Bava Batra 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

“Regarding the ancestors, who contradicted him!?”

Indeed, the witnesses were contradicted with regard to the specific detail of the three years of possession; however, with regard to the very detail for which we require their testimony, namely, the testimony concerning the ancestors, there is no one to contradict them!?!

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that Rava and Rav Naḥman disagree with regard to the same dispute as Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda

—that is, shall we say that the dispute between Rava and Rav Naḥman depends upon the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda?

As it was stated:

With regard to two sets of witnesses who contradict one another

with regard to any testimony:

Rav Huna said:

from this point forward:

This one comes independently and testifies

with regard to other testimonies,

and this one comes independently and testifies

with regard to other testimonies. Although one of the sets is disqualified from testimony, since it testified falsely, because it is uncertain which set is the lying one, we establish each set with the presumptive status of fitness.

And Rav Ḥisda said:

We do not accept testimony from either set, because

“what use have I for lying witnesses”

—it is known to us that one of the sets is lying, but we do not know which one, and we do not accept witnesses who have ever lied in their testimony!?! And if so:

Shall we say that Rav Naḥman—

who maintains that we do not take into consideration the fact that the sets were contradicted with regard to the testimony of possession, and that we should accept the testimony of one set concerning its assertion that the property belonged to the ancestors of this litigant—

ruled in accordance with Rav Huna

who maintains that, with regard to other testimony, the testimony of each set is accepted; and the testimony that the property belonged to his ancestors is like other testimony, with regard to which each set is deemed reliable according to Rav Huna—

And

if

Rava—

who maintains that their testimony is not accepted even with regard to the detail concerning which they were not contradicted—

ruled in accordance with Rav Ḥisda

who disqualifies a set of witnesses that has been contradicted from giving testimony? And we reject this:

No; according to Rav Ḥisda, everyone agrees

—that is, one cannot reject the suggestion by saying that both Rava and Rav Naḥman follow Rav Ḥisda, because it is certain that according to Rav Ḥisda we cannot accept their testimony that the property belonged to his ancestors, since it is known to us that one of the sets is lying, we do not know which one, and they are disqualified from all testimony in the world—

They disagree according to Rav Huna,

that is, one may reject this and say that both Rava and Rav Naḥman maintain the view of Rav Huna, that for other testimonies they are trustworthy, but Rav Naḥman and Rava disagree whether Rav Huna also renders them fit in this manner!

They disagree according to Rav Huna

—that is, one may reject the suggestion and say that both Rava and Rav Naḥman maintain like Rav Huna, that they are reliable with regard to other testimony; however, Rav Naḥman and Rava disagree over whether Rav Huna would also render them fit in this situation!

Rav Naḥman—

who renders them fit to testify that the property belonged to his ancestors—

follows Rav Huna

who renders them fit with regard to other testimony, and the same law applies: According to Rav Naḥman, they are fit with regard to this testimony as well!

And Rava

could say to you:

Rav Huna said only this much

—that they should be rendered fit with regard to other testimony, which has no connection to the testimony concerning which they were contradicted—

but with regard to that same testimony

—that is, concerning the same land, and the testimony concerning the ancestors and the possession—

no,

Rav Huna did not say that they should be rendered fit!

He then again brought witnesses that it was his ancestors’ property

: After Rav Naḥman had ruled that the land should remain in the possession of the one who had brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors, the other party also returned and brought witnesses who contradicted the testimony of the first witnesses, saying that the field belonged to the ancestors of this second party!

If these witnesses had come before the ruling had been issued to place the land in the possession of the other party, there is no doubt that we would have said: Since both parties have witnesses of possession and witnesses concerning the ancestors, and neither has greater power than the other, the rule is, “Whoever is stronger prevails.” However, since the court had already ruled that the land should be placed in the possession of one of them, one might say that we should no longer remove it from his possession, because of ziluta debei dina, the degradation of the court, as the court’s words would appear ridiculous and absurd, since it changes its rulings from one day to the next.

Nevertheless,

Rav Naḥman said:

“We brought him down; we can bring him back up”

—indeed, we ruled that one party should be brought down onto the land; nevertheless, since the circumstances have changed, we may remove him from the land— and

we are not concerned about the degradation of the court.

He raised an objection

concerning this

Rava

raised an objection

—and some say it was Rabbi Zeira

who raised the objection—[some say that Rabbi Zeira was the one who raised the difficulty], from that which was taught in a beraita:

Two

witnesses

say,

“He died—

her husband died, and she is permitted to marry,”

and two

others

say,

“He did not die—

her husband did not die”—

or

two say,

“She was divorced

from this husband of hers who died, and she is permitted to marry outside the levirate bond and does not require a yavam,”

and two say,

“She was not divorced

from him, and she requires a yavam”:

Since it is uncertain whether the woman was permitted to marry outside the levirate bond,

she may not marry,

because we establish her according to the presumptive status of a married woman—

but

nevertheless,

if

she transgressed and

married, she need not leave.

Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei says:

Even if she married,

she must leave.

Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei said: When do I say

that

she must leave? When

the

witnesses

who prohibit her from marrying

came first, and

she transgressed and

married

afterward, since she married in violation of the prohibition, for had she come to court, they would have told her not to marry due to the uncertainty.

But

if she

married

when only witnesses who permitted her to marry had come, so that she married permissibly,

and afterward the

witnesses

witnesses

who prohibit her came, I too concede that

she need not leave, because we are concerned about ziluta debei dina; and this poses a difficulty to Rav Naḥman, who said: We are not concerned about the degradation of the court!?!

because we are concerned about disgrace of the court; and this is a difficulty against Rav Naḥman, who said: “We are not concerned about disgrace of the court”!

He said to him

—Rav Naḥman said to the one who had raised the objection from the beraita:

“I had thought to carry out the practical ruling

but

now that you have raised an objection against us, and

also

Rav Hamnuna in Sura has raised an objection against us, we will not carry out the practical ruling

—initially, I thought that I would act according to my opinion, that we are not concerned about the degradation of the court. However, since you have given me a proper answer from the beraita, and Rav Hamnuna in Sura has likewise answered me, I retract my position and will not act according to my approach.

Nevertheless,

Rav Naḥman went out and

carried out a ruling,

carried out the practical ruling,

—Rav Naḥman went out and acted according to his position—and he was not concerned about the degradation of the court!

One who saw this thought: “He has erred.”

—Whoever saw Rav Naḥman doing this thought that he had made a mistake, for he had forgotten the response of the Sages, as well as his own statement that he would not carry out the practical ruling!

But the Gemara explains:

“It is not so”

—as that observer had thought, that Rav Naḥman had made a mistake—

rather,

Rav Naḥman carried out the practical ruling

because

Rav Naḥman found that

it depends upon great authorities

—the law of whether one is concerned about the degradation of the court depends upon great authorities. That is, it was the tannaim who disagreed about this matter, and some tannaim disagree with Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei and are not concerned about the degradation of the court; Rav Naḥman therefore acted according to the view of those who disagreed with Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei.

For

we

learned

in tractate Ketubbot 23b:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

One does not elevate

a person

to priestly status

—to permit him to eat teruma, perform the Temple service, and bless the people—

on the basis of one witness

who testifies that he is a koen. [The entire Mishna is explained later in the discussion.]

Rabbi Elazar said

to explain Rabbi Yehuda’s words:

When

one does not elevate him to priestly status on the basis of one witness is

when there are

witnesses

challenging his status

and testifying that he is disqualified from the priesthood [and this is explained more fully later in the discussion]—

But where there are no challengers,

and there is merely a rumor of disqualification that has circulated concerning him,

one elevates him to priestly status

even

on the basis of one witness.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben HaSegan:

One elevates him to priestly status on the basis of one witness

where there are no challengers, —and he proceeds to explain the difference between his view and that of Rabbi Elazar.

And we raise a difficulty:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Elazar,

since they both stated the same thing: One elevates him to priestly status on the basis of one witness when there are no challengers!?

And if you say

to reconcile:

one challenger

[one witness challenging his priestly status],

the difference between them is

whether the term “challengers” is understood to mean that a kohen is not elevated to priestly status on the basis of one witness who contradicts the challenger:

that

Rabbi Elazar held:

even

one challenger

[one witness who testified to his disqualification] is considered “challengers,” to invalidate the testimony of the one who establishes his qualification.