Bava Batra 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara resolves:

What are we dealing with here?

With a path through vineyards.

Here we are dealing with a case in which both dovecotes and the fledgling are located on a path through vineyards. Therefore, even if the fledgling is found hopping more than fifty cubits from the dovecotes, it is still considered to be hopping along. For although we said that a fledgling does not hop more than fifty cubits, here, since it is on a path through vineyards, the vineyards enable it to hop farther.

But one cannot attribute its arrival here to some other place,

for if it had come from elsewhere, since it was hopping, it could not have come.

If we were to say that it came from elsewhere—that is, from another place to here—that would not be possible. Since it is hopping, it cannot have come from another place to here,

as any fledgling that hops does so only when it can subsequently see its nest; but if not, it does not hop.

For any fledgling that hops does so only if it can see its nest when it turns its head back, and if it cannot see it, it does not continue hopping. Therefore, here, since the fledgling is on a path through vineyards, which conceal the sides, it is impossible to say that it came from another place, since if it turned its head back, it would be unable to see its nest. Consequently, it must have come from one of the two dovecotes standing on the path, which it can see when it turns its head back. And since we do not know from which dovecote it came, we follow the nearer one.

Abaye said: We, too, have learned this in a Mishna,

It can be proved from the Mishna in Tractate Nidda that the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina is correct.

As we learned [Nidda 17b]:

Blood found in the corridor is impure by uncertain status, as its presumption is that it came from the source.

It is explained in the Mishna in Nidda that the Sages used an analogy concerning a woman, saying that within her womb there are a “chamber,” a “corridor,” and an “upper chamber.”

The “chamber” is the womb itself. It is the source of the woman’s blood, and it is located inside the body.

The “corridor” is the passage between the womb and the exterior of the body.

The “upper chamber,” meanwhile, is situated above both of them.

The blood of the chamber is impure blood, since it is blood from the source. The blood of the upper chamber, by contrast, is pure blood, since it is not blood from the source.

There is also a “duct,” a small opening between the upper chamber and the corridor, through which blood [pure] occasionally descends into the corridor.

Therefore, if blood is found in the corridor and it is unknown where it came from—whether it is impure blood from the chamber, which is inside, or pure blood from the upper chamber above the corridor, through the duct there—that blood is impure by uncertain status, because the presumption is that it came from the source, from which most of a woman’s blood comes.

And the Gemara infers:

And despite the fact that there is an upper chamber that is nearer.

Although it is possible to say that the blood came from the upper chamber, which is closer to the corridor than the chamber is, nevertheless we attribute it to impure blood coming from the source, because there is more blood in the source than in the upper chamber.

It is therefore proven from here that when there is a majority and a proximity, we follow the majority!

Rava said to him: Are you speaking of a majority and prevalence? There is no authority who says that in a case of both majority and prevalence one follows the nearer source.

Rava argued to Abaye that it is impossible to prove from there that Rabbi Ḥanina’s opinion is correct, because there is also a majority in that case: There is more blood in the source than in the upper chamber. And it is also more prevalent for blood to emerge from the source than from the upper chamber. When there are both a majority and prevalence, no one says that one follows the nearer source. But when there is only a majority and a nearer source, it is possible to say that one follows the nearer source.

As Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: With regard to blood found in the corridor, one who enters the Temple while impure because of it is liable, and teruma is burned because of it.

One who came into contact with blood found in the corridor and entered the Temple is liable to bring an adjustable offering for entering the Temple while impure. And if he came into contact with teruma, it is burned, because we regard it with certainty as menstrual blood and are not uncertain about it. For if we were uncertain, how could one bring an offering on the basis of uncertainty? It might be ordinary non-sacred food brought into the Temple courtyard. Similarly, how could teruma be burned on the basis of uncertainty? It must be that we are certain that it is menstrual blood.

The Gemara’s intention is to explain the statements of Abaye and Rava: Both understood that the phrase in the Mishna, “as its presumption is that it came from the source,” means that it is regarded as certain, rather than as uncertain. Abaye therefore proved from here that when there is a majority and a proximity, one follows the majority. Rava rejects this, saying that it is because there are both a majority and prevalence. In any event, both understood that the blood is regarded as certainly impure.

And Rava said: Learn three things from Rabbi Ḥiyya.

We learn three things from Rabbi Ḥiyya’s baraita:

a.

Learn from this that when there is a majority and a proximity, one follows the majority,

as Abaye proved above from the Mishna.

b.

And learn from this that a majority is a Torah law,

We learn further from here that the principle of majority is a Torah law even when there is a nearer source opposed to it. For one who enters the Temple because of blood found in the corridor is liable, and teruma is burned because of it. This is certainly a Torah-level ruling, because if it were only rabbinic, they would not bring ordinary non-sacred food into the Temple courtyard, nor would they burn teruma, even though the blood of the upper chamber is nearer than the blood of the chamber.

c.

And learn from this that Rabbi Zeira’s ruling remains valid.

For Rabbi Zeira said: Even though the gates of the province are locked.

We learn from here in accordance with Rabbi Zeira, who said that when we learned that if there are nine shops in a city selling kosher-slaughtered meat and one shop selling unslaughtered animal meat, and meat is found outside, we follow the majority, this applies even when the gates of the province are locked, so that it is impossible for the meat to have come here from elsewhere; rather, it certainly came from the shops. Nevertheless, we follow the majority of the shops. The case is not limited specifically to one in which the gates of the province are not locked.

The novelty is that there are two types of majority: first, the majority of shops; and second, the majority of butchers surrounding the province who are Jews, whose meat is meat from an animal slaughtered in accordance with halakha.

Rabbi Zeira said that one majority—that of the shops—is sufficient.

And Rabbi Zeira’s ruling can be derived from the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya,

for the case of a woman is analogous to one in which the gates of the province are locked,

since with regard to a woman’s blood, it resembles a case in which the gates of the province are locked: The blood cannot have come from anywhere else, but only from the source or from the upper chamber,

and nevertheless we follow the majority.

Even so, in the case of a woman we follow the majority; therefore, the same should apply to Rabbi Zeira’s case.

And the Gemara asks:

But it was Rava who said: In a case of both majority and prevalence, there is no authority who says that one follows the majority!

Rava said above to Abaye that in the case of a woman there are both a majority and prevalence, and that no one says that in such a case one follows the majority rather than the nearer source. If so, how could Rava say here that we learn from Rabbi Ḥiyya that when there is a majority and a proximity, one follows the majority? After all, that case involves both a majority and prevalence.

And the Gemara resolves:

Rava retracted what he said in that earlier matter.

Rava retracted what he had previously said to Abaye. Rather, if, when there is a majority opposed to a nearer source, one follows the nearer source, the same applies when both a majority and prevalence are opposed to it.

It was stated:

We learned:

A barrel

of wine

that was floating in a river, Rav said:

If it is

found opposite a city whose majority are Jews, it is permitted;

the wine may be drunk. And if the barrel is found

opposite a city whose majority are gentiles, it is forbidden.

In the case of a barrel floating in a river, and it is unknown to us whether it belongs to a Jew, in which case the wine in it is permitted, or whether it belongs to gentiles, in which case the wine in it is forbidden as wine handled by a gentile, Rav said: If the barrel is found in the river opposite a city whose majority are Jews, we attribute the barrel to that city and permit it. If it is opposite a city whose majority are gentiles, we attribute it to that city and it is forbidden.

And Shmuel said: Even if it is found opposite a city whose majority are Jews, it is forbidden; perhaps it came from that place called Dikra.

Although it is found opposite a city whose majority are Jews, it is forbidden, because we are concerned that it came from the district called Dikra, which is on the Euphrates, where Jews are not commonly found, and the barrel could have come from there to here.

And the Gemara analyzes:

Shall we say that they disagree with regard to Rabbi Ḥanina’s ruling,

that they disagree about Rabbi Ḥanina’s law?

One accepts Rabbi Ḥanina’s ruling, and the other does not accept Rabbi Ḥanina’s ruling.

Rav does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina; rather, in his view one follows the nearer source, and therefore, if the barrel is found opposite a city whose majority are Jews, it is permitted. Shmuel holds in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina, that one follows the majority rather than the nearer source. Therefore, the barrel is forbidden, since we are concerned that it came from a distant place, where the majority of localities are inhabited predominantly by gentiles.

But the Gemara rejects this:

No. Everyone accepts Rabbi Ḥanina’s ruling;

indeed, it is possible to say that both hold in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina,

and here they disagree about this:

Here they disagree with regard to the following considerations:

One holds: If it had come from Dikra, the bends and shoals would have caused it to sink.

Rav holds that if it had come from Dikra, it would not have reached here, because along the way there are places where the water bends and swirls like a wheel in one spot, due to long rocks located within the river. This is called ikkulei, and if the barrel had been there, it would have spun around and sunk there. There are also places in the river where melting snow accumulates near the river; if the barrel came there, it would stop, since the river would not carry it onward. Therefore, one cannot attribute the barrel’s arrival to that place. Rather, we attribute it to the city nearest to it, and therefore, if it is found opposite a city whose majority are Jews, it is permitted.

And the other holds: It caught the swift current of the river and came here.

Shmuel holds that we attribute it to the possibility that it fell into the middle of the river, at the place where the river is swift and strong, where there is a powerful current capable of seizing it and carrying it here. Therefore, he forbids it even when it is found opposite a city whose majority are Jews.

There was a certain wine jug that was found in an orchard of orla,

There was a jug of wine that had been stolen, and it was later found buried in an orchard subject to the prohibition of orla, which was ownerless or belonged to someone else.

Ravina permitted it.

Ravina permitted the wine in the jug.

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that this was because he holds in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina,

that one may prove from here that he holds in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina, that one follows the majority rather than the nearer source? Since the majority of orchards are not subject to orla, he permitted the wine.

The Gemara rejects this:

There it is different, as if it had been stolen from that orchard, they would not have concealed it inside it.

That case is different, because one cannot follow the nearer source: If the wine had been stolen from that orchard, the thief would not have hidden it there, since he would fear that the person treading the grapes might find it. Consequently, it must have come from elsewhere. And since the majority of orchards are not subject to orla, Ravina permitted it.

And this applies only to wine; but with regard to grapes, they do conceal them.

The thieves do not conceal wine there, specifically, but they do conceal grapes there.

There were certain wineskins that were found among the vine trellises,

They found wineskins hidden among the vines in a vineyard belonging to Jews.

Rava permitted them,

He permitted them to be drunk and was not concerned that they were wine handled by a gentile.

And the Gemara analyzes:

Shall we say that he does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina’s ruling,

that Rava’s reason was that he does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Ḥanina, but rather one follows the nearer source? In this case, Jews were more commonly found in this place than gentiles, and one does not follow the majority of the world’s inhabitants, who are gentiles.