Bava Batra 86a — the Talmud in English

Esli

razgruzil,

esli razgruzil gruz svoikh pogonshchikov i rabochikh,

i vnes ikh v svoi dom,

to zdes est peredacha vo vladenie pokupatelya.

Poetomu esli

soglasoval

pokupatel cenu zerna s prodavtsom, dazhe

do togo kak izmeril

zerno, kotoroe on pokupaet, to on priobrel ego, i

ni odin iz nikh ne mozhet otoiti nazad.

A esli

izmeril

zerno

do togo kak soglasoval

ego cenu, on ne priobrel ego, no

oba mogut otoiti nazad.

I nizhe Gemara obyasnyaet, pochemu eto zavisit ot soglasovaniya ceny.

From what we learned—that if he unloaded them, brought them into his house, and agreed on the price before measuring, neither party may retract—it can be learned that the seller’s containers do not prevent the buyer’s acquisition. Presumably, the produce was in the seller’s containers, and nevertheless the buyer acquired it because it entered and was placed in his domain.

A poskolku sosud prodavtsa, nakhodyas v vladenii pokupatelya, ne priobrel

that is, since the seller’s containers are subordinate and nullified in relation to the buyer’s domain and do not prevent the buyer’s acquisition, therefore

sosudy pokupatelya takzhe,

kogda oni

nakhodyatsya vo vladenii prodavtsa, ne priobretayut

dlya pokupatelya, poskolku predmet nakhoditsya vo vladenii prodavtsa, a sosud pokupatelya podchinen vladeniyu prodavtsa, v kotorom on nakhoditsya, i ne obrazuyet otdelnogo vladeniya.

Skazal Rav Nachman bar Yitskhak:

net dokazatelstva iz etoi baraity! Ibo ee mozhno istolkovat tak: «Soglasoval cenu do izmereniya — ni odin iz nikh ne mozhet otoiti nazad»

v

sluchae,

k

kogda on razgruzil ego s pogonshchikov, i

vysypal

iz sosudov na zemlyu.

Odnako esli zerno ostalos vnutri sosuda prodavtsa, mozhno skazat, chto pokupatel ne priobretaet ego, poka zerno nakhodytsya v sosude prodavtsa, ibo sosud ne podchinen vladeniyu, v kotorom on nakhoditsya.

Rava became upset.

Rava, privodivshii eto dokazatelstvo, razgnevalsya iz-za togo, chto Rav Nachman bar Yitskhak takim obrazom otverg ego dokazatelstvo. Ibo

razve,

razve

skazano «vysypal»,

ved

skazano «razgruzil»?!

A «razgruzil» oznachaet v tom vide, v kakom oni est, vmeste s sosudami, v kotorykh nakhoditsya zerno.

No skazal Mar bar Rav Ashi:

tak sleduet oprovergnut dokazatelstvo Ravy i skazat: v kakom sluchae eto skazano?

V svyazkakh chesnoka,

puchkakh chesnoka, kotorye ne lezhat v meshkakh na pogonshchikakh, a nakhodyatsya kak est — bez meshkov.

But when produce is in a sack, if the sack belongs to the seller, the buyer does not acquire it even if the sack is in the buyer’s domain, since the seller’s container prevents the buyer’s acquisition.

Skazal

on, sprosil

ego Huna, syn Mar Zutry, u Raviny: «Razve, “razgruzil” skazano,

ved reč idet o tom, chto on razgruzil gruz pogonshchikov i rabochikh i polozhil ego vo vladenie pokupatelya.

I ved my uchili: «Vo vladenii pokupatelya, kak tolko prodavets prinyal na sebya [obyazatelstvo], pokupatel priobrel». I togda

chto tebe

to, soglasoval li prodavets cenu zerna s pokupatelem,

chto tebe, esli ne soglasoval?!»

Skazal emu

Ravina: esli

soglasoval,

pokupatel priobrel, tak kak

ego mnenie opiraetsya

na to, chto sdelka sostoyatsya.

Odnako esli

ne soglasoval —

ego mnenie ne opiraetsya,

mozhet byt, prodazha ne sostoyatsya, ibo poka oni ne ustanovili mezhdu soboi cenu, vozmozhno, prodavets potrebuet bolshuyu summu, ili pokupatel zakhochet zaplatit menshuyu summu, i oni ne pridut k soglasheniyu.

Poetomu my uchili: esli oni soglasovali mezhdu soboi cenu, pokupatel priobrel, dazhe esli sdelku eshche ne izmerili. A esli oni ne soglasovali mezhdu soboi cenu, pokupatel ne priobrel.

Skazal Ravina Rav Ashi: ta shma

dokazatelstvo iz slov Rav i Shmuely, chto sosudy pokupatelya priobretayut dazhe vo vladenii prodavtsa:

Ibo Rav i Shmuel oba skazali:

oni oba skazali:

«Sosud cheloveka priobretaet dlya nego v lyubom meste».

I sleduet utochnit: ved fraza «v lyubom meste» prikhodit chtoby dobavit i vklyuchit

chto zhe ona dobavlyaet,

chto dobavlyaet eta fraza?

Razve ne

razve ne

vklyuchaet vladenie prodavtsa?

Esli tak, uslysh iz etogo: sosud pokupatelya vo vladenii prodavtsa priobretaet dlya nego.

I oprovergayut: vsegda sosud pokupatelya vo vladenii prodavtsa ne priobretaet dlya nego, i iz slov Rav i Shmuelya nelzya dokazat, chto on priobrel, ibo

tam

reč idet o sluchae, kogda

skazal emu

prodavets pokupatelyu:

«Idi, priobretai!»

Ya khochu, chtoby tvoi sosud priobrel dlya tebya.

Indeed, if the seller explicitly said to the buyer, “I want your container to acquire it for you,” the buyer certainly acquires it, since the seller is considered to have lent the buyer the place where his container was set down.

Odnako nash vopros o sluchae, kogda prodavets ne skazal pokupatelyu po umolchaniyu: «Pust tvoi sosud priobretet dlya tebya»; togda my rassuzhdaem, podchinen li sosud vladeniyu, v kotorom on nakhoditsya, i pokupatel ne priobrel, ili zhe sosud ne podchinen vladeniyu prodavtsa, i togda priobretaemyi predmet lezhit vo vladenii pokupatelya, a ego sosud priobretaet ego dlya nego, podobno tomu kak ego dvor priobretaet dlya nego. Dva sleduyushchikh razbora privedeny zdes, hotya oni ne posvyashcheny priobreteniyu sosudom cheloveka, tak kak Gemara khotela dokazat rassmatrivaemyi zakon iz baraity o chetyrekh merakh.

My uchili tam

v Kiddushin 26a:

«Imushchestvo, imeyushchee garantiyu,

zemelnye uchastki,

priobretaetsya

posredstvom priobreteniya

deneg

cherez vruchenie deneg,

i

posredstvom priobreteniya

dokumenta,

i

posredstvom priobreteniya

vladeniyem

cherez to, chto pokupatel “ovladevaet” zemlei».

I

imushchestvo

ne imeyushchee garantii,

dvizhimoe imushchestvo,

priobretaetsya tolko posredstvom

priobreteniya

prityagivaniem,

kogda ego prityagivayut v ego vladenie ili vo vladenie, v kotorom u nego est dolya, naprimer v simta ili vo dvore partnerov; odnako dvizhimoe imushchestvo ne priobretaetsya za dengi, ni dokumentom, ni vladeniyem.

V yeshive, kotoraya

v Sura uchila ee,

uchili

etu baraytu

dalshe,

ot imeni Rav Chisdy.

A v yeshive, kotoraya

v Pumbedite uchila ee ot imeni Rav Kahana.

A nekotorye govoryat:

nekotorye peredayut etu sluhu

ot imeni Ravy

Ne uchili

v vysheprivedennoi Mishna v Kiddushin, chto prityagivanie priobretaet,

a imenno

v

veshchakh, kotorye ne prinyato podnimat,

tak kak oni tyazhelye,

no veshchi, kotorye prinyato podnimat,

legkie veshchi —

podnyatiem, a ne

da, oni deistvitelno priobretayutsya, no

prityagivaniem — net,

oni ne priobretayutsya.

Abaye was sitting and reciting this teaching,

Abaye sat and recited this teaching: Items whose usual acquisition is through lifting are not acquired through pulling, but only through lifting.

Rav Adda bar Matena raised an objection to Abaye

from a beraita: Whoever performs an act upon whose performance there are two separate liabilities for punishments, one light and one severe, such as death and money—

Since death is a severe punishment, and money is a light punishment, we say, “kim lei bed-rabba minei”—that is, we impose upon him the greater punishment, and do not punish him with the lesser punishment.

This rule—that “kim lei bed-rabba minei” is said even if the transgressor was not actually liable for the severe punishment, but it is sufficient that he committed a transgression that also carries a severe punishment—

For example, he committed the transgression for which one is liable for a severe punishment unintentionally, in which case he is not punished with death, and nevertheless he is not punished with the lesser punishment of money.

Therefore, one who steals money from his fellow on Shabbat, in such a manner that through his theft the thief transgressed the labor of carrying out on Shabbat, is exempt from paying money for the theft, since carrying out on Shabbat is a transgression that entails execution by the court.

It was taught in a beraita:

One who steals a purse,

a wallet, with money inside it,

on Shabbat,

which he lifted and carried out from the domain of the owners and placed in the public domain, he is

liable

to pay for the theft.

And even though he is liable to stoning for carrying the purse out from the private domain into the public domain, we do not say “kim lei bed-rabba minei”—since

he had already become liable for the theft,

when he lifted the purse from its place in the private domain,

before he came to the prohibition of Shabbat ,

which applies only when he carried out the theft and placed it in the public domain.

But if he

was dragging

the theft

and going out

from the domain of the owners,

dragging

it

and going out—

That is, he did not lift it in the domain of the owners so as to become liable for the “acquisition” of the theft through lifting, but the act of theft was only the removal of the object from the domain of the owners, by pulling the theft from the domain of the owners into the public domain

this person is

exempt

from paying for the theft,

for

the liability for

the prohibition of Shabbat and the

prohibition of

theft come

together

at the same time,

when he carried it out from the domain of the owners.

And from this beraita the Gemara wishes to prove that even an item whose usual acquisition is through lifting is acquired through pulling:

But a purse, which is an “item of lifting,”

for an ordinary purse is a light object,

and even so, it is acquired through pulling!?

And it is proven that pulling is effective for acquiring this purse through the “acquisitions of theft.” And this is difficult for the one who says: Items whose usual acquisition is through lifting are not acquired through pulling!?

He said,

he answered,

to him

Abaye: Here we are dealing with a case where he dragged the purse

with a mitena,

a strap, with a purse that is dragged by means of a strap.

But Rav Adda bar Matena wondered and said to Abaye:

I too,

with a purse that is pulled

with a mitena, I am saying!

What difference does it make that the purse has a strap? After all, ultimately, it is an item whose usual acquisition is through lifting, and it is not acquired through pulling!?

He said to him

Abaye to Rav Adda: We are not dealing with a light purse that has a strap, but rather

with an item that requires

a mitena,

with a heavy object that requires a strap, and whose usual acquisition is not through lifting but through pulling.

Come and hear

a proof from a beraita concerning the four measures among sellers, that an item acquired through lifting is also acquired through pulling:

For it was taught in a beraita:

In the seller’s domain—

the buyer has not acquired

the item,

until he lifts it, or until he carries it out

and pulls it

from his domain

of the seller into an alleyway.

And the Gemara assumed that with regard to that same object concerning which we taught “until he lifts it,” we also taught concerning it “until he pulls it.”

Thus evidently,

it is proven from here:

an item that is an “item of lifting”—if he wishes, he acquires it through lifting, and if he wishes, he acquires it through pulling,

an object that is suitable to be lifted, such as a light object: if he wishes, he acquires it through lifting, and if he wishes, he acquires it through pulling.

And this is difficult for what they said: Items whose usual manner is to be lifted are not acquired through pulling!?

He said,

he answered,

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

It is not difficult!

This beraita

is taught in two respects,

two laws were stated here in two different cases:

An item that is an item of lifting—

is acquired

through lifting

and not through pulling.

And

an item that is an item of pulling—

even

through pulling

it is acquired.