Bava Batra 50b — the Talmud in English

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Rabbi Yosei says:

Both are included in the law of “one day or two days”:

this one—

the first—

because he is

“under him,”

for he has usufructual ownership in him;

and this one—

the second buyer—

because he is

“his money,”

for his body is acquired to him.

And

the Gemara explains that

it is uncertain to

Rabbi Yosei

whether usufructual ownership is considered like ownership of the body—

and the first is the one who is exempt—

or whether it is not considered like ownership of the body—

and the second is the one who is exempt. And it follows that whether he remained one day or two days with the first, or whether he remained one day or two days with the second, it is uncertain whether, if he strikes him, he is liable to death;

and in an uncertainty concerning capital cases, one is lenient;

and therefore both are included in the law of “one day or two days.”

And

Rabbi Elazar says:

Neither of them is included in the law of

“one day or two days,”

and if either this one or that one strikes him, and he dies even after a year, they are liable to death

; this—

the second—

because he is not

“under him,”

and this—

the first—

because he is not

“his money.”

And Rava said: What is Rabbi Elazar’s reason?

For

the verse says:

“He shall not be avenged, for he is his money,”

and it should have said only: “He shall not be avenged.” Rather, it comes to teach:

his money that is uniquely his;

and this one is not unique to this one or to that one, for this one does not have ownership of the body, and that one does not have usufructual ownership.

And this is what we explained above: Amemar—who said, “Neither the man nor the woman can sell nichsei melog”—follows Rabbi Elazar, for from “his money” we learn even concerning a sale that anyone to whom it is not unique cannot sell, because neither of them is called an “owner”; but our Mishna, in which it is stated, “This is proof; there is,” and the woman can sell to her husband, follows the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara further raises a difficulty concerning what we learned in the Mishna: “And a man has no presumptive ownership over the property of his wife”: Is it indeed so that

“a man has no presumptive ownership over the property of his wife”?!

;

But did Rav not say: A married woman must protest,

for if she does not protest, the possessor acquires presumptive ownership over her property?!

But

with whom—

who is the possessor against whom she must protest, so that he should not acquire presumptive ownership?!

If you say, with another,

who acquired presumptive ownership over her nichsei melog,

but did Rav not say: Others do not acquire presumptive ownership

over the property of

a married woman?!

Rather, is it not with the husband

who acquired presumptive ownership over her property that Rav said: “A married woman must protest”? It is thus explicit in his words that a man does acquire presumptive ownership over his wife’s property, unlike what is stated in our Mishna?!

He said—

he answered—

Rava:

Actually, it is with the husband

that Rav said, “A married woman must protest,” as the questioner explained,

but

Rav is speaking

in a case where he dug

the husband

wells, cisterns, and caves,

and in this manner even a husband has presumptive ownership; whereas our Mishna is speaking when the husband ate produce from his wife’s property, both from nichsei melog and from her other property, and in this manner he does not have presumptive ownership!

And we raise a difficulty: If, as you say, Rav’s words concern a case where he damaged the field by digging wells, it is difficult:

But did Rav Naḥman say in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: There is no presumptive ownership through damages,

that is, damage for three years in a field is not considered presumptive ownership to say, “I purchased it” ; and how shall we explain Rav’s words—which imply that if she did not protest, he has presumptive ownership—as referring to a case where he damaged the field by digging wells, cisterns, and caves?!

And we answer: Do not understand Rav Naḥman’s words as meaning that three years of presumptive ownership through damages is effective for claiming, “I purchased it.” On the contrary,

say: There is no law of presumptive ownership for damages,

that is, there is no presumptive ownership through damages like ordinary presumptive ownership, whose period is three years; rather, it becomes presumptive ownership immediately, for no person sees someone damaging his land and remains silent. And if he did not protest, he forfeited it.

If you wish, I will say

to resolve it: Rav Naḥman is not speaking at all about presumptive ownership for claiming, “I purchased it,” but about damage that a person causes to his fellow within his house. Thus Rav Naḥman said: A person does not acquire presumptive ownership to damage his fellow, even if he did so for three years—for is it not indeed stated concerning it

: “Did it not state concerning it”?

Rav Mari said: With smoke

[with smoke]

; Rav Zevid said: With

the smell of

a privy?!

It is explicitly evident that the issue concerns the continuation of damage in one’s fellow’s house, and not the claim, “I purchased it,” on account of damage that he causes in a field.

Here the Gemara returns and brings another resolution to what we raised above, “But Rav said: A married woman must protest.” The questioner explained his words as concerning a husband who acquired presumptive ownership over her property, and consequently raised a difficulty, since Rav’s words contradict our Mishna. The questioner was compelled to explain Rav’s words as referring to a husband and not to another, because of Rav’s own statement: “Others do not acquire presumptive ownership over the property of a married woman” —

Rav Yosef said

to resolve it:

Actually,

what Rav said, “A married woman must protest,” means

with another,

and there is no longer a difficulty from our Mishna, which concerns a husband. And what is difficult for you from Rav’s statement that “others do not acquire presumptive ownership over the property of a married woman”—do not find it difficult:

And

here, when Rav said that a married woman must protest, it is

in a case where he ate [the other person ate the produce of the field]

another person

part of the period of presumptive ownership during the husband’s lifetime, and

he ate another

three

years

after the husband’s death—

and he is believed in this matter:

by the power of the claim that, had he wished, he could have said

the possessor to the woman:

“I purchased it from you,”

in which case he would have been believed, since he ate for three years in her presence after the husband’s death; therefore,

when he also said to her:

“You sold it to him [you sold it to your husband],

[ты продала его своему мужу],

and he sold it to me [and he is the one who sold it to me],”

[и именно он продал его мне]»,

he is believed!

And in this manner Rav said, “A married woman must protest”: A married woman whose husband sold the produce to another must protest against the purchaser if he continues to eat the produce after her husband’s death. [And see the Rashba and the Rashbam].

The matter itself: Rav said: Others do not acquire presumptive ownership

others

over the

melog property of

a married woman.