Bava Batra 38b (לח:) — the Talmud in English

For Judah and the Galilee are considered, in ordinary circumstances, as if they were in a state of emergency:

that is, even when there is peace between them, it is as though there were an emergency between them, because caravans are not common from one to the other. Therefore, whenever the protester was in the Galilee and the possessor established control in Judah, this does not constitute a presumption of ownership.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

One cannot establish a presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a fugitive,

that is, if someone established control over a fugitive's property and said, “I purchased it from him,” the control he exercised during the landowner's flight does not constitute a presumption of ownership. This is because, according to Rav, “a protest made in his absence is not a valid protest” that can invalidate the possessor's presumption of ownership, and the fugitive cannot come and protest before the possessor, since he fled from that place for whatever reason; and whenever one is unable to protest, the possessor's control does not constitute a presumption of ownership!

Rav Yehuda added and said:

When I related this before Shmuel,

when Rav died and I came to study under Shmuel, and I related this teaching to him in Rav's name,

he said to me

Shmuel:

Why should this not constitute a presumption of ownership?

Does

every landowner whose field is being possessed

need to protest before him,

the possessor,

in order

to invalidate the possessor's presumption of ownership!? Must we say that since this person is unable to protest, the other's control likewise does not constitute a presumption of ownership!?

Even if he protests in his absence, his protest is a valid protest. If so, the other's control does constitute a presumption of ownership, since even the fugitive can protest in the possessor's absence.

And

we raise an objection against

Rav: What does this

teach us

? He holds

that a protest made in his absence is not a valid

protest!?

But

yet

Rav said: A protest made in his absence is a valid protest!?

For Rav explained that this is the reasoning of the first tanna in our Mishna, as explained on 38a; and it follows that he too held like the first tanna, and therefore explained his reasoning accordingly.

And we answer: Rav actually holds that “a protest made in his absence is not a valid protest,” but

Rav

merely

explains the reasoning of the tanna of our Mishna [

Rav came only to explain the reasoning of the first tanna];

but he does not hold

that way

as his own position; rather, he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that a protest made in his absence is not a valid protest.

And some say

that this is what

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

One can establish a presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a fugitive,

and

when I related this before Shmuel, he said to me: It is obvious; does he need to protest before him!?

And

this is how we raise the objection:

What does Rav teach us!?

That

a protest made in his absence is a valid protest!?

But

he had already

said this once

[once] on 38a, in explaining the words of the first tanna; and once Rav explained our anonymous Mishna in this manner, we already know that this is his position!?

And we answer:

Rather, this is what Rav teaches us

by saying that one can establish a presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a fugitive:

even if

the protester

protested before two people who cannot tell him

that the landowner had protested to the possessor, also

it is a valid protest,

because they will tell others, and those others will tell others, until it reaches the possessor's ears.

As for Shmuel, who challenged Rav's statement and said, “It is obvious; does he need to protest before him?”—this is because he did not understand Rav to be teaching this point. He thought that Rav said that one can establish a presumption of ownership with regard to a fugitive's property only to teach that a protest need not be made before him. On the contrary, Shmuel does not hold that a protest made before two people who cannot tell him is a valid protest—

And

as Rav Anan said: It was explained to me by Mar Shmuel

[I heard it from Shmuel himself]:

If he protested before two people who can tell him, it is a valid protest,

but

if he protested before two people who cannot tell him, it is not a valid protest.

And

we explain the reasoning of

Rav,

who disagrees with Shmuel's statement and holds that a protest is valid even when made before two people who cannot tell him: He holds that even if these people themselves do not inform the possessor that the protester protested against him,

your friend has a friend, and your friend's friend has a friend

[the friend who heard the protest has a friend to whom he will relate it, and that friend has a friend to whom he will relate it, and so the protest will ultimately reach the possessor's ears].

Rava said: The halakha is:

a.

One cannot establish a presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a fugitive.

b.

And a protest made in his absence is a valid protest,

and therefore control exercised in his absence constitutes a presumption of ownership, and one who possesses a fugitive's property has a presumption of ownership.

And we raise an objection to Rava's words:

Two things

[Rava has stated two things here that cannot both be upheld], for if he can protest in his absence, why can one not establish a presumption of ownership with regard to a fugitive's property!?

And we answer:

This is not difficult:

Here—

when Rava said that a protest made in his absence is a valid protest, thereby teaching that one can establish a presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a fugitive—this is referring to a case in which the landowner was

a fugitive because of financial matters,

as he owed money and had no means to repay it, and was evading the creditor until he had the money to repay him. One who flees because of a debt is not pursued, and he is not concerned that people will learn where he is; therefore he can protest in the possessor's absence, and one can establish a presumption of ownership with regard to his property, since a protest made in his absence is a valid protest.

Here—

when Rava said that one cannot establish a presumption of ownership with regard to the property of a fugitive—this is referring to a case in which the landowner was

a fugitive because of meradin

[“murder” in Persian]: He had committed murder in his place of residence and feared the blood redeemer, lest he kill him; he was also afraid to reveal where he was, lest the blood redeemer pursue him in order to kill him. Consequently, he was unable to protest even in the possessor's absence, and therefore one cannot establish a presumption of ownership with regard to his property.

The Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances of a protest,

how does one protest in the possessor's absence?

Rav Zevid said:

If he said before witnesses:

“So-and-so

[and he specifies the name of the possessor of the land]

is a robber,”

and he does not add, “He is consuming my land by robbery,”

it is not a valid protest,

because even if the witnesses convey this expression to the possessor, he will not take care of his deed, since he does not know why the protester calls him a “robber” and therefore will not take care of his deed.

Only if he said:

“So-and-so is a robber, for he is consuming my land by robbery,”