Bava Kamma 113a — the Talmud in English

But if he is in the city,

if he is in the city,

no.

he is not placed under a ban if he did not come to the court based only on the court's messengers' report, since

we say: Perhaps they did not tell him.

Perhaps they did not convey the summons to him,

as they say: The court's messenger found him and told him.

For they think that there is no need to convey the summons to him, because the court's messenger certainly met him afterward and conveyed the summons to him himself.

And we said this

Even if he is not in the city, one does not rely on their report

only when he does not pass by the entrance of the court,

meaning that on his way home he does not pass by the court.

But if he passes by the entrance of the court,

if he passes by the court on his way home,

no,

one does not rely on their informing him of the summons, because

they say: The court found him and told him.

Surely, when he passed by the court, the court itself informed him of the summons.

And we said this

that one relies on them

only when he returns that same day,

meaning that he returned home on that day.

But if he does not return that same day,

if he did not return home that day,

no.

one does not rely on their having informed him of the summons, because

we say: Perhaps they forgot.

Perhaps by the next day they forgot their mission.

Rava said: In the case of one against whom a writ of excommunication was written because he did not come to court,

one against whom a writ of excommunication was written because he did not appear in court,

until he comes to court, we do not tear it up.

The writ is not torn up until he comes to court, and it is not enough that he promises to come.

And likewise, if the writ of excommunication was

because he did not obey the court's judgment,

meaning that the court ruled that he must pay his fellow, but he refuses to comply with the ruling, then

until he obeys, we do not tear it up.

Until he pays, the writ is not torn up, and it is not enough that he promises to pay.

The Gemara rejects this:

But that is not so!

Rather,

once he says, “I will obey,”

once he promises to comply with the court's ruling,

we tear it up

immediately, because perhaps he does not currently have money and genuinely intends to make efforts to obtain money in order to pay. But coming to court is not difficult for him, and as long as he does not come, this constitutes insolence toward the court. Therefore, the writ of excommunication is not torn up until he comes to court.

Rav Ḥisda said: We set court dates for Monday, Thursday, and Monday.

One date, and then another date after it.

That is, we do not set three dates for him at once. Rather, at first we set a date for him on Monday. If he does not come, we set a date for him on Thursday. If he does not come, we set a date for him on Monday.

We wait for him throughout the final Monday,

and on the following day,

if he did not come,

we write

a writ of excommunication against him.

Rav Asi happened to come to the house of Rav Kahana.

He saw a certain woman whom Rav Kahana had summoned to court in the evening,

Rav Asi saw that Rav Kahana had summoned a woman to court in the evening,

and in the morning,

the next morning, as soon as he realized that she had not come,

he wrote a writ of excommunication against her.

He wrote a writ of excommunication against her because she had not come to court.

He said to him

Rav Asi said to Rav Kahana: Is it that

Master does not hold in accordance with that which Rav Ḥisda said: We set court dates for Monday, Thursday, and Monday?!

Why, then, did you place her under a ban already after the first summons?

He said to him

Rav Kahana:

That applies to a man.

Only in the case of a man do we wait for him three times, since

he may be prevented by circumstances and may not be in the city,

as it is possible that circumstances beyond his control prevent him from coming, since he is not in the city.

But in the case of a woman, since she is in the city and does not come,

a woman who is generally in the city, and if she does not come even after only one summons,

she is rebellious!

Rav Yehuda said: We do not set a court date

we do not summon a person to court

neither during the days of Nisan nor during the days of Tishrei.

Because during Nisan people are occupied with the harvest, and during Tishrei they are occupied with the grape harvest, and they do not have time to come to court.

Nor on the eve of a Festival or on the eve of Shabbat

and likewise, we do not summon people on the eves of Festivals or on the eves of Shabbat, because people are then occupied with preparations for the Festival and Shabbat.

But during Nisan we set a date for after the days of Nisan, and during Tishrei we set a date for after Tishrei.

During Nisan and Tishrei, we set a date for a person to come after Nisan and Tishrei.

But on the eve of Shabbat we do not

set a date for after the eve of Shabbat.

On the eve of Shabbat, we do not set a date even for after Shabbat.

What is the reason?

He is occupied with his work for Shabbat.

Because of his preoccupation with preparations for Shabbat, he may forget the summons to court.

Rav Naḥman said: We do not set a court date for those who come to the kalla during the kalla,

people who come to hear the lecture on Shabbat; we do not summon them to come to court on Monday,

nor for those who come for the regel during the regel,

those who come to hear the laws of the Festival during the thirty days before the Festival; we do not summon them to court, lest they refrain from coming to the lecture.

When litigants came before Rav Naḥman

when claimants came during the kalla to ask Rav Naḥman to summon people attending the lecture to court,

he said to them: Did I gather this assembly for your sake?

Did I gather these people for the needs of your case?!

And we conclude:

But nowadays, when there are deceitful people

in our times, when deceitful people evade coming to court and exploit the fact that people are not summoned during a kalla,

we are concerned

and summon them even during a kalla.

We learned in the Mishna:

If it was an item for which one bears financial responsibility, he must pay.

Rabbi taught the Mishna to his son, Rabbi Shimon,

Rabbi taught and explained the Mishna to his son, Rabbi Shimon:

It is not referring only to an item that is inherently subject to financial responsibility,

not only if the stolen property their father left them was land,

but even

if it was

a cow with which one plows, or a donkey with which one travels while leading it; they must return them for the sake of their father's honor.

For everyone sees that they are using property stolen by their father.

Rav Kahana asked Rav:

If their father left them

a bed on which he reclines,

or

a table on which he eats, what is the ruling?

Must they also return these, or not? One might say that since people outside do not see the bed and table in the house, this is unlike a cow and a donkey, which are used outside; therefore, using them does not slight their father's honor. Or perhaps it nevertheless does slight their father's honor, since people enter the house and see them using the stolen bed and table?

He said to him

Rav: [Proverbs 9:9] “

Give to a wise person, and he will become wiser still.”

That is, the ruling of the bed and table is the same as the ruling of the cow and donkey.

Mishna:

One may not exchange

large coins for small coins

neither from the tax collectors' chest,

from the chest of tax collectors who collect payment for goods entering the country.

nor from the tax collectors' purse,

from the purse of tax collectors who impose a tax on each person in the country according to his means, because the money they collect is not legally authorized and is considered stolen property in their possession. [The Gemara will explain that this refers to a case in which these taxes do not have the force of “the law of the kingdom is law”].

And one may not take charity from them,

for the reason stated.

But one may exchange money or take charity from money that is in his house or from him in the marketplace.

It is permitted to exchange money or take charity from money belonging to the tax collector in his house or from money he has with him in the marketplace, because that money is his own and is not from the tax chest.

Gemara:

A tanna taught: But he gives him a dinar, and he receives the remainder.

If he owed the tax collector small coins worth half a dinar and had only a full dinar, he may give the tax collector the dinar and receive change, even from the tax chest, because this is like rescuing his money from the tax collector.

The Gemara asks:

But tax collectors—

why does the Mishna say that the tax they collect is stolen property?

And didn’t Shmuel say: “The law of the kingdom is law”?

Since the tax is established by the kingdom's law [and the tax collector purchases the right to collect the tax from the king for one year for a specified sum], one is legally obligated to pay it. Why, then, is the tax collector considered a robber?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel said:

The Mishna is speaking

about a tax collector who has no fixed rate,

who has no standard by which he collects the tax, but takes whatever he wishes. Therefore, this does not have the force of the law of the kingdom.

The school of Rabbi Yannai says:

It is referring

to a self-appointed tax collector,

who does not act on behalf of the kingdom; even if he has a fixed rate, the money is stolen property.

There are those who teach this

the dispute among the amoraim concerning how to explain our Mishna

with regard to this

with regard to the Mishna in tractate Kilayim.

As we learned in a Mishna:

A person may not wear a garment containing kilayim,

a garment in which wool and linen are mixed,

even over ten garments,

even though he does not benefit from the kilayim garment.

And even if he wears it only

to evade the tax with it

[because they did not collect tax on garments that a person was wearing], nevertheless, it is prohibited, even though his purpose in wearing it is not to enjoy wearing it, but only to evade the tax.

And we say:

The Mishna,

which prohibits wearing kilayim even to evade the tax, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

As it was taught in a beraita: It is prohibited to evade the tax

with a kilayim garment.

Rabbi Shimon says in the name of Rabbi Akiva:

It is permitted to evade the tax with a kilayim garment.

The Gemara asks:

Granted, with regard to kilayim, this is the issue over which they disagree:

the tannaim disagree whether it is permitted to evade the tax with a kilayim garment.

One master,

Rabbi Akiva,

holds: An act not intended is permitted.

Therefore, it is permitted to wear the kilayim while evading the tax, because he does not intend by wearing it to benefit from wearing it.

And the other master,

the first tanna,

holds: An act not intended is prohibited.

Therefore, he prohibits evading the tax with a kilayim garment, even though he does not intend to benefit from wearing it.

But is it permitted to use it to evade the tax?

How can Rabbi Akiva permit evading the tax?

But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is law,

so one who evades the tax is stealing from the Jewish tax collector, who lawfully purchased the right to collect the tax from the king?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel said:

It is referring

to a tax collector who has no fixed rate,

who is not authorized to take whatever tax he wishes; therefore, it is permitted to evade the tax owed to him.

The school of Rabbi Yannai says: It is referring to a self-appointed tax collector,

who has no right whatsoever to collect tax on his own.

And there are those who teach this

the dispute among the amoraim

with regard to this

with regard to the Mishna in tractate Nedarim.

As we learned in a Mishna:

One may make vows to murderers

it is permitted for a person to make a vow when [Jewish] murderers come against him seeking to kill him and take his property.

And to plunderers

or to robbers who come to seize his property without killing him.

And to tax collectors

or when they come to take tax from him.

For if these people come to steal his produce, he may deceive them and say

that

this produce

is teruma,

and in order to convince them, he makes a vow before them prohibiting all produce in the world to himself if this produce is not teruma.

Likewise, he may vow to them

that

this produce

belongs to the household of

the

king.

Through these vows he gets rid of them, because they do not take teruma or the property of the king.

Even though

the produce

is not teruma,

and

even though

it

does not belong to the king.

For these vows do not take effect at all, since they were made under coercion. Their status is that of “vows made under coercion,” which are explained in tractate Nedarim to be permitted automatically, without requiring the annulment of vows.

The Gemara asks: “And to tax collectors”—

how may he evade paying the tax?

But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is law?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel said: It is referring to a tax collector who has no fixed rate.

The school of Rabbi Yannai says: It is referring to a self-appointed tax collector.

Rav Ashi said: It is referring to a gentile tax collector.

The tax collector who purchased the right to collect the tax from the king is a gentile, and there is no concern about robbing him, because robbing a gentile is permitted where there is no concern about desecrating God's name, as in our case, where one evades the tax and the tax collector does not know about it.

As it was taught in a beraita

that robbing a gentile is permitted:

When a Jew and a gentile come to court

for judgment according to Torah law,

if you can find merit for

the Jew

according to Jewish law,

meaning that he is legally entitled according to Torah law,

find merit for him.

And say to him

to the gentile:

“This is our law!”

And if you can find merit for the Jew

according to the laws of the nations

of the world, meaning that he is entitled only according to gentile law,

find merit for him, and say to him

to the gentile:

“This is your law!”

But if not,

meaning that the Jew is not entitled according to either Jewish or gentile law,

we come against him

the gentile

indirectly,

cleverly, until the Jew is acquitted,

the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: We do not come against him indirectly, because of the sanctification of God's name, so that

a desecration of God's name will not result.

It follows that where there is no desecration of God's name, everyone agrees that it is permitted to rob a gentile.

And we raised [an objection] concerning this:

And as for Rabbi Akiva, is the reason that there is sanctification of the Name

only then they do not come upon him by indirect means.

But if there is no sanctification of the Name,

in a manner where there is no concern for profanation of the Name, he too concedes that

they come

upon him by indirect means?

And is robbery of a gentile permitted?

Does Rabbi Akiva permit, according to the essential law, the robbery of a Canaanite?

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiva expounded this matter when he came from Zephirin [שם מקום][a place-name]:

a place:

From where [do we know] that robbery of a gentile is forbidden?

The verse says

concerning a Hebrew slave who was sold to a gentile [Leviticus 25:48], "

After he has been sold, redemption shall be for him."