Bava Batra 48a — the Talmud in English

It is written at the beginning of the Book of Leviticus, concerning the vows of an elevation-offering: “If his offering is an elevation-offering from cattle, a male, unblemished, he shall bring it. To the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he shall bring it, willingly, before the L...” -

And we have to be precise from the wording of the verse: after Scripture had already said, “a male, unblemished, he shall bring it,” why did it repeat and say

“he shall bring it”?

Rather, this verse

teaches that they compel him

the court to fulfill his vow, which he vowed to bring an elevation-offering.

One might have thought

that they may compel him to bring and offer the elevation-offering even

against his will?

The verse therefore says,

“willingly.”

How is this?

They compel him until he says:

“I want to.”

We have thus learned that if a person says, “I want to,” even though he says this because of suffering, nevertheless he has resolved in his heart to consecrate and offer. And if so, the same is true of one whom they compelled to sell: since he receives the money for the sale and says to the purchaser who is compelling him, “Go, take possession and acquire,” he has agreed in his heart to transfer ownership.

But the Gemara asks:

Perhaps, there it is different,

perhaps the law there is different, in the case of compulsion to bring an offering,

for it is agreeable to him that he should have atonement,

it is agreeable to a person that he should gain atonement by bringing the elevation-offering to fulfill his vow, and for that reason, if in the end he says, “I want to,” he certainly said it wholeheartedly! But there is no proof from here with regard to an ordinary sale, to say that saying “I want to” after the compulsion is considered genuine consent to the sale.

Rather, from the latter clause

of that same beraita one may prove that “if they compelled him and he sold, his sale is a sale.” For thus we learned in the latter clause:

“And likewise you say with regard to bills of divorce from women,”

with regard to those women concerning whom the Sages said that the court may compel the husband, by lashes, to divorce her by means of a bill of divorce, such as one afflicted with boils and one with polypus, that

“they compel him”

to divorce her,

“until he says”

“I want to

divorce her.” For without his saying, “I want to,” it is impossible to compel him to divorce her against his will, because it is stated in the Torah concerning a bill of divorce, “And he shall write her a document of severance, and he shall place it in her hand,” and the wording “and he shall place” implies specifically that it is done with his consent.

We have thus learned that if they compel him until, because of his suffering, he says, “I want to,” this is considered as though he gives the bill of divorce willingly, because he has resolved in his heart to give her a bill of divorce. And if so, the same is true with regard to a sale: if they forced him to sell and he said, “I want to,” he resolved in his heart to transfer ownership, and the sale takes effect.

But the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps there it is different,

with regard to a bill of divorce, for only there can one say that in the end he wants to give a bill of divorce, because

it is a mitzva to heed the words of the Sages,

who obligated him to give a bill of divorce!

Rather,

the Gemara explains that the law that “if they compelled him and he sold, his sale is a sale” is not learned from Scripture; rather,

it is logical,

that

because of his coercion, he resolved and transferred ownership!

Because of the suffering, the seller resolved in his heart to transfer ownership, since, in addition to the coercion, he receives the money for the sale.

Rav Yehuda raised an objection

to Rav Huna from that which we learned in tractate Gittin [88b]:

A bill of divorce that is

“coerced,”

that was given under compulsion:

If the compulsion was

by

a court of

Israel,

it is a bill of divorce

valid.

And

if the compulsion was performed

by

a court of

gentiles,

then, even though the husband said, “I want to,” the bill of divorce is

invalid.

And Rav Yehuda understood that this is the explanation of the Mishna: if a court of Israel compelled him because he is legally obligated to divorce her, since he is one of those whom they compel to divorce their wives by means of a bill of divorce, this is a valid bill of divorce, because it is a mitzva to heed the words of the Sages. But if a gentile compelled him to give a bill of divorce to his wife, even if he is in a situation in which the husband is obligated to divorce her, this is an invalid bill of divorce.

And with a gentile,

if the court of Israel wishes to compel him through the gentiles:

the gentiles beat him

and

say to him:

“Do what Israel tells you.”

And Rav Yehuda understood in explaining the Mishna that only when the gentile compels him to give a bill of divorce in the name of the court of Israel, only then, presumably, does the husband resolve in his heart to divorce her, just as he agrees to divorce her when the court of Israel compels him, because he is obligated to divorce her.

And according to Rav Yehuda’s understanding of the Mishna, he is astonished at Rav Huna:

“But why,”

when a gentile forced him to divorce without the instruction of the court of Israel, is the bill of divorce not valid? After all, even if there is no “mitzva to heed the words of the Sages” here, as there is with Israel, nevertheless,

there too, let us say: because of his coercion, he resolved and divorced.

And this is like what Rav Huna said with regard to “if they compelled him and he sold,” that his sale is a sale.

And the Gemara answers:

“It was stated concerning it,”

concerning that Mishna:

Rav Mesharshiya said: By Torah law, even if

the compulsion was

by a gentile,

the bill of divorce is

valid.

And for what reason did they say

that a coerced bill of divorce

by a gentile is invalid?

So that each and every woman should not go and place herself in the hands of a gentile,

to flatter him and commit adultery with him,

and release herself from her husband’s authority

through him, so that that gentile will compel him to give her a bill of divorce.

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection

to Rav Huna from that which we learned in Gittin [55b]:

A person who

purchased,

who acquired land

from a sikrikon [

who is a robber and a coercer, who kills people over matters of money, and this is speaking in a case where the sikrikon came to kill the owner of the land, and he said to the sikrikon that he should take the land for himself and leave him alive],

and returned

the purchaser

and purchased

the land also

from the owner,

that is, he paid him for the land, and the owner wrote him a deed of acquisition for the land,

his purchase is void,

because the owner wrote this purchaser the deed of acquisition only out of fear of the sikrikon.

And

for Rav Huna there is a difficulty:

“But why”

is his purchase, which the purchaser purchased from the owner and paid him for, void? After all, according to his words,

“there too, let us say: because of his coercion”

of the sikrikon, and the money that he receives from the purchaser,

he resolved

the owner

and transferred ownership!?

And we answer:

“It was stated concerning it; Rav said: They taught this only when he said to him,”

the owner to the purchaser:

“Go, take possession and acquire”

the field that you purchased from the sikrikon,

“but

in a deed” [

if he wrote him a deed],

the purchaser acquired

it!

But the Gemara still asks:

“And according to Shmuel, who said” [

above, 47b]

“even in a deed”

that the owner wrote to the purchaser from the sikrikon,

“he also did not acquire; what is there to say!?”

And it answers:

Shmuel concedes where he gave money [

where the purchaser gave money]. That is, he concedes to Rav Huna that “if they compelled him and he sold, his sale is a sale.”

And we raise a difficulty:

“And according to Rav Bibi, who concludes with it” [

above, 47b]

“in the name of Rav Naḥman”:

a robber who brought proof through witnesses or a deed of sale that the robbed person sold it to him,

he has no land,

the field is not placed in his possession, but

he has money

from the robbed person, for the robbed person is obligated to return it to the robber, since he gave him money for the sale—

“what is there to say!?”

For it is proven that “if they compelled him and he sold” is not a sale, since if it were otherwise, he would have even had the land if he gave money.

And we answer: what

Rav Bibi said is a statement,

that he said this in the name of others, and this is neither a Mishna nor a beraita.

And Rav Huna does not accept a statement!

Rava said: The halakha is: if they compelled him and he sold, his sale is a sale.

Provided that he says, “I want to.”

“And for what reason did they say”

the Sages: concerning

“a loan by document”

that the lender

“collects from encumbered properties”

of the borrower?

“So that you should not lock the door before borrowers,”

for if lenders could not secure repayment of their debts, they would not wish to lend. Therefore, the Sages encumbered the borrower’s properties for them, so that even if he sold or gave them away, the lender could collect them for his debt.

And we challenge:

“If so, an oral loan also”

the Sages should have encumbered the borrower’s properties to the lender, so that you should not lock the door before borrowers.

And we answer:

“There,”

with an oral loan,

“it has no public notice”

it is not publicized; and if the Sages were to encumber the borrower’s properties to the lender, the purchasers who did not know to take care before buying the borrower’s properties would suffer a loss. This is not so with a loan by document, where the loan is publicized, and if the purchasers bought from the borrower and did not leave properties in his possession for repayment of the loan, they caused their own loss.

And we challenge:

“And did Rabbah say this”

that the law of encumbering the borrower’s properties to the lender is not a law of Torah?

“But”

it was brought above [124b] that they sent a halakha from the Land of Israel that the firstborn receives a double portion from loans that they inherited from their father, and concerning this

“Rabbah said”

to explain that only if they

“collected land”

for the debt of the loan

“does he have”

the firstborn in this a double portion. But if they

“collected”

from the borrower

“money”

for the debt,

“he does not have”

the firstborn in this a double portion.

And the reason that when they collected land the firstborn receives a double portion from it is that the firstborn does not inherit the firstborn’s share from property that the father was destined to receive after his death, but only from property that was in the father’s possession at the time of his death. And the land that they collected from the borrower for the debt had already become encumbered for repayment of the loan from the beginning of the loan, when the father was still alive; therefore, it was in his father’s possession.

It is implied that by Torah law the debt’s encumbrance takes effect upon the borrower’s lands.

“And if you would say: Reverse it,”

the teachings should be reversed, and the law

“of Rabbah attributed to Ulla and of Ulla to Rabbah,”

so that according to Rabbah the encumbrance of properties is from the Torah, and according to Ulla it is not from the Torah. In this way Rabbah’s words accord with what he said above, that by Torah law the borrower’s properties are encumbered to the lender.

It is impossible to explain this so, because

“Ulla said: By Torah law”—

from the Torah—

“the creditor’s law”

is that he pays

“with inferior land,”

with the poorest land, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 24:11]: “And the man to whom you lend shall bring the pledge outside to you,” and presumably the borrower brings out the poorest of his possessions; from here they also learned concerning lands that it is sufficient for him to pay with inferior land . It follows that Ulla’s view is that the encumbrance of properties is from the Torah , and this is not Rabbah’s view.

Rather,

Rabba

holds that the lien on the borrower’s property is not from the Torah, and what he said above was only

the reason of the בני מערבא,

that is, he merely came to explain the reason of the בני ארץ ישראל, who said that the firstborn inherits a double portion in his father’s loan, and he explained their words according to their position: if they collected land for the debt, the firstborn receives a double portion, since the land was under a lien to their father during his lifetime; but if they collected money, even according to their position he does not receive a double portion, since the money was not in the father’s possession at the time of his death, and the firstborn does not inherit the firstborn’s portion from property that the father was fit to receive after his death, but only from property that was in the father’s possession at the time of his death.

But

he does not hold this view,

for he himself does not hold so. In his view, from the Torah the borrower’s land is not under a lien to the lender, and therefore, in his view, the firstborn does not take a double portion in his father’s loan, whether they collected land for the debt or whether they collected money.

Rav and Shmuel both say: an oral loan —

is collected neither from the heirs nor from the purchasers

but only from free property, which is not in the possession of an heir or in the possession of a purchaser.

What is the reason?

For in their view,

the lien —

the law of placing the borrower’s property under a lien to the lender —

is not from the Torah —

it is not from the Torah.

But only in the case of a loan by deed, where there is publicity concerning the loan, did the Sages place the borrower’s property under a lien, and the lender collects from property under a lien, so that the door should not be closed before borrowers.

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish both say: an oral loan —

is collected

by the lender, for his debt,

both from the heirs and from the purchasers

who purchased from the borrower after he borrowed.

What is the reason?

For in their view,

the lien is from the Torah,

and from the Torah, at the time of the loan, the borrower’s property became subject to a lien to the lender, even when he borrowed without a deed and without publicity.

And we raise an objection to Rav and Shmuel:

It was objected

from what we learned:

One who digs a pit in the public domain and an ox fell upon him

upon the digger of the pit —

and killed him —

is exempt

the owner of the ox,

and furthermore, if the ox dies —

the heirs of the owner of the pit

who died

are obligated to pay the value of the ox to its owner.

For one who digs a pit in the public domain has performed a prohibited act, and he is liable for responsibility for damages caused by him to animals that fell into the pit. Therefore, if an ox fell there, the owner of the ox is exempt, since it is not his fault, and the owner of the pit is liable to pay for the damage to the ox.

And this debt, which the owner of the pit is obligated to pay as the value of the ox to its owner, is not a debt written in a deed, but it is like an oral loan; nevertheless, his heirs must pay the debt. It follows that an oral loan is collected from the heirs. This is difficult for Rav and Shmuel, who hold that an oral debt is not collected from the heirs or from the purchasers.

Rabbi Ila said that Rav said:

What we learned, that the heirs of the owner of the pit must pay the value of the ox to its owner, is speaking

when

the owner of the pit

stood

in judgment and became liable in court; and a court ruling has the force of a debt deed even if it was not written in a deed. In such a case, Rav and Shmuel agree that the liable person’s property becomes subject to a lien, and it is collected even from the liable person’s heirs and purchasers.

And we ask: How can the baraita that obligates the heirs of the owner of the pit to pay the debt of the owner of the pit be established as speaking of a case in which the owner of the pit became liable in court?

But it teaches: “and it killed him,”

for the baraita is speaking of a case in which the owner of the pit died from the ox that fell upon him, and he can no longer be brought to judgment.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

What we learned, that the ox killed him, does not mean that he died immediately, but rather

that it made him

the ox

a tereifa,

for the ox wounded him in such a manner that he died because of the wounds after some time, and he stood in judgment before his soul departed.

And we ask:

But Rav Nahman said: the tanna teaches —

the tanna taught:

“He died and it buried him,”

for the ox buried him inside the pit when it fell, and if so, it is not possible to explain that he stood in judgment concerning the ox’s killing him.

And we answer:

There

there, in the baraita, it can be explained that the court made him liable before he died, for example:

“the judges sat at the mouth of the pit and made him liable,”

for the judges sat at the edge of the pit and made him liable before his soul departed.