Bava Kamma 114a — the Talmud in English

Because

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through the mouth of one,

they judge and extract money on the basis of only one witness. And it is found that through his testimony he caused him an unlawful loss.

And we said this only with regard to one,

only if he is a sole witness is it forbidden for him to testify.

But with regard to two, no.

Two witnesses are permitted to testify in the court of the gentiles, since also according to our law they extract money on the basis of their testimony.

And with regard to one also, we said

that he is forbidden to testify

only in the law-courts of Magista,

in the court of the villagers who do not know how to judge according to law.

But in the court of the government,

the government court,

they too, with one—

—

an oath they impose upon him.

They too do not extract money on the basis of one witness; rather, they merely obligate the litigant to take an oath in order to refute the witness, as is the law of the Torah. Therefore, it is permitted to testify before them.

Rav Ashi said: When I was in the presence of Rav Kahana,

when I was with Rav Kahana,

we had a question: An important person, upon whom they rely like two witnesses,

whom the gentiles rely upon like two witnesses—are they

extracting money on his testimony

extracting money on his word because of his reliability,

and

therefore

he should not testify,

he is forbidden to go and testify even in the government court, lest they extract money on his word unlawfully?

Or perhaps, since he is an important person, he cannot evade them,

he cannot evade them by not coming to testify,

and

therefore

he may testify,

he is permitted to go and testify?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rav Ashi said: This Israelite who sells land to a gentile adjacent to the boundary of his fellow Israelite,

an Israelite who sold a field to a gentile that borders the field of another Israelite

we place him under a ban,

we excommunicate him.

And we raised an objection concerning it:

What is the reason?

If you say, because of the law of the bar metzra,

that the law is that the bar metzra [the owner of the field bordering the field being sold] has prior right to purchase the field, and therefore we place him under a ban because he did not sell the field to his Israelite neighbor?

It is impossible to say so, because

did not the Master say: One who buys from a gentile and one who sells to a gentile

one who buys a field from a gentile or sells a field to a gentile

is not subject to the law of the bar metzra!

And we answer:

Rather,

for this reason we place him under a ban, because

he says to him,

the Israelite owner of the adjacent field says to the seller:

“You have brought a lion to my boundary,”

you have brought me a lion at my boundary that is liable to harm me. And therefore

we place him under a ban until he accepts upon himself every harm that comes because of him.

We place the seller under a ban until he accepts upon himself to compensate the Israelite for every damage that the gentile may cause him.

Mishna:

The tax collectors took his donkey

for the tax

and gave him another donkey

in its place.

Or

bandits took his garment, and gave him another garment,

even though the donkey and the garment that the tax collectors and the bandits gave him are presumably stolen, nevertheless

these are his,

because the owners despair of them.

For presumably the owners have already despaired of the donkey and the garment, and when he takes them from the tax collectors and the bandits, he acquires them through despair and a change of possession.

One who rescues property from the river,

which carried away his fellow’s property,

or from an invading army

the military force,

or from bandits

who robbed his fellow—if

the owners despaired,

so that it is explicitly known to us that they despaired of their property, for example, we heard them say, “Woe to us over the loss of money,”

these are his,

the rescuer’s.

And likewise, a swarm of bees,

a group of bees that flew from his fellow’s hive and entered his domain—

if they despaired

the owners, so that it is known to us that they despaired of them,

these are his.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka said: A woman or a minor is trusted to say, “From here this swarm emerged,”

and they must return the swarm to this person.

And he may walk through his fellow’s field

one from whose domain a swarm of bees emerged into his fellow’s field is permitted to enter his fellow’s field without permission in order

to rescue his swarm.

And if he caused damage

through his walking, to his fellow’s field,

he pays for what he damaged.

But he may not cut down his shelter in order to give the money.

If the bees settled on a branch of his fellow’s tree, he may not cut the branch in order to transfer the entire swarm intact into his domain, even if he intends to pay his fellow the value of the branch.

Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, says: He may even cut it

he is permitted to cut his fellow’s branch

and give the money

and pay him for it.

Gemara:

The tannay taught: If he took

from the tax collectors the donkey that they gave him in place of his own donkey,

he returns it to the original owners.

He must return it to its owners. And this beraita disputes our Mishna, which says, “These are his.”

And we explain the reasoning of the tanna of the beraita:

he holds: mere despair does not acquire—

despair alone does not acquire, and although the owners despaired of the donkey that was in the hands of the customs collector, the customs collector did not acquire the donkey.

And originally it came into his hand through a prohibition—

and when the donkey came into the hand of the second person, it came to him through a prohibition; therefore he is obligated to return it to the original owners.

And there are those who say

that the beraita also agrees that he is not obligated to return it as a matter of law, but the beraita holds that

if he comes to return it—

if he is pious and wishes to be stringent with himself—

he should return it to the

original

owners, and not to the customs collector.

What is the reason?

Because

mere despair does acquire.

And the customs collector acquired the donkey through despair, and it is permitted to take it from him.

However, if he says

if the one to whom the customs collector wishes to give another donkey wishes to be stringent with himself, and he says:

I do not want—

I do not wish—

property that is not mine; he returns it to the original owners.

We learned in the Mishna: Robbers took his garment and gave him another garment;

these are his, because the owners

despair of them.

Rav Ashi said: They taught this only

that the owners despair in the case of robbers

but

with

a gentile robber, but

with

an Israelite robber, not

the owners do not despair of them, because the owners

think: Tomorrow I will seize him in judgment—

since the robber is an Israelite, the owners hope that they will summon the robber to a Torah court and take the stolen property from him, and they do not despair.

Rav Yosef objected to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable!

Gentiles, who judge with force,

who judge in their courts with arrogance and force,

do not cause despair,

therefore, if the robber is a gentile, the owners do not despair, because they hope to summon the gentile to their court and they will take the stolen property from him by force. But an Israelite court,

since they merely say,

they only say to the robber, “Go out and give it to him,” and they do not beat him with sticks and compel him to return it,

causes despair—

therefore the owners despair of an Israelite robber?

Rather, if it was stated,

this statement of Rav Ashi,

it was stated concerning the latter clause

of the Mishna

it was stated.

For we learned in the latter clause of the Mishna:

One who saves property from gentiles and from robbers—

if the owners despaired, these are

his.

And we infer: only

if the owners despaired

—that we know explicitly that they despaired—

then

are these his; but

ordinarily,

if we do not know explicitly that they despaired,

not

do we say that, as a presumption, they despair of the robbers.

And concerning this Rav Ashi said:

They taught

that ordinarily they do not despair

only

with

gentile robbers, because they judge with force

—their courts forcibly compel the robber to return the stolen property—

but an Israelite robber, since they merely say,

they only say that he should return it and do not compel him,

causes despair—

the owners despair ordinarily, and it is not necessary for us to know with certainty that they indeed despaired.

We learned there

in tractate Kelim:

Hides belonging to a householder

who is not accustomed to sell his hides, but uses them himself and prepares them for various uses,

thought renders them impure

—if he thought to use his hides as they are, with no work remaining to be done to them, such as making a mat for a bed or a table, they immediately become susceptible to impurity, according to the law of an object whose work is finished.

But those belonging to a tanner

—hides of a craftsman who processes them for sale—

thought does not render them impure

—even though he thought to use them as they are, they are not yet susceptible to impurity, for if people come to buy these hides, he will sell them to them, and they will make shoes from them; consequently, the work on the hides is not yet finished.

Hides

belonging to a robber—thought does not render them impure

—the robber’s thought to use the stolen hides as they are is not effective to impose upon them the status of susceptibility to impurity, because the hides are not his, since in robbery the owners do not despair, as they know who the robber is and hope to summon him to judgment and take the stolen property from him. A person’s thought is not effective with regard to susceptibility to impurity in an object that is not his.

And hides

belonging to a thief—thought renders them impure

because in theft the owners despair, since they do not know who the thief is in order to summon him to judgment, and the thief acquires the hides through despair and they are his; therefore his thought concerning them is effective.

Rabbi Shimon says: The matters are reversed: those belonging to a robber—thought renders them impure

because in robbery the owners despair, since they know that the robber is a violent person who robbed him before his eyes and against whom they were unable to stand, and they have no hope of taking the stolen property from him. Therefore, the hides are his and his thought concerning them is effective.

But

those belonging to a thief—thought does not render them impure, because the owners did not despair

—they still hope to find the thief and summon him to judgment; therefore the hides are not his, and his thought concerning them is not effective for susceptibility to impurity.

Ulla said: The disagreement

between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon is only

in an ordinary case,

where we did not hear the owners despair: the first tanna holds that ordinarily theft involves the owners’ despair and ordinarily robbery does not involve the owners’ despair, while Rabbi Shimon holds the opposite—that ordinarily robbery involves despair and ordinarily theft does not involve despair.

But when it is known,

that we heard the owners despair,

everyone agrees that despair acquires.

Even a robber according to the Sages, and a thief according to Rabbi Shimon.

Rabba said: Even when it is known, there is a disagreement.

Even if we heard the owners despair, the Sages hold concerning a robber that this is not despair, because at every moment the owners intend to summon him to judgment and take the stolen property from him; and likewise Rabbi Shimon holds concerning a thief that this is not despair, because the owners always hope to find the thief and summon him to judgment.

Abaye said to Rabba: Do not disagree with Ulla.

Do not disagree with Ulla

! For we learned in the Mishna in accordance with him.

For we learned in the Mishna like him.

For in that same Mishna in which the Sages and Rabbi Shimon disagreed, it was stated in Rabbi Shimon’s words that the reason why in the case of theft there is no despair is

because the owners did not despair.

And we infer:

the reason

is that the entire reason is

because the owners did not despair; but if the owners despaired,

if it is known to us that they despaired, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that

these are his.

And this is explicitly in accordance with Ulla’s words!

He said to him,

Rabba to Abaye:

we

“because there is no despair for the owners”

expound it—

we interpret the Mishna as teaching that even if the owners despaired, their despair is not despair, since in their hearts they have still not despaired.

And we raise an objection:

We learned

in our Mishna:

If customs collectors took his donkey

and gave him another donkey, or robbers took his garment and gave him another garment, these are his, because the owners despair of them.

Yet a customs collector is a robber who takes openly, whereas a robber is a thief.

And we ask:

Who is it?

In accordance with which of the tannaim who disagreed as to whether theft involves the owners’ despair or robbery involves the owners’ despair does our Mishna hold?

If it is the Sages, there is a difficulty concerning the robber.

For the Sages hold that in the case of a robber the owners do not despair, whereas our Mishna says concerning a customs collector, who is a robber, that the owners despair of it?

And

if it is Rabbi Shimon, there is a difficulty concerning the thief.

For Rabbi Shimon holds that in the case of a thief the owners do not despair, whereas our Mishna says concerning a robber, who is a thief, that the owners despair?

Granted, according to Ulla, who said that

that

when it is known

that the owners despaired, everyone agrees that both in the case of a thief and in the case of a robber there is despair and

he acquires

the stolen property through despair. If so, it is possible to answer:

here too,

the Mishna is speaking

when it is known

that the owners despaired,

and it is the view of everyone.

But according to Rabba, who said that even

that even

when it is known

that the owners despaired, there is

also a disagreement

between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon, if so, there is a difficulty:

whose view is this?

Our Mishna is

neither the Sages nor Rabbi Shimon!

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking only of a robber. For the robber mentioned in our Mishna is not a thief who comes secretly; rather, the Mishna is speaking of

an armed robber

who is a robber who comes forcefully and openly.

And it is the view of Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that the owners despair in the case of a robber.

And we raise an objection:

If so, this is the same as a robber.

The Mishna has already taught the law of a robber, namely, the customs collector; why does the Mishna need to teach us the law of a robber again?

And we answer:

There are two types of robber.

The Mishna wishes to explain that there are two forms of robber: a customs collector and an armed robber.

And we raise an objection:

Come and hear:

it was taught in a beraita:

The thief, the robber, and the extortionist,

a person who takes by force but pays for what he takes, if they consecrated the stolen property, or separated teruma or tithe from it, then

their consecration is consecration,

the consecration takes effect upon the stolen property and it is forbidden to benefit from it,

and their teruma is teruma,

and it is forbidden for a non-koen to eat it,

and their tithes are tithe.

Yet only the owners can consecrate their property and separate teruma and tithe from their produce. And the beraita, which says that both the thief and the robber can consecrate and separate teruma and tithe from the stolen property, must necessarily be because it holds that in both cases the owners despair and they acquire the stolen property through despair.

And now there is a difficulty:

whose view is it?

In accordance with whose view does the beraita hold?

If it is the Sages, there is a difficulty concerning the robber,

how can he consecrate it, since the owners did not despair?

If it is Rabbi Shimon, there is a difficulty concerning the thief,

how can he consecrate it?

Granted, according to Ulla, who said, when it is known

that the owners despaired, everyone agrees that there is despair and

he acquires;

it is possible to answer:

here too,

the beraita is speaking

when it is known, and it is the view of everyone.

But according to Rabba, who said that even when it is known there is a disagreement,

there is a difficulty:

whose view is this—neither the Sages nor Rabbi Shimon?

And we answer:

here too,

the beraita also does not refer to an ordinary thief, but rather to

an armed robber,

who is a robber.

And it is the view of Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that in the case of a robber the owners despair.

And we raise an objection:

If so, this is the same as a robber!

The beraita has already mentioned the law of a robber? And we answer:

There are two types of robber.

The beraita teaches us that there is another form of robber, namely, an armed robber, who is also considered a robber.

And if you wish, say: This beraita

this beraita

is Rabbi’s,

who holds that both in the case of a thief and in the case of a robber the owners despair, and the thief mentioned in the beraita is always simply an ordinary thief.

For it was taught: Rabbi says: A thief

whose law

is like that of a robber

with regard to the owners’ despair.