Bava Kamma 113b (קיג:) — the Talmud in English

It follows that

he may not pull him out and leave,

meaning that the court may not remove him immediately from the gentile, but only through redemption, because it is forbidden to rob a gentile.

I might have said

,

he may overcharge him,

meaning that the Hebrew slave should pay the gentile, who demands payment for his redemption, a higher price than the amount he paid for him?

The verse therefore states: “

And he shall reckon with his purchaser,”

indicating that

he must calculate carefully with his purchaser.

That is, the Hebrew slave must carefully reckon with his gentile master, so that the latter does not inflate the price of his redemption.

It follows that Rabbi Akiva held that robbing a gentile is forbidden as a matter of law, and not merely because of the concern for desecration of the Name?

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said: This is not difficult: Here it is referring to a gentile,

meaning that Rabbi Akiva’s statement permitting the robbery of a gentile refers to an ordinary gentile.

There it is referring to a resident alien,

whereas the Torah’s prohibition against robbing the gentile refers to a resident alien who accepted upon himself not to engage in idolatry and to eat unslaughtered animals.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

But both of them are written together!

The passage concerning the redemption of a Hebrew slave is stated with regard to both of them; and even when he is sold to an ordinary gentile, the Torah forbids robbing the gentile and removing him from the gentile without redemption?

As we learned in a beraita in tractate Kiddushin (20a): A person who engages in commerce with the produce of the Sabbatical year is subject to severe punishment, and he becomes progressively impoverished, descending from one misfortune to another. The beraita derives from the passages adjacent to the passage of the Sabbatical year in Parashat Behar the sequence of his punishments: Initially, he is forced to sell his movable property; afterward, he sells his fields and his house, and even his daughter; subsequently, he is forced to borrow with interest; until ultimately he sells himself as a slave, as it is stated there: “When your brother becomes impoverished with you and is sold to you.”

And the beraita says there:

Not only to you,

the Israelite, is he sold as a slave;

rather,

in the end, he is even forced

to a convert

to sell himself,

as it is stated

in the adjacent passage: “

And he is sold to a convert.”

And not

merely

to a righteous convert

is he sold;

rather,

even

to a resident alien, as it is stated

there: “And he is sold

to a resident alien.”

And the continuation of the verse is: “Or to the root of the family of a convert.” The beraita first expounds the words

“the family of a convert”:

This is the gentile

who ultimately sells himself to a gentile [who is from the convert’s family, before the latter converted].

When it says “

or to the root,”

this is one who is sold

to idolatry

itself—meaning that ultimately he sells himself to serve idolatry, chopping wood and drawing water.

Immediately afterward it states: “After he is sold, he shall have redemption,” from which Rabbi Akiva derives the prohibition against robbing the gentile. It follows that it is forbidden to rob even an ordinary gentile. How, then, can it be said that the verse refers only to a resident alien?

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: This is not difficult: Here it is referring to robbery.

Actual robbery is indeed forbidden by Rabbi Akiva even when the victim is a gentile.

And here it is referring to evading a debt,

meaning evading payment of what one owes him; Rabbi Akiva holds that this is permitted in the case of a gentile, since it is not actual robbery when no desecration of the Name is involved. It was in this manner that Rabbi Akiva stated that it is permitted to act deviously toward a gentile. It is likewise permitted to evade the customs duty from a gentile tax collector, since this is comparable to evading a debt: one does not pay him what one owes him by the law of the kingdom.

Abaye said

to Rava: But the

Hebrew slave

—from whom Rabbi Akiva derives that it is forbidden to rob him and remove him from his gentile master without redemption—

involves evading a debt!

The money that the gentile paid in advance for the slave’s labor is a loan; and when the slave leaves him without returning the money, he is evading that debt. Nevertheless, this is forbidden. How, then, can you say that evading a gentile’s debt is permitted?

And we answer:

Rava follows his own reasoning, as he said: The Hebrew slave’s person is acquired

by his master for the duration of his six years of labor; consequently, when he forcibly leaves him, he is actually robbing him.

Rav Beivai bar Gidal said in the name of Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida: Robbery of a gentile is forbidden.

His lost property is permitted,

meaning that one is not required to return his lost property to him.

And we explain:

His robbery is forbidden: As Rav Huna said: From where is it derived that robbery of a gentile is forbidden?

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 7:16]: “

And you shall consume all the peoples that the Lord your God gives you.”

This implies specifically

when they are delivered into your hand

then you may rob them, but not when they are not delivered into your hand.

His lost property is permitted: As Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said in the name of Rav: From where is it derived that the lost property of a gentile is permitted?

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:3]: “And you shall do likewise

to all the lost property of your brother

,”

which implies specifically:

You return lost property to your brother, but you do not return it to a gentile.

We raise a difficulty:

And say: This matter applies

only when the exclusion expressed by “the lost property of your brother” is

where it has not yet come into his possession,

when the finder has not yet picked up the lost object; only then does the Torah exclude the lost property of a gentile,

as he is not obligated to pursue it and return it,

meaning that he is not required to trouble himself to return the lost object to the gentile.

But where it has come into his possession,

if the finder has already picked up the lost object,

say that he should return it,

perhaps in that case he is obligated to return it even to a gentile?

And we answer:

Ravina said: The continuation of the verse states: “For all the lost property of your brother that is lost from him

and you find it

”—

it implies that it has come into his possession.

Thus, even when he has found the lost object and is holding it in his hand, he is obligated to return it only to his brother, and not to a gentile.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Pinḥas ben Ya’ir says: In a place where there is desecration of the Name,

if he does not return the lost object to the gentile,

even his lost property is forbidden,

and he must return his lost object to him.

Shmuel said: The gentile’s error is permitted.

If a gentile owed money to an Israelite, and the gentile made an error in the calculation and paid him more, the Israelite may keep it, since the gentile does not know of the error and there is no desecration of the Name involved.

This is like that incident involving Shmuel, who purchased a golden vessel from a gentile

—Shmuel bought a golden vessel from a gentile—

for the price of an iron one;

the gentile mistakenly thought it was made of copper. The gentile also erred in that he named its price

as four dinars, and he concealed from him

—Shmuel concealed in the payment—

one dinar,

deceiving him in the calculation and paying him only three dinars, because it is permitted to deceive a gentile.

Rav Kahana purchased from a gentile

—he bought from a gentile—

one hundred and twenty barrels

of wine

for one hundred

dinars,

and he concealed one dinar from him,

deducting one dinar from the hundred.

He said

—Rav Kahana said to the gentile—

“See that I am relying on you!”

I am not counting the money; rather, I am relying on you to count it. He said this so that if the gentile noticed the error, he would not suspect him of having made it deliberately. [Alternative explanation: The gentile said to Rav Kahana, “I am relying on you to have counted the money, and I am not counting it again.” Rav Kahana was therefore certain that the gentile would not notice the error.]

Ravina purchased a palm tree together with a gentile in order to chop it up

Ravina purchased a palm tree in partnership with a gentile in order to split it into pieces.

Ravina said

to

his attendant

—to his servant:

“Go ahead and bring [my share] from its base,”

meaning: Hurry and take my share from the thick pieces cut from the base of the palm tree, which is the thicker side,

because the gentile knows the count

—the gentile knows only the number of pieces and does not notice that some are thick and some are thin. Therefore, this is considered a gentile’s error, which is permitted.

Rav Ashi was traveling on the road,

he was walking along the road,

and he saw a vine branch in an orchard

—he saw vine branches in an orchard—

with clusters of grapes hanging from it

.

He said to his attendant: “Go and see whether they belong to a gentile,

check whether the orchard belongs to a gentile;

bring them

me some of the grapes.

If they belong to an Israelite,

if the orchard belongs to an Israelite,

do not bring them to me,

do not bring me any.

A certain gentile who was sitting in the orchard heard

the words Rav Ashi said to his attendant,

and said

to Rav Ashi:

“Is [taking from] a gentile permitted?!”

Is it permitted to steal from a gentile?

He said

—Rav Ashi said to the gentile: I did not mean that if the grapes belong to a gentile, he should take them without paying. Rather, if they belong to a

gentile, he will take payment;

he will certainly agree to sell the grapes. But if they belong to an

Israelite, he will not take payment,

since the Israelite will not agree to sell the grapes. Therefore, I told my attendant to take grapes only if they belong to a gentile, with the intention of paying for them.

The main matter: Shmuel said: The law of the kingdom

is law.

Rava said: Know

that this is indeed the law:

they cut down palm trees and make bridges

—the government uproots palm trees belonging to individuals and makes bridges from them—

and we cross over them

—we cross these bridges and use them. If the law of the kingdom were not law, how would it be permitted to use these bridges, which would be stolen property?

Abaye said

to Rava: What proof is there?

Perhaps

the reason it is permitted to use these bridges is

that their owners despaired of them,

because the owners have already despaired of their palm trees, and not because the law of the kingdom is law?

He said

—Rava said:

If the law of the kingdom were not law, how could they despair?

Despair alone would not make it permitted to use the bridges, since despair alone effects acquisition only when accompanied by a change of possession or a change in the object itself, and the like. Here there was no change of possession, because the bridges remain in the public domain and did not enter another person’s domain; nor was there a change in the object, because the designation of palm tree still applies to the bridges. And we raise a difficulty:

But they did not act as the king commanded!

The laborers who uprooted the palm trees did not carry out the king’s command, and consequently the action does not have the validity of the law of the kingdom. How, then, is it permitted to use the bridges?

For

the king said: “Go and cut down [trees] from every valley,”

—the king commanded that the palm trees be uprooted equally from all the valleys—

but they went and cut them down from a single valley.

Yet they uprooted all of them from only one valley.

And we answer:

The king’s agent is like the king.

The king’s agents are legally like the king himself,

and he did not trouble himself.

They are authorized to uproot all the date palms from one valley in order to spare themselves the trouble.

And they brought the loss upon themselves—

the people of the valley from whom all the date palms were cut caused themselves a loss, in that

they should have collected from all the valleys and taken payment.

They should have demanded that the other valleys pay them for the date palms that had been cut from them, since the obligation had been imposed equally upon them all.

Rava said: One who is found in the threshing floors pays the king’s tax share,

If four people were partners in a threshing floor, and three of them had already brought their portions home while the fourth remained at the threshing floor, and the tax collectors came and collected the tax from him, this payment is on behalf of all of them, and they must pay him their shares; they cannot claim that the tax was imposed only upon him. The collectors are permitted to do this and collect from one on behalf of all, since they need not trouble themselves to collect from each individual [as above]. And if the collector is an Israelite who purchased the tax from the king, he need not be concerned that this involves robbery; and if he is a gentile, it is permitted to purchase from him the tax that he collected lawfully.

And this applies only in the case of a partner.

Only if the fourth person who remained at the threshing floor was a partner in the field.

But in the case of a tenant farmer,

if he is merely a tenant farmer,

it is his tenancy that he is taking out.

Since he has no share in the land itself, he is not obligated to pay the tax on behalf of the owners of the fields. If they collected it from him on behalf of the others, it is robbery in the collector’s possession, and it is forbidden to purchase it from him.

And Rava said: One townsman may be distrained for another townsman.

The tax collector is permitted to take one of the townspeople as security and collect from him the tax owed by another resident of that town [and he will subsequently collect it from him], for this is the law of the kingdom.

And this applies to a land tax,

What we said—that it is possible to take one townsman as security for another—applies only to a tax imposed upon land,

and to the poll tax

or the tax collected according to the number of persons,

of this year

of the current year.

But with regard to a year that has passed,

the tax from the previous year,

since he has paid off the king, it has passed.

Once the collector has already paid the king the entire tax from the previous year, the tax now belongs to him. Although he is permitted to collect the tax from each individual, nevertheless he is not permitted to take one person as security for another.

And Rava said: Those who keep flocks

Gentiles who raise animals in order to sell their dung to the owners of fields for fertilizing them—if this is

within the town’s boundary

of the town,

it is forbidden to purchase from them

any animal at all.

What is the reason?

Because the animals of the townspeople become mixed in with theirs,

for perhaps animals belonging to Israelites became mixed among them, and this animal belongs to an Israelite.

Outside the town’s boundary, it is permitted to purchase from them,

since there is no concern there that animals belonging to Israelites became mixed among them.

Ravina said: If owners are pursuing them,

if there are Israelite owners here whose animal was lost and who are searching for it among the gentile’s animals outside the town’s boundary, then

even outside the town’s boundary it is forbidden,

for there is an indication here that an animal belonging to an Israelite was indeed mixed among the gentile’s animals.

Rava announced—and some say Rav Huna announced: Those who ascend upward,

those who are going up to Eretz Yisrael,

and those who descend downward,

those who are descending from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia: listen!

This Israelite who knows testimony favorable to a gentile,

an Israelite who knows testimony that would benefit a gentile,

and goes and testifies on his behalf in a gentile court against his fellow Israelite,

and goes and testifies for the gentile in their court against an Israelite,

we excommunicate him;

we place him under a ban.

What is the reason?