Bava Batra 85b — the Talmud in English

Is it not referring to the public domain

as it states, “this is the public domain,”

literally—and learn from it that even in the actual public domain, a person’s vessels acquire for him, unlike Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu!?

And we reject this:

And we reject this:

No:

the public domain that it states is

a side-street,

and in a side-street everyone agrees that his vessels acquire for him.

And we raise an objection:

but

the public domain that it states is

analogous to a courtyard that belongs to neither of them

is it not!?

And just as a courtyard that belongs to neither of them is a domain in which they do not have permission to place their objects, so too, in the “public domain” that we learned in the beraita—they do not have permission to place their objects; and this is the actual public domain, and not a side-street!

And we answer:

What does “a courtyard that belongs to neither of them” also

mean, as it states?

It belongs entirely neither to this one, nor entirely to that one

—it is not the domain of the seller alone, and not the domain of the buyer alone—

but belongs to both of them,

for it is the courtyard of partners, and each of them has permission to place his objects there.

And “the domain of many,” analogous to the courtyard of partners, means a side-street; but in the actual public domain his vessels do not acquire for him.

He asked

—he questioned—

Rav Sheshet asked Rav Huna:

When

the buyer’s vessels

are

in the domain

of the

seller,

and the seller placed the sold object in that vessel, does the

buyer

acquire

acquire it,

as though the object being acquired entered the buyer’s courtyard and domain?

Or not

does the buyer not acquire, since the vessel is subordinate to the seller’s domain, and the object is not found in the buyer’s domain?

He said to him

Rav Huna said to Rav Sheshet:

You have learned it;

one can learn from a Mishna in Gittin that the buyer’s vessels acquire for him even in the seller’s domain:

It is stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 24:1]: “When a man takes a woman and possesses her, and it comes to pass, if she does not find favor in his eyes because he has found in her a matter of nakedness, then he shall write for her a scroll of severance, and place it in her hand, and send her from his house.”

And the Sages received that it is not necessary to give the bill of divorce [the scroll of severance] specifically into her hand; even if he gave the bill of divorce in her domain, she is divorced.

We learned in Tractate Gittin [77a]: A husband who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife and

threw it to her,

threw the bill of divorce to her,

into her lap

or into her basket

—a basket into which women put needles and spindles—even though she is standing inside her husband’s courtyard,

she is divorced.

It entered our minds: The basket is lying on the ground, and from the fact that she is divorced even though her basket is in her husband’s domain, one can learn that a person’s vessels acquire for him even in the seller’s domain. Therefore, also with regard to divorce: the basket acquires for her, and the bill of divorce is in her domain, even though she is in her husband’s courtyard.

Rav Naḥman said

to Rav Huna:

What is the reason you resolved

Rav Sheshet’s doubt

from that

from that Mishna? For from there it is impossible to prove anything at all,

for

already

they struck it with a hundred measures in a measure,

that is, they had already rejected this proof with many refutations.

And these are the refutations with which they rejected this proof: a.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

What we learned—that the basket acquires for her—

is when her basket was hanging from her,

and it is not dragging on the ground; therefore her basket acquires for her, for it is similar to lifting, which acquires everywhere.

b.

And Resh Lakish said:

It is sufficient for us that her basket is

tied

to her,

even though it is not hanging from her—

her basket acquires for her.

c.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

Even if the basket is neither hanging in the air nor tied to her, nevertheless the basket acquires the bill of divorce for her, so that she will be divorced through it,

for example, when her basket was placed between her thighs,

for although her basket is resting on the ground, the husband is not particular about the place where his wife sits, and until now that place had been acquired by her. d.

Rav Mesharshiya, son of Rabbi Ami, said:

Wherever her basket is found, she is divorced, because the Mishna was speaking

of a case where her husband was selling baskets,

and in that courtyard where all the baskets are found, he is not particular about their location.

e.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Wherever her basket is found, if the husband threw the bill of divorce into her basket, she is divorced, because as long as she is in his house,

the

place

of a woman’s lap

is

is acquired by her,

and

the place of her basket is acquired

by her.

He said,

he explained,

Rava: What is the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan?

since a person is not particular about either the place of his wife’s bosom

of his wife,

or about the place of her basket.

Rather, clarify for him

your question,

from this

from what we learned in the beraita above, and learn from it that he does not acquire:

For we learned that if the vessel was

in the seller’s domain, he did not acquire

the buyer

until he lifted it

the measuring vessel,

or until he removed it from his domain

of the seller, and pulled it to a place where pulling effects acquisition.

Is it not [

is it not referring in the beraita to every vessel, and even]

to the buyer’s vessels?

If so, we have learned that if the buyer’s vessel was in the seller’s domain, the buyer did not acquire.

We reject this:

and we refute it:

No,

the beraita was speaking

of the seller’s vessels,

therefore the buyer did not acquire until he lifted it or pulled it into his domain, for it did not leave the seller’s domain at all.

But if it was the buyer’s vessel, the buyer acquired even in the seller’s domain, since the vessel is the buyer’s domain, and it is not nullified to the domain in which it is located.

And

the Gemara proves from the final clause: for

since the beginning [

if the beginning] speaks

of the seller’s vessels, the final clause also

speaks

of the seller’s vessels.

Come and consider the final clause,

for we learned in the final clause of the beraita:

in the buyer’s domain—

once the seller has accepted it upon himself, the buyer acquires.

And if you think to say: the vessel is not nullified to the domain in which it is located, then just as the buyer acquired in the seller’s domain through his vessels, so too the buyer should not acquire even in his own domain if the object is in the seller’s vessels, since the seller’s vessels are the seller’s domain.

And if

the final clause is speaking

of the seller’s vessels,

even in the buyer’s domain,

why did the buyer acquire

when the seller accepted it upon himself, when the object still had not left the seller’s domain!?

Rather, necessarily the vessel is nullified to the domain in which it is located, and the law is determined according to the domain. Therefore, in the seller’s house the buyer did not acquire, even with the buyer’s vessels, and in the buyer’s house the buyer acquired, even with the seller’s vessels.

And we reject this: there is no proof from here, for although the beginning speaks of the seller’s vessels, nevertheless in the

final clause we have come [

we have come]

to

speak of

the buyer’s vessels,

and we ask:

And what certainty is there!?

Is it a definite and clear matter that in the seller’s house they always measure with the seller’s vessels, and in the buyer’s house they measure with the buyer’s vessels!?

And we answer: indeed,

the ordinary presumption of the matter

is so

! In the

house of

the seller—

the seller’s vessels are commonly found,

and in the

buyer’s house—

the buyer’s vessels are commonly found.

Since the seller’s vessels are found in the seller’s house, therefore we learned: in the seller’s domain he did not acquire until he lifted it or removed it from his domain, because the seller’s vessels are the seller’s domain, and the buyer does not acquire in them.

And since the buyer’s vessels are found in the buyer’s house, therefore we learned: in the buyer’s domain—that is, in the buyer’s vessels—once the seller accepted it upon himself and consented to the sale, immediately the buyer acquired, since the buyer’s vessels are his domain, and a person’s vessels acquire for him.

And even if the seller’s vessel were in the buyer’s domain, the law would be so: the buyer would not acquire until he lifted it or removed it from the seller’s domain, that is, from his vessels.

And even if the buyer’s vessel were in the seller’s domain, the law would be so: immediately when the seller accepted it upon himself, the buyer acquired.

And we did not learn in the beraita “the seller’s domain” and “the buyer’s domain” because of the location of the vessel, but because of the vessel itself, because in the seller’s domain they generally measure with the seller’s vessels, and in the buyer’s domain they generally measure with the buyer’s vessels.

Rava said: Come and hear

from a beraita that the buyer does not acquire with his vessels that are located in the seller’s domain:

One whose donkey drivers and workers were carrying the grain of another person on them, and he

pulled

his

donkey drivers and workers

and brought them into his house

in order to purchase the grain from the owners.

He has not acquired the grain.

Not through the fact that he pulled his donkey drivers and workers, for he pulled human beings, and pulling a person carrying produce is not effective for acquiring the produce. And not through the fact that the workers entered his house, since the grain was resting upon human beings, and not upon the buyer’s ground.

Therefore,

whether

if

the buyer fixed

the price of the grain with the seller,

before [

still not]

he measured

the grain and placed it in his domain.

and whether

if

he measured

the buyer, and the grain was placed in his domain,

before he fixed the price,

and the seller and the buyer had still not fixed the price of the grain between themselves.

Then

both of them are able to retract.

If he fixed the price but did not measure, they are able to retract, since the buyer still had not performed an acquisition act with regard to his purchase.

And if he measured but did not fix the price, they are able to retract, since they still had not made up their minds to sell and purchase, as will be explained below in the Gemara.