Bava Batra 47b (מז:) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

It is necessary to teach us!

rather,

in the case of a woman who is divorced but not divorced

for example, where he threw her a bill of divorce, and it is uncertain whether it was closer to him, in which case she is not divorced, or whether it was closer to her, in which case she is divorced, and she has a chezka with regard to his property—

and

the baraita teaches us

in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira!

For Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said that Shmuel said: Wherever the Sages said

about a woman that she is "

divorced but not divorced,"

and because of the uncertainty,

her husband

still

is obligated to provide her sustenance,

until he gives her a definite bill of divorce!

That is, she has a chezka with regard to his land if she has consumed its produce for three years. And although Rabbi Zeira said that he is obligated to provide her sustenance, one might have said that she consumes the produce of the land for the sake of her sustenance. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that we do not say this, because once he has begun the act of divorce, he hates her, and will no longer provide her sustenance except when the court compels him to do so. Consequently, it is not plausible that he would designate land for her.

Rav Naḥman said: Huna said to me:

All of them,

the craftsman and the sharecropper, and all those mentioned above who do not have a chezka to claim, “It is purchased by me”— this applies only when they have not brought proof.

But when

they brought proof

of their claim—for example, witnesses to whom the owner acknowledged that he had sold it to them, or when they brought a deed of sale—then

their proof is valid, and we place

the

field

in their possession.

However,

when a robber brought proof

that the owner acknowledged it to him, or even when he brought a deed of sale,

his proof is not valid,

and we do not place the field in his possession.

This is in accordance with the reasoning of Rav Kahana above: had he not acknowledged it to him or written him a deed of sale, he would have brought him and his donkey to the official.

And we raise an objection:

What does

Rav Huna teach us? For

we already learned

this law in a Mishna in tractate Gittin:

As we learned in the Mishna:

If a person purchased

land

from a sicarius

a robber who kills people over monetary matters, and the one whom he comes to kill says to him, “Take this land and leave me”]], and the sicarius went and sold the land to another person,

and

the purchaser

then purchased

the land also

from the owner,

as the owner wrote him a deed of sale or a deed of gift, but he did not receive money from him,

the purchaser’s acquisition

the purchaser’s acquisition from the owner

is void,

because the owner wrote the deed to the one who purchased it from him only out of fear of the sicarius.

And if so, what does Rav Huna teach us by saying that if he brought proof that the owner himself wrote a deed to the robber, he is not trusted? This follows all the more so from that Mishna!?

And we explain: Rav Huna needed to teach us that even if the robbed party wrote the robber a deed of sale, his proof is not valid,

to exclude the opinion of Rav.

For Rav said

with regard to the law of one who purchases from a sicarius:

They taught

that when the purchaser from the sicarius returned and purchased from the owner, his acquisition is void,

only

in a case such as

where the owner said to

the purchaser, “

Go, take possession and acquire.”

But when there is a deed,

where he wrote him a deed stating that he transfers the field to him—

he acquires it!

Rav Huna teaches us

that the halakha is not in accordance with this, but rather the halakha is

in accordance with Shmuel, who said that even with a deed he does not acquire it,

because the owner wrote it only out of fear of the sicarius,

until

the owner writes the purchaser

a guarantee of property

for the sale, so that if it is seized from him, he can claim against him.

And Rav Bibi concludes it,

with regard to the statement that Rav Naḥman cited above in the name of Rav Huna,

in the name of Rav Naḥman

himself:

the robber does not have the land,

as the field is not placed in his possession even when he brought proof, as Rav Huna said,

but the robber does have the money

The robber is entitled to the money. That is, if the robber gave the robbed party money for the land, the robbed party must return it to him, since the acquisition did not take effect, and we do not penalize the robber by causing him to lose the money he gave.

In what case is this said,

that he is entitled to the money? In a case where

witnesses said: “

In our presence, he counted out

money to the robbed party.”

But

if

the

the

witnesses merely said: “

In our presence,

the robbed party acknowledged to the robber that he had received money from him”—

the robbed party does not

return the money, because this acknowledgment is not truthful,

in accordance with the statement of Rav Kahana!

For Rav Kahana said: Had he not acknowledged it to him, he would have brought him and his donkey to the tax official

If he had not acknowledged it to him, the robber would have brought him and his donkey to the authorities’ tax official, and they would have confiscated everything from him!

Rav Huna said: If they compelled him to sell,

meaning, they suspended him from a tree or inflicted suffering upon him until he sold something and received its value, and he said, “I want to,”

his sale is a valid sale

the sale that he made is a valid sale.

But if they compelled him to give a gift, his gift is not a gift!

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

everything

that

a person sells,

the ordinary sales of objects, household utensils, and his garment that a person sells,

if he were not under duress, he would not sell.

And nevertheless, his sale is a valid sale.

That is, anyone who sells his household utensils and personal belongings would not sell them if he were not compelled to sell because he needs money. Nevertheless, his sale is a valid sale, since the Torah did not distinguish by saying that when a person sells something he needs, his sale is invalid because he did not fully resolve to transfer ownership of it.

And if so, even in this case of duress, where they compelled him, although he did not fully resolve to transfer ownership, nevertheless his sale is a valid sale!

But the Gemara considers:

Perhaps the duress arising from one’s own circumstances is different,

Perhaps a person’s own duress, when he needs money and sells of his own accord, is different, and one may say that because he needs the money, he fully resolves to transfer ownership,

from duress imposed by others,

from the duress under which others force him to sell, in which case one may say that the sale does not take effect because he did not fully resolve to transfer ownership!?

Rather,

in truth, if we knew that he had not fully resolved to transfer ownership, the sale would not take effect. And the reason the sale takes effect when they compel him to sell is that we say: Since, as a result of the suffering, he said, “I want to,” he has thereby fully resolved to transfer ownership, and therefore the sale takes effect.

And we learned this matter

from that which was taught: