Bava Kamma 113a (קיג.) — the Talmud in English

But if he is in the city,

if he is found in the city,

no.

He is not placed under a ban if he did not come to the court, relying solely on the court’s messengers, since

we say: Perhaps they did not tell him.

Perhaps they did not convey the summons to him,

as they say: The court’s messenger encountered him and told him.

They assume that there was no need to convey the summons to him, since the court’s messenger certainly encountered him afterward and conveyed the summons to him personally.

And we said this

even if he is not in the city, one may not rely on them

only when he does not pass by the court’s entrance,

as on his way home he does not pass by the court.

But if he passes by the court’s entrance,

if he passes by the court on his way home,

no,

one may not rely on them to inform him of the summons, since they

say: The court encountered him and told him.

They certainly informed him of the summons themselves when he passed by the court.

And we said this

that one relies on them

only when he returns that same day,

when he returned home that same day.

But if he does not return that same day,

if he did not return home that same day,

no.

One may not rely on them to have informed him of the summons, because

we say: Perhaps he forgot.

Perhaps they forgot their mission until the next day.

Rava said: In the case of one against whom a petiha was written because he did not come to court,

one against whom a writ of excommunication was written because he did not appear before the court,

until he comes to court, we do not tear it up.

The writ is not torn up until he comes to court; it is not sufficient that he merely promises to come.

And likewise, if the writ of excommunication was

because he did not obey the court,

as the court ruled that he must pay his fellow and he refuses to fulfill the court’s ruling, then

until he obeys, we do not tear it up.

Until he pays, the writ is not torn up; it is not sufficient that he promise to pay.

The Gemara rejects this:

That is not so!

Rather,

once he says, “I will obey,”

once he promises to fulfill the court’s ruling,

we tear it up

immediately, since perhaps he does not currently have money and truly intends to make an effort to obtain money in order to pay. But coming to court presents no difficulty for him, and as long as he does not come, this constitutes insolence toward the court. Therefore, the writ of excommunication is not torn up until he comes to court.

Rav Ḥisda said: We establish a date—Monday, Thursday, and Monday.

A date, and a date after a date.

That is, one does not establish three dates for him all at once. Initially, one establishes Monday of that week for him. If he does not come, one establishes Thursday for him. If he does not come, one establishes Monday.

And one waits for him on the final Monday throughout the entire day,

and on the following day,

if he did not come,

we write

a writ of excommunication against him.

Rav Asi happened to come to the house of Rav Kahana.

He saw a certain woman whom he had summoned to court in the evening,

Rav Asi saw that Rav Kahana had summoned a woman to court in the evening,

and in the morning,

the following morning, immediately upon realizing that she had not come,

he wrote a petiha against her.

He wrote a writ of excommunication against her because she had not come to court.

He said to him,

Rav Asi said to Rav Kahana: Is it the case that

the Master does not accept that which Rav Ḥisda said: One establishes a date of Monday, Thursday, and Monday!?

And why did you excommunicate her already the first time?

He said to him,

Rav Kahana said to him:

This applies to a man.

Only in the case of a man does one wait for him three times, since

he may be prevented by circumstances beyond his control and be absent from the city,

as it is possible that he did not come because of circumstances beyond his control, since he was not in the city.

But in the case of a woman, once she is in the city and does not come,

a woman who is generally in the city, and if she does not come even after only one summons,

she is rebellious!

Rav Yehuda said: We do not set a date

for summoning a person to court

on the days of Nisan or on the days of Tishrei.

Because during Nisan people are occupied with the harvest, and during Tishrei they are occupied with the vintage, and they have no time to come to court.

Not on the eve of a Festival and not on the eve of Shabbat,

and likewise one does not issue summonses on the eve of Festivals or on the eve of Shabbat, because people are then occupied with preparations for the Festival and Shabbat.

But from Nisan one may establish a date for after the days of Nisan, and during the days of Tishrei one may establish a date for after Tishrei.

During Nisan and Tishrei, one establishes a date for a person to come after Nisan and Tishrei.

But from the eve of Shabbat for after the eve of Shabbat one does not

establish a date.

On Friday, one does not establish a date even for after Shabbat.

What is the reason?

He is preoccupied with his Shabbat work.

Because of his preoccupation with preparations for Shabbat, he may forget the summons to court.

Rav Naḥman said: We do not set a date for members of the kalla during the kalla,

people who come to hear the lecture on Shabbat are not summoned to come to court on Monday,

and not for members of the rיגla during the rיגla,

those who come to hear the laws of the Festival during the thirty days preceding the Festival are not summoned to court, lest they consequently refrain from coming to the lecture.

When they would come before Rav Naḥman,

when claimants would come during the kalla to ask Rav Naḥman to summon people participating in the lecture to court,

he would say to them: Did I convene your assembly for your sake?

Did I gather these people for the purpose of your litigation?!

And we conclude:

But nowadays, when there are swindlers,

in our times, when there are deceitful people who evade coming to court and exploit the fact that summonses are not issued during the kalla,

we are concerned

and summon them even during the kalla.

We learned in the Mishna:

If it was an item that has a guarantee, they are obligated to pay.

Rabbi taught it to Rabbi Shimon, his son,

Rabbi taught and explained the Mishna to his son Rabbi Shimon:

Not specifically an item that has a guarantee,

that the stolen property their father left them was land,

but even

if it was

a cow, and he plows with it, or a donkey, and he drives it, they are obligated to return it, because of the honor of their father.

For everyone sees that they are using an item stolen by their father.

Rav Kahana asked Rav

about a case in which their father left them

a bed, and he reclines upon it,

or

a table, and he eats upon it—what is the halakha?

Must they also return these items, or not? One could argue that since people outside do not see the bed and table in the house, this is not comparable to a cow and a donkey, which are used outside; therefore, their use does not involve diminishing their father’s honor. Or perhaps there is nevertheless a diminution of their father’s honor, since people enter the house and see them using the stolen bed and table?

He said to him,

Rav said to him: [Proverbs 9:9] “

Give to a wise person, and he will become wiser still.”

That is, the halakha of the bed and table is the same as the halakha of the cow and donkey.

Mishna:

One may not exchange

sela coins for small coins

from the tax collectors’ box,

from the treasury of tax collectors who collect payment for merchandise entering the country,

nor from the wallet of the collectors,

from the wallet of tax collectors who impose a tax on the people of the country, each according to his means. This is because the money they collect is unlawfully taken and is considered stolen property in their possession. [The Gemara will explain that this refers to a case in which these taxes do not have the force of dina de-malkhuta.]

And one may not take charity from them,

for the reason stated above.

But one may take from his house or from the marketplace.

It is permitted to exchange money and to take charity from money that the tax collector or collector has in his house, or from money that he has with him in the marketplace, since that is his own money and not money from the tax treasury.

Gemara:

A tanna taught: But he may give him a dinar and receive the remainder from him.

If he owed the tax collector small coins worth half a dinar, and he has only a whole dinar, he may give the tax collector the dinar and receive change from him, even from the tax treasury, because he is like one rescuing his money from the hands of the tax collector.

And we raise a difficulty:

And tax collectors?

Why does the Mishna say that the taxes they collect are stolen property?

But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is law?

Since the tax is a royal levy [and the tax collector purchases the right to collect the tax from the king for one year for a certain sum], by strict law people are obligated to pay it. Why, then, is the tax collector considered a robber?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel said:

The Mishna is speaking

of a tax collector who has no fixed rate,

who has no standard or fixed measure in collecting the tax, but takes as he wishes. Therefore, the tax does not have the force of dina de-malkhuta.

The school of Rabbi Yannai said:

The case is

of a self-appointed tax collector,

who does not act on behalf of the government; even if he has a fixed rate, it is stolen property.

There are those who teach this

dispute among the amoraim concerning how to reconcile our Mishna

with this

with the Mishna in tractate Kilayim.

As we learned:

A person may not wear a garment containing kilayim

a garment in which wool and linen are mixed

even over ten garments,

even though he does not derive benefit from the garment containing kilayim.

And even if he wears it only

to evade the tax

because they did not collect tax on garments that a person was wearing , nevertheless, it is prohibited, even though his intention in wearing it is not for the pleasure of wearing it, but only to evade the tax.

And we say:

The Mishna

which prohibits wearing kilayim even to evade the tax, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

As it is taught in a beraita: It is prohibited to evade the tax

by wearing a garment containing kilayim.

Rabbi Shimon says in the name of Rabbi Akiva:

It is permitted to evade the tax by wearing a garment containing kilayim.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, with regard to kilayim, this is the dispute between them:

the tanna’im dispute whether it is permitted to evade the tax by wearing a garment containing kilayim,

as one Master

Rabbi Akiva

holds: An unintentional act is permitted.

Therefore, it is permitted to wear kilayim while evading the tax, since he does not intend by wearing it to derive the pleasure of wearing it.

And the other Master,

the first tanna,

holds: An unintentional act is prohibited.

Therefore, he prohibits evading the tax by wearing a garment containing kilayim, even though he does not intend to derive the pleasure of wearing it.

But is it permitted to evade the tax with it?

How can Rabbi Akiva permit evading the tax?

But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is law,

which means that one who evades the tax robs the Jewish tax collector who lawfully purchased the right to collect the tax from the king?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel said:

The case is

of a tax collector who has no fixed rate,

who is not authorized to take tax as he wishes. Therefore, it is permitted to evade the tax from him.

The school of Rabbi Yannai said: It is a self-appointed tax collector,

who has no right whatsoever to collect tax on his own.

And there are those who teach this

dispute among the amoraim

with regard to this,

with regard to the Mishna in tractate Nedarim.

As we learned:

One may vow to murderers

a person is permitted to make a vow when Jewish murderers come against him, seeking to kill him and take his property.

And to plunderers,

or to robbers who come to seize his property without killing him.

And to tax collectors,

or when they come to take tax from him.

For if these people come to rob him of produce, he may deceive them and say

that

this produce

is teruma,

and, in order to convince them of this, he vows and prohibits to himself all the produce in the world if this produce is not teruma.

Likewise, he may vow to them

that

this produce

belongs to the house of

the

king.

Through these vows he escapes from them, since they do not take teruma or the property of the king.

Even though

the produce

is not teruma,

and

even though

it

does not belong to the king.

For these vows do not take effect at all, since they were made under coercion. Their status is that of vows made under duress, which are discussed in tractate Nedarim and are automatically permitted, without any need to resort to the annulment of vows.

And we raise a difficulty: And to tax collectors

how is it permitted for him to evade payment of the tax?

But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is law?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel said: It is a tax collector who has no fixed rate.

The school of Rabbi Yannai said: It is a self-appointed tax collector.

Rav Ashi said: It is a gentile tax collector.

The tax collector who purchased the right to collect the tax from the king is a gentile, and there is no concern about robbing him, since robbing a gentile is permitted where there is no concern for desecration of the Name, as in our case, where he evades the tax without the tax collector knowing of it.

As it is taught in a beraita,

that robbing a gentile is permitted:

A Jew and a gentile who came to court

for judgment according to Torah law.

If you can vindicate him,

the Jew

according to Jewish law,

as he is entitled to prevail according to Torah law,

vindicate him

and say to him,

the gentile:

This is our law!

And if you can vindicate the Jew

according to the laws of the nations

of the world, such that he is entitled to prevail only according to gentile law,

vindicate him and say to him

the gentile:

This is your law!

But if not,

if the Jew is not entitled to prevail according to either Jewish law or gentile law,

one comes upon him

the gentile

indirectly,

cleverly, until the Jew is acquitted,

according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: One may not come upon him indirectly, because of the sanctification of the Name! In order

to prevent the desecration of the Name.

Thus, where there is no desecration of the Name, everyone agrees that it is permitted to rob a gentile.

And we raised this difficulty:

“And Rabbi Akiva—the reason is that there is sanctification of God's Name,”

only then are they not coming against him indirectly.

“But if there is no sanctification of God's Name,”

where there is no concern about desecrating God's Name, he too agrees that

they come

against him indirectly?

“But is robbery of a gentile permitted?”

Does Rabbi Akiva permit, as a matter of fundamental law, robbing a gentile?

“And was it not taught in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiva expounded this matter when he came from Zephirin”

a place:

“From where is it derived that robbery of a gentile is forbidden?”

“The verse states”

with regard to a Hebrew slave who was sold to a gentile [Leviticus 25:48]:

“After he has been sold, he shall have a redemption.”