Bava Kamma 107a — the Talmud in English

“For it is this” mentioned in the section of guardians":

“The intermingling of sections is written here”,

that is to say: a verse from another section became intermingled with this section,

and when it is written "

“For it is this”"

it is written regarding a loan,

to say: if he admitted to part and denied part, he is liable for an oath, and its place is in the section “If you lend money”; but with a deposit, he becomes liable for an oath even without an admission to part and a denial of part.

And we explain:

“And what is different about a loan,”

that is to say: why do we uproot the verse from its place and interpret it regarding a loan? Because with a deposit, logically there is reason to make him liable even when he denied everything, and only with a loan is there no reason to make him liable when he denied everything, and

as Rabbah [said: “There is a presumption that a person does not brazenly show his face before his creditor,” and for this reason he should be believed when he denied everything, for otherwise he would not brazenly deny everything before one who did him a favor; but with a deposit, where this reasoning does not apply, since the depositor did not do him a favor, it is therefore logical that the Torah made him liable for an oath even when he denied everything, as is explained in the continuation of the matter] —

who said: “It is presumed that a person does not brazenly display insolence in the presence of his creditor,” and for this reason he should be believed when he denies everything, since otherwise he would not brazenly deny everything in the presence of one who had done him a favor. But with regard to a deposit, this reasoning does not apply, since the depositor did not do him a favor; therefore, it is logical that the Torah made him liable to take an oath even when he denied everything, as will be explained later in the discussion]—

For Rabbah said:

“Why did the Torah say: One who admits to part of the claim

in a loan

shall take an oath,

when, since if he denied everything he is exempt, we ought to exempt him when he admitted to part, because he is like one who returns a lost object”?!

For

“there is a presumption that a person does not brazenly show his face before his creditor,”

who did him a favor,

and this one

truly

wanted to deny him everything,

[his intention was to deny everything],

and the fact that he did not deny him everything was because a person does not brazenly show his face,

and if so, he is not “one who returns a lost object.”

And Rabbah adds further: perhaps you will say, if he is suspected of stealing money, then he is also suspected regarding an oath, and what reason is there to make him take an oath?! And Rabbah explains that he is not regarded by us as suspected regarding money; rather, we are concerned lest:

“He wanted to admit everything to him,”

[his intention was to admit everything],

“and the fact that he denied him part”

was not with the intention of stealing, but

he thought,

the defendant:

“If I admit everything to him, he will sue me for everything,”

[if I admit everything, then the claimant will sue me for everything, and I do not have the means to pay him everything], and therefore:

“Let me evade him for now,”

[now I will evade him],

“until I have money”

“and I will pay,”

[until I have money with which to repay everything],

“therefore the Merciful One imposed an oath upon him”

[the Torah imposed an oath upon him]

“so that he would admit everything to him,”

[so that he would admit everything].

And here the Gemara returns to explain how, according to Rabbah’s words, it is understood that logically we should make him liable in a loan only when he admitted to part, but not with a deposit:

“And with regard to a loan, it is possible to say this,”

that “a person does not brazenly show his face before his creditor,” and therefore it is logical that the verse exempted him when he denied everything,

“but with regard to a deposit,”

where the depositor did not do him a favor,

“he brazenly shows his face, and brazenly shows his face,”

and therefore he should be made liable for an oath even when he denied everything regarding a deposit.

Rami bar Hama taught

[in accordance with Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba and not in accordance with Rav Hiyya bar Yosef]: