Bava Batra 83b — the Talmud in English

He raised a question,

Rav Ashi

asked:

If he sold three trees within his field, and between the trees there is

a pit

of gathered water,

what is the law: does it interrupt

between them?

If you say that a tree on the boundary strip or in his fellow’s property does not join with two trees within his field, even though there is nothing at all interrupting between them, then all the more so if there is a pit between them—they do not join.

But if you say that a tree on the boundary strip or in his fellow’s property does join with them, perhaps even so a pit interrupts between them, and they are like two fields? And Rav Ashi further raised a question: If you say that a pit interrupts, even though the water is not visible from outside, all the more so when there is a water channel [a water canal] between them—they do not join.

But if you say that a pit does not interrupt,

a water channel

whose waters are visible from outside,

what is the law: does it interrupt

between them?

And Rav Ashi further raised a question: If you say that a water channel does not interrupt,

a public thoroughfare,

whose width is between four cubits and sixteen cubits,

what is the law

that it should interrupt?

And Rav Ashi further raised a question:

a joining of date palms

[the joining of many date palms together]

what is the law

that it should interrupt, if you say that a public thoroughfare does not interrupt?

All these doubts were not resolved and remained in

teyku.

Hillel asked it of

Rabbi: A cedar grew between them,

between the trees,

what is the law?

It entered our minds that the cedar grew between the trees after the sale.

Therefore we ask in wonder: What difference does it make that

the cedar grew

between them!? The ground belongs to him, since he bought three trees; it follows that the cedar

grew in his domain,

so what uncertainty is there for you!? And we conclude:

Rather,

this is what Hillel asked Rabbi:

There was a cedar between them

at the time of the sale,

what is the law?

Does this tree interrupt between them, since the seller sold him other trees, and this cedar was not discussed? If so, it may be said: This cedar is not included in the sale, and it interrupts between the trees; and the buyer did not acquire the ground between them.

Or perhaps this cedar is not a sufficiently important tree to interrupt between the three trees that were sold to the buyer?

He said to him,

Rabbi to Hillel:

He acquired it, and he acquired it,

there is no doubt about the matter: the cedar does not interrupt between the trees, and certainly the buyer acquired the ground together with the trees.

And not only that, but even the cedar was sold to the buyer, for we learned [above, page a]: “This one acquired the ground and the trees between them.”

And the Gemara discusses: Those three trees,

how are they standing,

so that we may say: He acquired all three of them, he acquired the ground?

Rav said: Like a row,

they stand in a straight row, one after the other, and between each one and the other there are from four cubits to sixteen.

And Shmuel said: Like a tripod,

like a vessel that has three legs: they stand with one opposite the space between its two fellows.

And we explain:

Who

[Rav]

says: Like a row,

they stand,

all the more so

if they stand

like a tripod,

in that case he acquired the ground, since the ground between them is not fit for plowing, and he did not reserve it for himself.

And the one

[Shmuel]

who says: Like a tripod,

they stand, means specifically that if they stand like a tripod, in that case he acquired the ground,

but

if they stand

like a row, he did not

acquire the ground.

And what is the reason

for the matter?

Because it can be sown between them,

the seller can plow there with a plow and sow between the trees; therefore this ground is important to him, and he reserved it for himself.

Rav Hamnuna objected to him: And according to the one who says: Like a tripod

specifically,

what is the reason?

Why, is it

because it cannot be sown between them!?

If that is so,

according to this reason, if

he sold him three large thorn bushes,

large thorn bushes,

which cannot be sown between them,

because of their thorns, since people are wary of walking near them, lest they be pricked by their thorns,

then likewise he has

ground for the buyer!?

He said to him:

There is no comparison between large thorn bushes and actual three trees, for

these,

the large thorn bushes,

are not important,

whereas

these

three trees, concerning which it was said, “He acquired three, he acquired the ground,”

are important.

And the reason for the matter is: The ruling “He acquired three, he acquired the ground” was stated only under two conditions: the trees that he sold are important trees,

and the area between them is not fit for sowing.

Mishna:

Our Mishna deals with a person who sold his fellow part of an animal, and discusses whether, presumptively, his intention was to sell along with it another part of it.

And Maimonides wrote [Sale 27:11]: “Let the great fundamental principle in these matters not move from your eyes — namely, the custom of the country, and the names known specifically for each and every thing. And in a place where there is no custom, one follows these general principles that the Sages explained.”

1.

The seller

to his fellow

the head

of a

large animal [

cattle],

did not sell

presumptively

the legs

along with the head.

2. And likewise conversely — if he

sold

to his fellow

the

legs, he did not sell

along with them, presumptively,

the head.

3. And likewise if he

sold

to his fellow

the windpipe [

that is the lung, and it is called by the name of its windpipe ],

he did not sell

presumptively

the liver

along with the windpipe.

4. And likewise conversely — if he

sold

to his fellow

the liver, he did not sell

presumptively also

the windpipe

belonging to it, along with the liver.

These laws were stated specifically with regard to a large animal,

but with regard to a

small

animal:

1. If he

sold the head,

this means that he

sold

presumptively

the legs

along with the head.

2. Nevertheless, if he

sold the legs

of a small animal, this means that he

did not sell the head,

because the head is an important thing in itself.

3. And likewise, if he

sold the windpipe, he sold

presumptively

the liver

with it.

4. Nevertheless, if he

sold the liver

of a small animal, presumptively he did not

sell the windpipe

with it, because the windpipe is an important thing in itself, and it is not appropriate that the important thing should be subordinate to one that is not important, to be sold along with it.

When does this matter apply? In a place where they did not customarily sell , but in a place where they customarily sold — everything follows the custom of the country.

Thus far the Mishna discussed what is included, presumptively, in a sale that a person makes with his fellow. Now the Mishna discusses the law of a person who purchased an object from his fellow, and it was found that the seller did not give him what they had agreed between them.

One who wrongs his fellow in a sale, whether a seller who wronged the purchaser or a purchaser who wronged the seller, if the wrong was in the quality of the sale, the hand of the wronged party is on top: if he wishes to uphold the sale, his sale stands; and if he wishes to cancel the sale, the sale is cancelled.

Four measures,

four different laws were stated

with regard to sellers:

1.

He sold him good wheat,

a person who said to his fellow, “I am selling you good wheat,”

and they were found to be

those wheat grains that were wheat

bad.

And behold, the purchaser is the one who was wronged and suffered a loss from this sale, and not the seller. Therefore,

the purchaser can retract,

and cancel the sale, but the seller cannot cancel the sale, since the purchaser did not wrong him.

And even if, after the time of the sale, the wheat increased in price and it was found that the seller suffered a loss, we do not say: The seller too was wronged and can cancel the sale. Rather, since at the time of the sale the purchaser was wronged and the seller was not, therefore the purchaser can retract, but the seller cannot.

2. A person who said to his fellow: “

Bad

wheat I am taking from you,”

and they were found to be

wheat

good.

In this case, the seller is the one who was wronged and suffered a loss from this sale, and not the purchaser.

Therefore, the

seller can retract

and cancel the sale, but the purchaser cannot cancel the sale, even if after the time of the sale the wheat became cheaper, since at the time of the sale the purchaser was not wronged.

3. He said to him: “Sell me

bad, and

indeed

they were found to be bad

as he said,” or he said to him: “Wheat

good

I am selling you,”

and they were found to be good

as he said to him. There is no wrong here. Therefore,

neither of them can retract

from the sale, even if afterward the wheat became cheaper or became more expensive, since at the time of the sale there was no wrong in it.

4. The seller undertook to sell him

red wheat [

red wheat ],

and it was found to be white [

white wheat], or he undertook to sell him

white wheat, and it was found to be red wheat.

And likewise if he undertook to sell him

olive wood, and it was found to be sycamore wood,

or he undertook to sell him wood

of sycamore, and it was found to be

wood

of olive.

And likewise if he sold him

wine, and it was found to be

that it was

vinegar,

or

vinegar, and it was found to be wine.

In these three cases, both of them were wronged — both the seller and the purchaser. And although there was no wrong here in the monetary value of the objects, nevertheless he gave him an object different from what they had agreed between them. Therefore,

both of them can retract

and cancel the sale.

Gemara:

One who wrongs his fellow in the price of the sale, if the measure of the wrong was a sixth — the hand of the wronged party is on top; if he wishes, he can retract and cancel the sale, and if he wishes, he may uphold the sale.

If the wrong was more than a sixth, even the wrongdoer can retract and cancel the sale.

Rav Ḥisda said:

A person who

sold him

the purchaser an object

worth five for six,

meaning that the seller wronged the purchaser by a sixth of the sale price.

And

even if afterward the object

increased in price [

became more expensive]

and stood at eight,

and it was found that the seller suffered a loss in the sale of more than a sixth, nevertheless the seller cannot retract and cancel the sale.

For since

who was deceived

initially was the

buyer—

and not the seller—therefore: the

buyer can retract,

but not

the

seller.

And even though the sale had still not been completed, since the buyer had the possibility of cancelling the sale on the claim of overcharge, and it follows that the seller too was deceived “at the time of the sale,” nevertheless, the seller cannot retract.