Bava Kamma 103a — the Talmud in English

Rather, Abaye said: This is what it is saying: One who purchases a field in the name of his fellow, the Reish Galuta,

so that they would not contest the sale,

the seller is not compelled to sell

by a deed in his name,

a second time,

in addition to the first deed that he wrote in the name of the Reish Galuta, in order to secure himself, so that the heirs of the Reish Galuta would not come later to claim the field for themselves.

And if he said to him

the purchaser to the seller, at the time of the sale,

on the condition

that you will write me an additional deed in my name, besides the first deed that was written in the name of the Reish Galuta,

the seller is compelled to sell

and to write a deed also in the name of the purchaser.

And the Gemara explains:

The Master said: One who purchases a field in the name of his fellow is not compelled to sell a second time.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious

that the seller is not obligated to write him a second deed, for he wrote him what was spoken of between them?

And we answer:

It might have been said: He can say to him

the purchaser to the seller,

You knew

you knew

that I was taking it for myself,

that in truth I purchased the field for myself,

and it was merely a protection [

a safeguard and protection alone]

that I established,

and therefore I made the transaction in the name of the Reish Galuta, in order to distance the challengers.

And I did not cast away my money for nothing,

and it was not my intention to lose my money by purchasing a field in the name of another person,

but on the understanding that he would write him another deed,

and I relied on the fact that you would write me another deed in my name.

It teaches us this: He said to him

the seller to the purchaser,

a condition [

a condition]

I made with you together with the one whose name you purchased it in,

you should have stipulated in advance with that person in whose name you purchased the field,

and he should write you another deed,

that he is selling it to you, and you have no legal claim or discussion with me.

And we explain further:

And if he said to him, “On the condition,” the seller is compelled to sell.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious

that if he stipulated with him in advance, he is obligated to fulfill his condition?

And we answer:

It is necessary only where he said to them

the purchaser

to the witnesses

in the presence of the seller,

“See that I am requesting another deed.”

And he did not stipulate this with the seller himself.

It might have been said: He can say to him

the seller to the purchaser,

“You were speaking of a deed from the one from whom you purchased it in his name,”

I thought that your intention was to demand from the person in whose name you purchased it that he write you a deed, and this does not obligate me.

It teaches us this: He said to him

the purchaser,

“For this reason I took the trouble and said to the witnesses”

that I want an additional deed in my name,

“before you” [

in your presence], because

“it is from you that I am requesting it”

that you write me a deed.

Rav Kahana gave money for flax,

he gave money to a merchant for flax, and after he purchased the flax, he left it with the seller.

In the end, the price of the flax rose.

Its owner sold it,

the owner of the flax sold it in order to give its money to Rav Kahana.

He came

Rabbi Kahana

before Rav. He said to him: What shall I do?

Whether

I should go and take my money

and there is no concern of interest in this.

He said to him

Rav,

“If, when he purchased it, he said” [

if at the time of the transaction the seller said]

“This flax belongs to Rav Kahana,” [

this flax belongs to Rav Kahana],

“go and take it,”

and there is no prohibition of interest in this.

But if not,

if the seller did not say to them that the flax belonged to Rav Kahana,

do not take

the addition in the price that Rav Kahana paid the seller, because of interest.

According to whom? According to the Westerners, who say: “Who informed the owner of the wheat that he should acquire wheat for the owner of the money?”

And the same is true in our case, where the purchasers did not intend to transfer the money to Rav Kahana, and it emerges that he received the money from the owner of the flax; and since he received more than he paid for the flax, this appears as interest.

And we challenge this:

Is it so that Rav Kahana gave four

on the condition of receiving money back,

and took eight,

which is interest?

For he was supposed to take from the seller only flax,

and the flax itself increased in price,

and when the owner of the flax sold it,

he robbed it,

for it was without authorization.

And we learned [

93b]

“All robbers pay according to the time of the robbery.”

If so, even if the purchasers did not intend to transfer the price of the flax to Rav Kahana, the owner of the flax is obligated to pay their value to Rav Kahana by virtue of being a robber, and according to the time of the robbery, when the flax was already expensive; and apparently there is no interest in this?

And we answer:

They said: There it was a purchase agreement,

when Rav Kahana gave the money for the flax, it was a price fixed with them, so that they would supply him with flax at the low market price throughout the year,

and Rav Kahana did not draw the flax,

and therefore Rav prohibited it.

And Rav follows his own reasoning [

according to his method],

for Rav said [

Bava Metzia 63a]:

“One may make a purchase agreement for produce, but one may not make a purchase agreement for money.”

It is permitted for a person to give money to produce merchants on the condition that they supply him with produce at a reduced price, but this is only if in the end he actually takes the produce; however, if, when he comes to take his produce, the seller says to him, “I will give you money equal to the value of the produce,” it is forbidden for him to accept it, because it appears as interest, since he receives more than he gave.

And the same is true in the case of Rav Kahana: since this was a purchase agreement for produce, Rav prohibited him from receiving more money than he had paid for it.

Mishna:

One who robs his fellow of the value of a peruta,

and when he demanded payment from him, the robber denied it,

and he swore to him,

about this. And afterward he admitted that he had robbed him and wished to return the robbery, he has no atonement until he returns it to the robbed person himself; but if he is not found before him,

he shall take it after him [

even]

to Media.

And in the Gemara they learned this from what is written [Leviticus 5], “To whom it belongs he shall give it.”

He shall not give it, neither to his son

of the robbed person,

nor to his agent

of the robbed person; and if he gave it to them and the money was lost, even through circumstances beyond his control, he has not attained atonement, and he must pay again.

But he may give it to an agent of the court

and this atones for him, even if it is lost on the way.

And if he died,

the robbed person,

he shall return it

the robbery

to his heirs.

If he gave him

to the robbed person

the principal, but did not give him the fifth,

which he became obligated to pay in addition to the principal, since he denied it and swore about it,

or the robbed person

forgave him the principal, but did not forgive him the fifth.

Or the robbed person

forgave him this and that,

that is, the principal and the fifth,

except for the value of a peruta of the principal,

which he did not forgive him,

he must go after him,

in order to fulfill the mitzva of return, even for part of the robbery, or for the fifth alone.

He gave him the principal,

after he had already sworn and become obligated to pay the principal and the fifth, and only the fifth remained owed. And when he demanded payment of the fifth from him, he denied it,

and swore to him regarding the fifth,

that he had already paid him.