Bava Kamma 102b — the Talmud in English

The Sages taught: One who gives money to his agent

in order that

he purchase for him

with it

wheat

and afterward, when he sells it, they will divide the profits.

And he purchased barley with it

without the knowledge of the sender.

Or he gave him money with which to purchase

barley, and he purchased wheat with it.

It was taught in one [beraita]

In one beraita we learned:

If they decreased,

the barley that he purchased became cheaper and its value decreased,

they decreased for him

the loss is the agent’s, and the owner of the money may claim all his money from the agent.

And if they increased

the barley or wheat that he purchased became more expensive,

they increased for him

the agent profits from this, and the owner of the money is not a partner in the profit.

And one [beraita] teaches,

whereas in another beraita we learned:

If they decreased, they decreased for him,

the loss belongs to the agent alone,

and if they increased

if what he purchased became more expensive,

they increased for the middle

the owner of the money is a partner in the profits.

It follows that this beraita contradicts what was stated in the previous beraita, that the profits belong to the agent alone? And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is not difficult; this

first beraita is according to

Rabbi Meir, and this

other beraita is according to

Rabbi Yehuda.

And we explain:

This

beraita, which said that if they increased, they increased for the agent, follows

Rabbi Meir, who says that a change effects acquisition,

and therefore when he purchased with the money something to which the owner of the money did not consent, it is like robbery in his possession, and he acquired it through the change, so whatever became more expensive belongs to him.

And this

the beraita that said that if they increased, they increased for the middle, follows the view of

Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a change does not effect acquisition.

What he purchased belongs to the owner of the money; therefore, if they increased, the profit is divided between them, as was stipulated originally. But if they decreased, the owner of the money is not a partner in the loss, because he can say to the agent: Since you deviated from my instructions, you are not my agent in this matter, and the entire loss is yours.

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection against this: From where

do we know this assumption, that according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that a change effects acquisition, the profit belongs to the agent?

Perhaps Rabbi Meir said

that a change effects acquisition

only with regard to an item suitable for his body,

when he was sent to purchase an object with the money in order to use it, for then he becomes a robber with regard to the money, since it was not given to him to purchase merchandise and profit from it, and the purchase of the object constitutes a change that effects acquisition; therefore, whatever increased belongs to him.

But

when he purchased wheat or barley

for commerce,

although he deviated from the owner’s instructions, this is not robbery, since he did not take it for himself,

Rabbi Meir did not say

that the agent acquires it, since there is no change here. If so, it is difficult: Why, if they increased, did they increase for the middle?

And we answer:

Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: Both this and that

the two beraitot are according to the view of

Rabbi Meir, and it is not difficult.

Here,

the beraita in which it was stated that if they increased, they increased for him, concerns a case in which the agent purchased barley with the money

for eating.

Since he deviated from the owner of the money’s instructions, this is robbery, and the object that he purchased is different and is acquired by the agent; therefore, the profit belongs to him.

Here,

the beraita in which it is written that if they increased, they increased for the middle, concerns a case in which he purchased barley with the money

for commerce,

and there is no change in the object of the purchase itself. Therefore, if they increased, they divide the profits.

They mocked this in the West

the amoraim in the Land of Israel raised difficulties.

To Rabbi Yohanan,

who resolved the contradiction between the beraitot by saying that they dispute the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir, according to his words,

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that a change does not effect acquisition, the fact that whatever increased is divided between the owner of the money and the agent is difficult:

But did the seller of the wheat inform him that he should acquire wheat for the owner of the money

and not for the agent? Surely he thought that the agent was the owner of the money, and his intention was to transfer ownership to him alone; and since according to Rabbi Yohanan there is no agency here, the owner of the money has no right to claim a partnership in the profit?

Text missing—perhaps this note is note 5, and all the notes shifted backward because of it, until the next place where we wrote that

text is missing.)

Rav Shmuel bar Sasrati raised an objection against this.

If so,

if we require the owner of the wheat’s intention to transfer ownership to the owner of the money, and without such intention the owner of the money does not acquire it, then

even

if he sent him to purchase

wheat

and he purchased

wheat as well, it will not

be effective as an acquisition, and the entire profit will belong to the agent. Yet the beraita implies that only when he purchased wheat instead of barley does the owner of the money not receive the profit, whereas when he did not deviate from his agency, he is obligated to divide the profit with the owner of the money?

Rabbi Abbahu said: It is different

when he sent him to purchase

wheat

and he purchased

wheat,

for the intention of the transferor to transfer ownership to the agent is sufficient, because

he is performing his agency, and therefore the agent

is

considered like the master of the house.

This is not so when he purchased barley, for he is not the agent of the owner of the money; the owner of the money does not acquire it if the owner of the wheat did not intend to transfer ownership to him.

Know

a proof that when the purchase is made through the purchaser’s agency, the seller’s intention toward the sender is not necessary,

as we learned [A0107]]in Arakhin 24a:

in Arakhin 24a:

One who consecrates

all

his property,

and likewise

one who assesses himself [A0113]]who said, “My assessment is upon me,” and the Temple treasurer came to take security from him, since all his property is liened for this debt,

and the Temple treasurer comes to seize property from him, since all his property is pledged for this debt,

does not have

the treasurer the right of collection

from his wife’s clothing or from his children’s clothing,

since these are not included in his property. The same law applies to one who consecrates his property, for these garments are not included in his property.

Nor from the dyed material that

the artisan

dyed for the sake

of his wife and children,

nor from new sandals that he purchased for their sake,

and they had not yet used them, for neither the dyed material nor the sandals are included in his property for his assessment or for consecration.

And why

are they not included in his property?

Let us say here as well: Who informed the dyer that he should acquire the dyed material for the woman?

Since he did not intend this, the dyed material does not belong to his wife and children; why, then, should consecration not take effect upon the dyed material?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the dyed material is acquired for his wife and children

because we say

that when the husband gave the money,

he is performing his agency, and he is considered like his wife’s hand,

and the dyer who intends to transfer ownership to the husband is considered as intending to transfer ownership to the wife,

here too,

the agent who purchases wheat on behalf of the owner of the money

is performing his agency and is considered like the master of the house’s hand,

and it is unnecessary that the owner of the wheat intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money; it is sufficient that he transfers ownership to the agent.

And we reject this:

Rabbi Abba said: No,

there is no proof from here, because

everyone who consecrates his property does not have his intention

at the time of consecration

for his wife’s and children’s clothing,

and they are not included in the consecration at all, even though they are included in his property. It is possible that with agency as well, the purchase is acquired for the sender only when the transferor intends this.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection against this

on the basis that what a person does not intend to include in consecration, even when he did not explicitly exclude it from consecration, is not subject to consecration.

But does a person have his intention upon his phylacteries

? Surely he needs to use them and put them on.

And we learned [A0150]]in Arakhin 23b:

in Arakhin 23b:

One who consecrates his property, they assess his phylacteries for him,

they appraise the phylacteries for the amount required to redeem them, because consecration takes effect upon them as well, despite the fact that a person does not intend to consecrate his phylacteries, since he needs to use them. This implies that even with regard to something that he does not intend to consecrate, if he did not explicitly exclude it from consecration, consecration takes effect upon it, and this is unlike Rabbi Abba?

Abaye said to him: Yes [A0154]]indeed,

—indeed so—

a person’s intention,

when he consecrates his property, is

also upon phylacteries,

because

one who consecrates his property reasons: I am performing a mitzva.

By consecrating the phylacteries I am thereby performing a mitzva; therefore, consecration takes effect upon the phylacteries.

And a person does not have his intention

when he consecrates his property

for his wife’s and children’s clothing,

although through this as well he would perform a mitzva,

because of hostility,

so that they would have a grievance against him.

Rav Oshaya raised an objection against this: But here they taught those liable for assessments

in this Mishna, for it says in it, “And likewise one who assesses himself”; and according to what Rabbi Abba explained, the taking effect of assessments also depends on the intention of the one who assesses himself.

And we learned [A0170]]in Arakhin 21a:

in Arakhin 21a:

Those liable for assessments, security is taken from them

if they do not wish to pay. And if we say that consecration and assessments depend on his intention, this is astonishing:

But does a person have his intention upon himself

at the time of the assessment

to take security from him?

Surely he does not have such an intention, and it follows that his intention does not determine this, unlike Rabbi Abba?

Rather, Rabbi Abba said:

Everyone who consecrates his property is considered as though he had transferred ownership of his wife’s and children’s clothing to them from the outset,

the Sages assessed the consecrator’s intention as his desire to transfer ownership of their clothing to his wife and children. Since he firmly intended to transfer ownership in a clear manner, his thought is effective, and it is considered acquired by them even though they did not perform an act of acquisition; consecration does not take effect upon it.

The Sages taught: One who purchases a field

for himself, but tells the seller that he is purchasing

in the name of his fellow, they do not compel him to sell.

And if he said to him

to the seller

on the condition, they compel him to sell.

And the Gemara explains:

What is he saying?

Rav Sheshet said: This is what he is saying: One who purchases a field from his fellow

for himself, and in order that people should not come to challenge the sale, he told the seller that he was purchasing it for the Resh Galuta, who was an important person and from whom people were afraid. And the seller wrote the document

in the name of the Resh Galuta.

They do not compel the Resh Galuta to sell

and to write a deed of sale stating that he sold it to the purchaser. [And below it will be explained to whom the field belongs.]

And if he said

the purchaser said to the seller

on the condition

that afterward the Resh Galuta would write him a deed stating that he was selling it to me,

they compel the Resh Galuta to sell,

and to write him a deed to that effect.

And we explain:

The Master said: One who purchases a field in the name of the Resh

Galuta, they do not compel the Resh Galuta to sell.

By inference,

from the fact that they do not compel the Resh Galuta to sell, it follows

that he acquires it for him

the field is acquired by the purchaser, but this does not obligate the Resh Galuta to write a deed to that effect.

Shall we say that it disagrees

Can it be proved from here that the beraita disagrees with the reasoning

of the people of the West, who say: “Who informed the owner of the wheat that he should acquire wheat for the owner of the house?”,

and the same law applies here: the owner of the field intended to transfer ownership to the Rish Galuta, and did not know that the buyer intended to acquire it for himself; if so, the acquisition does not take effect for the owner of the money, and it follows that the beraita disagrees and holds that even without the seller’s intention, the purchase is acquired by the owner of the money?

And we answered:

If because of this, it is not difficult,

for it is possible to establish the beraita

in a case where he informed

the buyer

the owner of the field

that his intention was to acquire it for himself,

and he informed them

also

the witnesses [to the witnesses of the sale]

that the acquisition was for the buyer, and the Rish Galuta served only as a cover, in order to cast fear upon the claimants; but if the buyer did not inform the seller of his intention, indeed he does not acquire it, in accordance with the reasoning of the people of the West.

And we objected:

Rather, say the latter clause:

if the buyer said to the seller

on condition

that the Rish Galuta sell it to me,

they compel the Rish Galuta to sell.

Why

do they compel him,

and let the Rish Galuta say: “I do not want your honor” [I have no desire for the honor with which you honor me],

[I have no interest in the honor with which you honor me],

“and I do not want your disgrace” [nor the disgrace resulting from this, as though I had become a dealer in land]; and how does the statement “on condition” obligate the Rish Galuta to write him a deed of sale for the field?

[nor the disgrace that results from it, as though I had become a dealer in real estate]. How, then, does the phrase “on the condition” obligate the Exilarch to write him a deed of sale for the field?