Bava Batra 50a (נ.) — the Talmud in English

And one:

land

that he designated for her

before witnesses after her marriage

in her ketuba

for her ketuba, and he made this field an apotiki for his wife in her ketuba.

And one:

land

that she brought him from her own property,

meaning, she brought it from her father's house to her husband as nikhsei tzon barzel, “iron-flock property.” Its value is assessed at the time of the marriage, and the husband returns its value when he dies or divorces her. This field is encumbered to her like the rest of the husband's property, but she relies more on this field, since she brought it from her father's house.

And the Gemara explains:

What is this intended to exclude?

With regard to which fields did Rabba bar Rav Huna say that she cannot say, “I acted only to please my husband”?

If you say it is intended to exclude other property

of the husband, which is automatically encumbered to the woman by her ketuba, and the teaching would be that if she signed for a purchaser that she would not collect her ketuba from other property that he had sold, she could not claim, “I acted only to please my husband”—this cannot be said, since:

All the more so, she would arouse his hostility

[he would hate her] if she did not sign for the purchaser!?

For

after all,

he would say to her

her husband: “Clearly, you did not sign for him because

you have set your sights on divorce and death”

[you are waiting either to be divorced or for me to die]; that is to say:

If, with regard to these three fields, concerning which the husband cannot claim to her, “You have set your sights on divorce and death” -

for it is legally justified for her to protest the sale of fields designated for the collection of her ketuba, and even if she did not set her sights on divorce and death, nevertheless you say that she can claim, “I acted only to please my husband”—then all the more so with regard to other fields, concerning which he has the claim against her, “You have set your sights on divorce and death”: it is certainly reasonable to say that she signed for the purchaser only so that he would not make this claim against her.

Rather, certainly

the essential intent of Rabba bar Rav Huna's statement was only

to exclude

signing for the sale of

nikhsei melog

of his wife: If the husband sold land belonging to her nikhsei melog, in which he possesses only the right to the produce, and afterward the purchaser had the woman sign a deed of sale in which she sold him her land, in such a case the purchaser's acquisition from the woman is not void. She cannot say, “I acted only to please my husband,” because since these lands belong to her, she is not concerned about her husband and can invalidate the sale; therefore, if she affirmed it, the purchaser's acquisition remains valid—

And as for Rabba bar Rav Huna's mention of these three fields, this is what he means: We say, “I acted only to please my husband,” only with regard to the sale of fields encumbered solely to the woman!

And regarding what we said, that in the sale of encumbered fields her waiver has no effect: It is unnecessary to say this concerning other property, with regard to which she can certainly make this claim, so that he will not say to her, “You have set your sights on divorce and death.” Rather, even with regard to these three fields, concerning which this claim cannot be made, since it is legally justified for her to protest the sale of what he designated for her ketuba, nevertheless the purchaser's acquisition is void. For since these fields are not entirely hers but belong to the husband, she can say, “I acted only to please my husband.” And we still challenge what is explained in our Mishna, that a woman's sale of her property to her husband is valid and she cannot say, “I acted only to please my husband”:

But

Ameimar said:

A man and a woman who sold nikhsei melog,

the Gemara initially thought that this means as follows: A man sold his wife's nikhsei melog, and afterward went to the woman, who also wrote him a deed of sale,

they have accomplished nothing;

because she can say, “I acted only to please my husband.” If so, all the more so, when she sells to her husband she should be able to make this claim, and this would contradict our Mishna: “But there is proof”!?

And we answer: Ameimar did not mean to say that a man and a woman who sold together property belonging to nikhsei melog have accomplished nothing. Rather,

when Ameimar's statement was made,

it referred to a man alone and a woman alone who sold nikhsei melog. And this is what he means:

a.

Where he sold, and then died, she comes and takes it away,

if a man sold his wife's nikhsei melog and died, the woman takes the land and its produce from the purchasers. For the husband can sell only the produce during his lifetime, which belongs to him, and the substance of the property after his wife's death, which he inherits from her. But if he dies during her lifetime, he cannot sell it. This is what Ameimar said: “A man who sold nikhsei melog has accomplished nothing.”

b.

Alternatively,

that is, what Ameimar said—“A woman who sold nikhsei melog has accomplished nothing”—means that

she sold and died

[the woman sold her nikhsei melog and died], and he no longer has rights to its produce. Nevertheless,

he comes and takes it away

[he takes the substance and the produce from the purchaser], since the husband inherits her—

Although this is not the law with regard to every inheritance, and if the deceased sold the land to another during his lifetime, the heir does not inherit it, nevertheless a husband who inherits his wife takes it from the purchasers

by rabbinic ordinance,

which they enacted in Usha, when the Sanhedrin was exiled there from the Chamber of Hewn Stone,

and in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina! For Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said:

In Usha they enacted: If a woman sold nikhsei melog and died, the husband takes it from the purchasers,

because the husband, by virtue of his inheritance, is considered like a first purchaser who preceded the purchaser who bought from the woman.

But where both of them sold to an outsider

[but when both the man and the woman sold the nikhsei melog to a third party], and this is the case discussed by Rabba bar Rav Huna,

alternatively,

if

she sold it to him

[she sold the nikhsei melog to her husband], as in the case discussed by our Mishna, from which we infer: “But there is proof”—

In both these cases,

the sale is a valid sale

[her sale is a sale]!

And if you wish, say

to resolve the difficulty from our Mishna, which states, “But there is proof”—meaning that the sale of the woman's property to her husband is valid—from Ameimar's statement, which implies that if the man sold and afterward the woman sold, they have accomplished nothing, and all the more so when the woman sold to her husband:

The reason Ameimar said that the sale does not take effect when both of them sold is not that she can say, “I acted only to please my husband.” Rather, the sale is ineffective for another reason:

Ameimar follows the view of Rabbi Elazar,

who derives from Scripture that with regard to an item belonging to two people—its substance to one and its produce to the other—neither one is called its “owner,” and neither has the power to sell it, either to another person or to the other co-owner; whereas our Mishna follows the view of the Sages!

As it is taught in a beraita:

It is stated in the Torah in the passage of Mishpatim [Exodus 21:20–21]: “And if a man strikes his slave or his maidservant with a rod, and he dies under his hand, he shall surely be avenged [the master is executed by death by the sword]. But if he survives for a day or two [if the slave survives after the blow for a day, which is like two days, namely, a full twenty-four-hour period], he shall not be avenged [the master is not executed], for he is his money.” In this respect, a slave differs from every other person: In the case of any other person, if he dies from the blow even after a year, the assailant is liable for death, whereas in the case of a slave the master is exempt if the slave did not die within a full twenty-four-hour period.

One who sells his slave, and stipulates

the seller

with him

[with the purchaser]

that he will serve him

the slave will continue serving the seller

for thirty days;

that is, he retained for himself the ownership of the produce of the slave for thirty days. Consequently, the substance is owned by the purchaser, while the produce belongs to the seller:

Rabbi Meir says: The first—

the one who has ownership of the produce of the slave—if he struck his slave during these thirty days,

is subject to the law of “one day or two days,”

and he is not executed if the slave remains alive for a full twenty-four-hour period,

because he is “

under him,”

meaning, we interpret “under his hand” as applying to him because he is the one using the slave

; but the second is not subject to the law of “

one day or two days,”

because he is not “

under him,”

since he does not use the slave, and his status is like that of one who struck an Israelite, for which he is liable for death even if the victim dies a year later as a result of that blow.

And the Gemara explains Rabbi Meir's reason, namely, that

he holds

Rabbi Meir:

ownership

of the produce—

which the first master has in the slave during these thirty days—

is considered like ownership of the substance

[as though he acquired the substance]. He is therefore considered the slave's master, whereas the second, who has ownership of the substance of the slave, is considered to possess nothing, since the substance exists only for its produce.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The second

is the one who

is subject to the law of “

one day or two days,”

because he is “

his money,”

meaning, because he is included in “for he is his money,” that is, the one to whom the slave is sold with regard to the substance.

Whereas

the first is not subject to the law of “

one day or two days,”

because

he is not “

his money.”

And the Gemara explains his reason:

he holds

Rabbi Yehuda: “

ownership of the produce”

of the first

is not considered like ownership of the substance.

his money.” And the Gemara explains his reason: it is because Rabbi Judah holds: “ acquisition of produce”

Rabbi Yosei says:

is not considered like acquisition of the substance.