Bava Kamma 12b — the Talmud in English

But is it not established for us that we do not require them to be gathered!?

Why are the slaves acquired only when they are standing within the land, when with regard to the law of acquisition through agav we adopt as halakha that it is not necessary for the movable property to be standing upon the land?

Rather, what do you have to say,

what can you say to resolve this? That

movable property that moves is different from movable property that does not move,

for one must distinguish between movable property that moves, such as slaves, which, despite being considered movable property, are acquired through agav with land only if they are lying upon the land being acquired, and movable property that does not move, which is acquired through agav with the land even when it is not lying upon the land. And now, since you were necessarily compelled to make this distinction, if so, even according to the first formulation of Rav Ika, who holds that according to everyone slaves are like land, and your difficulty was why, when he took possession of the land, he did not acquire the slaves even though they were not standing within it, as in the law of ten fields in ten countries,

so too here,

it can be resolved in this way as well:

movable land that moves is different from movable land that does not move.

One must distinguish between land that moves and land that does not move.

A slave is movable land that moves,

a slave is moving land [which is not attached to the earth]; therefore, in this case, if he took possession of one parcel of land, the slave is not acquired unless he is standing within it.

But

there,

in Shmuel’s law, that one who acquires ten fields and takes possession of one acquires them all even when they are in ten different countries, it is because

the foundation of the land is one.

The substance of all the land in the world is one great land, and one who takes possession of one parcel of land is as one who has taken possession of them all.

We learned in the Mishna:

property in which there is no sacrilege.

Liability for damages applies only when he damaged property with regard to which there is no law of sacrilege.

And the Gemara infers: Only

sacrilege is absent from them; but consecrated property—consecrated property!?

From the wording of the Mishna, “property in which there is no sacrilege,” it follows that for liability for damages, the essential matter is that there not be a law of sacrilege with regard to the damaged property. But if the property is consecrated property in which there is no sacrilege, he should be liable for its damage—for example, if he damaged a person’s property, an offering animal in the category of “lesser sacred offerings,” which is an offering eaten by its owners but with regard to which there is no law of sacrilege, he should be liable for its damage.

And the Gemara discusses:

Who is the tanna?

Who is the tanna of our Mishna, who imposes liability for damage caused by an ox belonging to the consecrated property, and does not exclude it by means of “his fellow’s ox,” and not an ox belonging to the consecrated property [above, 6b]. And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yohanan said:

The Mishna is speaking

of lesser sacred offerings, and according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who said,

lesser sacred offerings

are the property of the owners,

they are considered so, and not the property of the Most High. Therefore, one who damages lesser sacred offerings is liable, since they are considered included in “his fellow’s ox.”

For it was taught

in a beraita: It is stated in the section of the “oath of the deposit” [Leviticus 5:21]

“and he deals treacherously against the Lord,”

this verse comes to teach us

to include lesser sacred offerings,

that even if a person deposits an animal that is lesser sacred offerings with another, and the guardian denied it and swore falsely that this animal had not been deposited with him, and then admitted that he had sworn falsely to him, he is liable for a guilt-offering and a fifth, according to the law of the “oath of the deposit,” because

that

lesser sacred offerings

are his property

of the person

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

And the Gemara asks:

But we learned,

we learned in a Mishna in Kiddushin:

One who betroths

a woman

with his portion,

which he received from the meat of the offerings,

whether

he betrothed her

with most sacred offerings, whether

he betrothed her

with lesser sacred offerings,

she is not betrothed,

because consecrated offerings are not a person’s property, but the property of the Most High [the property of the Holy One, as it were], and a person is given only permission to eat them. It follows that he did not give the woman property with which she could be betrothed.

And if lesser sacred offerings are considered the property of the owners, why is a woman not betrothed with lesser sacred offerings?

Let us say

shall we say that this Mishna is

not according to

the position of

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili!?

And the Gemara answers:

Even if you say,

it is possible to say that this Mishna is according to

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili

it is,

because,

when

did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili say

that lesser sacred offerings are the owners’ property? Only

while alive,

while the offering animal is still alive.

But after slaughter, even Rabbi Yosei HaGelili concedes

that even the portions of meat given for eating to the owners or to the priests are not the owners’ property,

for when they acquire,

when they acquire their portion from the offering,

they acquire from the table of the Most High.

They acquire from the table of the Holy One. For when the offering is slaughtered, it all becomes the property of the Most High, and when they take their portion from it to eat, they are like one taking a portion from the table of the Most High, like a servant taking a portion from his master, and this is not the owners’ property. If so, the Mishna can be dealing with one who betroths with his portion after the slaughter of the offering, and in this Rabbi Yosei HaGelili concedes that the meat is not the owners’ property.

But the Gemara objects:

And while alive, who said so!?

Did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s words—that lesser sacred offerings are the owners’ property—indeed apply only when they are alive, and according to this the Rabbis, who dispute him, hold that even while alive they are the property of the Most High?

But we learned

we learned in a Mishna in Tractate Maaser Sheni [1:2]:

A firstborn

of a pure animal

they sell it

the priests, when it is

unblemished,

without a defect, only while it is still

alive,

and the purchaser waits until a defect occurs in it, and then slaughters it.

And not slaughtered,

for if they slaughtered the unblemished firstborn, they may not sell it, because benefit from it is prohibited.

And

if the firstborn was

blemished,

the priests sell it whether it is

alive, and

whether it is

slaughtered.

And

so

they betroth with it

the priests

the woman,

since the firstborn is the property of the priests.

And Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: They taught

not,

the Mishna did not say that an unblemished firstborn can be sold while alive because it is considered the owners’ property,

except for a firstborn in the present time,

when the Temple is not standing,

for since it is not fit for offering, the priests have an acquisition in it.

Since in the present time it is not fit to be offered upon the altar, it is therefore considered the priests’ property while alive.

But during the time that the Temple is standing, when it is fit

when an unblemished firstborn is fit

for offering, not

do we say that it is the priests’ property, so that they could sell it and betroth a woman with it; rather, at that time it is the property of the Most High.

The Gemara has not yet completed the objection, and brings what they challenged and answered to Rav Naḥman, as a continuation of the Gemara’s objection:

And he challenged him

Rava to Rav Naḥman,

concerning what he said—that while the Temple is standing, the firstborn is not the property of its owners—from the beraita that we learned in which it says

“And he committed a trespass against the Lord”

and denied his fellow, the verse came

to include sacred offerings that are his property; these are the words of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean. Since the verse includes lesser sanctities also with regard to a guilt-offering, it certainly refers even to the time when the Temple is standing.

We have here that even while the Temple is standing, lesser sanctities are the property of their owners. But the firstborn is lesser sanctity, so why is it considered the property of the Most High?

And Ravina answered [

Ravina explains the words of Rav Naḥman], what Rabbi Yosei the Galilean said—that lesser sanctities are the property of their owners—indeed refers also to the time when the Temple is standing, but not to a firstborn fit for sacrifice; rather,

to a firstborn

born

outside the Land of Israel, and according

according to his position

of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the Mishna in Temura [21a]:

in the Mishna in tractate Temura (21a]:

“If they came unblemished, they shall be sacrificed.”

If they brought a firstborn from outside the Land of Israel [while the Temple existed], and it was unblemished, they would sacrifice it on the altar.

And it implies:

if they “came,”

that is, after the fact,

yes,

then they shall be sacrificed. But

initially, no

one need bring the firstborn from outside the Land to the Land of Israel in order to sacrifice them; rather, they shall graze in the fields until a blemish occurs in them, and they shall be eaten with their blemish. Accordingly, the firstborn outside the Land is not considered to be standing for sacrifice, and therefore this firstborn is the property of the priest.

And what Rabbi Yosei the Galilean said—that lesser sanctities are the property of their owners—he said only in such a case, in which it is not fit for sacrifice. But with regard to other lesser sanctities that are fit for sacrifice, he concedes that they are the property of the Most High.

And now the Gemara brings the objection:

And if it is so, that when Rabbi Yosei the Galilean said that it is his property, he meant while it is alive,

if indeed Rabbi Yosei says that they are the property of their owners only while alive, and accordingly the Rabbis who disagree hold that even while alive they are the property of the Most High, then why does Ravina need to force the matter and say that Rabbi Yosei the Galilean is speaking only of a firstborn outside the Land, so that there should not be a difficulty for Rav Naḥman,

let him say,

that Ravina should answer simply: