Bava Batra 48b — the Talmud in English

And we said this only

that when they compelled him and he sold, his sale is a sale,

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exact page location") only

in

a situation in which they compelled him to sell

an unspecified field,

that they did not specify which field he was required to sell, and he himself chose one field and sold it. Since they gave him the possibility of choosing the field, he chooses the worst field, and thereby reveals his דעת that he is comfortable selling it because of its poor quality.

But with

they compelled him regarding

this field

[a particular field]—

not

according to Rava was his sale a sale with regard to his דעת.

And

even

with "

this field,"

we said this also only

that it is not a sale

when he did not count out

that the owner did not count out

the coins,

the money that he received from the one who compelled him, for by this he revealed his דעת that he was not interested in the sale.

But

if

he counted out,

the owner counted out

the coins—

we do not

say that the sale does not take effect; rather, indeed the sale takes effect!

And we said this only

that in the case of this field, and he did not count out the coins, the sale does not take effect,

but

in a situation

in which he had no way to evade,

that the seller did not have the possibility of evading selling.

But

if

he had

the seller

a way to evade

the one who compelled him—for example, that he could say to the one who compelled him: Wait for me until tomorrow or until my wife comes, and he did not do so—

we do not

say that the sale does not take effect; rather, the sale takes effect! But the conclusion of the Gemara is:

And the halakha is—

in all of them,

even when he did not count out the money, and even when he could not evade,

that his sale is a sale, and even with "

this field"—

for

for indeed

a woman,

when a man compels her to become betrothed to him against her will, like "

this field"

is similar,

for he compels her to become betrothed specifically to him and does not leave her the choice of to whom to become betrothed,

and

nevertheless

Ameimar said: If they compelled

a woman

and he betrothed

her—

his betrothal is a betrothal.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: In the case of a woman,

when they compel her and he betroths her,

certainly there is no betrothal—

and not as a matter of law, but it is a rabbinic enactment, because

he acted improperly

in compelling her to become betrothed to him;

therefore they acted toward him

the Sages

improperly,

not according to Torah law,

and the Sages annulled his betrothal for him.

The Sages annulled the betrothal from him.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works

where

he betrothed her with money

[when he compelled her and betrothed her with money], for it is properly applicable to say: the Sages declared the betrothal money ownerless from him, since “the ownerlessness of the court is ownerlessness,” and consequently the betrothal does not take effect, since the money is not his; but if he compelled her and

betrothed her through intercourse, what is there to say!?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi to Ravina:

The Sages made his intercourse an intercourse of licentiousness!

An incident involving

Tabi,

who was a violent man,

that he hung Pappi on a kinnara tree, and he sold

[he hung a man named Pappi on a tree called kinnara, and Pappi sold his field to Tabi]!

Pappi delivered a declaration of annulment, that he sold only because of the compulsion, but he did not wish to sell.

Rabba bar bar Hanna signed

and another witness with him for Pappi

on the declaration

[on the declaration that Pappi delivered before the deed of sale was written].

And

Rabba bar bar Hanna also signed

on the deed

[on the deed of sale].

Rav Huna said: Whoever signs on the declaration, he signed properly

[whoever signed on the declaration acted properly], meaning, the declaration he delivered was effective to annul the sale. And

whoever signs on the deed, he signed properly.

That is, even the signature on the deed was effective, to uphold the sale!

And we object: But

whichever way you look at it!?

If it is a declaration, there is no deed,

if the declaration is effective to annul, it is impossible for the deed to be effective to uphold

; and if it is a deed, there is no declaration,

and if the deed is effective to uphold, the declaration is not effective to annul!?

And we answer:

This is what he is saying: If it were not for

Pappi having delivered

a declaration, whoever signed on the deed, he signed properly.

That is: had the declaration not been signed regarding this sale, the deed of acquisition would stand, even though they compelled Pappi—

because

Rav Huna

goes

according to his position

[according to his method],

for Rav Huna said: When they compel him and he sells, his sale is a sale.

And we object:

Is that so?

That is, how did the declaration on which Rabba bar bar Hanna signed annul the deed of sale on which he himself signed!?

But did Rabbi Naḥman not say: The witnesses who

signed a loan deed and

said

after some time:

“Our words were a trust,”

that when we signed the deed, we signed it in the borrower’s possession, for he had us sign a deed so that it would be ready in his possession whenever he wished to borrow, and he gave the deed to the lender even before he borrowed, because he trusted the lender not to claim the debt from him until he borrowed,

they are not believed.