Bava Batra 51a (נא.) — the Talmud in English

And the Judges of the Diaspora

said: One establishes presumptive ownership.

Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the Judges of the Diaspora!

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav:

Did

the Master retract his teaching [Did you retract your position]!? For Rav himself said that another person does not establish presumptive ownership of the property of a married woman, contrary to the opinion of the Judges of the Diaspora.

He said to them

Rav:

It stands to reason that they said this, in accordance with the ruling of Rav Yosef,

meaning, I did not say that the halakha is in accordance with their opinion except in a case where that other person had established part of the presumptive ownership during the husband’s lifetime and three years during the wife’s lifetime; in such a case he does have presumptive ownership, as Rav Yosef said above, on page 50b.

We learned in the Mishna: A man does not have presumptive ownership of his wife’s property,

nor does a woman have presumptive ownership of her husband’s property.

And we raise an objection: But

it is obvious

that a woman has no presumptive ownership of her husband’s property!? For

since she is entitled to sustenance, it is sustenance that she is consuming [Since he is obligated to provide her with sustenance, she consumes the produce as her sustenance],

meaning, everyone knows that she enters the property only for the produce, in order to provide for her sustenance, and therefore he need not protest!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

for our Mishna to teach that she does not have presumptive ownership in a case such as

where he designated other land for her sustenance [the husband designated other land for her sustenance]. Nevertheless, she does not have presumptive ownership of the husband’s property, because the husband does not object if she consumes more than she is entitled to.

And we infer from the Mishna’s statement that a woman does not have presumptive ownership of her husband’s property, to prove that she acquired it from him:

This implies that if there is proof—

if she brings other proof that the husband sold it to her—

there is,

she can claim, “It is purchased by me,” meaning, the sale is valid. But why!?

For

let him say [let the husband say]: “Although she purchased the land from me with money, the money is mine, for whatever a woman acquires, her husband acquires. And although I accepted the money in exchange for the sale, I did not intend to accept it as an act of acquisition; rather,

it was

to reveal the money

that she had hidden from me

that I wanted [I wanted the sale to reveal whether she had hidden money from me], but I did not intend to transfer ownership of the land to her”!?

Did

you learn from this

from our Mishna that it follows the opinion of the one who holds:

When one sells land to his wife, she acquires it, and we do not say: It was only to reveal the money that he wanted?

And we answer:

No;

you cannot prove this from our Mishna, because

say

in explaining the inference from our Mishna:

This implies that if there is proof

in the form of

a deed of gift,

but if she produces a deed of sale, it can indeed be said that she did not acquire it, since it was only to reveal the money that he wanted!

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna:

You were not with us last night in the beit-midrash at the edge of the Shabbat boundary, when we said excellent teachings [

you were not with us last night in our beit-midrash at the edge of the boundary, when we said excellent novel insights]!

Rav Huna said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

What excellent teachings did you say [

what excellent novel insights did you say last night]?

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: We came up with the following novel teaching:

When one sells land to his wife, she acquires it, and we do not say that it was only to reveal the money that he wanted!

He said to him,

Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: But

it is obvious

that this is the law, for

remove the money from the equation, and she acquires it by means of the deed [

even if you remove the monetary acquisition from consideration, she acquires the land through the deed]!?

That is, even if you would say that with regard to acquisition through money we say that it is not an acquisition because it was only to reveal the money that he wanted, nevertheless, with regard to acquisition through a deed it is not possible to say, “It was only to reveal the money that I wanted.”

Did we not learn [

did we not learn in the Mishna] that a deed effects acquisition of land!? For we learned in Kiddushin 26a:

Property that is security-bearing [

land]

is acquired through money, through a deed, and through presumptive ownership!?

Rav Naḥman said to him,

Rav Huna:

But was it not stated concerning this, ‘Shmuel said: They taught—

that land is acquired through a deed—

only in the case of a deed of gift; but in the case of a deed of sale, he does not acquire it until he gives him its money’!? Since a deed of sale is not effective without payment of the money, it would be possible to say, “It was only to reveal the money that I wanted,” and she would not acquire it!

Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman:

And

if

not,

did Rav Hamnuna not raise an objection [

did Rav Hamnuna not challenge] Shmuel’s statement from the following beraita taught concerning that Mishna:

How

are land properties acquired through a deed?

He wrote to him

the seller wrote to the purchaser

on paper or on earthenware, even though it is not worth a peruta: “

My field is sold to you; my field is given to you”;

it is sold and given;

this shows that a deed effects acquisition even in a sale, contrary to Shmuel’s statement that a deed effects acquisition only in the case of a deed of gift!?

And since Rav Hamnuna was refuted, and the deed alone effects acquisition, there is no need to teach us that we do not say, “It was only to reveal the money that he wanted,” in a case where he sold it to her by means of a deed.

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna:

And

if

did he not raise the objection and resolve it [

did we not learn that Rav Hamnuna challenged Shmuel and also answered his challenge]: What is the case here, in the beraita of “How are they acquired through a deed”?

It is a case of one who sells his field because of its poor quality [

because it is a poor-quality field]. In the sale of such a field, he certainly completed the transfer of ownership through the deed, while the money would remain a debt upon the purchaser.

If so, Shmuel’s statement stands: The deed does not effect acquisition until he gives him its money. Consequently, it is not so obvious that we do not say, “It was only to reveal the money that he wanted,” and therefore it was necessary for us to teach this last night.

And Rav Ashi said

to resolve the difficulty against Shmuel from the beraita, “How are they acquired through a deed ... My field is sold to you”:

Actually, this beraita is not dealing with a deed of sale, for in that case he does not acquire it until he gives its money, as Shmuel said. And what we learned, “My field is sold to you,” actually refers to a deed of gift, and

he wished to give it to him as a gift; and why did he write it to him in the language of a sale, “

My field is sold to you”?

In order to enhance

his

rights,

for if a claimant comes and contests the field, the donor will be obligated to compensate him—so that the recipient will not have a grievance against the donor—as he would be obligated to compensate him when he sells him a field and the purchaser gives him money. And this is the meaning of the beraita: “How are they acquired through a deed? He wrote to him on paper ... ‘My field is sold to you,’ and it will also be given to you”; it is sold, so that its liability is upon the donor, as in the case of a seller, and it is also given, so that another cannot claim it under the law of bar metzra [the right of the adjacent landowner to purchase]. There is no law of bar metzra in the case of a gift.

Meytivi

Rav Naḥman, who said: When one sells land to his wife, she acquires it, and we do not say, “It was only to reveal the money that he wanted,” from the following beraita:

If he borrowed

the master

from his slave

his own, and wrote him a loan document in which he pledged all his property,

and then emancipated him;

or if the husband borrowed

from his wife

his own

and divorced her, they have no claim against him,

for the money was not theirs!

But

what is the reason

that he is not obligated to pay them!? Is it

not because we say

that they did not intend to pledge their property, but rather

to reveal the money—

that of the slave or the wife—

was what he wanted!?

And we answer:

The case there is different,

in the beraita, which deals with a loan and not a sale, for we are certain

that he does not wish—

the master or the husband—

to make himself [

to make himself] “

The borrower is servant to the lender” if he can free himself from this in any way!

Rav Huna bar Avin sent

to the students of the beit-midrash:

When one sells land to his wife:

She acquires it,

the woman, and we do not say, “It was only to reveal the money that he wanted,”