Bava Batra 38a (לח.) — the Talmud in English

The reason is that since he necessarily acquired a right to the land so that his tree could remain there, the land is therefore his.

Rava raised an objection:

And

since we learned that one who sells a single tree to another does not sell him the land, it follows that he did not acquire any land at all. And regarding your difficulty: Since he acquired the tree so that it could continue to exist in this land, it follows that he acquired the land’s nourishment also for the purpose of planting another tree in this one’s place—

let the owner of the land say to the owner of the tree: “

Turmeric—

it is a type of vegetable that is customarily sold together with the land, and when the produce is fully grown, the purchaser takes it—

is what I sold you; uproot the turmeric and go,

I did not sell you the tree except in the manner in which turmeric is sold: once your tree dries up, uproot it, take it, and go!”?

Rather, Rava said:

He acquired the land beneath the tree only

when he came with a claim,

when he explicitly claimed to the seller: “You sold me the tree and the land beneath it in order to plant another in its place, and I have consumed its produce for the period of presumptive ownership, and I did not take greater care of my documents than for three years.”

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi:

But if he sold him the tree as turmeric, what could he have done,

if indeed he did not sell him the tree except in the manner in which turmeric is sold? What could the owner have done to prevent this person from establishing presumptive ownership of the tree and claiming that he had also sold him the land? Rav Ashi said to him:

He should have lodged a protest

against the purchaser of the tree, informing him that he had acquired only his tree, and not the land beneath it; this would invalidate his claim of presumptive ownership.

For if you do not say so,

that even a partial protest such as this—where he did not say of him, “He is a robber”—is a valid protest,

those loans secured by the land of Sura—

where the borrower gives the lender the right to consume the produce of his field—

in which it is written

as follows: “

When these years are completed, this land shall leave without payment,”

once the specified number of years has ended, as they agreed between them, the land returns to its owners without payment or price—

and

if he hides the document of the secured loan in his possession and says, “

It is purchased property in my possession,”

would he likewise be deemed credible,

could the lender conceal the document of the secured loan and claim, “It is purchased property in my possession,” and would we believe him on the basis of presumptive ownership for three years? Yet the one challenging the claim cannot invalidate his presumptive ownership through a partial protest!?

And should you say that this is indeed so!?

And is it possible that

the Sages instituted—

who instituted the loan secured by the land of Sura—

a measure through which one could come to a loss,

is it possible that the Sages would institute an enactment through which the borrower could come to suffer a loss!? Surely the Sages would not institute an enactment of this kind—

Rather,

necessarily, there is no concern of loss here, because

he should have

the borrower

lodged a protest

against the lender through a partial protest, and this protest would invalidate the lender’s presumptive ownership; thus, he has no means of causing the borrower a loss—

and if so,

here—

when he gave him the right to consume the produce—

likewise,

if he is concerned that at the end of three years the lender will claim that it belongs to him,

he should have lodged a protest

against the lender during the three years through a partial protest, since even a partial protest is a valid protest!

Mishna:

There are three regions

in Eretz Yisrael that are separate from one another

with regard

to

presumptive ownership: Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee.

What does this mean?

If

the owner of the land

was in Judea, and someone established presumptive ownership

of his field that was

in the Galilee;

or if the owner of the land

was in the Galilee, and someone established presumptive ownership

of his field that was

in Judea—

or if the owner of the land was in Judea or in the Galilee and someone established presumptive ownership of his field in Transjordan; or if the owner of the land was in Transjordan and someone established presumptive ownership of his field in Judea or in the Galilee—

in all these cases

it is not presumptive ownership,

and the Gemara explains the reason: between these three regions caravans are not common. If the owner of the land protests in the place where he is, the protest will not reach the one who established presumptive ownership, so that he will know to take greater care of his document beyond three years. Since his protest is not a valid protest, the owner of the land has not suffered a loss by failing to protest; and the one who established presumptive ownership should have taken care of his document beyond three years, since he knows that the owner of the land is unable to protest—

until

the owner of the land is

with him

with the one who established presumptive ownership

in the same region,

meaning that both are in the Galilee, Judea, or Transjordan, even if they are in different cities within that same region.

Rabbi Yehuda said,

disputing the statement of the first tanna, who maintains that presumptive ownership is effective only when both are in the same region: even if they are in two different regions, it is presumptive ownership, since:

The Sages did not say

[according to Rabbi Yehuda] that presumptive ownership is effective only after

three years,

although they could have said: A person does not allow another to consume the produce of his field and remain entirely silent,

except so that

the owner of the land should be

in Aspamia,

which is an extremely distant place from Eretz Yisrael, and caravans do not commonly travel there,

and the purchaser should establish presumptive ownership

in the purchaser’s

year

of the land in Eretz Yisrael. During that year, word would spread that someone was establishing presumptive ownership of his field,

and

then

they would go and inform him

that someone had been establishing presumptive ownership of his field for

a year

more,

and

the owner of the land would come

in another year

to protest against the one who had established presumptive ownership. It is therefore proven that presumptive ownership is effective even when the one who established it and the challenger are in two different regions between which caravans do not commonly travel.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: There are three regions with regard to presumptive ownership—Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee. If he was in Judea and someone established presumptive ownership of his field in the Galilee ... it is not presumptive ownership until he is with him in the same region:

And we raise a difficulty:

What does the first tanna maintain,

what is the rationale of the first tanna, who distinguishes between presumptive ownership established in two cities in the same region and presumptive ownership established in two different regions!?

If he maintains that a protest

lodged by the challenger

not in his presence

of the one who established presumptive ownership

is a valid protest

to invalidate his presumptive ownership [because the protest certainly reached the one who established presumptive ownership, as the one who heard the protest told his colleague, and his colleague told his colleague, until the protest reached the one who established presumptive ownership], then he should maintain that presumptive ownership established in two cities is presumptive ownership, since the owner could protest even not in his presence—

If so,

even Judea and the Galilee

[even if the one who established presumptive ownership was in Judea and the owner of the land was in the Galilee]

likewise

should be presumptive ownership, since he can protest not in his presence, just as he does when they are in two cities!?

And

if he maintains that a protest not made in his presence is not a valid protest,

and therefore there is no presumptive ownership in two regions, since he cannot protest, then

even Judea and Judea

[if both were in Judea, but one was in one city and the other in a different city]

also would not

be presumptive ownership, since just as the protest in his place is not a valid protest, the presumptive ownership established by the other is also not presumptive ownership. And why did we learn, “until he is with him in the same region”? It should have said, “until he is with him in the same city”!?

Rabbi Abba bar Memel said that Rav said,

explaining the view of the first tanna:

The first tanna actually maintains

the following:

A protest not made in his presence is a valid protest,

and therefore, if he was with him in the same region, even in a different city, it is presumptive ownership

; and our Mishna

deals

with a time of emergency,

when there are hostilities between the inhabitants of Judea and those of the Galilee.

They taught

that it is not presumptive ownership, because at such a time caravans do not commonly travel from the Galilee to Judea, and when caravans are not common, his protest is not a valid protest when made not in his presence, since the protest will not reach the ears of the one who established presumptive ownership. Since his protest is not a valid protest, the other’s presumptive ownership is also not presumptive ownership.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

if so,

what is different about Judea and the Galilee that he mentions,

for the same law should apply to any place where there is a state of emergency between two regions: it is not presumptive ownership. He should have said: All regions are separate from one another with regard to presumptive ownership in a time of emergency!?

And we answer:

This teaches us

that our Mishna specifically mentions Judea and the Galilee: