Bava Kamma 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

This one is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, and that one is the Rabbis.

That is, he could have answered simply that Rav Naḥman holds in accordance with the Rabbis, and therefore he establishes the Mishna as referring to the present time, when the animal is unfit for sacrifice. But when the Temple is standing, it is the property of Heaven. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili always holds that even if it is fit for sacrifice, it is the property of the owners.

And from the fact that he did not answer this way, it is evident that their dispute certainly applies only after slaughter. But while the animal is alive, everyone considers it the property of the owners. Therefore, Ravina had to establish that only a firstborn animal outside Eretz Yisrael is the property of the owners, because otherwise there would be no difficulty for Rav Naḥman, whether from Rabbi Yosei or from the Rabbis, since they did not dispute the matter while the animal was alive.

The Gemara answers:

He can say to you

that the one who distinguished between the animal's being alive and its being dead, and was challenged by Ravina's statement, can say to you:

priestly gifts

are you speaking of!?

Are you raising a difficulty from the law of a firstborn, which is one of the priestly gifts? That is not a difficulty, because:

the case of priestly gifts is different, since when they acquire them, they acquire them from the table of Heaven!

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili concedes that a firstborn, which is one of the priestly gifts, is the property of Heaven even while it is alive, and that the priests' entire acquisition is only from the table of the Holy One, Blessed be He. Therefore, Ravina did not establish the matter in accordance with the Rabbis, since with regard to a firstborn Rabbi Yosei HaGelili agrees with the Rabbis that if it is a firstborn fit for sacrifice, it is the property of Heaven. Only a firstborn that is unfit for sacrifice, such as one outside Eretz Yisrael or one born in the present time, is the property of the owners. But with regard to the owners' share, as in the case of a peace-offering, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that there is a distinction between while it is alive, when it is the property of the owners, and after slaughter, when it is the property of Heaven. Therefore, if one betroths a woman with his share after slaughter, even with the owners' share, she is not betrothed.

The Gemara now returns to explain the beraita that cites Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's statement:

As for the fundamental matter,

the body of the beraita cited above: It is stated in the passage concerning an oath of deposit:

“And he deals treacherously against the Lord”

“and denies his fellow.” The verse comes

to include minor sacrificial offerings,

for one who denies and falsely swears to his fellow with regard to them is liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse, as in the case of an oath of deposit—which is the oath of a bailee to the owner of the deposit, for if the bailee denies the deposit and falsely swears to his fellow concerning it, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering—because

the

minor sacrificial offerings

are the property

of the owner of the offering,

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

Ben Zoma says:

What Rabbi Yosei said about including minor sacrificial offerings means

to include the peace-offerings

[and the Gemara will immediately explain what he comes to exclude].

Abba Yosei ben Dostai says:

Ben Zoma did not say

“to include”

except with regard to a firstborn alone,

for if it is unfit for sacrifice [such as outside Eretz Yisrael], it is the property of the owners. And if a priest deposited it, and the bailee denied it to the priest under oath and then confessed, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse.

The Gemara explains the beraita:

The Master said: Ben Zoma says, “to include the peace-offerings.” What is he excluding?

Which of the “minor sacrificial offerings” does Ben Zoma intend to exclude, as not being the property of the owners?

If you say that he comes to exclude a firstborn,

if you say that the verse comes to exclude a firstborn, teaching that it is not the property of the owners but the property of Heaven, there is a difficulty:

now,

now that you hold that a peace-offering is the property of the owners, can it be said that a firstborn is not the property of the owners but the property of Heaven? Surely the opposite follows by a kal va-chomer:

And if with regard to peace-offerings,

whose sanctity is greater, since special stringencies apply to them,

which

are

required to have semikha

[the owners must place their hands on the head of the offering in the Temple courtyard, immediately before slaughter],

, and

it is also necessary to bring with them a meal-offering of

libations,

and

they are also required to undergo

the waving of the breast and thigh,

and nevertheless

you said that it is the property

of the owners.

If so,

a firstborn,

which requires neither semikha, nor libations, nor waving,

is it necessary to say so!?

Must you really say that it is the property of the owners? If so, Ben Zoma certainly did not come to exclude a firstborn ; what, then, does he come to exclude?

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Ben Zoma came only

to exclude

the offering of

the animal tithe,

which is a minor sacrificial offering and is eaten by the owners like a peace-offering, but nevertheless is not considered the property of the owners in the manner of a peace-offering.

Rabbi Yoḥanan proves his statement from a beraita:

As it was taught

in a beraita:

In the

passage concerning

a firstborn

of a kosher animal

it is stated

[Numbers 18]: “But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat

you shall not redeem.”

This indicates that a firstborn is subject only to the law of redemption, which does not apply to it ,

but

it

may be sold unblemished,

while it is

alive,

as the priest who received it may sell it to another priest, who will eat it with its sanctity when it develops a blemish.

And

if the firstborn is

blemished,

it may be sold both while

alive and

while

slaughtered.

However,

in

the passage concerning

the animal

tithe

it is stated

[Leviticus 27:33]: “And it and its replacement shall be holy,

it shall not be redeemed.”

And the Sages derived by means of a gzera shava from the passage concerning “devoted property” , where it is stated [ibid., verse 28]: “It shall not be sold, and it shall not be redeemed”: Just as with devoted property, when the Torah says “it shall not be redeemed,” it also prohibits its sale, so too, with regard to the animal tithe, when the Torah says “it shall not be redeemed,” it prohibits its sale.

And

therefore, the tithe

is not sold, neither

while

alive, nor

when

slaughtered. It is not

while

unblemished, nor

when

blemished.

Now that we have learned that the animal tithe is prohibited for sale, it follows that it is not the property of the owners. This is what Ben Zoma excluded: Only peace-offerings and a firstborn are the property of the owners, whereas an animal tithe is the property of Heaven.

The Gemara now cites another opinion, which attributes Rabbi Yoḥanan's statement to the latter clause:

Ravina taught it with regard to the latter clause,

as he would recite and attribute Rabbi Yoḥanan's statement to the latter clause of the beraita, where we learned:

Abba Yosei ben Dostai says: “Ben

Zoma said it only with regard to a firstborn alone.”

The Gemara infers:

What is he excluding?

Which minor sacrificial offerings did Abba Yosei come to exclude, as offerings that Ben Zoma did not consider the property of the owners?

If you say,

if it is said that he comes

to exclude peace-offerings,

which are the property of Heaven, there is a difficulty:

now,

now that he holds that a firstborn is the property of the owners, can it be said that peace-offerings are not the property of the owners but the property of Heaven!?

Surely the matter follows by a kal va-chomer:

And if a firstborn,

whose sanctity is greater, since

it

is

sanctified

already

from the womb

of its mother, nevertheless

it is his property,

and not the property of Heaven,

peace-offerings,

which are originally non-sacred and were sanctified only now by their owner,

is it necessary to say so!?

Must it be stated that they are the property of the owners? If so, Abba Yosei certainly did not come to exclude peace-offerings; what, then, did he come to exclude?

Regarding this,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Abba Yosei did not come to exclude peace-offerings, but rather

to exclude

the offering of

the animal tithe, teaching that it is the property of Heaven.

As he proves from a beraita:

As it was taught: With regard to a firstborn, it is stated, “You shall not redeem it,”

indicating that it is subject only to redemption,

but

nevertheless

it may be sold,

if it is

unblemished,

while

alive. And

if it is

blemished,

it may be sold whether

alive or

whether

slaughtered.

However,

with regard to the animal tithe it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed,” and

we derive by a gzera shava from devoted property that it

is not sold, neither alive nor slaughtered, neither unblemished nor blemished.

It is therefore evident that the animal tithe is the property of Heaven and consequently cannot be sold.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Ravina, who attributes Rabbi Yoḥanan's statement to the latter clause:

And

he said, “with regard to a firstborn alone,”

but Abba Yosei, who said that Ben Zoma said it only with regard to a firstborn, added the word “alone,” meaning only a firstborn and nothing else. If so, it is impossible to say that according to him peace-offerings are also included among the property of the owners, and that he came only to exclude the animal tithe. Rather, according to Abba Yosei, only a firstborn is the property of the owners.

The Gemara concludes:

It is difficult!

Indeed, this is difficult for Ravina's explanation.

The Gemara now returns to the Mishna's statement that liability for damages applies to “property that is not subject to misuse,” indicating that one who damages sacrificial offerings is also liable if they are not subject to misuse. At first, we established this as referring, according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, to minor sacrificial offerings. Now, however, the Gemara offers another explanation of the Mishna:

Rava said: What is

the meaning of

“property that is not subject to misuse”? —

Property that is not subject to the “law” of misuse.

That is, property that is not of the type of property to which the law of misuse applies, namely, property that has no sanctity at all for Heaven, since the law of misuse may apply to sacred property, such as the most sacred offerings or the sacrificial portions of minor offerings after the blood has been sprinkled.

And what are they?

What is “property that is not subject to the law of misuse”? Property

of an ordinary person.

The Gemara asks:

And let him teach

“property

of an ordinary person”!?

If the Mishna's intention is only ordinary property, why did the tanna not state it simply: “The property of an ordinary person”?

The Gemara concludes:

It is difficult.

Indeed, this is difficult for Rava's interpretation.

Until now, we dealt with minor sacrificial offerings that were damaged. The Gemara now presents the law of minor sacrificial offerings that caused damage:

Rabbi Abba said: If peace-offerings caused damage, the injured party collects from their flesh, but does not collect from their sacrificial portions.

That is, if an ox designated as a peace-offering was an innocuous ox and gored, the injured party collects half the damages only from the ox's flesh, in accordance with the law of an innocuous ox, which pays from its body, but does not collect from the sacrificial portions of the peace-offering.

And the Gemara asks:

Obviously!

It is obvious that one cannot collect from the imurin, because

the imurin ascend to the Most High!

They are brought up for sacrifice to the Most High upon the altar, and are the property of the Most High, from which one does not collect, as in the case of a consecrated ox that gored an ordinary ox, where the owner is exempt. What, then, did Rabbi Abba teach us by stating this?

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary;

Rabbi Abba needed to teach us

with regard to the amount

that one does not collect

from its flesh corresponding to

the portion of the

imurin.

For example, an unblemished ox worth two hundred zuz that gored an ox worth two hundred zuz: In the case of an ordinary ox, the law is that the injured party collects half the damages, namely one hundred zuz [“a maneh”], which is half the value of the ox, from the body of the liable ox. Here, however, the injured party collects only half the value of the ox’s flesh, even though half its flesh is not worth a full maneh. And the value of half the imurin is not paid out of the value of the other half of the flesh, because the imurin, which are part of the ox’s body, are also considered to have participated in causing the damage, and the proportionate part of the damages must also be collected from them. Since one cannot collect from them, the injured party loses the proportionate share attributable to the imurin.

And the Gemara discusses:

According to whose view

did Rabbi Abba state this innovation? For in a beraita [below, 53a], the Sages and Rabbi Natan dispute the law concerning an ox that pushed another person’s ox into a pit, where the ox died in the pit. Who is liable for payment of the damages? According to the Sages, if the pushing ox was forewarned, its owner pays full damages. If the pushing ox was unblemished, its owner pays half the damages. The owner of the pit is always exempt. According to Rabbi Natan, however, if the pushing ox was forewarned, its owner pays half the damages and the owner of the pit pays the other half. If the ox was unblemished, its owner pays one quarter of the damages and the owner of the pit pays the remaining three quarters.

According to the Sages, who hold that in such a case an unblemished ox pays only half the damages and the owner of the pit is exempt, it is evident that they hold that when there are two factors in causing the damage and it is impossible to collect from one of them, the entire payment is not imposed upon the other factor. Rabbi Natan, by contrast, disagrees and holds that the remainder is imposed upon the other factor. Therefore, according to his view, the owner of the pit pays the remainder of the damages.

Therefore, the Gemara asks according to whose view Rabbi Abba stated his innovation:

If it is according to the Sages,

if it is according to the Sages, then

obviously!

It is obvious that this is the law, because

the Sages said

that

when payment cannot be collected from this one, it is not collected from that one!

The Sages hold that if there are two factors in the damage, and it is impossible to collect from one of them, one does not collect the share of that factor from the other. Accordingly, in the case of shelamim that caused damage, since the imurin also participated in the damage, it is obvious that the payment corresponding to the value of the imurin will not be collected from the flesh.

And if it is according to Rabbi Natan, he said: “When payment cannot be collected from this one, it is collected from that one”!

He holds that when it is impossible to collect from one factor, it is collected from the other. If so, certainly, if shelamim caused damage, one should collect from the flesh also the share of the imurin, and not as Rabbi Abba stated!?

The Gemara gives two answers:

Alternatively,

if you wish, one can say that Rabbi Abba’s statement was according to the view of

Rabbi Natan.

Alternatively,

if you wish, one can say that it was according to the view of

the Sages.

And the Gemara explains its words:

Alternatively,

Rabbi Abba’s statement is according to the view of

the Sages.

As for what we asked, that according to their view this law is obvious, one can say that it is not obvious, because what they said concerning a pit and an ox,

that applies only when there are two bodies,

they said this only with regard to two factors, such as an ox and a pit, which are two separate and distinct bodies,

but when there is one body,

as with an animal of shelamim, one could say that they did not say this, but rather hold that

he can say to him

the injured party can say:

“From any part I wish, I will collect!”

I will collect from any part I choose. Rabbi Abba therefore taught us that even with regard to an animal, which is one body, the Sages hold that if it is impossible to collect from one part, one does not collect it from the other part.

Alternatively,

Rabbi Abba’s statement is according to the view of

Rabbi Natan.

As for what we asked, that according to his view, when it is impossible to collect from one factor, one collects from the other, one can distinguish and say that specifically

there,

in the case of the ox and the pit, the law

is

so, because

the owner of the

the

ox

that was injured

says to the owner of the pit: “I found my ox in your pit,”

I found my ox dead in your pit; therefore, the primary responsibility for the damage is considered yours. Therefore,

“whatever I cannot collect from that one,”

whatever I cannot collect from the owner of the pushing ox,

“I will collect from you!”

I will collect from you.