Bava Batra 47b — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

it is necessary

to teach us only

in the case of a divorced woman whose status is uncertain

[for example, he threw her a bill of divorce, and it is uncertain whether it was nearer to him, and she is not divorced, or whether it was nearer to her, and she is divorced] who has a presumption of ownership over his property—

and

the beraita teaches us

in accordance with Rabbi Zeira!

For Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said that Shmuel said: Everywhere that the Sages said

concerning a woman that she is

“divorced but not divorced”

because of uncertainty,

her husband

is still

obligated to provide her sustenance,

until he gives her a definite bill of divorce!

That is to say, she has a presumption of ownership over land belonging to him if she consumed its produce for three years, even though Rabbi Zeira said that he is obligated to provide her sustenance, and it might have been said that she consumes the produce of the land for the sake of her sustenance. Therefore the beraita teaches us that this is not said, because since he began the act of divorce, he hates her, and he will no longer provide her sustenance except when the court compels him, and therefore it is not plausible that he would designate land for her.

Rav Naḥman said: Huna said to me:

All of them,

the craftsman and the sharecropper, and all those mentioned above who do not have a presumption of ownership to claim, “It is purchased by me” — this is only when they did not bring proof.

But when

they brought proof

for their words—for example, witnesses to whom the owner admitted that he had sold it to them, or they brought a bill of sale—

their proof is proof, and they establish

the

field

in their possession.

But

a robber who brought proof

that the owner admitted to him, or even that he brought a bill of sale—

his proof is not proof,

and they do not establish the field in his possession.

And this is in accordance with the reasoning of Rav Kahana above: if he had not admitted to him or written him a bill of sale, he would have brought him and his donkey to the official.

And we object:

what does Rav Huna teach us

and did we not

learn it

already? We already learned this law in a Mishna in tractate Gittin:

As we learned:

If

a person purchased land

from a sikrikon

[a robber who kills people over monetary matters, and the one who comes to kill him says to him, “Take this land and leave me”], and the sikrikon went and sold the land to another person,

and

the purchaser

returned and purchased

the land also

from the owner,

for the owner wrote him a bill of sale or a deed of gift, but he did not receive money from him,

the purchase

of the purchaser from the owner

is void,

because the owner wrote the deed to the one who purchased it from him only because of fear of the sikrikon.

And if so, what does Rav Huna teach us by saying that if he brought proof—that the owner wrote a deed to the robber himself—he is not trusted? It follows all the more so from that Mishna!?

And we answer: Rav Huna needed to teach us that even if the robbed person wrote the robber a bill of sale, his proof is not proof,

to exclude Rav’s opinion.

For Rav said,

regarding the law of one who purchases from a sikrikon:

They taught

that if the purchaser from the sikrikon returned and purchased from the owner, his purchase is void

only

in a case

where the owner said to him

the purchaser, “

Go, take possession and acquire.”

But with a deed,

when he wrote him a deed that he transfers the field to him—

he acquires it!

Rav Huna teaches us

that the halakha is not so; rather, the halakha is

in accordance with Shmuel, who said that even with a deed he does not acquire it,

because the owner wrote it only out of fear of the sikrikon,

until he writes

the owner to the purchaser

a guarantee of the property

for the sale, so that if it is confiscated from him, he can return to him.

And Rav Bיבי concludes it,

in the statement that Rav Naḥman said above in the name of Rav Huna,

in the name of Rav Naḥman

himself:

The robber has no land,

for they do not establish the field in his possession even if he brought proof, as Rav Huna said,

but the robber has money

That is to say, if the robber gave the robbed person money for the land, the robbed person returns it to him, since the acquisition did not take effect, and we do not penalize the robber by causing him to lose the money he gave.

In what case is this said

that he has money? In a case

where witnesses said: “

In our presence he counted out to him

the robber money to the robbed person.”

But

if they only

said

the

witnesses: “

In our presence he admitted to him

the robbed person to the robber that he had received money from him”—

he should not

return the money to the robber, because this admission is not true,

in accordance with Rav Kahana!

For Rav Kahana said: If he had not admitted to him, he would have brought him and his donkey to the official [if he had not admitted to him, the robber would have brought him and his donkey to the customs official on behalf of the authorities, and they would have confiscated everything from him]!

If he had not acknowledged it to him, the robber would have brought him and his donkey to the authorities’ tax official, and they would have confiscated everything from him!

Rav Huna said: If they forced him and he sold,

one whom they hung on a tree, or to whom they caused suffering until he sold something and received its payment, and he said, “I want it,”

his sale is a sale

[the sale that he made is a sale].

But if they forced him and he gave a gift, his gift is not a gift!

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

every

thing

that a person sells,

the majority of the sales of objects, household utensils, and his garment that a person sells,

if he were not compelled, he would not sell.

And even so, his sale is a sale.

That is to say, every person who sells his household utensils and objects of use, if he were not compelled to sell because he needs money, he would not sell; nevertheless, his sale is a sale, for the Torah did not distinguish by saying that if a person sells something that he needs, his sale is not a sale, since he did not resolve in his mind to transfer ownership.

And if so, even with this coercion, that they forced him, although he did not resolve in his mind to transfer ownership, nevertheless his sale is a sale!

But the Gemara considers:

Perhaps the coercion of oneself is different,

perhaps a person’s own coercion, when he needs money and sells of his own accord, is different, and it may be said that he resolves in his mind to transfer ownership because he needs money,

from the coercion of others,

from coercion in which others compel him to sell, in which case it may be said that the sale does not take effect, since he did not resolve in his mind to transfer ownership!?

Rather,

in truth, if we knew that he did not resolve in his mind to transfer ownership, the sale would not take effect. And the reason the sale takes effect when they force him and he sells is that we say: Since, because of the suffering, he said, “I want it,” he resolved in his mind to transfer ownership, and therefore the sale takes effect.

And we learned this matter

from that which was taught: