Bava Batra 23b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

A fledgling

a young pigeon

found within fifty cubits

from the dovecote,

it belongs to the owner of the dovecote.

For we presume that the young pigeon came from this dovecote, and we return it to the owner of the dovecote.

Beyond fifty cubits, it belongs to its finder.

If the young pigeon was found beyond fifty cubits from the dovecote, we do not presume that it came from this dovecote; rather, it is unknown from where it came, and since it has no identifying mark, it belongs to its finder.

If it was found

the young pigeon

between two dovecotes, nearer to this one, it belongs to this one; nearer to that one, it belongs to that one.

Whichever one the young pigeon is nearer to, it belongs to him.

If it is exactly halfway, they shall divide it between them.

If it is found at an equal distance from the two dovecotes, it is uncertain from which dovecote it came, and therefore they divide it between them.

Gemara:

Rabbi Hanina said: When the majority and the proximity -

are in conflict, we follow the majority!

When there is a contradiction between “the indication of the majority” and “the indication of proximity,” one must decide according to “the indication of the majority.”

That is, when, on the basis of the conduct of the majority, one must decide that the object belongs to Reuven, while on the basis of proximity one must decide that it belongs to Shimon, we decide according to the majority.

And although the majority is of Torah status and proximity is of Torah status, even so, the majority is preferable.

Even though the law that one follows the majority is a law of Torah status, which is learned from the verse, “Incline after the majority,” that one decides the judgment according to the majority of the judges; and the law that one follows proximity is also a law of Torah status, which is learned from the rite of the heifer whose neck is broken, since the Torah says that the city nearest to the corpse must bring the heifer whose neck is broken; nevertheless, the decision based on the majority is preferable to the decision based on proximity. And even when there is proximity such that it is reasonable that the object came from there and not from another place, one likewise follows the majority and not the proximity.

Rav Zeira raised an objection

against him from the verse concerning the heifer whose neck is broken: “

And it shall be that the city nearest to the corpse,”

it is the one that must bring the heifer whose neck is broken, for we presume that the murderer came from there,

and even though there is another city larger than it.

Even though there is another city there in which more people dwell, nevertheless the Torah said that the nearer city must bring the heifer whose neck is broken. It is proven from here that one decides according to proximity more than according to the majority.

And the Gemara answers:

It is in a case where there is none.

It is speaking of a case where there is no other city there in which more people dwell.

But the Gemara asks:

Let us follow the majority of the world,

let us follow the majority of the world! That is, even though here, near the corpse, there is no other city in which more people dwell, nevertheless, in another place, far from here, there is another city in which more people dwell; and after all, when the majority and proximity are in conflict, one follows the majority.

And the Gemara answers:

It is speaking of a city situated between the mountains.

It is speaking of a case where the corpse is found between the mountains, for it is not the way of murderers to come here from other places; rather, certainly the murderer came from one of the towns near the corpse. And since no other city has more people than the nearer city, we therefore presume that the murderer came from the nearer city. The Gemara continues to ask:

We learned in the Mishna,

we stated in our Mishna:

A fledgling found within fifty cubits belongs to the owner of the dovecote.

And even though there is another one larger than it.

It is stated in the Mishna that if the young pigeon is found within fifty cubits of a dovecote, it belongs to the owner of the dovecote, and even though there is another dovecote there that has more young pigeons, nevertheless one follows the nearer dovecote. And this is difficult for Rabbi Hanina.

And the Gemara answers:

It is in a case where there is none.

It is speaking of a case where there is no other dovecote there.

The Gemara asks:

If so, say the latter clause: Beyond fifty cubits, it belongs to its finder.

And if there is no other one, it certainly fell from that one!

If we say that it is speaking of a case where there is no other dovecote there, there is a difficulty from the latter clause, which says that if the young pigeon is found beyond fifty cubits, it belongs to its finder. And if we say that there is no other dovecote there besides this one, then certainly one must presume that the young pigeon came from this dovecote, even though it is beyond fifty cubits; and we do not presume that the young pigeon fell from passersby, since whenever it is possible to presume that it came from some nearby dovecote, we do not presume that it fell from people, for falling is uncommon. If so, why does it belong to its finder?

? And one cannot answer that it is speaking of a case where there is another dovecote there, containing a number of young pigeons equal to the number in this dovecote, and therefore it is not certain to whom the young pigeon belongs, because from the language of the Mishna it follows that if the young pigeon is found beyond fifty cubits, it belongs to its finder even when it is found nearer to this dovecote than to the other dovecote. And if the two are equal, why should we not follow the dovecote that is nearer? Rather, it is necessarily speaking of a case where there is no other dovecote there at all. If so, it is difficult: why does it belong to the finder?!

The Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a fledgling that is walking by hopping.

Here it is speaking of a case where the young pigeon is walking by hopping, for it is small and cannot fly, but only hops little by little.

For Rav Ukva bar Hama said: Anything that walks by hopping does not hop farther than fifty cubits.

One that can only hop and cannot fly does not hop farther than fifty cubits. Therefore, if it is found within fifty cubits, we presume that it came from this dovecote. But if it is beyond fifty cubits, it necessarily follows that the young pigeon has already grown and is not merely hopping, but can fly; and if so, it is possible that it came here from another place. And when the majority and proximity are in conflict, one follows the majority. Therefore, we presume that it came here from another place, since there are many dovecotes in the world.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked: One of its legs is within fifty cubits, and one of its legs is beyond fifty cubits—what is the law?

If one leg of the young pigeon was within fifty cubits and its second leg beyond fifty cubits, is it still considered to be hopping and does it belong to the owner of the dovecote, or is it no longer considered to be hopping, since it is impossible for it to hop with one leg beyond fifty cubits? It necessarily falls into the category of one that flies and is able to fly, and if so, it belongs to its finder.

And because of this, they expelled Rabbi Yirmeya from the bet midrash.

Because of this question they expelled Rabbi Yirmeya from the bet midrash. Since the Sages established that anything that hops does not hop farther than fifty cubits, it is impossible for it to hop farther even by a small amount, so that one of its legs would be beyond fifty cubits, just as with all the measures of the Sages, which are exact and precise. And so that people would not come to cast doubt on the measures of the Sages, they expelled him from the bet midrash.

Come and hear

a proof not in accordance with Rabbi Hanina, from what we learned in our Mishna:

If it was found between two dovecotes: nearer to this one, it belongs to this one; and nearer to that one, it belongs to that one.

And the Gemara infers:

And even though one of them is larger than the other.

The unqualified wording of the Mishna implies that everything depends on proximity and does not depend on the size of the dovecote; rather, even if one dovecote is larger than the other, one follows the nearer one, and this is difficult for Rabbi Hanina. And the Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where both are equal.

The Mishna is speaking of a case where the two dovecotes are equal in the number of young pigeons.

The Gemara asks:

Let us follow the majority of the world,

let us follow the majority of the world. That is, let us say that the young pigeon came from other dovecotes that are in other places, and if so, it should belong to its finder, as in the latter clause of the Mishna. For the Gemara now understood that “if it was found between two dovecotes” also refers to one found beyond fifty cubits, and therefore it raises the difficulty that in such a case one should presume that it came from other places.