Bava Batra 47a — the Talmud in English

A. A creditor collects “intermediate” land [of intermediate quality] from the borrower, and cannot refer him to inferior land that he has.

B. One does not collect from the guarantor first; rather, he goes to the borrower himself. Even if the borrower had only inferior land, whereas the guarantor had intermediate land, nevertheless one does not collect from the guarantor first.

C. However, there is a distinction between an ordinary guarantor and a kablan guarantor, who is one who received the money directly from the lender and handed it over to the borrower, for in the case of a kablan guarantor, the lender may collect from whomever he wishes.

Kablan: a guarantor

kablan

who is such that the lender may collect from the guarantor first and need not sue the borrower first, if he testifies for the borrower concerning his land against a claimant who says, “It is mine”:

Some say

there are those who say: This is what we learned in a beraita: he

testifies

for him, provided that the borrower has other land from which the lender can collect, as in the case of an ordinary guarantor.

And some say,

and there are those who say: This is what we learned in a beraita:

he does not testify

for him, even when the borrower has other land, as it explains the reason below.

The Gemara explains the two views:

Some say: he testifies,

because

he is like a guarantor,

who testifies for the borrower when he has other land, as explained above.

And some say: he does not testify,

because it is

pleasing to him

the kablan guarantor

that both should be in his possession

of the borrower,

both of them [

the two parcels]: inferior [which he also has] and intermediate [about which he is now testifying],

for when the creditor comes, he takes whatever he wishes [

for the creditor can take whatever he wants].

That is to say, it is advantageous for the guarantor that, besides the inferior land that the borrower also has, the borrower should also have the intermediate land concerning which he is now testifying. For since the lender may collect from the kablan guarantor first, if the guarantor has intermediate land and the borrower only inferior land, the lender will collect from the guarantor the intermediate land in the guarantor’s possession. Therefore it is advantageous to him that the borrower should also have intermediate land, for then the lender will say to him, “I will give you the borrower’s intermediate land.”

Rabbi Yohanan said:

A craftsman

indeed

has no presumption of ownership,

but

the son of a craftsman,

that is, the craftsman died and bequeathed it to his son, who is not a craftsman,

has a presumption of ownership,

and it explains this below.

A tenant farmer has no presumption of ownership,

but

the son of a tenant farmer has a presumption of ownership,

as it explains below.

A robber,

who was established as a robber with regard to this field [and some say: he is one who murders people for money, as all this is explained below],

and

even

the son of a robber have no presumption of ownership;

but

the grandson of a robber has a presumption of ownership.

A. Every presumption of ownership—whether a presumption of ownership of movable property or a presumption of ownership of land, which is established through three years—that is not accompanied by a claim is not a presumption of ownership.

B. “One who comes by virtue of inheritance,” meaning that the heir established possession and claims, “I inherited it from my father,” while he does not know whether it belonged to his father or not, does not require a claim. Rather, we make the claim on his behalf that it indeed belonged to his father, as was explained in the Mishna there.

And we raise an objection concerning this:

What are the circumstances [

what situation are we dealing with]?

If they came with the claim of their father [

if the sons come with their father’s claim], that is, if we are dealing with the heirs of a craftsman, a tenant farmer, or a robber who established possession, and they admit that they themselves did not purchase it from the claimant, but claim, “Our father bequeathed it to us”—

if they were the sons of other people, their presumption of ownership would be effective, for although they themselves have no claim, nevertheless we would make the claim on their behalf that their father purchased it from the claimant. Rabbi Yohanan teaches us that there is a distinction between the son of a craftsman or of a tenant farmer, whose law is like that of other heirs and whose presumption is a valid presumption, and the son of a robber, who has no presumption of ownership—

then it is impossible to say this, for the reason for the law that the son of a robber has no presumption of ownership in such a case is that just as the father himself has no presumption of ownership, so the son who comes through his power has no presumption of ownership. If so:

Even these [

the son of a craftsman and the son of a tenant farmer]

also not

should have a presumption of ownership!?

And

if they did not come with their father’s claim, but with their own claim, [

and if we are dealing with a case in which they themselves hold the object or established possession of the land for three years, and they claim, “We purchased the object or the land from you”], even so it is impossible to say that:

If so,

even the son of a robber also

should have a presumption of ownership!?

If so, in what manner does the beraita distinguish between the sons of the craftsman and the tenant farmer and the son of the robber? And we answer:

It is necessary, for witnesses say [

here we are dealing with a case in which witnesses came and testified]:

“In our presence he admitted to him”

the claimant admitted to the craftsman, the tenant farmer, or the robber that it belonged to him, and therefore there is a distinction between them:

These—

the son of the craftsman or the tenant farmer—

it may be said that they are speaking the truth [

it may be said that they are indeed speaking truthfully] in their claim that they say, “Our father purchased it from you”—but

this one—

the son of the robber—

even though he admitted

the claimant

is nevertheless not believed,

the robber’s son—

as Rav Kahana! For Rav Kahana said

concerning an admission to a robber, that it is not an admission:

For

if he had not admitted to him, he would have delivered him and his donkey to the officer [

if the robbed person had not admitted to the robber, he would have handed him and his donkey over to the official], that is, to a violent person; for an ordinary robber is a violent person, and his admission is not an admission.

And this is the explanation of Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

A craftsman has no presumption of ownership when he does not bring witnesses that the claimant admitted; but the son of a craftsman has a presumption of ownership when he brings witnesses that the claimant admitted in his father’s presence. A tenant farmer has no presumption of ownership when there was no admission, and the son of a tenant farmer has a presumption of ownership when there was an admission. A robber and the son of a robber have no presumption of ownership even when there was an admission. The grandson of a robber has a presumption of ownership when he claims, “I inherited it from my father,” and we make the claim on behalf of the heir that his father purchased it, for had his father come with his own claim, he would have been believed. And

Rava said: Sometimes even the son of a robber

has a presumption of ownership,

even though he does not come with his own claim that he purchased it.

And we explain:

What are the circumstances?

For example, when he comes with his grandfather’s claim, [

for example, when the son of the robber claims: “My father’s father purchased it from you, and bequeathed it to my father, and my father bequeathed it to me”], and he is believed with this claim, through a migo that he could have said, “I purchased it from you,” in which case he would be believed. The Gemara explains:

What is the definition of a robber

who has no presumption of ownership?

Rabbi Yohanan said: For example, he was established as a robber with regard to this field,

but with regard to other fields, concerning which it is not known that they came into his possession through robbery, he is believed.

And Rav Hisda said: such as the house of so-and-so

—the house of a certain person, whose name Rav Hisda specified—,

who murder people over monetary matters

, and is not credible regarding any field, because people are afraid to protest against them.

The Sages taught:

a.

A craftsman has no presumption

, but a craftsman who

left his craft

and afterward takes possession of it,

has a presumption.

b.

A sharecropper has no presumption

, but a sharecropper who

left

his sharecropping has a presumption.

c. Although we learned above, 48a: “A man has no presumption regarding his wife’s property, and a woman regarding her husband’s property; nor a father regarding his son’s property, nor a son regarding his father’s property,” nevertheless:

A son who separated

—distanced himself from his father and is not supported at his table, such as when he married a woman and no longer engages in his father’s property—,

and a woman who was divorced

from her husband:

they are like all other people

, and the father has a presumption regarding his [son’s] property, and he regarding his father’s property; and the husband has a presumption regarding her property, and the woman regarding his property.

And we raise an objection:

Granted

“a son who separated”

was necessary

to teach us that a son has a presumption regarding his father’s property, for

it might enter your mind to say: A father waives it to his son

[a father waives it to his son when he takes possession of his property, and therefore he did not protest], and the son should not have a presumption regarding his father’s property—

it teaches us that this is not so

, and he has a presumption!

Rather

“a woman who was divorced”

, is it

obvious

that they are like two strangers who have a presumption against one another!?