Bava Kamma 12a — the Talmud in English

And Ulla returns and explains Rabbi Elazar’s words differently:

After he left,

after Rav Naḥman left,

Ulla said to them

to those sitting before him: Although I initially said that Rabbi Elazar was not speaking with regard to collection from orphans, this is not so. Rather,

this is what Rabbi Elazar said: Even from orphans

they collect from slaves. This is so both when the borrower died and left slaves as an inheritance to the orphans, and when he did not designate them as an apotiki. For Rabbi Elazar holds that slaves have the status of land and not of movable property; therefore, just as one collects from the land that the borrower-father left to his orphans, so one collects from the slaves that he left to them.

Rav Naḥman said,

after Ulla’s words became known to him:

Ulla eluded me

[he slipped away and evaded me]

Ulla,

because he was afraid to say in my presence what he held—that slaves have the status of land—for Ulla knows that my opinion is that slaves have the status of movable property and not of land. He was afraid that I would defeat him with objections and halakhot; therefore, at first he changed his explanation and explained that one does not collect from orphans.

And the Gemara brings that Rav Naḥman would conduct himself in accordance with his view in actual halakhic practice:

There was an incident

[there was a case]

in Nehardea,

in which a creditor came to collect his debt from orphans,

and the judges of Nehardea collected it,

the judges in Nehardea ruled that he should collect from the slaves whom the orphans had inherited. And likewise

there was an incident

[there was a case]

in Pumbedita,

in which a creditor came to collect a debt from orphans,

and Rav Ḥana bar Bizna collected it,

and Rav Ḥana ruled that he should collect from the slaves whom the orphans had inherited.

Rav Naḥman said to them

to those judges:

Go, return them!

Go and annul your ruling, and let the creditors return the slaves to the orphans.

And if not

you do so,

we will collect it from your palaces

[I will collect it from the palace, from your house], that is, I will collect it from you.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Here is Ulla,

and

here is Rabbi Elazar, here are the judges of Nehardea, and here is Rav Ḥana bar Bizna;

all these hold that slaves have the status of land. If so,

Master,

who disagrees and holds that their status is that of movable property,

whose view does he hold

whose opinion is this?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman:

I know a beraita!

I know a beraita; that is, my view is explicit in a beraita.

For Avimi taught,

Avimi taught a beraita that states several laws: A.

A prozbol

takes effect with land,

the enactment of a prozbol, which Hillel instituted so that the Sabbatical year would not cancel debts, takes effect only if the borrower has land,

but does not take effect with slaves.

If the borrower has no land but only slaves, the prozbol is ineffective.

B. And

movable property is acquired together with land,

if a person sold land and movable property to a buyer, and the buyer performed an effective act of acquisition with the land, through this he acquired also the movable property incidentally to the land, without performing an additional, separate act of acquisition.

But they are not acquired together with slaves.

If he sold slaves and movable property, and performed an effective acquisition with the slaves, the movable property was not acquired together with the slaves, until he performs an act of acquisition with the movable property as well. And as long as he has not performed an act of acquisition with them, the seller can retract from the sale of the movable property.

It is thus explained in the beraita that slaves do not have the status of land, but rather of movable property.

And the Gemara attempts to say that tannaim disputed this law:

Let us say that it is a dispute between tannaim,

let us say that this question—whether slaves are like land or like movable property—is a dispute between tannaim. For we learned in a beraita:

If he sold him slaves and land;

if

he took possession

[performed an act of acquisition], the buyer

with the slaves, he did not acquire

through them the

land,

and the seller can retract from the sale of the land. And likewise, if the buyer took possession [performed an act of acquisition]

of the land, he did not acquire

the

slaves [and the Gemara will later explain the reason for this].

And if he sold him

land and movable property:

then, if

he

took possession

[performed an act of acquisition]

of the land, he acquired the movable property,

the movable property was acquired for him incidentally to the land, and no additional acquisition is required. But if he performed an act of acquisition

with the movable property, he did not acquire

incidentally to the movable property the

land.

If he sold him

slaves and movable property:

if he

took possession of the slaves, he did not acquire

incidentally to the slaves the

movable property.

And likewise, if he performed an act of acquisition

with the movable property, he did not acquire

incidentally to the movable property the

slaves.

And it was explained in the final clause of this beraita that if he took possession of the slaves, he did not acquire the movable property incidentally to the slaves.

But was it not taught,

whereas in another beraita we learned: He sold him slaves and movable property; if

he took possession of the slaves, he acquired

incidentally to the slaves also the

movable property.

What, is it not with regard to this that they disagree,

is it not to be said that the beraitot dispute this law:

For one Master holds: slaves are considered like land.

The tanna of the beraita that holds that he acquired the movable property holds that a slave has the status of land; therefore, if he took possession of the slaves, he acquired through an incidental acquisition also the movable property, because movable property is acquired incidentally to land.

And one Master holds: slaves are considered like movable property.

But the tanna of the beraita that holds that he did not acquire the movable property holds that slaves are not like land but like movable property; therefore, if he took possession of the slaves, he did not acquire the movable property, because movable property is not acquired incidentally to movable property.

But the Gemara rejects this, saying that the beraitot disputed another law:

Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said:

The beraitot did not dispute this law; rather,

everyone,

the two beraitot hold that

slaves are considered like land.

And

accordingly,

as it was taught,

the second beraita, which holds that if he took possession of the slaves he

acquired

movable property, is

properly

understood: Since slaves have the status of land, the movable property was acquired incidentally to the slaves.

And as for the beraita that taught, he did not acquire,

the beraita that holds that through acquiring the slaves the movable property was not acquired, despite the fact that the slaves are like land, this is because

we require land resembling “fortified cities in Judah,” which do not move.

This beraita holds that the acquisition “incidentally,” in which movable property is acquired incidentally to land, applies only to the acquisition of land that does not move, resembling the “fortified cities in Judah” mentioned in the verse from which we learned the law of incidental acquisition [as the Gemara immediately continues to explain]. Since slaves are mobile, although their status is that of land, they do not have the law of incidental acquisition, such that movable property would be acquired incidentally to the acquisition of the slaves.

And the Gemara brings the teaching from “fortified cities” for incidental acquisition:

For we learned,

we learned in a Mishna [Kiddushin 26a]:

Property that has no guarantee

[movable property]

is acquired together with property that has a guarantee

[land and houses],

through money, a document, and possession.

If a person sells land and movable property together, and the buyer performs an act of acquisition with the land, through money, a document, or possession, the movable property is also acquired for him incidentally to the land, without an additional act of acquisition.

And the Gemara asks [there, in Kiddushin]:

From where are these

matters,

from where are these matters learned?

And the Gemara answers:

Ḥizkiya said, for the verse says

[II Chronicles 21:3],

“And their father gave them many gifts of silver and gold and delicacies, together with fortified cities in Judah.”

Since Scripture said that their father gave the gifts “together with” the cities, it implies that through acquiring the cities they acquired, incidentally to the acquisition of the cities, the gifts as well.

And since from here we learn the law of incidental acquisition, the beraita holds that the acquisition is effective only with something resembling the acquisition of “fortified cities,” namely land that does not move.

And now the Gemara brings another version of Rav Ika’s answer:

There are those who say,

there are those who say that this is what

Rav Ika, son of Rav Ami, said

to resolve the contradiction between the beraitot:

Everyone,

the two beraitot hold that

slaves are considered like movable property.

And

accordingly,

as for the beraita,

the first beraita, which holds that if he took possession of the slaves he

did not acquire

movable property, it is

properly

understood: Since slaves have the status of movable property, movable property is not acquired incidentally to movable property.

And

as for the beraita that taught, he acquired,

the second beraita, which holds that through acquiring the slaves the movable property was acquired, this is not through the law of incidental acquisition, because slaves are considered movable property; rather, it is speaking

when they are upon him,

when the movable property is placed upon the slave. Therefore, through acquiring the slave, the slave becomes like the buyer’s courtyard, and the movable property too is acquired through the law of a person’s courtyard [property], which acquires for him.

But the Gemara asks against this answer:

And if they are upon him, what of it?

What difference does it make that the movable property is placed upon the slave, so that he should acquire it through the law of a courtyard?

It is a moving courtyard, and a moving courtyard does not acquire.

A person’s domain acquires for him through the law of a courtyard only if the domain remains in its place, and not if it is a moving domain; therefore, the slave cannot acquire for him through the law of a courtyard.

And if you would say that he is standing,

perhaps you would say, to answer that it is speaking of a slave who is standing, and therefore this is not like a moving courtyard.

But Rava said: Any

thing

that, if it

were

moving, would not acquire

for its owner through the law of a courtyard, even when it is

standing or sitting, it does not acquire

for him. Since it can walk if it wishes, this does not resemble a courtyard, and it does not acquire for its owner through the law of a courtyard.

And the Gemara answers:

And the halakha,

this law [that is, this answer that the slave acquired the movable property while it was upon him] speaks

of

a situation in which the slave is

tied

[bound and unable to walk]; from now on, he is like any other courtyard that remains in its place.

And the Gemara raises another contradiction between baraitot:

We learned in the first baraita: If he took possession of land, he did not acquire slaves.

But it was taught

in another baraita:

If he took possession of land, he acquired slaves.

And the Gemara answers:

There,

in the baraita that says that through acquiring the land he acquired the slaves, it is speaking

of

slaves who are

standing within it

[upon the land], and in such a manner they are acquired through the acquisition of the land, by means of “agav” .

And the Gemara explains the continuation of the answer and asks about it:

From this

you learn that he came to answer

that this one did not acquire,

that the other baraita, which says that one who took possession of land did not acquire slaves, is speaking

when there are no

standing

slaves

within it.

This works according to that version,

this answer is understandable only according to the second version,

as R. Ika, son of R. Ammi, said

according to whom everyone agrees that

slaves are deemed like movable property,

and since slaves have the status of movable property,

that is, if they are standing within it, yes; if not, no.

According to this, it is possible to distinguish between when the slaves were standing within the land, in which case they are acquired through the acquisition of agav, and when they were not standing within it, in which case they are not acquired.

Rather, according to that version,

according to the first version in the words of R. Ika,

who said that slaves are deemed like land,

for both baraitot hold that slaves have the status of land, it will be difficult:

why do I need it,

why is it necessary that they be

standing within it? Did not Shmuel say:

if

a person sold him

a

ten fields in ten countries

different and separate,

once he took possession

that the buyer performed an act of taking possession

in one of them, he acquired

the

all of them.

And if so, also with slaves: if they are like land, since he took possession of one parcel of land, he should thereby acquire the slaves as well, wherever they are, just as he acquires the parcels of land in ten countries.

And the Gemara answers:

For your reasoning,

according to your words, for you asked why he acquires specifically when they are standing within it, one should ask this also

according to that version,

according to the second version of R. Ika,

who said that slaves are deemed like movable property: why do I need [them] standing within it,