Bava Batra 85b (פה:) — the Talmud in English

Does this not mean, in the public domain

as it is taught, that is the public domain

itself—

and learn from here that even in the actual public domain, a person’s vessels acquire an item for him, contrary to the opinions of Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Abbahu!?

And we reject this:

No.

The public domain that it teaches means

a side street,

and in a side street, everyone agrees that his vessels acquire an item for him.

And we raise an objection:

But

the public domain that it teaches

is analogous to a courtyard that belongs to neither of them

!?

Just as a courtyard that belongs to neither of them is a domain in which they have no permission to place their possessions, so too, the “public domain” that we learned in the beraita is a domain in which they have no permission to place their possessions. That is the actual public domain, and not a side street!

And we resolve:

What does the courtyard that belongs to neither of them also

mean,

as it teaches: It belongs entirely neither to this one nor entirely to that one

—it is not the domain of the seller alone, nor the domain of the buyer alone—

but belongs to both of them

for it is the courtyard of partners, and each of them has permission to place his possessions there.

And the domain of the many, which is analogous to the courtyard of partners, means a side street; but in the actual public domain, a person’s vessels do not acquire an item for him.

[Rav Sheshet] asked

[him; he asked]

Rav Huna:

When

the buyer’s vessel

is

in the domain

of the

seller, and the seller placed

the sold item in that vessel, does

the

acquire

buyer

acquire it, as though the purchased item had entered the buyer’s courtyard and domain?

Or does he not

acquire it—the buyer, since the vessel is subordinate to the seller’s domain, and the item is not located in the buyer’s domain?

He said to him

Rav Huna to Rav Sheshet:

You have learned its answer.

One can derive from a Mishna in Gittin that the buyer’s vessels acquire an item for him even in the seller’s domain:

It is stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 24:1]: “When a man takes a wife and lives with her, and it happens that she does not find favor in his eyes because he has found in her an indecent matter, and he writes her a bill of divorce, places it in her hand, and sends her from his house.”

And the Sages received as a tradition that it is not necessary to place the bill of divorce [the document of severance] specifically in the woman’s hand; even if he placed the bill of divorce in her domain, she is divorced. Gittin 77a.

We learned in tractate Gittin [77a]: If a husband who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife

threw it to her

—he threw the bill of divorce to her—

into her lap

or into her basket

[a basket into which women place needles and spindles], even though she is standing in her husband’s courtyard,

she is divorced.

It initially entered our minds that the basket was resting on the ground. Since she is divorced even though her basket is in her husband’s domain, one can derive that a person’s vessels acquire an item for him even in the seller’s domain. Therefore, with regard to divorce as well, the basket acquires the bill of divorce for her, and the bill of divorce is in her domain even though she is in her husband’s courtyard.

Rav Naḥman said

to Rav Huna:

For what reason did you resolve

Rav Sheshet’s uncertainty

from that

Mishna? Nothing at all can be proved from there,

for

they have already

struck it a hundred times with an ukhla

—that is, they have already rejected this proof with many refutations.

And these are the refutations with which they rejected this proof: a.

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

What we learned—that the basket acquires the bill of divorce for her—

is when the basket was suspended from her

and was not dragging on the ground. Therefore, the basket acquires it for her, as this resembles acquisition by lifting, which acquires an item everywhere.

b.

And Reish Lakish said:

It is sufficient that her basket be

tied

to her,

even though it is not suspended from her—

her basket acquires the bill of divorce for her.

c.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

Even if the basket is neither suspended in the air nor tied to her, nevertheless, her basket acquires the bill of divorce for her, enabling her to be divorced,

when her basket was resting between her thighs

for although the basket is resting on the ground, the husband does not object to the place where his wife sits, and until now that place had been acquired by her. d.

Rav Mesharsheya, son of Rabbi Ami, said:

Wherever her basket is located, she is divorced, because the Mishna was speaking

when her husband was selling baskets;

in the courtyard where all the baskets were located, he did not object to their placement.

e.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Wherever her basket is located, if the husband throws the bill of divorce into her basket, she is divorced, because as long as she is in his house,

the place

of a woman’s lap

is

acquired by her,

and

the place of her basket is acquired

by her.

He said—

he explained—

Rava: What is the reason for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling?

Because no person is particular about the place of his wife's bosom

or

about the place of her basket.

Rather, clarify for her

your question:

from this

from what we learned in the aforementioned beraita, and learn from it that he does not acquire:

For we learned that if the vessel was

in the seller's possession, the buyer does not acquire it

until

until he lifts it

the measuring vessel,

or until he removes it from his possession

of the seller, and pulls it to a place where pulling effects acquisition.

Is it not [

does this beraita not refer to every vessel, even]

the buyer's vessel?

If so, we have learned that if the buyer’s vessel was in the seller’s domain, the buyer did not acquire.

If so, we learn that if the buyer's vessel was in the seller's possession, the buyer does not acquire it.

And we reject this:

No,

the beraita refers to

the seller's vessel,

and therefore the buyer does not acquire it until he lifts it or pulls it into his domain, since it has not left the seller's possession at all.

But if it was the buyer's vessel, the buyer acquires it even in the seller's domain, since the vessel is the buyer's domain and is not subsumed into the domain in which it is located.

And

the Gemara proves this from the latter clause: for

since the first clause [

if the first clause] refers to

the seller's vessel, the latter clause as well

refers to

the seller's vessel.

Consider the latter clause:

for we learned in the latter clause of the beraita:

In the buyer's domain—

once the seller agrees to it, the buyer acquires it.

And if you think to say that the vessel is not subsumed into the domain in which it is located, then, just as the buyer acquires in the seller's domain through his own vessel, so too the buyer should not acquire even in his own domain if the object is in the seller's vessel, since the seller's vessel is the seller's domain.

And if

the latter clause refers

to the seller's vessel,

even in the buyer's domain,

why does the buyer acquire

when the seller agrees to it, when the object has still not left the seller's possession!?

Rather, you are compelled to say that the vessel is subsumed into the domain in which it is located, and the law is determined according to the domain. Therefore, in the seller's house the buyer does not acquire, even with the buyer's vessel, whereas in the buyer's house the buyer acquires, even with the seller's vessel.

And we reject this: There is no proof from here, for although the first clause refers to the seller's vessel, nevertheless, in the

latter clause we have come [

we have come]

to

speak of

the buyer's vessel,

And we raise an objection:

But what basis is there for this!?

Is it a fixed and clear matter that in the seller's house they always measure with the seller's vessel, while in the buyer's house they measure with the buyer's vessel!?

And we answer: Indeed,

as a rule

this is the case:

in the house [

in the house of]

the seller—

the seller's vessels are commonly found, while

in the

buyer's house—

the buyer's vessels are commonly found.

Since the seller's vessels are found in the seller's house, we therefore learned: In the seller's domain, the buyer does not acquire until he lifts it or removes it from his possession, because the seller's vessel is the seller's domain, and the buyer does not acquire through it.

And since the buyer's vessels are found in the buyer's house, we therefore learned: In the buyer's domain, meaning in the buyer's vessel, once the seller agrees to it and consents to the sale, immediately the buyer acquires it, since the buyer's vessel is his domain, and a person's vessels acquire for him.

And even if the seller's vessel were in the buyer's domain, the law would be the same: the buyer would not acquire until he lifted it or removed it from the seller's domain—that is, from his vessel.

And even if the buyer's vessel were in the seller's domain, the law would be the same: as soon as the seller agreed to it, the buyer would acquire it.

We did not say in the beraita “the seller's domain” and “the buyer's domain” on account of the location of the vessel, but on account of the vessel itself, because in the seller's domain they generally measure with the seller's vessel, and in the buyer's domain they generally measure with the buyer's vessel.

Rava said: Come and hear

from a beraita that the buyer does not acquire through his vessel that is located in the seller's domain:

If a person had his donkeys and his laborers laden with another person's produce on their backs, and

he pulled

his

his donkeys and laborers

and brought them into his house

in order to purchase the produce from its owners,

he does not acquire the produce.

Not through having pulled his donkeys and laborers, for he pulled people, and pulling a person laden with produce is not effective for acquiring the produce. Nor through the laborers' entering his house, since the produce is resting on people and not on the buyer's ground.

Therefore,

whether

if

the buyer agreed on

the price of the produce with the seller,

before [

it was still not]

measured

the produce and placed it in his domain.

and whether

if

he measured

the buyer and the produce was placed in his domain,

before he agreed on the price,

and the seller and the buyer had still not agreed between them on the price of the produce,

then

both of them can retract.

If he agreed on the price but did not measure, they can retract, since the buyer has still not performed an act of acquisition with regard to his purchase.

And if he measured but did not agree on the price, they can retract, since they have still not made up their minds to sell and to buy, as will be explained below in the Gemara.