Bava Kamma 102a — the Talmud in English

Ordinary wood,

even wood for illumination,

is designated for kindling,

and its ordinary use is to benefit from the heat of the coals and not to illuminate with it at the time of burning it. Therefore, even if it happened that it was used for the purpose of light, it is not considered something whose benefit and elimination occur simultaneously, and for this reason ordinary wood does not have the sanctity of the seventh year. However, wood used as dyeing materials does have the sanctity of the seventh year, since its benefit is at the time of its being consumed. But with regard to vine leaves, which have a dual use, for kindling and for eating, their sanctity depends on the intention of the one who gathers them.

Rav Kahana said: And wood for kindling

whether it has the sanctity of the seventh year when it is wood for illumination, or not, since ordinary wood is designated for kindling—this is a

dispute among tannaim.

For it was taught in a beraita: One may not give seventh-year produce,

such as seventh-year wine,

neither for soaking,

to soak flax in it,

nor for washing,

to wash clothing with it, since one does not benefit from the wine by way of eating and drinking, whereas the Torah said: “For eating,” and not for commerce. Therefore, every profit or use that is not in the manner of eating is prohibited by virtue of this derivation.

This law applies even if, at the time of gathering from the vineyard, the gatherer intended the grapes to make them into wine for the purpose of soaking flax or washing clothing—a use whose benefit and elimination do not occur simultaneously [the wine spoils immediately when flax is soaked in it, and likewise when a garment is placed in it]. By virtue of such a use, the sanctity of the seventh year should not have applied to the wine. Nevertheless, it does apply to it, since ordinary wine is designated for drinking, whose benefit and elimination occur simultaneously, and from the time of the fruit’s formation it is designated for eating [and this is not comparable to vine leaves, which from the beginning of their growth are designated for the two uses].

According to the Sages, one should state the opposite side as well: even wood for illumination is not considered according to the use of light, since in its ordinary state it is designated from the time of its growth for kindling and not for illumination. Therefore wood—even wood for illumination—does not have the sanctity of the seventh year.

And Rabbi Yosei says:

One does not say that ordinary produce is designated for eating, in order to remove from it the possibility of designating it for washing and soaking. Rather, if it happened that one gathered the grapes from the vineyard in order to make wine from them for soaking flax or washing clothing, these fruits are defined as fruits whose benefit and elimination do not occur simultaneously, and they do not have the sanctity of the seventh year. And according to him:

One may put seventh-year produce into soaking and into washing.

According to him, the same is true of wood for illumination: if one gathered it for the purpose of burning it for light, it has the sanctity of the seventh year, since one gathered it for a use whose benefit and elimination occur simultaneously.

And now the Gemara explains the reason for the dispute.

What is the reason of the Rabbis?

The verse says: “For eating,” and not for soaking. “For eating,” and not for washing.

And Rabbi Yosei says: The verse says: “For you,”

and the verse thereby includes that seventh-year produce was given

for all your needs.

But the Rabbis also have, “For you,”

which implies for all your needs?

And the Gemara explains: The Rabbis expound

“For you” in a manner analogous to “for eating,” with regard to something whose benefit and elimination are equal. So soaking and washing are excluded, whose benefit

is

after their elimination.

For the wine spoils immediately upon the flax or garment being placed in it, whereas the action of the wine with regard to the flax or garment takes place afterward.

But Rabbi Yosei also has, “For eating”!?

He can say to you: That “for eating”

Но и рабби Йоси — ведь в стихе написано «для еды»?!

is needed for

to expound from it,

as it was taught:

For it was taught in a beraita: “For eating,” and not for a poultice [a medicine],

even though its benefit and elimination occur simultaneously, and according to the reason that will be explained below.

You say

that the verse’s exclusion is

“for eating,” and not for a poultice; or perhaps it is only “for eating,” and not for washing.

When it says “for you,” washing is stated

as permitted

. What, then, do I establish “for eating” as meaning? For eating, and not for a poultice!

And what did you see to include washing and exclude a poultice?

I include washing, which is equal for every person, and I exclude a poultice, which is not equal for every person,

but only for a sick person.

And the Gemara explains:

In accordance with whom does that which was taught in a beraita go: “For eating,” and not for a poultice; “for eating,” and not for sprinkling,

wine in the house for the sake of its scent,

“for eating,” and not to make from it an apiktuizin

[a laxative medicine]?

In accordance with whom,

necessarily

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei. For if it were in accordance with the Rabbis, soaking and washing would also be included

among those that were excluded.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the enhancement, and so on:

(Mnemonic: Saban.)

Rav Yosef was sitting behind Rabbi Abba, before Rav Huna.

And Rav Huna was sitting and saying

two laws: the first,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha

in his dispute with the Sages [concerning the matter that will be explained in the Gemara below],

and

the second,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

in our Mishna.

Rav Yosef turned his face away,

Rav Yosef turned his head backward in anger, and

said: Granted,

with regard to what Rav Huna said, that the halakha is in accordance with

Rabbi Yehoshua ben

Korkha,

it is proper that Rav Huna

needed

to make this known to us, because

it might have entered your mind

that one should rule not in accordance with him, since it is established for us that in a dispute between

an individual and the many, the halakha is in accordance with the many,

and therefore

he teaches us

Rav Huna that nevertheless here

the halakha is in accordance with the individual.

And, parenthetically, the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha—

what is it?

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha says:

If a Jew lent money to a gentile, if this was

a loan by document, one may not collect from him

close to the days of their festivals [the days of the gentiles’ holidays]. For such a loan, with regard to which the Jew has a document against the gentile, weighs upon the gentile, since he cannot evade repaying it. And when he repays it, he rejoices. Therefore, if the Jew collects his debt from the gentile before the festival, there is concern that he thereby causes the gentile to go on the day of the festival to the house of idolatry, in order to give thanks to the idolatry for his release from the burden of the debt. But if this was

an oral loan,

which does not weigh upon the gentile,

one may collect from him

even close to the days of their festivals,

because he is like one rescuing from their hands.

That is, collecting a debt from a gentile against which there is no document is merely an act of rescue and not collection of a debt, since the gentile does not rejoice that he has now merited repaying the debt, as he had the ability not to pay the debt at all.

But

with regard to what Rav Huna added and said,

“the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda”—

why do I need

him to make this known to us?

And

this dispute is,

“a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling,”

for at first it is taught here as a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir, and afterward Rabbi Yehuda’s view is taught as an anonymous Mishna [as the Gemara will explain immediately],

and

we have an established halakhic principle that wherever we have learned

a dispute, and afterward

then

we have learned

an anonymous ruling

in accordance with the view of one of the disputants,

the halakha is in accordance with the anonymous ruling.

And now the Gemara explains how this dispute was taught as a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling:

A dispute—

here,

in

tractate

Bava Kamma.

For we learned in our Mishna:

If he instructed him to dye it red and he dyed it black, or black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: He gives him the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the enhancement is greater than the expense, he gives him the expense; and if the expense is greater than the enhancement, he gives him the enhancement.

And

afterward we learned in the Mishna

an anonymous ruling,

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

in Bava Metzia.

For we learned:

A.

Anyone who alters—

his hand is on the lower side.

B.

And anyone who retracts, his hand is on the lower side.

Thus, there we learned in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that anyone who alters has his hand on the lower side!

And now the Gemara explains Rav Huna’s reason:

And Rav Huna needed

to make known to us that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, because

it might have entered your mind

that

“there is no order to the Mishna,”

and it is possible that the Mishna in Bava Metzia was taught first,

and

if so, it is possible that

“an anonymous ruling and afterward a dispute”

is the case, and in an anonymous ruling and afterward a dispute the halakha is not in accordance with the anonymous ruling, since once Rabbi later repeated the dispute, this indicates that the halakha is not in accordance with the anonymous ruling.

And Rav Yosef,

who was strict, holds:

If so,

if it is possible that the Mishna in Bava Metzia was taught first, this should be difficult regarding the very principle:

With regard to every dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling, let us say there is no order to the Mishna, and it is an anonymous ruling and afterward a dispute!

Rather, necessarily there is an order to the Mishna, and therefore it is obvious to us that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, for we learned in tractate Bava Metzia an anonymous Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, after we learned here his dispute with Rabbi Meir.

And Rav Huna

holds

that we do not say, “There is no order to the Mishna” [that is, rather, there is an order to the Mishna]

that is, rather, there is an order to the Mishna,

within one tractate,

and there it is said that the halakha follows a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling.

But in two tractates, we say,

“there is no order to the Mishna,” and therefore it is possible that the Mishna in tractate Bava Metzia was indeed taught before the Mishna here, and here we do not have the principle “a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling—the halakha is in accordance with the anonymous ruling.”

And

whereas

Rav Yosef

holds that

all of it,

all the tractates in the Order of

Nezikin, are one tractate.

And the principle applies to them that a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling—the halakha is in accordance with the anonymous ruling.

And if you wish, say:

Rav Yosef, too, can hold that the tractates in the Order of Nezikin are separate tractates, and consequently one cannot prove the principle “a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling” from two tractates, because in two tractates there is no order to the Mishna. And Rav Yosef’s anger at Rav Huna was

because he taught it

as Rabbi Yehuda’s view in the Mishna in tractate Bava Metzia

with regard to “a definitive halakhic ruling,”

which implies there that the tannay came to make known several definitive laws, since he lists two different laws: one,

anyone who alters, his hand is on the lower side.

And the second,

and anyone who retracts, his hand is on the lower side,

and therefore it is obvious that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.