Bava Kamma 107a (קז.) — the Talmud in English

“Ki hu ze,” which is stated in the section concerning bailees":

An intermingling of passages is written here,

meaning: a verse from another section has been interposed in this section.

And when it is written "

“Ki hu ze”,"

it is written with regard to a loan,

meaning: if he admitted part of the claim and denied part of it, he is liable to take an oath; and its proper place is in the section beginning, “When you lend money to My people.” But with regard to a deposit, he becomes liable to take an oath even without admitting part and denying part.

And we explain:

And what is different with regard to a loan,

meaning: why do we uproot the verse from its place and interpret it with regard to a loan? This is because, with regard to a deposit, logic dictates that he should be liable even when he denied everything, whereas with regard to a loan, he should not be liable when he denied everything, and

in accordance with Rabbah [

who said: “It is presumed that a person does not brazenly display insolence in the presence of his creditor,” and for this reason he should be believed when he denies everything, since otherwise he would not brazenly deny everything in the presence of one who had done him a favor. But with regard to a deposit, this reasoning does not apply, since the depositor did not do him a favor; therefore, it is logical that the Torah made him liable to take an oath even when he denied everything, as will be explained later in the discussion]—

As Rabbah said:

Why did the Torah say: One who admits part of the claim

with regard to a loan

must take an oath,

when, since if he denied everything he would be exempt, we should exempt him when he admits part, because he is like one who returns a lost object!?

Because

it is presumed that a person does not brazenly display insolence in the presence of his creditor,

who had done him a favor,

and this one

in truth

wanted to deny everything, [

his intention was to deny everything],

but the reason that he did not deny it was that a person does not brazenly display insolence,

and therefore he is not “one who returns a lost object.”

Rabbah adds further: Perhaps you will say that if he is suspected of stealing money, then he is also suspected with regard to an oath; and what purpose is there in making him take an oath!? Rabbah explains that we do not consider him suspected with regard to money. Rather, we are concerned that perhaps:

He wanted to admit everything to him, [

his intention was to admit everything],

but the reason that he denied part of it

was not that he intended to steal, but rather

he thought,

the defendant:

If I admit everything to him, he will sue me for everything [

if I admit everything, the claimant will then sue me for the entire amount, and I do not have the means to pay him all of it]. Therefore:

Let me evade him for now [

now I will evade him],

until I have money

and repay him [

until I have enough money to repay the entire amount].

Therefore the Merciful One imposed an oath upon him [

the Torah imposed an oath upon him]

so that he would admit everything to him [

so that he would admit the entire amount].

Here the Gemara returns to explain how, according to Rabbah’s words, it follows logically that with regard to a loan we should make him liable only when he admitted part, but not with regard to a deposit:

And with regard to a loan, it is possible to say this

that “a person does not brazenly display insolence in the presence of his creditor,” and therefore it is logical that Scripture exempted him when he denied everything.

But with regard to a deposit,

where the depositor did not do him a favor,

he does brazenly display insolence,

and therefore he should be liable to take an oath even when he denied everything with regard to a deposit.

Rami bar Hama taught [according to Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba and not according to Rav Hiyya bar Yosef]:

[in accordance with Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba and not in accordance with Rav Hiyya bar Yosef]: