Bava Kamma 11b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

If [the proof were] from the Mishna, I would say: ![](pamud.bmp "

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that there is a part of the afterbirth without a fetus.

It cannot be learned from the words of the Mishna that there is no part of the afterbirth without a fetus, because it could in fact have been interpreted that there is a part of the afterbirth without a fetus. And according to the basic law, when only part of the afterbirth emerged, it should not have been necessary to forbid all of it, because it is possible that nothing of the fetus emerged; and even if something emerged, perhaps only a minority of it emerged, and it is not considered born.

And

however, the Sages issued

a decree

concerning the emergence of

part of it, lest it be confused with

the emergence of

all of it

and its returning to its place. That is, they decreed to forbid even in a case in which part of the afterbirth emerged, lest people come to permit it when the entire afterbirth emerged and returned to its place, and say that even in such a case the fetus has not yet emerged. And when the Mishna said, “a sign of a fetus in an animal,” it does not refer to a situation in which part of the afterbirth emerged; rather, it means that we decree, when part of it emerges, lest it be confused with a case in which all of it emerged, and in this case it is certainly “a sign of a fetus in an animal and in a woman,” for the fetus certainly emerged, and the slaughter of the mother does not permit it.

Accordingly, it could have been said that in the case of a woman we should not be stringent when part of the afterbirth emerged, to render impure the pure things that she touched on the first day, because in the case of a woman there is no need to decree because of the entire afterbirth, since here everything is apparent: on the second day, when the entire afterbirth emerges, we render her impure.

Therefore

it teaches us

Ulla in the name of Rabbi Elazar that there is no part of the afterbirth without a fetus, and therefore one must be concerned because of the doubt even on the first day. And from now on, even in the Mishna the reason is this: that there is no part of the afterbirth without a fetus.

And the Gemara brings another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: A firstborn who was killed within thirty days,

a human firstborn who was killed within thirty days of his birth,

one does not redeem him;

there is no need to redeem him, and we do not say: Had he not been killed, he would have lived more than thirty days, and consequently he is not a miscarriage and is obligated in redemption.

And so taught Rami bar Hama [that he learned this from a

beraita]:

Since it is stated “

but

you shall surely redeem

the firstborn of man” [Numbers 18], in the doubled expression “you shall redeem, you shall surely redeem,” which indicates that it comes to include,

one might have said [it is possible that it comes to include] that

even one who

was killed [was killed]

[died]

within thirty days

his father is obligated to redeem him?

The verse says: “

But

you shall redeem, you shall surely redeem”—the verse made a division. That is, the verse comes to make a division and exclude, so that not every firstborn is redeemed, but specifically one who was not killed within thirty days.

And the Gemara brings another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: A large animal is acquired through pulling [through the buyer’s leading the animal into his domain].

[where the purchaser leads the animal into his domain].

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But we learned in the Mishna,

behold, we learned in the Mishna [Kiddushin 25b]: “A large animal is acquired

through handing over” [through the seller’s handing the animal to the buyer],

and not through pulling.

And the Gemara answers:

He said it according to this tanna.

Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the tanna of the beraita.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

And the Sages say: Both this and this [both a large animal and a small animal] are acquired

[both a large domesticated animal and a small one] are acquired

through pulling.

Rabbi Shimon says: Both this and this

are acquired

through lifting.

And Ulla in the name of Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of the Sages in the beraita.

And another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: Brothers who divided—

their father died, and the brothers lived and supported themselves from their father’s property that came to them by inheritance, and afterward they came to divide the property among themselves—one must appraise what each one took from the inheritance for his support, and deduct this from the share due to him in the inheritance. And the law is that even

what they are wearing must be appraised,

even the clothing they are wearing, since it was taken or purchased with inheritance funds; therefore, it is appraised for purposes of the division.

But

however,

what their sons and daughters are wearing must not be appraised.

The clothing that the brothers dressed their sons and daughters in is not appraised within the division, since the appraisal is conducted in court, and it is not customary for young sons to come to court; and if we bring them for the division, it turns out that we are disgracing them. But the brothers themselves, who come to court for the division, have even the clothing they are wearing appraised.

And Rav Pappa adds a case in which even what the brothers themselves are wearing is not appraised:

Rav Pappa said: Sometimes [there are cases] in which

[there are cases] in which

even what they are wearing [the brothers]

[the brothers]

is not appraised,

and

you find it

in the case of the eldest brother.

Such a case is found with the eldest of the brothers, who was occupied with the property on behalf of all the brothers,

for it was agreeable to them that his words be listened to.

It was comfortable and good for the brothers that this brother, who dealt with the property, be honored with fine garments at their expense, so that he would appear respectable and they would take his words into consideration. Therefore, they certainly waived their rights to his garments, and he had already acquired them for himself.

And another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: When a paid or unpaid bailee transfers [the deposit] to another bailee,

a bailee who accepted a deposit for safekeeping, and went and transferred it without the owner’s permission to another bailee to guard it in his place, and the deposit was damaged,

he is exempt

the first bailee from paying in all cases in which he would have been exempt had he continued to guard the deposit himself. That is, transferring the deposit to another bailee is not considered negligence; therefore, he is liable only for matters for which he would have been liable without the transfer.

And it is not necessary to say,

and not only

an unpaid bailee who transferred

the deposit

to a paid bailee

is exempt if an unavoidable accident occurred, since the transfer is not considered negligence because

he improved its safekeeping,

for through the transfer he only improved the safekeeping, since a paid bailee, who assumes liability for theft and loss, devotes himself to guarding more than an unpaid bailee; therefore, it is clear that transferring the deposit in such a manner is not considered negligence, and the first bailee cannot be held liable for an unavoidable accident that occurs while it is with the second bailee,

but even a paid bailee who transferred

the deposit

to an unpaid bailee, thereby impairing its safekeeping,

for by doing so he diminishes the quality of the safekeeping, since an unpaid bailee takes less trouble in guarding the object, nevertheless

also,

even in such a case

he is exempt

the first bailee if an unavoidable accident occurs. And the reason it is not considered negligence is

that he transferred

the deposit

to

a person

of understanding,

who knows and is capable of guarding it.

And the Gemara brings a dissenting opinion concerning this law:

Rava said: When a bailee transfers [the deposit] to another bailee

without the owner’s permission,

he is liable,

the first bailee even for unavoidable accidents.

And it is not necessary to say,

and not only

a paid bailee who transferred

the deposit

to an unpaid bailee

is liable for unavoidable accidents, since his transfer is considered negligence,

for he impaired its safekeeping,

since he diminished the quality of the deposit’s safekeeping.

But even an unpaid bailee who transferred

the deposit

to a paid bailee,

thereby improving the quality of the safekeeping, nevertheless

he is liable

for unavoidable accidents, since a bailee who makes a claim of an unavoidable accident is not exempt so long as he has not sworn that he was not negligent with the object. Here, the first bailee cannot swear that there was no negligence in guarding the object, since he cannot know this, because the object was in the possession of the second bailee. And the first bailee cannot say to the depositor that he should require the second bailee to swear that he was not negligent in his safekeeping, because

he can say to him

the depositor can say to the first bailee: only

you are trusted by me through an oath;

you alone are trusted by me when you swear to me that you were not negligent with the deposit, but

this one is not trusted by me through an oath.

The other bailee is not trusted by me on the basis of his oath. Therefore, the first bailee, who was not with the object and cannot swear, cannot rely upon the second bailee’s oath, and he must pay.

And another statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha is,

the practical ruling is as follows:

We collect from slaves.

A creditor who comes to collect his debt collects from the slaves of the debtor.

Rav Nachman said to Ulla:

But

did Rabbi Elazar say even from orphans!?

Did Rabbi Elazar say that one collects from slaves even when the debtor died and they come to collect from property inherited by the orphans? That is, although one does not collect from movable property inherited by orphans, but only from land, are slaves considered like land, so that they may be collected from the orphans?

And Ulla replied:

No.

Rabbi Elazar did not say that one collects from slaves even in a case in which the debtor died and one collects from the orphans; rather, he said only that one collects

from him,

from the debtor himself!

But the Gemara asks: If the matter concerns collection

from him,

from the debtor himself, what novelty is there in this? After all, from him one collects

even from the cloak on his shoulder

[from the cloak on his shoulder], that is, one collects from anything from which it is possible to collect, and one also collects from movable property; if so, certainly one will also collect from slaves. What is Rabbi Elazar teaching us? And the Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing,

Rabbi Elazar is speaking about a case

in which he designated it as an apotiki.

The debtor established with the creditor that the debt would be collected from this slave. And in such a case the slave’s lien to the creditor is stronger than that of the debtor’s other property. Rabbi Elazar teaches us that even if the debtor sold the slave, the creditor collects him from the buyer, unlike other movable property, which, even if he designated it as an apotiki, if the debtor sold it, the creditor does not collect from it.

And

according

to the law

,

said

Rava.

As Rava said:

One who

made his slave an apotiki, and sold him, the creditor collects from him.

The creditor collects the slave from the purchaser. But if he made

his ox an apotiki, and

afterwards

sold it, the creditor does not collect from him,

from the purchaser, the ox.

What is the reason?

What is the reason for the distinction between an apotiki of a slave and an apotiki of an ox?

This one has public knowledge,

a report goes out concerning a slave if he was liened as an apotiki; therefore, whoever purchased the slave from him, despite knowing that the slave was liened to the lender, brought the loss upon himself.

And

however,

this one has no public knowledge,

a report does not go out concerning an ox even if it is liened as an apotiki, and the purchaser did not know to take precautions; therefore, they do not collect from purchasers.