Bava Kamma 13a — the Talmud in English

This [view] is Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s, that [view] is the Rabbis’.

That is, he could have answered simply that Rav Naḥman holds in accordance with the Rabbis, and therefore he establishes the Mishna as referring to the present time, when it is not fit for sacrifice. But when the Temple is standing, it belongs to the Most High. And Rabbi Yosei the Galilean always holds that even if it is fit for sacrifice, it belongs to the owners.

And from the fact that he did not answer so, it is proven that certainly their dispute is only after slaughter. But while alive, according to everyone it is considered the owners’ property. Therefore Ravina had to establish that only an animal of the firstborn-offering outside the Land of Israel is the owners’ property, because otherwise there would be no difficulty for Rav Naḥman, neither from Rabbi Yosei nor from the Rabbis, since while alive they did not dispute.

And the Gemara answers:

he can say to you,

the answerer, who distinguished between while alive and after death, and who was challenged from Ravina’s words, can say to you:

priestly gifts

are you saying!?

Are you raising the difficulty from the law of the firstborn, which is one of the priestly gifts? This is not a difficulty. For

the priestly gifts are different, since when they acquire, they acquire from the table of the Most High!

The firstborn, which is one of the priestly gifts, is something Rabbi Yosei the Galilean concedes belongs to the Most High even while alive, and all the priests’ acquisition is only from the table of the Holy One, blessed is He. Therefore Ravina did not establish it in accordance with the Rabbis, since concerning the firstborn Rabbi Yosei the Galilean concedes to the Rabbis that if it is a firstborn fit for sacrifice, it belongs to the Most High. Only a firstborn that is not fit for sacrifice, such as outside the Land of Israel or at the present time, belongs to the owners. But concerning the owners’ portion, as with a peace-offering, Rabbi Yosei the Galilean holds that there is a distinction between while alive, when it belongs to the owners, and after slaughter, when it belongs to the Most High. Therefore, one who betroths [a woman] with his portion after slaughter, even with the owners’ portion, has not betrothed her.

And now the Gemara returns to explain the beraita that brings Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s words:

With regard to the fundamental matter,

the body of the beraita brought above: It is stated in the passage concerning the oath of a deposit:

“And he commits a trespass against the Lord”

“and denies his fellow.” The verse comes

to include lesser sanctified offerings,

for one who denies them and swears falsely to his fellow is liable for a guilt-offering for misuse, as in the law of the oath of a deposit [which is the oath of the bailee to the owner of the deposit: if the bailee denied the deposit and swore falsely to his fellow concerning it, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering], because

that

lesser sanctified offerings

are his property

of the owner of the offering,

the words of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean.

Ben Azzai says:

What Rabbi Yosei said, to include lesser sanctified offerings, means

to include a peace-offering [

and the Gemara will immediately explain what he comes to exclude].

Abba Yosei ben Dostai says:

Ben Azzai did not say

to include

anything except a firstborn,

for if it is not fit for sacrifice [such as outside the Land of Israel], it belongs to the owners. And if the priest deposited it, and the bailee denied it to the priest under oath and then admitted, he is liable for a guilt-offering for misuse.

And the Gemara explains the beraita:

The Master said: Ben Azzai says, “to include a peace-offering”—to exclude what?

Which of the “lesser sanctified offerings” does Ben Azzai intend to exclude, that they are not the owners’ property?

If you say that he comes to exclude a firstborn,

if you say that the verse comes to exclude a firstborn, to say that it does not belong to the owners but belongs to the Most High, it is difficult:

now,

now that you hold that a peace-offering belongs to the owners, can one say that a firstborn does not belong to the owners but belongs to the Most High? Surely the opposite follows by a kal va-chomer:

And if a peace-offering,

whose sanctity is greater, for special stringencies apply to it,

that

it

requires placing of hands [

so that the owners place their hands on the head of the offering in the Temple courtyard close to the slaughter],

and

it must likewise bring with it a meal-offering of

libations,

and

it likewise

requires the waving of the breast and thigh,

and nevertheless

you said, “the owners’ property”

it is.

If so,

a firstborn,

which requires neither placing of hands, nor libations, nor waving,

is it necessary to say so!?

Do you really need to say that it belongs to the owners? If so, certainly Ben Azzai did not come to exclude a firstborn , and what, then, does he come to exclude?

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Ben Azzai came only

to exclude

the offering of

the animal tithe,

which is a lesser sanctified offering and is eaten by the owners like a peace-offering, but nevertheless is not considered the owners’ property like a peace-offering.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan proves his words from a beraita:

As it was taught

in a beraita:

In

the passage of

the firstborn

of a pure animal

it is stated [Numbers 18]: “But the firstborn of an ox or the firstborn of a sheep or the firstborn of a goat

you shall not redeem.”

you shall not redeem.”

And it implies that only the law of redemption does not apply to a firstborn ,

but

it

is sold unblemished,

when it is

alive,

for the priest who received it may sell it to another priest, and the latter eats it in its sanctity when a blemish befalls it.

And

if the firstborn is

blemished,

it may be sold both while it is

alive and

when

slaughtered.

However,

in

the passage of

the animal tithe

it is

stated [Leviticus 27:33]: “And it and its substitute shall be holy,

it shall not be redeemed.”

it shall not be redeemed.”

And the Sages derived by a gzera shava from the passage of “dedications” where it is stated [there, verse 28]: “It shall not be sold and it shall not be redeemed”: just as with dedications, when the Torah says “it shall not be redeemed,” it also includes a prohibition against selling, so too with the animal tithe, when the Torah says “it shall not be redeemed,” there is a prohibition against selling.

And

therefore, the tithe

is not sold either

while it is

alive, nor

when it is

slaughtered. It is not

while it is

unblemished, nor

when it is

blemished.

And now, since we have learned that the tithe is forbidden to be sold, it is not the owners’ property. This is what Ben Azzai excluded: only the peace-offering and the firstborn are the owners’ property, but the animal tithe belongs to the Most High.

And now the Gemara brings another opinion, which attributes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words to the latter clause:

Ravina taught it with regard to the latter clause,

he would recite and attribute Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words to the latter clause of the beraita, in which we learned:

Abba Yosei ben Dostai says: “Ben

Azzai said only concerning a firstborn.”

And the Gemara infers:

To exclude what?

Which lesser sanctified offerings did Abba Yosei come to exclude, such that Ben Azzai did not hold that they are the owners’ property?

If you say,

if it is said that he came

to exclude a peace-offering,

which belongs to the Most High, it is difficult:

now,

now that he holds that a firstborn belongs to the owners, can one say that a peace-offering does not belong to the owners but belongs to the Most High!?

Surely the matter follows by a kal va-chomer:

And if a firstborn,

whose sanctity is greater, because

that

it is

sanctified

already

from the womb

of its mother, nevertheless

it is his property,

and not the property of the Most High,

a peace-offering,

which was originally ordinary and only now was sanctified by its owner,

is it necessary to say so!?

Is it necessary to say that it is the owners’ property? If so, certainly Abba Yosei did not come to exclude a peace-offering; what does he come to exclude?

And concerning this

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Abba Yosei did not come to exclude the peace-offering, but

to exclude

the offering of

the animal tithe, to say that it belongs to the Most High.

And as he proves from a beraita:

As it was taught: In the case of a firstborn it is stated, “It shall not be redeemed”

and it implies that only redemption does not apply to it,

but

nevertheless it

is sold, if it is

unblemished,

when it is

alive. And

if it is

blemished,

it is sold both

while

alive and

when

slaughtered.

However,

concerning the tithe it is stated, “It shall not be redeemed,” and

we learn by a gzera shava from dedications that it

is not sold, neither alive nor slaughtered, neither unblemished nor blemished.

It follows that the tithe belongs to the Most High, and therefore it is not sold.

And the Gemara challenges Ravina, who attributes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words to the latter clause:

And

“concerning a firstborn only,” he said: Abba Yosei, who said that Ben Azzai said only concerning a firstborn, added the word “only,” meaning only concerning a firstborn and not something else. If so, it is impossible to say that according to him a peace-offering is also included among the owners’ property, and that he came only to exclude the animal tithe. Rather, certainly, according to Abba Yosei, only a firstborn is the owners’ property.

And the Gemara concludes:

Indeed, it is difficult for Ravina’s explanation.

It is difficult!

Indeed, it is difficult according to Ravina.

And now the Gemara returns to the words of the Mishna, that liability for damages applies to “property in which there is no misuse,” which implies that even one who damages consecrated property is liable if there is no misuse in it. At first we established this as referring to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, concerning lesser sanctified offerings. But now the Gemara brings another explanation of the words of the Mishna:

Rava said: What is

the explanation of

“property in which there is no misuse”? —

Property in which there is no “law” of misuse.

That is, property that is not of the type of property to which the law of misuse applies, namely, property in which there is no sanctity whatsoever for Heaven, because with offerings consecrated to Heaven the law of misuse can apply, such as with most-holy offerings, or with the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctified offerings after the sprinkling of the blood.

And what are they,

what are “the property in which there is no law of misuse”? Property

of ordinary people.

And the Gemara asks:

And let him teach

“property

of ordinary people”!?

If the intention of the Mishna is only ordinary property, why did the tanna not teach simply: “Ordinary property”?

And the Gemara concludes:

It is difficult.

Indeed, it is difficult according to Rava’s explanation.

Until now we dealt with lesser sanctified offerings that were damaged, and now the Gemara brings the law of lesser sanctified offerings that caused damage:

Rabbi Abba said: If peace-offerings caused damage, he collects from their flesh, but he does not collect from their sacrificial portions.

That is, an unblemished ox that was consecrated as a peace-offering gored, and the injured party collects half the damage only from the flesh of the ox, according to the law of an unblemished ox that pays from its body, but he does not collect from the sacrificial portions of the peace-offerings.

And the Gemara asks:

Obviously!

For it is obvious that one cannot collect from the sacrificial portions, for

the sacrificial portions ascend to the Most High!

They go up for offering to the Most High upon the altar, and they are the property of the Most High, from which one does not collect, as with a consecrated ox that gored an ordinary ox, which is exempt. And what is Rabbi Abba teaching us by this?

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary;

Rabbi Abba needed only to teach us

with regard to the Most High,

that one does not collect

from their flesh corresponding to

the portion of the

sacrificial portions.

For example, an innocuous ox worth two hundred that gored an ox worth two hundred: in the case of an ordinary ox, the law is that the injured party collects half the damage, namely one hundred zuz [“a maneh”], which is half the ox, from the body of the damaging ox. Here, however, the injured party collects only half the monetary value of the ox’s flesh, even though half its flesh is not worth a full maneh. And the monetary value of half the sacrificial portions is not paid from the monetary value of the other half of the flesh, because the sacrificial portions, which are part of the body of the ox, are also regarded as having participated in causing the damage, and one must collect from them as well the proportionate part of the damage. And since it is impossible to collect from them, the injured party loses the proportionate part represented by the sacrificial portions.

And the Gemara discusses:

According to whom,

according to which method did Rabbi Abba state this innovation? For in a beraita [below, 53a], the Sages and Rabbi Natan disputed the law of an ox that pushed another person’s ox into a pit, and the ox died in the pit: Who is liable for payment of the damage? According to the Sages, if the pushing ox was a confirmed ox, the owner of the ox pays full damage. And if the pushing ox was an innocuous ox, he pays half damage. And the owner of the pit is always exempt. But according to Rabbi Natan, if the pushing ox was a confirmed ox, the owner of the ox pays half damage, and the owner of the pit pays the other half of the damage. And if the ox was innocuous, the owner of the ox pays a quarter of the damage, and the owner of the pit pays the remaining three portions.

According to the Sages, who hold that in such a case an innocuous ox pays only half damage and the owner of the pit is exempt, it is demonstrated that they hold that when there are two factors in causing the damage and it is impossible to collect from one of them, the entire payment is not imposed upon the other factor. Whereas Rabbi Natan disagrees and holds that the remainder is imposed upon the other factor. Therefore, according to him, the owner of the pit pays the remainder of the damage payment.

Therefore, the Gemara asks according to whom Rabbi Abba stated his innovation:

If according to the Sages,

if it is according to the Sages, then

obviously!

It is obvious that this is the law, for

they said

the Sages:

When there is no possibility of collecting from this one, payment is not collected from that one!

For the Sages hold that if there are two factors responsible for the damage, and it is impossible to collect from one of the factors, the share of the one factor is not collected from the other factor. And according to them, in the case of an animal of peace-offerings that caused damage, since the sacrificial portions also participated in the damage, it is obvious that the payment for the value of the sacrificial portions will not be collected from the flesh.

And if according to Rabbi Natan, he said: When there is no possibility of collecting from this one, payment is collected from that one!

For he holds that when it is impossible to collect from one factor, it is collected from the other. If so, certainly, if an animal of peace-offerings caused damage, one should collect from the flesh also the portion of the sacrificial portions, and not as Rabbi Abba said!?

And the Gemara answers with two answers:

Alternatively,

if you wish, it can be said that Rabbi Abba’s statement was according to the method of

Rabbi Natan.

Alternatively,

if you wish, it can be said that it was according to the method of

the Sages.

And the Gemara explains its words:

Alternatively,

Rabbi Abba’s statement is according to the method of

the Sages.

And concerning what we asked, that according to them this law is obvious, one can say that it is not obvious, because what they said with regard to a pit and an ox,

that applies when there are two bodies,

they said this only with regard to two factors such as an ox and a pit, which are two separate and different bodies,

but when there is one body,

in one body, as with an animal of peace-offerings, it may be said that they did not say so, but hold that

he can say to him,

the injured party can say:

From any place that I need, I will collect payment!

I will collect from whichever part I wish. Therefore Rabbi Abba taught us that even with regard to an animal, which is one body, the Sages hold that if it is not possible to collect from one part, it is not collected from the other part.

Alternatively,

Rabbi Abba’s statement is according to the method of

Rabbi Natan,

and concerning what we asked, that according to his method, when it is impossible to collect from one factor, one collects from the other, one must distinguish and say that specifically

there,

with regard to an ox and a pit, the law

is

so, because

the owner said

the

ox

of the injured party

to the owner of the pit: “I found my ox in your pit,”

I found my ox, killed, in your pit; therefore the principal damage is considered to be upon you. Therefore,

whatever I cannot collect from that one,

whatever I cannot collect from the owner of the pushing ox,

I will collect payment from you!

I will collect from you.