Bava Batra 31b — the Talmud in English

“In the matter of the ancestors, who contradicted him!?”

Indeed, the witnesses were contradicted regarding the specific detail of the three years of eating, but regarding that detail for which we require their testimony, namely, the testimony concerning the ancestors, there is no one who will contradict them!?

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that Rava and Rav Naḥman disagree in the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda

—whether it may be said that the dispute between Rava and Rav Naḥman depends upon the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda?

For it was stated:

Two groups of witnesses who contradict one another

in any testimony:

said Rav Huna:

From this point onward:

This one comes by itself and testifies

with other testimonies,

and this one comes by itself and testifies

with other testimonies; and although one of the groups is disqualified from testimony, since it testified falsely; because it is uncertain which group is the lying one, we establish each one with a presumption of fitness.

And Rav Ḥisda said:

We do not accept testimony from either group, because

what do I need witnesses who are liars

—it is known to us that one group is lying, and we do not have to accept witnesses who have ever lied in their testimony!? And if so:

shall we say that Rav Naḥman

—who maintains that one must not take into consideration that the groups were contradicted regarding the testimony of possession, and that the testimony of one group must be accepted concerning its statement that the property belonged to the ancestors of this one—

acted in accordance with Rav Huna

who maintains: for another testimony, the testimony of each group must be accepted, and what they testify—that it belonged to his ancestors—is like another testimony, regarding which each of the groups is trustworthy to testify according to Rav Huna—

And

if

Rava

—who maintains that their testimony is not to be accepted even regarding that detail concerning which they were not contradicted—

acted in accordance with Rav Ḥisda,

who disqualifies a group that has been contradicted from testifying? And we reject this:

No; according to Rav Ḥisda, everyone agrees

—that is, indeed, it is impossible to reject this by saying that both Rava and Rav Naḥman maintain the view of Rav Ḥisda, for certainly according to Rav Ḥisda we cannot accept their testimony that the property belonged to his ancestors, since it is known to us that one group is lying, but we do not know which one, and they are disqualified for every testimony in the world—

They disagree according to Rav Huna,

that is, one may reject this and say that both Rava and Rav Naḥman maintain the view of Rav Huna, that for other testimonies they are trustworthy, but Rav Naḥman and Rava disagree whether Rav Huna also renders them fit in this manner!

Rav Naḥman

—who renders them fit to testify that the property belonged to his ancestors—

is in accordance with Rav Huna,

who renders them fit for other testimonies, and according to his view they are likewise fit for this testimony!

And Rava

could say to you:

Rav Huna said only this much

—that they are to be rendered fit for other testimonies—

but for another testimony

that has no connection between that testimony and the testimony regarding which they were contradicted,

but for the same testimony,

that is, regarding the same land—and testimony concerning ancestors and possession—

no,

Rav Huna did not say to render them fit!

He then brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors,

after Rav Naḥman had ruled that the land should be established in the possession of the one who brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors; the other one then also returned and brought witnesses contradicting the testimony of the first ones, and saying: the field belonged to the ancestors of this one!

If these witnesses had come before the ruling had been issued to establish the land in the possession of the other, there is no doubt that we would have said: since both have witnesses of possession and witnesses concerning ancestors, and this one has no greater power than that one, therefore, “the stronger one prevails”; but since the court had already ruled to establish the land in the possession of one of them, there is room to say that we should no longer remove it from his possession, because of “disgrace of the court,” so that the words of the court would appear as mockery and ridicule, as though they changed their ruling from one day to the next.

Nevertheless,

Rav Naḥman said:

We brought him down; we shall bring him up,

indeed, we ruled to bring the one down onto the land; nevertheless, since the circumstances have changed, we must remove him from the land, and

we are not concerned about disgrace of the court.

He raised an objection

concerning this

Rava

against Rav Naḥman,

and some say Rabbi Zeira

—there are those who say that it was Rabbi Zeira who raised the objection—from that which was taught in a beraita:

Two

witnesses

say,

“He died

—the husband of this woman—and she is permitted to marry,”

and two

others

say,

“He did not die

—the husband of this woman”—

Or

two say,

“She was divorced

from this woman’s deceased husband, and she is permitted to marry outside, and she does not require levirate marriage,”

and two say,

“She was not divorced

from him, and she requires levirate marriage”:

Since it is uncertain whether the woman was permitted to marry outside,

she may not marry,

because we establish her with the presumption of being a married woman—

and

nevertheless,

if

she transgressed and

married, she need not leave.

Rabbi Menaḥem bar Rabbi Yosei says:

Even if she married—

she must leave.

Rabbi Menaḥem bar Rabbi Yosei said: When do I say

that she

must leave, when the

the

witnesses

who prohibit her from marrying

came first,

and afterward she transgressed and

married,

since she married in prohibition, for if she had come to court, they would have told her not to marry because of the uncertainty.

But

if she

married

when only witnesses who permitted her to marry had come, so that she married permissibly,

and afterward the

witnesses

witnesses

who prohibit her came, I too concede that

she need not leave,

because we are concerned about disgrace of the court; and this is a difficulty against Rav Naḥman, who said: “We are not concerned about disgrace of the court”!

He said to him

Rav Naḥman, to the one who raised the objection from the beraita:

I thought to carry out the practical ruling,

but

now that you have raised an objection against me, and

also

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection against me in Sura, we shall not carry out the practical ruling in this matter,

[at first I thought that I would carry out a practical act according to my opinion, that we are not concerned about disgrace of the court; however, since you have answered me with a correct answer from the beraita, and Rav Hamnuna in Sura also answered me, I retract and will not carry out a practical act according to my position].

Nevertheless,

Rav Naḥman went out and

carried out a ruling,

carried out a practical ruling,

[Rav Naḥman went out and carried out a practical act according to his position], and was not concerned about disgrace of the court!

One who saw this thought: He has made a mistake,

[whoever saw Rav Naḥman doing this thought that he had made a mistake, for he had forgotten the answer of the Sages, and even his own words, when he said, “I shall not carry out a practical ruling”]!

But the Gemara explains:

It is not so,

as that observer thought, that Rav Naḥman had made a mistake,

but

Rav Naḥman carried out a practical ruling

because

Rav Naḥman found

that it depends upon great trees

[that the law of “we are concerned about disgrace of the court” depends upon great authorities], that is, tannaim disputed the matter, and there are tannaim who disagree with Rabbi Menaḥem bar Rabbi Yosei and are not concerned about disgrace of the court; and Rav Naḥman carried out a practical ruling according to the view of those who disagree with Rabbi Menaḥem bar Rabbi Yosei.

For

it is

taught

in tractate Ketubot 23b:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

One does not raise

a person

to the priesthood

to authorize him to eat teruma, perform the Temple service, and raise his hands

on the basis of one witness

who testifies that he is a priest, [and the entire Mishna is explained later in the discussion].

Rabbi Elazar said

to explain Rabbi Yehuda’s words:

When

one does not raise him to the priesthood on the basis of one witness is

when there are against him

witnesses

raising objections,

that he is disqualified from the priesthood [and this is explained further in the discussion]—

But where there are no objections,

but merely a report of disqualification has gone out concerning him,

one raises him to the priesthood

even

on the basis of one witness.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben HaSegan:

One raises him to the priesthood on the basis of one witness

where there are no objections, [ and he proceeds to explain what the difference is between his view and that of Rabbi Elazar].

And we raise a difficulty:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is Rabbi Elazar

for both of them said the same thing: that one raises him to the priesthood on the basis of one witness when there are no objections!?

And if you say

to reconcile:

one challenger

[one witness challenging his kohen status],

there is a difference between them

if “challengers” is understood to mean not elevating a kohen on the basis of one witness who contradicts the challenger:

For

Rabbi Elazar holds:

even

one challenger

[one witness who testified to his disqualification] is considered “challengers,” to invalidate the testimony of the one who establishes his fitness.