Bava Batra 42a (מב.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer: Actually, a sale conducted before witnesses does not become public knowledge. Nevertheless, Rav maintains that there is no concern for the purchasers’ loss, because

there—

in the case of one who sells his field before witnesses—

the purchasers

brought the loss upon themselves [The purchasers caused their own loss]. That is, had the purchasers investigated the matter, they would have known that the seller was a debtor; since they did not investigate, they suffered the loss. But in the case of three purchasers, it would not have occurred to the claimant to investigate whether there had been a sale, because, on the contrary, he certainly assumed that they were afraid to establish possession for three years through the possession of a single person.

The Gemara returns to challenge Rav’s statement that one who sells his field before witnesses collects from property liened to a creditor:

Wherein the Gemara objects to Rav's statement that: one who sells his field with witnesses collects from mortgaged assets:

Can Rav really have said this [Is it possible that Rav said so]!?

[Is it possible that Rav said so]!?

But didn’t we learn in the Mishna: One who lends money to another by means of a document,

which becomes public knowledge,

collects from property liened to a creditor?

But one who lends money to another

by means of witnesses collects

only from unencumbered property,

because this loan does not become public knowledge, and the purchasers do not know to take precautions.

If so, the same law should apply to a liability debt: if it was not created through a sale documented in a deed, it should be collectible only from unencumbered property. This is therefore a difficulty against Rav!?

And if you would say,

perhaps one might resolve the matter as follows: Indeed, the Mishna proves that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav; nevertheless,

Rav is a tanna [Rav possesses the authority of a tanna]

and he disputes

the Mishna!?

with the Mishna!?

But Rav

himself

and Shmuel both say,

as is written in the Mishna, that

an oral loan—

that is, a loan made before witnesses without a document—

is not collected either from heirs or from purchasers,

because a loan made before witnesses does not become public knowledge, and we are concerned for the purchasers’ loss.

And we answer:

Are you comparing a loan to a sale [Are you challenging the law of a sale from the law of a loan]!?

There is a distinction between them with regard to the purchasers’ loss:

For

when one borrows,

the borrower

borrows discreetly, so that his property will not be devalued because of him [The borrower borrows only discreetly, so that people will not know that he needs money and pressure him by lowering the price of his fields],

and therefore there is concern for the purchasers’ loss.

But

in the case of a sale [a sale],

on the contrary,

one who sells land sells publicly, so that the matter will become known [The seller, on the contrary, endeavors to publicize the sale, so that buyers will come to purchase it],

and therefore we say that the purchasers brought the loss upon themselves, because had they investigated the matter, they would have learned of it.

The Sages taught:

If the father possessed the field—

a field that was presumed to belong to its owner—

for one year

in the presence of the claimant, who did not protest,

and the son

of the first possessor possessed it for another

two

additional years; or if

the father possessed it for two

years

and the son for one year; or if

the father possessed it for

one year

and

the son for one year,

one year,

and the purchaser

who purchased it from the son by means of a document possessed it for

one year,

an additional year,

this constitutes presumptive ownership.

That is: and the purchaser wins even if neither he nor the heir alleged anything, because "we require allegation" from the heir and from the purchaser, and all the more so if the purchaser alleged.

And we challenge:

Does this imply that a purchaser

from an heir even when the purchase is documented

has a public announcement [Is it indeed so that a purchaser who acquires a field by means of a document has a public announcement of the sale, and therefore the claimant cannot argue: I thought that you were afraid to possess the field for three years through the possession of one person, because you were afraid to possess it]!?

And we raise a contradiction

from that which was taught in a baraita:

If

the possessor

possessed the field in the presence of the father

of the claimant

for one year,

and the possessor claims that he purchased the field from the claimant’s father,

and

he possessed it for another

two years in the presence of the son; or if he possessed it

for two years in the presence of the father

and

for one year in the presence of the son; or if he possessed it

for one year in the presence of the father,

and for one year in the presence of the son, and in the presence of

the

purchaser

from the claimant

for one year, this constitutes presumptive ownership.

And if it should enter your mind that a purchaser has a public announcement [When one purchases a field, there is publicity concerning the sale by which he acquired it],

then when the claimant sold the field after two years to another purchaser, and made the sale by means of a document,

you have no greater protest than this,

as he was thereby informing everyone that the land did not belong to the possessor.

And if it could enter your mind that a purchaser becomes publicly known [a purchaser of a field makes the sale known], then when the claimant sold the field to another purchaser after two years, and sold it by means of a document,

there is no greater protest than this,

Rather, it is certain that a sale does not become public knowledge, and this “protest” does not reach the claimant; therefore it is not a protest. This is consequently a difficulty against what is implied by the first baraita, namely, that a sale documented in a deed does become public knowledge!?

He said

and explained, Rav Pappa: When that baraita was taught,

the baraita that apparently proves that a sale documented in a deed does not become public knowledge,

it was with regard to one who sells

all

his fields

to a purchaser

without specification,

without specifying which properties they are. In general, a document does become public knowledge, but this does not qualify as a protest, because the possessor does not know that the claimant is making any claim concerning the specific field that he possesses.

The following Mishna deals with two types of presumptive ownership:

The first is presumptive ownership established through three years of possession, which applies to land and slaves.

The second is presumptive ownership of movable property, which does not require three years; rather, anything in a person’s possession is presumed to belong to him.

without specifying which parcels of land he is selling. In general, a document does become publicly known, but this does not count as a protest, because the holder does not know that the claimant is making any claim concerning the particular field that he is holding.

The following Mishna discusses two types of presumed ownership:

The first is a presumption of ownership established through three years of possession, which applies to land and slaves.

The second is a presumption of ownership with regard to movable property. It does not require three years; rather, whatever is in a person’s possession is presumed to belong to him.

Mishna:

Artisans

who receive utensils to repair, launder, or dye them, and who have other people’s utensils in their possession, where the artisan claims that he purchased them from their owners, while the owners claim that they gave him these utensils to repair, dye, or perform a similar service.

And partners

who jointly owned land, where one of them held the entire property for three years and claims that he purchased his partner’s share of the land. The partner, however, claims that this is the practice of partners: One uses the land for three years or more, and afterward the other partner uses it for a corresponding period.

And sharecroppers

who receive land to work and take half, a third, or a quarter of the produce as their compensation, where it is known that he entered this field as a sharecropper, and the sharecropper consumed all the produce of the field for three years, and therefore he claims a chazaka in the field. The field’s owner, by contrast, claims that the sharecropper had paid him the value of his share of the produce, or had recorded that amount as a loan owed to him.

And guardians

of orphans and the like—

All of these

do not establish a chazaka.

Likewise,

not the husband

the husband who consumes the produce of his wife’s field does not establish

a chazaka

of three years

with regard to the property of [

the fields of ]

his wife,

even when he has no right to consume her produce, because a wife does not object to her husband’s doing so, as explained in the Gemara.

Nor the wife,

the wife who consumes produce from her husband’s field does not establish

a chazaka

of three years

with regard to her husband’s property,

because a husband does not object to his wife’s consuming the produce of his field.

And

even

the father

does not establish a chazaka

with regard to the son’s property,

because he does not object to his son’s actions.

Nor the son

establish a chazaka

with regard to the father’s property.

In what context are these words stated,

with regard to all those mentioned here, concerning whom we have just learned that they do not establish a chazaka at all, and likewise with regard to what we learned concerning land, that a chazaka establishes ownership only after three years?—

With regard to one who holds the property,

meaning one who wishes to retain his possession and claims, on the basis of his possession, that the field belongs to him.

But in the case of one who gives a gift,

who comes to transfer his field to the recipient of the gift,

and

likewise

brothers who divided

their father’s inheritance and now come to acquire each his portion,

and one who takes possession of the property of a convert,

which is ownerless, so that whoever is first to acquire it acquires it, and a person comes to acquire it—

In all these cases, if he

locked

the field [by making a door for it], or

fenced

it, by building a wall around the field,

or breached [

or breached ] an opening in the wall through which to enter, even if he did so only

to any extent [

as the Gemara will explain ],

this constitutes

an acquisition by

a chazaka.