Bava Batra 47a (מז.) — the Talmud in English

a. A creditor collects from the debtor land of “intermediate” quality [of average quality], and he cannot direct him to inferior-quality land that he owns.

b. One does not collect from a guarantor first; rather, the creditor must go to the debtor himself. Even if the debtor owns only inferior-quality land, while the guarantor owns intermediate-quality land, the creditor nevertheless may not collect from the guarantor first.

c. However, there is a distinction between an ordinary guarantor and a kablan guarantor, meaning a guarantor who received the money directly from the lender and then gave it to the debtor, for with a kablan guarantor, the lender may collect from whomever he wishes.

Kablan: a guarantor

a kablan

who may be collected from by the lender first, and the lender need not sue the debtor first, if he testifies on behalf of the debtor regarding land belonging to the debtor against a claimant who says: “It is mine”:

Some say:

There are those who say: This is what we learned in a beraita: He

may testify

on his behalf, provided that the debtor owns other land from which the lender can collect, just as in the case of an ordinary guarantor.

And some say:

And there are those who say: This is what we learned in a beraita:

He may not testify

on his behalf, even when the debtor owns other land, as the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason.

The Gemara explains the two opinions:

Some say that he may testify,

because

he is like an ordinary guarantor,

who may testify on behalf of the debtor when the debtor owns other land, as explained above.

And some say that he may not testify,

because

it is preferable to him

the kablan guarantor

that both of them should be in his possession,

the debtor’s

two

[the two plots]: inferior-quality land [which he also owns] and intermediate-quality land [about which he is now testifying],

for when the creditor comes, he takes whatever he wants

[since the creditor may take whichever land he wishes].

That is, it is preferable for the guarantor that, in addition to the inferior-quality land that the debtor owns, the debtor should also possess the intermediate-quality land about which he is now testifying. Since the lender may collect first from the kablan guarantor, if the guarantor owns intermediate-quality land while the debtor owns only inferior-quality land, the lender will collect from the guarantor the intermediate-quality land in his possession. It is therefore preferable to him that the debtor, too, should own intermediate-quality land, for then the lender will say to him: “I will give you the debtor’s intermediate-quality land.”

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

An artisan

indeed

has no presumptive ownership,

but

the son of an artisan,

that is, the artisan died and bequeathed the property to his son, who is not an artisan,

has presumptive ownership,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

A sharecropper has no presumptive ownership,

but

the son of a sharecropper has presumptive ownership,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

A robber,

who has established a reputation for robbery with regard to this field [and some say: he is a murderer who kills people for money, as the Gemara will explain below],

and

even

the son of a robber have no presumptive ownership;

but

the grandson of a robber has presumptive ownership.

a. Any presumptive ownership—whether presumptive ownership of movable property or presumptive ownership of land, which is established through three years—that is not accompanied by a claim is not presumptive ownership.

b. “One who comes by virtue of inheritance,” meaning that the heir established possession and claims, “I inherited it from my father,” but does not know whether it actually belonged to his father, need not provide a claim; rather, we assert on his behalf that it indeed belonged to his father, as explained in the Mishna there.

We raise an objection to this:

What are the circumstances

[what case are we dealing with]?

If they came with their father’s claim

[if the sons come with their father’s claim], that is, if we are dealing with heirs of an artisan, a sharecropper, or a robber who had established possession, and they acknowledge that they themselves did not purchase the property from the claimant, but claim: “Our father bequeathed it to us”—

if they were the sons of other people, their presumptive ownership would be effective, for although they themselves have no claim, nevertheless we would assert on their behalf that their father purchased it from the claimant. Rabbi Yoḥanan would then be teaching us that there is a distinction between the son of an artisan or the son of a sharecropper, whose law is like that of other heirs and whose presumptive ownership is valid, and the son of a robber, who has no presumptive ownership—

this cannot be said. For the reason that the son of a robber has no presumptive ownership in such a case is surely that just as the father himself has no presumptive ownership, so too the son who comes through him has no presumptive ownership. If so:

Even these

[the son of an artisan and the son of a sharecropper]

also not

should have presumptive ownership!?

And

if they did not come with their father’s claim, but with their own claim,

[if we are dealing with a case in which they themselves possess the object, or in which they established possession of the land for three years, and they claim: “We purchased the object or the land from you”], even so it cannot be said that:

if so,

even the son of a robber too

should have presumptive ownership!?

If so, in what manner does the beraita distinguish between the sons of the artisan and the sharecropper and the son of the robber? And we answer:

It is necessary in a case where witnesses say

[the case concerns witnesses who came and testified]:

“In our presence he admitted to him,”

that is, the claimant admitted to the artisan, the sharecropper, or the robber that the property belonged to him; therefore, there is a distinction between them:

These—

the son of an artisan or of a sharecropper—

may indeed be telling the truth

[it may be said that they are indeed telling the truth] in their claim that “Our father purchased it from you.” But

this one—

the son of a robber—

even though he admitted

the claimant

is nevertheless not believed,

the robber’s son—

as in the statement of Rav Kahana! For Rav Kahana said

with regard to an admission made to a robber, that it is not considered an admission:

For

had he not admitted to him, he would have delivered him and his donkey to the official

[if the robbed person had not admitted to the robber, he would have handed him and his donkey over to an official, that is, to a violent person], for an ordinary robber is a violent person, and his admission is not considered an admission.

And this is the meaning of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

An artisan has no presumptive ownership when he does not bring witnesses that the claimant admitted to him; but the son of an artisan has presumptive ownership when he brings witnesses that the claimant admitted in his father’s presence. A sharecropper has no presumptive ownership when the claimant did not admit to him, while the son of a sharecropper has presumptive ownership when the claimant admitted. A robber and the son of a robber have no presumptive ownership even when the claimant admitted. The grandson of a robber has presumptive ownership when he claims, “I inherited it from my father,” and we assert on behalf of the heir that his father purchased it, since if his father had come with his own claim, he would have been believed. And

Rava said: There are cases in which even the son of a robber

has presumptive ownership,

even though he does not come with his own claim that he purchased it.

And we explain:

What are the circumstances?

For example, when he comes with his paternal grandfather’s claim,

[for example, when the son of the robber claims: “My father’s father purchased it from you, and bequeathed it to my father, and my father bequeathed it to me”], and he is believed with this claim by virtue of a migo, since he could have said: “I purchased it from you,” in which case he would be believed. The Gemara explains:

What is the definition of a robber

who has no presumptive ownership?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For example, when he has established a reputation for robbery with regard to this field,

but with regard to other fields, where it is not known that they came into his possession through robbery, he is believed.

And Rav Ḥisda said: For example, the house of a certain family

a particular person's house, whose owner's name Rav Ḥisda mentioned,

whose members murder people over monetary matters

and therefore he is not deemed reliable with regard to any field, because people are afraid to protest against them.

The Sages taught:

a.

A craftsman has no presumption of ownership;

but a craftsman who

left his craft

and afterward takes possession of it,

has a presumption of ownership.

b.

A sharecropper has no presumption of ownership;

but a sharecropper who

left

his sharecropping, has a presumption of ownership.

c. Although we learned above, on page 42b: “A man has no presumption of ownership with regard to his wife’s property, nor a woman with regard to her husband’s property; neither a father with regard to his son’s property, nor a son with regard to his father’s property,” nevertheless:

A son who separated

from his father, no longer depends on his father’s table, for example, because he married a woman and no longer attends to his father’s property,

and a woman who was divorced

from her husband:

they are like all other people,

and the father has a presumption of ownership with regard to his son’s property, and the son has one with regard to his father’s property; and the husband has a presumption of ownership with regard to her property, and the woman has one with regard to his property.

And we raise an objection:

Granted, “

a son who separated”

was necessary

to teach us that a son has a presumption of ownership with regard to his father’s property, since

it might enter your mind to say: A father waives his rights to his son

a father waives his rights when his son takes possession of his property, and therefore he did not protest, and consequently the son should not have a presumption of ownership with regard to his father’s property

—it teaches us that this is not so,

and he does have a presumption of ownership!

But “

a woman who was divorced,”

is it

obvious

that they are like two strangers who have a presumption of ownership against each other!?