Bava Kamma 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

And Ulla returns and explains Rabbi Elazar’s words differently:

After he left,

after Rav Naḥman had left,

Ulla said to them

to those sitting before him: Although I initially said that Rabbi Elazar was not discussing collection from orphans, this is not so. Rather,

this is what Rabbi Elazar said: Even from orphans

one collects from slaves. This applies both when the debtor dies and leaves slaves as an inheritance to the orphans, and when he did not designate the slaves as an apotiki—a specific asset earmarked for repayment. For Rabbi Elazar maintains that slaves have the status of land, and not of movable property. Therefore, just as one collects from land that the debtor-father left to his orphans, so too one collects from the slaves that he left them.

Rav Naḥman said,

after Ulla’s words became known to him:

Ulla eluded me

—he slipped away and evaded me—

Ulla

because he was afraid to say in my presence what he believed, namely, that slaves have the status of land. Ulla knew that my opinion is that slaves have the status of movable property and not land, and he feared that I would overwhelm him with objections and halakhic arguments. Therefore, at first he changed his explanation and said that one does not collect from orphans.

And the Gemara relates that Rav Naḥman would act in accordance with his own opinion in actual practice:

There was an incident

—an incident occurred—

in Nehardea,

in which a creditor came to collect his debt from orphans,

and the judges of Nehardea collected it,

as the judges in Nehardea ruled that he should collect from the slaves inherited by the orphans. And likewise,

there was an incident

—an incident occurred—

in Pumbedita

in which a creditor came to collect a debt from orphans,

and Rav Ḥana bar Bizna collected it,

as Rav Ḥana ruled that he should collect from the slaves inherited by the orphans.

Rav Naḥman said to them

to those judges:

Go and retract!

Go and annul your ruling, and let the creditors return the slaves to the orphans.

And if not,

if you do not do so,

we will collect it from your palaces

—I will collect it from your palace, from your home; that is, I will collect it from you.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Here is Ulla,

and

here is Rabbi Elazar, here are the judges of Nehardea, and here is Rav Ḥana bar Bizna;

all of these maintain that slaves have the status of land. If so,

Master,

who disagrees and maintains that their status is that of movable property,

whose opinion does he follow,

whose view is it?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

I know a baraita!

I know a beraita; that is, my position is explicitly stated in a beraita.

For Avimi taught

that Avimi taught a beraita that states several laws:

A prosbul

takes effect with regard to land,

the enactment of the prosbul instituted by Hillel so that the Sabbatical year would not cancel debts applies only when the borrower owns land,

but does not take effect with regard to slaves.

If the borrower owns no land but only slaves, the prosbul is ineffective.

b. And

movable property is acquired together with land,

if a person sells land and movable property to a buyer, and the buyer performs an effective act of acquisition with regard to the land, he thereby acquires the movable property as well, by virtue of the land, without performing an additional, separate act of acquisition.

But movable property is not acquired together with slaves.

If one sells slaves and movable property, and the buyer performs an effective act of acquisition with regard to the slaves, he does not acquire the movable property together with the slaves until he performs an act of acquisition with regard to the movable property as well. As long as he has not performed such an act of acquisition, the seller may retract from the sale of the movable property.

It is thus clear from the beraita that slaves do not have the status of land, but rather that of movable property.

And the Gemara attempts to say that the tannaim disagree concerning this law:

Let us say that this is a dispute between tannaim,

that the issue of whether slaves have the status of land or movable property is a dispute between tannaim. For we learned in a beraita:

If he sold him slaves and land,

if

he took possession

—the buyer performed an act of acquisition—

of the slaves, he did not acquire

through them the

land,

and the seller may retract from the sale of the land. And likewise, if the buyer took possession [performed an act of acquisition]

of the land, he did not acquire

the

slaves [the Gemara will explain the reason for this below].

And if he sold him

land and movable property:

then, if

he took possession

—performed an act of acquisition—

of the land, he acquired the movable property;

the movable property was acquired by him through the land, and no additional act of acquisition is necessary. But if he performed an act of acquisition

with regard to the movable property, he did not acquire

through the movable property the

land.

If he sold him

slaves and movable property:

if

he took possession of the slaves, he did not acquire

through the slaves the

movable property.

And likewise, if he performed an act of acquisition

with regard to the movable property, he did not acquire

through the movable property the

slaves.

It was explained in the latter clause of this beraita that if he took possession of the slaves, he did not acquire the movable property through the slaves.

But was it not taught

in another beraita: If he sold him slaves and movable property, if

he took possession of the slaves, he acquired

through the slaves also the

movable property?

Is it not that they disagree concerning this,

that the beraitot disagree about the following law:

One Master holds that slaves have the status of land.

The tanna of the beraita that maintains that he acquired the movable property holds that a slave has the status of land. Therefore, if he took possession of the slaves, he acquired the movable property through the mechanism of acquisition through attachment, because movable property is acquired through land.

And one Master holds that slaves have the status of movable property.

But the tanna of the beraita that maintains that he did not acquire the movable property holds that slaves do not have the status of land, but rather that of movable property. Therefore, if he took possession of the slaves, he did not acquire the movable property, because movable property is not acquired through movable property.

But the Gemara rejects this explanation, saying that the beraitot disagree about another matter:

Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said:

The beraitot do not disagree about this matter. Rather,

everyone,

both beraitot maintain that slaves

have the status of land.

And

accordingly,

as it was taught,

the second beraita, which maintains that if he took possession of the slaves he

acquired

the movable property, is

entirely

understandable: Since slaves have the status of land, the movable property was acquired through the slaves.

But as for the beraita that taught, “He did not acquire,”

the beraita that maintains that the movable property was not acquired through the purchase of the slaves—even though slaves have the status of land—this is because

we require land analogous to the “fortified cities in Judea,” which are immobile.

This beraita maintains that acquisition through attachment, whereby movable property is acquired through land, applies only to the acquisition of land that is immobile, analogous to the “fortified cities in Judea” mentioned in the verse from which we derive the law of acquisition through attachment [as the Gemara immediately proceeds to explain]. Since slaves are mobile, despite having the status of land, the acquisition-through-attachment law does not apply to them, so that movable property would be acquired through the acquisition of slaves.

And the Gemara cites the derivation from “fortified cities” for the law of acquisition through attachment:

As we learned,

we learned in a Mishna [Kiddushin 26a]:

Property that is not subject to responsibility

—movable property—

is acquired together with property that is subject to responsibility

—land and houses —

through money, a document, or possession.

If a person sells land and movable property together, and the buyer performs an act of acquisition with regard to the land, through money, a document, or possession, the movable property is also acquired by him through the land, without an additional act of acquisition.

And the Gemara asks [there, in Kiddushin]:

From where are these

matters

derived?

And the Gemara answers:

Ḥizkiya said: For the verse says

[II Chronicles 21:3],

“And their father gave them many gifts of silver and gold and delicacies, together with fortified cities in Judea.”

Since Scripture says that their father gave the gifts “together with” the cities, it follows that through acquiring the cities they also acquired the gifts by virtue of the acquisition of the cities.

Since we derive the law of acquisition through attachment from this verse, the beraita maintains that the acquisition is effective only in a case analogous to the acquisition of “fortified cities,” namely, land that is immobile.

The Gemara now presents another version of Rav Ika’s resolution:

Some say

that this is what

Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said

to resolve the contradiction between the beraitot:

Everyone,

both beraitot maintain that

slaves have the status of movable property.

And

accordingly,

as for the beraita that taught,

the first beraita, which maintains that if he took possession of the slaves he

did not acquire

the movable property, this is

entirely

understandable: Since slaves have the status of movable property, movable property cannot be acquired through movable property.

And

as for the beraita that taught, “He acquired,”

the second beraita, which maintains that through the acquisition of the slaves he acquired the movable property, this is not by means of acquisition through attachment, since slaves have the status of movable property. Rather, it is referring to a case

where they were upon him,

where the movable property was placed upon the slave. Therefore, through acquiring the slave, the slave became the buyer’s courtyard, and the movable property was also acquired by virtue of his courtyard [his domain], which acquires property for a person.

But the Gemara asks about this resolution:

And if they were upon him, what of it?

What difference does it make that the movable property was placed upon the slave, such that he should acquire it by virtue of a courtyard?

It is a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not acquire.

A person’s domain acquires property for him by the law of a courtyard only if the domain remains in its place, and not if it is a mobile domain. Therefore, the slave cannot acquire the property for him by the law of a courtyard.

And should you say that he is standing,

perhaps you will resolve the difficulty by saying that the case is one in which the slave is standing, and therefore he is not like a mobile courtyard.

But Rava said: Anything

that

if

it

were walking, would not acquire

for its owner by the law of a courtyard, even when it is

standing or sitting, it does not acquire

for him. Since it can walk if it wishes, it is not analogous to a courtyard and does not acquire for its owner by the law of a courtyard.

The Gemara answers:

And the halakha is:

this halakha [that is, this resolution] that the slave acquired the movable property while it was upon him applies

in

a case in which the slave is

bound

—tied and unable to walk—so that he is now like any other courtyard that remains in its place.

And the Gemara raises another contradiction between beraitot:

We learned in the first beraita: If one acquired possession of land, he did not acquire slaves.

But was it not taught

in another beraita:

If one acquired possession of land, he acquired slaves.

The Gemara answers:

There—

the beraita that says that by acquiring the land he acquired the slaves is referring to

s

laves

standing within it

[on the ground], and in this manner they are acquired through the acquisition of the land, by the principle of “along with it” .

The Gemara explains the continuation of the answer and raises a question concerning it:

By inference

you learn that the attempt to answer

that this one did not acquire them—

the other beraita, which says that one who acquired possession of land did not acquire slaves, is referring to a case

when they are not

standing

the slaves

within it.

This works according to that wording,

this resolution is intelligible only according to the second wording,

as Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said

according to which everyone agrees that

slaves are considered like movable property;

since slaves have the status of movable property,

that is, if they stand within it, yes; if not, no.

According to this, it is possible to distinguish between a case in which the slaves stood within the land, in which case they are acquired through acquisition along with it, and a case in which they did not stand within it, in which case they are not acquired.

But according to that wording,

according to the first wording in the statement of Rav Ika,

who said that slaves are considered like land,

since both beraitot maintain that slaves have the status of land, the following difficulty arises:

why do I need

for them to be

standing within it? Did Shmuel not say:

If

a person sold him

a

ten fields in ten countries

different and separate from one another,

once he acquired possession—

once the purchaser performed an act of possession

in one of them, he acquired

the

entirety.

If so, with regard to slaves as well, if they are like land, once he acquired possession of one parcel of land, he should thereby acquire the slaves wherever they are, just as he acquires the land in ten countries.

The Gemara replies:

As for your reasoning,

according to your argument that you asked why he acquires them specifically when they stand within it, the same question can be raised also

according to that wording,

the second wording of Rav Ika,

who said that slaves are considered like movable property: Why do I need them to be standing within it?