Bava Batra 50a — the Talmud in English

And one:

land

that he designated for her

with witnesses after her marriage

in her marriage contract

[for her marriage contract], and he made this field an “apotiki” for his wife in her marriage contract.

And one:

land

that she brought in to him from her own property,

that is, she brought it from her father’s house to her husband as “iron-sheep property,” and its value is assessed at the time of the marriage, and the husband returns its value when he dies or divorces her; and this field is encumbered to her like the rest of the husband’s property, except that she relies more upon this field, since she brought it in from her father’s house.

And the Gemara explains: And

to exclude what

concerning which fields did Rabba bar Rav Huna say that she cannot say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction”?

If you say, to exclude: other property

of the husband, which is automatically encumbered to the woman by her marriage contract, and to teach: if she signed for a purchaser that she would not collect her marriage contract from other property that he had acquired, she cannot claim, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction”? It is impossible to say this, for:

All the more so, there would be hostility toward her

he would hate her] if she did not write for the purchaser!?

For

indeed

he would say to her

her husband, “Certainly you did not sign for him because

you have set your eyes upon divorce and death

you are expecting to be divorced or for me to die]”; that is:

If concerning these three fields, regarding which the husband cannot claim to her, “You have set your eyes upon divorce and death” \-

for it is indeed the law that she should protest the sale of fields designated for her collection of her marriage contract, and even if she did not set her eyes upon divorce and death—nevertheless you say that she can say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction”—then all the more so concerning other fields, regarding which he has the claim against her, “You have set your eyes upon divorce and death”: it is certainly reasonable to say that she signed for the purchaser only so that he would not make this claim against her.

Rather, certainly

the essential statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna came only

to exclude

a signature on the sale of

nichsei melog

of his wife, such that if the husband sold lands belonging to the nichsei melog, in which he has only acquisition of the produce, and afterward the purchaser returned and had the woman sign a deed of sale in which she sold him her lands, in such a case his purchase from the woman is not void, for she cannot say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction.” Since these lands belong to her, she is not concerned about her husband, and she can nullify the sale; and if she confirmed it, the purchaser’s acquisition stands—

And what Rabba bar Rav Huna mentioned these three fields means as follows: We say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction,” only concerning the sale of fields encumbered solely to the woman!

And regarding what we said concerning the sale of encumbered fields, that her waiver has no effect: it is not necessary to say this concerning other property, where she certainly can say so, so that he will not say to her, “You have set your eyes upon divorce and death”; but even concerning these three fields, regarding which this cannot be said, since it is the law that she should protest what he designated for her marriage contract, nevertheless the purchaser’s acquisition is void, because since in any event they are not entirely hers, but belong to the husband, she can say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction.” And we still raise an objection against what is explained in our Mishna, that a woman’s sale of her property to her husband stands, and she cannot say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction”:

But

Ameimar said:

When a man and a woman sold property that belongs to the wife but whose produce belongs to the husband,

the Gemara initially thought that this meant as follows: A man sold his wife’s such property, and afterward went to the woman, who also wrote him a deed of sale,

A man and a woman who sold nichsei melog,

the Gemara initially thought that this is what he means: a man who sold his wife’s nichsei melog, and afterward went to the woman and she too wrote him a deed of sale,

did not accomplish anything;

because she can say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction.” And if so, all the more so, if she sold to her husband, she can say this, and our Mishna is difficult: “This implies that there is evidence”!?

And we answer: Ameimar’s intention was not to say, “A man and a woman sold ‘together’ nichsei melog,” but rather

when Ameimar’s statement was stated

concerning a man separately and a woman separately who sold nichsei melog; and this is what he means:

A.

Where he sold and died, she comes and takes it out, a man who sold his wife’s nichsei melog and died: the woman takes the land and its produce from the purchasers, because the husband can sell only the produce during his lifetime, which belongs to him, and the substance after the woman’s death, which he inherits from her; but if he dies during her lifetime, he cannot sell it, and this is what Ameimar said: “A man who sold nichsei melog did not accomplish anything.” B.

Alternatively,

that is, what Ameimar said, “A woman who sold nichsei melog did not accomplish anything,” means that she

sold them and died

the woman sold her nichsei melog and died], and he no longer has a right to their produce; nevertheless

he comes and takes it out

he takes the substance and the produce from the purchaser], since the husband inherits her—

And although this is not the law in all inheritances, and if the deceased sold the land to another during his lifetime, the heir does not inherit it, nevertheless a husband who inherits his wife takes it out from the purchasers

by a rabbinic enactment

that they enacted in Usha, when the Sanhedrin was exiled there from the Chamber of Hewn Stone,

and in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina! For Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina said:

In Usha they enacted: If a woman sold nichsei melog and died, the husband takes it out from the purchasers,

because the husband—by virtue of his inheritance—is considered like a first purchaser who preceded the purchaser who acquired from the woman.

But when both of them sold it to another person

But where both of them sold to the world

but when both the man and the woman sold the nichsei melog to a third person], and in the manner of which Rabba bar Rav Huna spoke,

alternatively

if

she sold it to him

she sold the nichsei melog to her husband], and in the manner of which our Mishna spoke, from which we infer: “This implies that there is evidence”—

In both these ways,

the sale is a sale

the sale—the sale]!

And if you wish, say

to resolve the difficulty against our Mishna, in which it was explained, “This implies that there is evidence”—namely, that the woman’s sale of her property to her husband stands—from Ameimar’s words, from which it appears that if the man sold and afterward the woman sold, they accomplished nothing, and all the more so when the woman sold to her husband:

Ameimar, who said that the sale does not take effect when both of them sold, did not say this because she can say, “I acted for my husband’s satisfaction,” but for another reason the sale is ineffective:

Ameimar holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who derives from Scripture that concerning something belonging to two people—its substance to one and its produce to another—neither of them is called its “owner,” and neither of them has the power to sell it either to another or to his fellow; whereas our Mishna follows the words of the Sages!

It is stated in the Torah, in the portion of Mishpatim [Exodus 21:20–21]: “When a man strikes his slave, male or female, with a rod, and he dies under his hand, he shall surely be avenged [the master is executed by the sword]. But if he survives for a day or two [if the slave lives after the blow for one day, which is considered two days, meaning a full twenty-four-hour period], he shall not be avenged [the master shall not be executed], for he is his money.” A slave differs in this respect from every other person: If any other person dies from a blow, even after a year, the one who struck him is liable for death; but in the case of a slave, the master is exempt if the slave did not die within a full twenty-four-hour period.

For it was taught:

It is stated in the Torah, in the section of Mishpatim [Exodus 21:20]: “And when a man strikes his slave or his maidservant with a rod, and he dies under his hand, he shall surely be avenged [the master shall be put to death by execution with the sword]. But if he survives a day or two [if the slave lives after the blow for one day, which is like two days, namely, a full twenty-four-hour period], he shall not be avenged [the master shall not be punished], for he is his money.” A slave differs in this from every other person, for with every other person, if he dies from the blow even after a year, the striker is liable to death, whereas in the case of a slave he is exempt if the slave did not die within a full twenty-four-hour period.

One who sells his slave and stipulates

the seller

with him

with the purchaser]

that he will serve him

the slave will continue to serve the seller

for thirty days; that is, he retained for himself acquisition of the produce of the slave for thirty days, and it follows that the substance is acquired by the purchaser, while the produce belongs to the seller:

the one who has the right to use the slave—if he strikes his slave during these thirty days,

Rabbi Meir says: The first—

who has acquisition of the produce of the slave—if he struck his slave during these thirty days

is subject to the law of “a day or two”,

so that he is not put to death if the slave remains alive for a full twenty-four-hour period,

because he is “

under him,”

that is, we read concerning him “under his hand,” because he is the one using him

; and the second is not subject to the law of “

a day or two,”

because he is not “ under him,” for he does not use him, and his law is as though he struck an Israelite, for which he is liable to death even if he dies a year later as a result of that blow.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Meir’s reason: It is because

Rabbi Meir holds

that:

the right to use

the produce—

And the Gemara explains the reason of Rabbi Meir, which is because

Rabbi Meir holds:

acquisition

of produce— which his first master has in the slave during these thirty days— is considered like acquisition of the substance as though he acquired the substance], and he is considered the slave’s master, whereas the second, who has acquisition of the substance in the slave, is as though he has nothing, since his substance stands only for its produce.

The second

is the one who

is subject to the law of

“one day or two days,”

because he is

“his money,”

Rabbi Judah says:

The second

is the one who

is subject to the law of “

a day or two,”

because he is “

his money,”

that is: because he is included in “for he is his money,” namely, one to whom he is acquired with regard to his substance.

But

the first is not subject to the law of “

a day or two,”

because

he is not “

his money.” And the Gemara explains his reason: it is because Rabbi Judah holds: “ acquisition of produce”

of the first

is not considered like acquisition of the substance.