Bava Batra 49b (מט:) — the Talmud in English

An inheritance that is coming to him

that is destined to come to him

from another source

that is, an inheritance that he inherits only by rabbinic ordinance, namely, his wife’s inheritance

:

A person may stipulate concerning it that he will not inherit it,

such as when he says: “I have no claim or involvement in that inheritance that is destined to come to me.” Just as he may withdraw from inheriting his wife—before it comes into his possession—since it is a matter of rabbinic law, so too he may withdraw from the usufruct of his wife’s usufruct property that the Sages instituted for the husband, since while she is betrothed he writes this stipulation for her, when the property has not yet come into his possession.

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava! For Rava said:

Anyone who says, “

I do not want to accept the ordinance of the Sages

such as

an ordinance

like this

that they were discussing in the beit-midrash, and which is of rabbinic origin [and he proceeds to explain it],

we heed him,

for the Sages do not confer a benefit upon a person against his will.

The Gemara asks:

What is meant by “

such as this”

that Rava said? That is, with regard to which ordinance did Rava state his principle?

The Gemara explains: They were engaged at that time in the beit-midrash with the ordinance concerning sustenance—the ordinance that a husband must provide sustenance for his wife, and in return, he is entitled to the products of the woman’s labor—and Rava said that in a case involving such an ordinance, if the woman says, “I do not want to accept the ordinance of the Sages, and I do not want my husband to provide me with sustenance, and I too will not give him the products of my labor,” she may say so—

And Rava came to teach us

in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rav! For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

A woman may say to her husband: “

I will not be sustained, and I will not work,”

because the primary purpose of the Sages’ ordinance was to provide sustenance for the woman, while her labor is given in return for that sustenance. This is unlike the view of those who disagree and maintain, in tractate Ketubbot 58b, that the primary purpose of the Sages’ ordinance was to give the products of her labor to her husband, and that the Sages instituted sustenance in return for her labor. According to their view, she cannot say, “I will not be sustained, and I will not work,” since the primary purpose of the ordinance was not for her benefit.

Here the Gemara returns to the words of the Mishna that we learned: “A man has no presumption of ownership over his wife’s property,” and it infers:

The presumption of ownership is the one circumstance in which a man cannot use it to prove that he purchased his wife’s property.

But proof

by witnesses or by a document

is [

effective for proving his claim that she sold it to him]; that is, if it is indeed established that the woman sold him the field, then her sale is valid!?

But why!?

Let her say [

the woman may say]: “

I acted to please my husband

by selling it to him, so that he would not become angry with me, but I did not intend to transfer ownership of the property to him”!?

For

did we not learn

in a Mishna in tractate Ketubbot 95a that a woman can make a claim of this kind!?

And we learned:

If

a person

purchased land from the man,

and it was encumbered to the woman for collection of her ketubba, like all of his other land,

and subsequently purchased it from the woman,

that is, after his purchase from the husband, he came to the woman and had her sign a document stating that she would have no lien on the property he had purchased from her husband, then

the purchaser’s

purchase

is void,

that is, she can still collect her ketubba from this property, despite having signed a cancellation of the lien.

Evidently,

it is proven from this Mishna that she

said [

she may say]: “

I acted to please my husband,”

and therefore I signed.” If so,

here too,

let her say [

the woman may say]: “

I acted to please my husband,”

and therefore I sold it to him”!?

And we answer:

It was stated concerning it

that Mishna:

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

It was necessary—

what we learned, “His purchase is void”

—only with regard to those three fields

[and he proceeds to explain them], which are more heavily encumbered to her than his other properties, and upon which she relies more strongly. Only with regard to these is his purchase void, because she certainly did not resolve to transfer ownership; rather, she acted to please her husband. And these are:

One:

a field

that he specified for her in the

document of

her ketubba,

that is, he explicitly encumbered it in the ketubba as security for payment of her ketubba.