its body. How, then, can Rabbi Elazar be established as saying, concerning a dog that took a coal, that he pays full damages from its body, in a case where it acted unusually and in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, when according to Rabbi Tarfon he pays from the superior property? And we answer:

Yes!

Certainly, according to Rabbi Tarfon he pays from its body.

For

from where did he derive it

[from where did Rabbi Tarfon learn] that for an unusual act in the injured party’s courtyard one pays full damages? He learned it by a

kal va-chomer from a horn in the public domain.

What is the case with a horn in the public domain? Although the Torah was lenient there concerning payments for a tooth and a foot, exempting them, the Torah was stringent there concerning a horn that damaged there, so that one pays half-damages. In the injured party’s domain, where the Torah was stringent concerning a tooth and a foot, requiring payment of full damages, all the more so should we be stringent in the law of a horn, so that he should pay full damages .

Therefore let us say:

It is sufficient for what comes from the law

[to be learned by a kal va-chomer]

to be like the subject from which it is learned

, from which you learn it:

And just as a horn in the public domain, from whose stringency in the public domain you learn, pays only from its body,

so too in the injured party’s domain, where he pays full damages, he pays only from its body.

And we object:

But Rabbi Tarfon

disagrees with the Rabbis, and

does not accept

this principle of

“It is sufficient

for what comes from the law to be like the subject from which it is learned”!

For if he accepts “it is sufficient,” he should pay only half-damages in the injured party’s domain, like a horn in the public domain, since you come to learn from a horn in the public domain, and there he pays half-damages.

And we answer:

When he does not accept

Rabbi Tarfon

“it is sufficient,”

that is specifically

where

by saying “it is sufficient,”

the kal va-chomer is completely undermined,

such as if we were to say, “It is sufficient for what comes from the law to be like the subject from which it is learned,” and he should pay only half-damages for a horn in the injured party’s courtyard. In that case it would emerge that through “it is sufficient” the kal va-chomer accomplishes nothing, since he pays half-damages in the injured party’s domain in any event [even without the kal va-chomer, because the Torah did not distinguish in payments for a horn between the public domain and the injured party’s domain].

But

where the kal va-chomer is not undermined,

as here, where we say “it is sufficient” only concerning the fact that he pays from its body, while the kal va-chomer still accomplishes something by teaching that he pays full damages in the injured party’s domain, properly

he accepts

“it is sufficient.”

And it emerges that even according to Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that for an unusual act in the injured party’s courtyard one pays full damages, nevertheless he pays only from its body and not from the superior property. Thus Rabbi Elazar, who says that one pays full damages from its body, can properly be established as following him.

The essential matter: Rava asked:

In a case where it damaged with pebbles three times, whether

there is forewarning for pebbles or there is no forewarning for pebbles.

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

we compare it to a horn,

since for pebbles one pays half-damages like a horn, therefore, when it has been forewarned, one pays full damages like a forewarned horn;

or perhaps,

since for pebbles even the first time it is

a derivative of a foot,

for its occurrence

is customary,

and its damaging is common, and it is forewarned from its inception, and even so he pays only half-damages, therefore even after three times he pays only half-damages.

And we come to resolve this problem:

Come and hear:

We find that they disagreed about this in a beraita.

For it was taught:

The dancing

[the jumping of a chicken] on top of vessels

is not forewarned

and he pays half-damages.

And some say: This one is forewarned.

And it is difficult: Is it conceivable that concerning

dancing

alone

it would enter your mind

that there is an authority who says that he pays half-damages?

But it damaged with its body, and it is a fully established foot!

Rather,

say:

dancing and projecting

, meaning that through its dancing it projected pebbles onto the vessels and they broke, which is a case of pebbles.

Is it not that

the case is

where it did

so, the chicken,

three times? And in this they disagree

in the beraita:

One Master,

who says that dancing and projecting is forewarned,

holds that there is forewarning

for pebbles; therefore he pays full damages.

And one Master,

who says that it is not forewarned,

holds that there is no forewarning

for pebbles; therefore, even though it did so three times, it is not forewarned and he pays half-damages.

And we reject this:

No,

the case is

of

doing so not three times, but only

one time, and they disagree in the dispute between Sumchos and the Rabbis.

The one who says that it is not forewarned holds like the Rabbis, that for pebbles one pays half-damages. And the one who says that it is forewarned holds like Sumchos, that for pebbles one pays full damages. Therefore one cannot resolve from here the question whether there is forewarning for pebbles or not.

Come and hear:

For it was taught:

An animal that discharged dung onto dough

[and this damage is pebbles, for it damaged through its force and not with its body]

Rabbi Judah says:

this one

pays full damages, and Rabbi Elazar says: half-damages

is what he pays.

Is it not that

the case is

where it did

so

three times, and in this they disagree

Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Elazar:

One Master

[Rabbi Judah]

holds that there is forewarning

for pebbles; therefore he pays full damages.

And one Master

[Rabbi Elazar]

holds that there is no forewarning

for pebbles; therefore even after three times he pays half-damages. It follows that the tannaim disagreed concerning Rava’s question.

And we reject this:

No,

they do not disagree about this; rather, the case is

of

discharging dung only

one time.

And they disagree in the dispute between Sumchos and the Rabbis,

who disagreed whether for pebbles one pays half-damages or full damages.

And we object:

But

discharging dung onto dough

is unusual,

for this is not its customary manner, and it is a derivative of a horn; according to everyone, it is half-damages that he must pay, as in the law of a horn. Why, then, does Rabbi Judah hold that he pays full damages?

And we answer: Here the case is

that the world was constricted for it.

The animal was standing in a narrow place, and it is not unusual for it to discharge its dung onto the dough, since it has no possibility of moving from there; and it is properly considered pebbles whose occurrence is customary.

And we ask: If Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Elazar disagree in the dispute between Sumchos and the Rabbis, it is difficult:

Let Rav Judah say, “The halakha is in accordance with Sumchos.” And let

Rabbi Elazar say, “The halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis.”

Why did they establish their disagreement in the case of an animal that discharged dung onto dough?

And we answer: The law of

dung was needed

to teach us, for

it might enter your mind to say: since

dung

is dragged along after the body

of the animal,

for they

are carried by its body,

it is like

it damaged with

its body

and is not pebbles at all, and according to everyone he pays full damages.

It teaches us

that even dung is pebbles, and it is included in the dispute between Sumchos and the Rabbis.

And the Gemara brings another proof in order to resolve Rava’s problem, whether there is forewarning for pebbles:

Come and hear: For Rami bar Yehezkel taught: A chicken that extended its head into the airspace of a glass vessel and let out a cry in it

with its voice

and broke it,

for the vessel split because of the sound, and this is pebbles, since it damaged through its force—behold, it

pays full damages.

And

on the other hand, we find that

Rav Yosef said: They said in the academy of Rav:

[in Rav’s academy]

A horse that neighed

[let out a cry]

and a donkey that brayed and broke the vessels

with its voice

pay half-damages.

Is it not [that]

both are speaking

of a case where it did [so],

where it gored

three times.