Bava Kamma 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

Is it not established law that we do not require the movable property to be gathered together!?

Why, then, are the slaves acquired only when they are standing on the land, seeing that with regard to acquisition through attachment to land, we follow the halakha that the movable property need not be standing upon the land?

Rather, what can you say?

What can you say to resolve this?

Movable property that moves differs from movable property that does not move,

for one must distinguish between movable property that moves, such as slaves, which, despite being considered movable property, are acquired through attachment to land only if they are lying upon the land being acquired, and movable property that does not move, which is acquired through attachment to the land even when it is not lying upon it. Now that you have necessarily had to make this distinction, the same applies even according to Rav Ika’s first formulation, which maintains that everyone agrees that slaves are like land; although you asked why, when one takes possession of the land, he does not acquire the slaves even though they are not standing within it, as in the case of ten fields in ten different countries,

so too here,

this can likewise be explained as follows:

Land that moves differs from land that does not move.

One must distinguish between land that moves and land that does not move.

A slave is land that moves,

a slave is movable land [as he is not attached to the earth]; therefore, if one takes possession of one parcel of land, the slave is not acquired unless he is standing within it.

But

there,

in Shmuel’s ruling, when one acquires ten fields and takes possession of one of them, he acquires them all, even when they are in ten different countries, because

the foundation of the land is one.

The substance of all the land in the world is one great expanse of land, and one who takes possession of one parcel of land is considered as though he had taken possession of them all.

We learned in the Mishna:

property with regard to which there is no misuse of consecrated property.

Liability for damages applies only when one damages property with regard to which there is no law of misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara infers: only

misuse is absent from them; but consecrated property—sacrificial consecrated property—is present!

The wording of the Mishna, “property with regard to which there is no misuse,” implies that for liability for damages, the essential requirement is that the damaged property not be subject to the law of misuse; but if the property is consecrated property that is not subject to misuse, one is liable for its damage. For example, if one damages another person’s property—an animal designated as a sacrifice that is in the category of lesser sanctity, a sacrifice that may be eaten by its owner but is not subject to the law of misuse— he is liable for its damage.

The Gemara discusses this:

Who is the tanna?

Who is the tanna of our Mishna who holds one liable for damage caused by an ox belonging to the Temple, rather than excluding it by means of the phrase “his fellow’s ox,” as opposed to an ox belonging to the Temple [above, 6b]? The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The Mishna is speaking

of lesser sanctity, and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says

that lesser sanctity

is the property of the owners,

and is not the property of the Most High. Therefore, one who damages an animal of lesser sanctity is liable, since it is included within the category of “his fellow’s ox.”

As it was taught

in a beraita: It is stated in the passage concerning “the oath of deposit” [Leviticus 5:21]:

“And he misappropriates against the Lord,”

and this verse comes to teach us

to include lesser sanctity,

that if a person deposits an animal of lesser sanctity with another, and the custodian denies it and falsely swears that this animal was not deposited with him, and later admits that he falsely swore to him, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering and to pay the additional fifth, as required in the case of “the oath of deposit,” because

lesser sanctity

lesser sacred offerings

is his property

of the person

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

The Gemara asks:

But didn’t we learn

in a Mishna in tractate Kiddushin:

One who betroths

a woman

with his portion

that he received from the meat of the sacrifices,

whether

he betroths her

with most sacred sacrifices, or

whether he betroths her

with lesser sanctity,

she is not betrothed,

because sacrificial property is not a person’s property; rather, it is the property of the Most High [the property of the Holy One, blessed be He, so to speak], and a person is merely granted permission to eat it. It follows that he did not give the woman property with which she could become betrothed.

And if lesser sanctity is considered the property of the owners, why is a woman not betrothed with lesser sanctity?

Let us say

that this Mishna is

not in accordance with

the view of

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili!?

The Gemara answers:

Even you can say

that this Mishna is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili

and is consistent with his opinion.

because

when did

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili say

that lesser sanctity is the owners’ property? Only

while alive,

while the sacrificial animal is still alive.

But after slaughter, even Rabbi Yosei HaGelili agrees

that even the portions of meat given for consumption to the owners or to the priests are not the owners’ property,

for when they acquire them,

when they acquire their portion of the sacrifice,

they acquire it from the table of the Most High.

They receive it from the table of the Holy One, blessed be He. Once the sacrifice has been slaughtered, it all becomes the property of the Most High; and when they take their portion from it to eat, they are like one taking a portion from the table of the Most High, like a servant taking a portion from his master. It is therefore not the owners’ property. Consequently, the Mishna can be speaking of one who betroths a woman with his portion after the sacrifice has been slaughtered, in which case Rabbi Yosei HaGelili agrees that the meat is not the owners’ property.

But the Gemara challenges this:

And while alive—is that what he said!?

Did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili really say that lesser sanctity is the owners’ property only while the animal is alive, which would mean that the Rabbis, who disagree with him, maintain that even while alive it is the property of the Most High?

But didn’t we learn

in a Mishna in tractate Maaser Sheni [1:2]:

A firstborn

of a kosher animal

the priests may sell

when it is

unblemished,

without a defect, only while it is still

alive,

and the purchaser waits until a defect develops in it, at which point he slaughters it.

[But not slaughtered],

for if they slaughtered an unblemished firstborn, they may not sell it, since it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

And

if the firstborn was

blemished,

the priests may sell it whether it is

alive, or

whether it is

slaughtered.

And

so

they may betroth a woman with it,

the priests

the woman,

since the firstborn is the property of the priests.

And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: They taught

not

that the Mishna states that an unblemished firstborn may be sold while alive because it is considered the owners’ property,

but only a firstborn in the present era,

when the Temple is not standing,

for since it is not fit to be offered, the priests have a right of acquisition in it.

Since in the present era it is not fit to be offered upon the altar, it is considered the priests’ property while alive.

But when the Temple is standing, when it is fit

for an unblemished firstborn to be

offered, it is not

said that it is the priests’ property, so that they could sell it and betroth a woman with it; rather, at that time it is the property of the Most High.

The Gemara has not yet completed its objection, and it cites what was challenged and answered concerning Rav Nahman, as a continuation of the Gemara’s objection:

And he raised an objection

Rava to Rav Nahman,

concerning what he said—that while the Temple is standing, a firstborn animal is not the property of its owner—from the beraita in which we learned:

“And he commits a trespass against the Lord”

and denies his fellow’s claim; the verse comes

“to include consecrated animals that are his property; these are the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.” Since the verse includes kodashim kalim even with regard to a guilt offering, it certainly refers also to the time when the Temple is standing.

Thus, we find that even while the Temple is standing, kodashim kalim are the property of their owners. But a firstborn animal is kodashim kalim; why, then, is it considered the property of the Most High?

And Ravina replied [Ravina resolves Rav Nahman’s statement]: What Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said—that kodashim kalim are the property of their owners—does indeed refer also to the time when the Temple is standing, but not to a firstborn animal fit to be offered. Rather, it refers

Ravina explains the words of Rav Naḥman], what Rabbi Yosei the Galilean said—that lesser sanctities are the property of their owners—indeed refers also to the time when the Temple is standing, but not to a firstborn fit for sacrifice; rather,

to a firstborn animal

born

outside Eretz Yisrael, and according to

his position,

Rabbi Shimon, who said in the Mishna in Temura [21a]:

in the Mishna in tractate Temura (21a]:

“If they came unblemished, they shall be offered.”

If they brought a firstborn animal from outside Eretz Yisrael [in the time of the Temple], and it was unblemished, they would offer it on the altar.

And it is implied:

If “they came,”

meaning after the fact,

yes,

then they shall be offered. But

initially, no

one should bring firstborn animals from outside Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael in order to offer them. Rather, they should graze in the fields until they develop a blemish, and then be eaten with their blemish. Accordingly, a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael is not considered destined to be offered; therefore, this firstborn animal is the property of the koen.

And what Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said—that kodashim kalim are the property of their owners—he said only in such a case, where the animal is not fit to be offered. But with regard to other kodashim kalim that are fit to be offered, he concedes that they are the property of the Most High.

And now the Gemara presents the objection:

And if it is so, that when Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said that it is his property, he was referring to its lifetime,

if Rabbi Yosei indeed says that they are the property of their owners only while alive, and accordingly the Rabbis who dispute him hold that even while alive they are the property of the Most High, then why must Ravina force the explanation that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is speaking only about a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael, so that Rav Nahman’s statement will not be difficult?

let him formulate

Ravina’s answer simply: