Bava Batra 31a (לא.) — the Talmud in English

However,

if he cultivated it for only

six

years, it turns out that before the completion of the two years establishing presumptive ownership, the owner sold the property to another, since the date of the document is four years earlier, and

there is no greater act of protest than this,

for the owner of the land protested against the possessor by selling it to another, and if so, his presumptive ownership is invalidated.

An incident involving two people who disputed a field:

One says: It belonged to my ancestors,

and I inherited the land from them,

and

also

I cultivated it for the two years establishing presumptive ownership—

and the other says: It belonged to my ancestors,

and I inherited it from them.

This one brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors; and this one brought witnesses that he cultivated it for the two years establishing presumptive ownership,

the first brought witnesses that the land had once belonged to his ancestors, whereas the second—the one who claimed that the land belonged to his ancestors and that he had cultivated it for the requisite two years—did not find witnesses to testify in accordance with his claim, but brought witnesses who testified that he had cultivated it for the requisite two years.

Apparently, we should establish the land in the possession of the one who brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors, since his opponent does not claim that he purchased the land from his ancestors or from him, in which case his presumptive ownership would support his claim; whereas his claim against the witnesses is of no consequence. Nevertheless,

Rabba said

that he should be believed in his claim, against the witnesses, that it belonged to his ancestors, because

why would he lie,

that is, he should be believed on the basis of a migo.

For

if he wished, he could have said to the one opposing him:

his opponent:

I purchased it from you,

[Had he wished, he could have claimed: “I purchased it from you”],

and

I am believed in this, since

I cultivated it for the two years establishing presumptive ownership

and since he could make a claim that would establish him as the possessor of the land, he can make a claim against the witnesses and say that it belonged to his ancestors.

Abaye said to Rabba

to Rabba:

“Why would he lie”

in the presence of

witnesses

who contradict him—

we do not say this.

He then said to him,

the possessor again claimed to the challenger:

“Indeed, it belonged to your ancestors, and I purchased it from them; and when I said to you, ‘It belonged to my ancestors,’

my intention was to say:

‘I rely upon it as though it were my ancestral property’.”

That is, the land indeed belonged to your ancestors, as the witnesses testified, but I purchased it from them, and I should be believed in this claim because I possessed it for the two years establishing presumptive ownership. Perhaps you will say: Initially, I claimed that it came to me from my ancestors by inheritance, and not as I now claim. This is not so; my intention was to say that I am established and secure in this field as though I had inherited it from my ancestors. -

There is a question: if

a person claims

a certain claim

and then returns and makes another claim

to correct his initial words when the second claim partially contradicts them,

or does a person not

claim

a claim

and then return and make another claim?

Ulla said: A person may claim

a claim and

then return and make another claim.

The scholars of Nehardea say: He may not claim and then return and make another claim.

And Ulla concedes—

who holds that “he may claim and then return and claim again”—

that he cannot return and make another claim in either of the following two ways:

A.

Where he initially said to him

at first,

“It belonged to my ancestors and not to your ancestors,”

he may not claim and then return and claim

saying, “It belongs to your ancestors, and I purchased it from them,” because he completely uproots his initial words.

B.

And

likewise

where he was standing in court and did not make the claim, but then went outside and made it,

at the time of the hearing in court he did not return and make the claim, but maintained his first claim; he went outside, then returned to court and changed his claim, for

he may not return and claim

when he partially contradicts his initial words!

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that he may not return and claim after going outside the court?

Because

his claim was taught to him,

as his friends and relatives outside the court taught him new claims!

But

on the other hand,

the scholars of Nehardea concede

that he may change his claim in either of the following two ways: A.

Where

he again

said to him

“It belonged to my ancestors, who purchased it from your ancestors,”

he may return and claim,

since this does not contradict his initial words at all, but merely adds to them; and he should be believed in this claim itself, since he has a three-year presumption of ownership.

B.

And where he discussed the matter outside the court but did not make the claim, and then came to court and made it,

if, when they disputed the matter outside the court, he made his first claim, but after they entered court he changed his claim and made his second claim—

he may return and claim.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that he may change the claim he made outside court?

Because

a person may refrain from revealing his claims except to the court,

as a person may refrain from revealing his true claims except to the court.

Ameimar said: “I am a man of Nehardea,”

I am one of the people of Nehardea,

and

nevertheless

I maintain

not in accordance with their view, but rather

that one may claim and then return and claim again,

in accordance with Ulla’s view.

The Gemara concludes:

And the halakha

in practice is:

one may claim and then return and claim again,

in accordance with Ulla’s view, because he does not completely uproot his initial words.

Two people disputed a field:

One says: “It belonged to my ancestors, and I cultivated it for the two years establishing presumptive ownership,” and the other says: “It belonged to my ancestors!”

This one brought witnesses that it belonged to his ancestors and that he cultivated it for the two years establishing presumptive ownership,

when he made this claim,

and this one

did not

bring witnesses,

but only

that he cultivated it for the two years establishing presumptive ownership,

during the years that his fellow claimed that he had cultivated it for the requisite two years; but concerning his claim that it belonged to his ancestors, he brought no witnesses.

Rav Naḥman said:

the field should be established in the possession of the one who brought witnesses supporting his claim that it belonged to his ancestors. Although these witnesses are contradicted and are possibly liars, since they added that he cultivated it for the requisite two years, and on this detail their words were contradicted by other witnesses, this is because—

because

set the testimony concerning the cultivation against the testimony concerning the cultivation, and establish the land in the presumptive possession of the ancestors;

that is: indeed, concerning the detail of presumptive ownership, there is contradictory testimony here, which cannot be accepted; nevertheless, we do not need this detail of their testimony, since it suffices that they say that it belonged to his ancestors.

Rava said to him:

How can you rely on these witnesses,

when this is contradictory testimony—

that is, one of the two groups of witnesses certainly testified falsely and is disqualified from all testimony in the world, and since you do not know which group it is, you must disqualify both groups on account of the doubt!?

Rav Naḥman said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

Granted, they were contradicted concerning the cultivation,