Bava Kamma 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

If this were derived from the Mishna, I would say:

that there can be part of a placenta without a fetus.

It cannot be learned from the Mishna that there cannot be part of a placenta without a fetus, because it could actually be interpreted as saying that there can be part of a placenta without a fetus. And according to the basic law, when only part of the placenta emerged, it should not have been necessary to prohibit all of it, because it is possible that nothing of the fetus emerged; and even if something emerged, perhaps only a minority of it emerged, in which case it is not considered born.

And

the Sages nevertheless decreed

a decree

concerning the emergence of

part of it, due to

the emergence of

all of it and its returning to its place. That is, they decreed that it is prohibited even when part of the placenta emerged, lest people come to permit the case in which the entire placenta emerged and then returned to its place, and say that even in such a case the fetus has not yet emerged. And when the Mishna says, “A sign of a fetus in an animal,” it is not referring to a case in which part of the placenta emerged. Rather, it means that we decree, with regard to the emergence of part of it, due to the emergence of all of it; and in that case it is certainly “a sign of a fetus in an animal and in a woman,” for the fetus certainly emerged, and the slaughter of the mother does not render it permitted.

and its returning to its place. That is, they decreed to forbid even in a case in which part of the afterbirth emerged, lest people come to permit it when the entire afterbirth emerged and returned to its place, and say that even in such a case the fetus has not yet emerged. And when the Mishna said, “a sign of a fetus in an animal,” it does not refer to a situation in which part of the afterbirth emerged; rather, it means that we decree, when part of it emerges, lest it be confused with a case in which all of it emerged, and in this case it is certainly “a sign of a fetus in an animal and in a woman,” for the fetus certainly emerged, and the slaughter of the mother does not permit it.

Accordingly, it could have been said that with regard to a woman we should not be stringent when part of the placenta emerged and render impure the pure items that she touched on the first day, because in the case of a woman there is no need to decree on account of the entire placenta, since here everything is apparent: on the second day, when the entire placenta emerges, she is rendered impure.

Therefore

it teaches us

that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar that there cannot be part of a placenta without a fetus, and therefore one must be concerned because of the uncertainty even on the first day. From now on, even in the Mishna the reason is this: there cannot be part of a placenta without a fetus.

And the Gemara cites another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: In the case of a firstborn who was killed within thirty days,

a human firstborn who was killed within thirty days of his birth,

he is not redeemed;

there is no need to redeem him. We do not say that, had he not been killed, he would have lived more than thirty days, and consequently he was not a nefel and was obligated in redemption.

And Rami bar Ḥama likewise taught [that he learned this from a

baraita]:

Since it is stated, “

only,

you shall surely redeem

the firstborn of man” [Numbers 18], using the doubled expression “you shall surely redeem,” which indicates that the verse comes to include cases,

one might have thought [that it was coming to include] that

even one who was killed

[died]

within thirty days

his father is obligated to redeem him?

The verse states, “

only, you shall surely redeem.” The verse distinguishes. That is, the verse comes to distinguish and exclude: not every firstborn is redeemed, but specifically one who was not killed within thirty days.

you shall redeem, you shall surely redeem”—the verse made a division. That is, the verse comes to make a division and exclude, so that not every firstborn is redeemed, but specifically one who was not killed within thirty days.

And the Gemara cites another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: A large domesticated animal is acquired through pulling

[where the purchaser leads the animal into his domain].

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But we learned in the Mishna,

for we learned in the Mishna [Kiddushin 25b]: “A large domesticated animal is acquired

through handing over”

[where the seller hands the animal to the purchaser], and not through pulling.

And the Gemara answers:

He stated his ruling in accordance with this tanna.

Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the tanna of the baraita.

As it was taught

in a baraita:

And the Sages say: Both this and that

[both a large domesticated animal and a small one] are acquired

through pulling.

Rabbi Shimon says: Both this and that

are acquired

through lifting.

Ulla, in the name of Rabbi Elazar, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Sages in the baraita.

And another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: In the case of brothers who divided

, whose father died, and the brothers remained alive and supported themselves from their father’s assets that they inherited, and afterward came to divide the assets among themselves, the value of whatever each one took from the inheritance for his support must be assessed, and that amount is deducted from the share of the inheritance due to him. And the law is that even

what they are wearing is assessed,

even the clothing they are wearing, since it was taken or purchased with inheritance funds; therefore, it is assessed for purposes of the division.

But

however,

what their sons and daughters are wearing is not assessed.

The clothing that the brothers gave their sons and daughters is not assessed as part of the division, because the assessment is performed in court, and young children do not ordinarily come to court; if we were to bring them for purposes of the division, we would thereby disgrace them. But the brothers themselves, who come to court for purposes of the division, have even the clothing they are wearing assessed.

And Rav Pappa adds a case in which even the brothers’ clothing is not assessed:

Rav Pappa said: Sometimes

[there are cases] in which

even what they are wearing

[the brothers]

is not assessed,

and

you find this

in the case of the eldest brother.

Such a case is found with the eldest of the brothers, who was responsible for managing the assets on behalf of all the brothers,

because it was agreeable to them that his words be heeded.

It was comfortable and beneficial for the brothers that this brother, who managed the assets, be honored with fine garments at their expense, so that he would appear respectable and people would take his words into consideration. Therefore, they certainly relinquished their rights to his clothing, and he had already acquired it for himself.

And another statement that Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: In the case of a bailee who handed the item over to another bailee,

a bailee who accepted a deposit for safekeeping and went and, without the owner’s permission, handed it over to another bailee to safeguard in his place, and the deposit was damaged,

he is exempt

the first bailee from paying in all cases in which he would have been exempt had he continued guarding the deposit himself. That is, handing the deposit over to another bailee is not considered negligence; therefore, he is liable only for matters for which he would have been liable had he not handed it over.

This need not be stated,

and not only

a gratuitous bailee who handed over

the deposit

to a paid bailee

is exempt if an unavoidable accident occurred, because the handing over is not considered negligence since

he improved the quality of its safekeeping,

for by handing it over he only improved the safekeeping: a paid bailee, who accepts liability for theft and loss, devotes himself to guarding the item more than a gratuitous bailee does. Therefore, it is clear that handing over the deposit in this manner is not considered negligence, and the first bailee should not be held liable for an unavoidable accident that occurred while it was in the second bailee’s possession;

rather, even a paid bailee who handed over

the deposit

to a gratuitous bailee, thereby weakening the quality of its safekeeping,

since in this way he diminished the quality of the safekeeping, as a gratuitous bailee takes less trouble to guard the item, nevertheless

also

in such a case

he is exempt

the first bailee if an unavoidable accident occurs. The reason is that this is not considered negligence,

for he handed over

the deposit

to

a

competent person,

who knows how and is capable of guarding it.

And the Gemara cites a dissenting opinion concerning this law:

Rava said: In the case of a bailee who handed the item over to another bailee

without the owner’s permission,

the first is liable

even in cases of unavoidable accidents.

This need not be stated,

and not only

a paid bailee who handed over

the deposit

to a gratuitous bailee

is liable for unavoidable accidents, because his handing it over is considered negligence,

as he weakened the quality of its safekeeping,

for he diminished the quality of the deposit’s safekeeping.

Rather, even a gratuitous bailee who handed over

the deposit

to a paid bailee,

thereby improving the quality of the safekeeping, nevertheless

is liable

for unavoidable accidents. For a bailee who claims that an unavoidable accident occurred is not exempt until he swears that he was not negligent with the item. Here, the first bailee cannot swear that there was no negligence in guarding the item, since he cannot know this because the item was in the possession of the second bailee. Nor can the first bailee tell the depositor to require the second bailee to swear that he was not negligent in guarding it, because

he can say to him,

the depositor can say to the first bailee: Only

you are trusted by me with an oath;

you alone are trusted by me when you swear to me that you were not negligent with the deposit. However,

this one is not trusted by me with an oath.

The other bailee is not trusted by me on the basis of his oath. Therefore, the first bailee, who was not with the item and cannot swear, cannot rely on the second bailee’s oath, and he must pay.

And another statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Elazar:

And Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha is,

the practical ruling is as follows:

Creditors collect from slaves.

A creditor who comes to collect his debt collects from the slaves of the debtor.

Rav Naḥman said to Ulla:

But did

Rabbi Elazar say even from orphans!?

Did Rabbi Elazar say that creditors collect from slaves even when the debtor has died and they come to collect from property inherited by the orphans? That is, although one does not collect from movable property inherited by orphans, but only from land, are slaves considered like land, such that they may be collected from orphans?

And Ulla replied:

No.

Rabbi Elazar did not say that creditors collect from slaves when the debtor died and they collect from the orphans; rather, he said only that they collect

from him,

from the debtor himself!

But the Gemara asks: If the matter concerns collection

from him,

from the debtor himself, what novel point is there in this? After all, from him they collect

even from the cloak on his shoulders

[a cloak on his shoulder], meaning, they collect from anything from which collection is possible, including movable property. If so, certainly they would also collect from slaves. What, then, does Rabbi Elazar teach us? And the Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing?

Rabbi Elazar is speaking of a case

in which he designated it as an apotiki.

The debtor stipulated with the creditor that the debt would be collected from this particular slave. In such a case, the lien on the slave in favor of the creditor is stronger than the lien on the debtor’s other assets. Rabbi Elazar teaches us that even if the debtor sold the slave, the creditor collects it from the purchaser, unlike other movable property: even if he designated it as an apotiki, if the debtor sold it, the creditor cannot collect it from the purchaser.

And

as

the law

that

said

Rava.

As Rava said:

one who

designated his slave as an apotiki and sold him, the creditor collects from him.

The creditor collects the slave from the purchaser. But if he designated

his ox as an apotiki, and

then

sold it, the creditor does not collect from it,

from the purchaser, the ox.

What is the reason?

What is the reason for the distinction between an apotiki designation of a slave and an apotiki designation of an ox?

In this case, there is publicity,

with regard to a slave, word spreads if he was encumbered as an apotiki. Therefore, one who purchased the slave from him, despite knowing that the slave was encumbered to the creditor, caused the loss to himself.

But

in the other case,

there is no publicity,

with regard to an ox, no word spreads even if it was encumbered as an apotiki, and the purchaser had no way to know and take precautions; therefore, collection is not made from purchasers.