Bava Batra 24a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? ![](pamud.bmp "

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With a path through vineyards.

Here, we are dealing with a case in which the two dovecotes and the fledgling are located on a path through vineyards. Therefore, even if the fledgling is found hopping more than fifty cubits from the dovecotes, it is still considered hopping, for although we said that one that hops does not hop farther than fifty cubits, here, since it is on a path through vineyards, by means of the vineyards it hops farther.

But it cannot be assumed that it came here from another place,

for if it is so that it came from elsewhere, since it hops, it could not have come.

If we wish to say that it came from the world, that is, from another place to here, this is impossible. Since it hops, it cannot come from another place to here,

for anything that hops and then can see its nest, hops, but if not, it does not hop.

For anything that hops, if it can see its nest when it turns its head, it hops, but if it cannot see it, it does not continue hopping. Therefore, here, since the fledgling is found within a path through vineyards, which conceal the sides, it is impossible to say that it came here from another place, since if it turns its head it will not be able to see its nest. And if so, necessarily it came from one of the two dovecotes that stand on the path, which it can see when it turns its head. And since we do not know from which dovecote it came, therefore we follow the nearer one.

Abaye said: We, too, have also learned this:—

There is proof from the Mishna in tractate Niddah like Rabbi Hanina.

For we learned [Niddah 17b]:

Blood that is found in the corridor—its uncertainty renders it impure, for its presumption is that it is from the source.

It is explained in the Mishna in Niddah that the Sages used an analogy concerning a woman, that she has in her womb a “chamber,” a “corridor,” and an “upper chamber.”

The “chamber” is the womb itself, and it is the source of the woman’s blood, and it is within the body.

The “corridor” is the passage between the womb and the outer side of the body.

Whereas the “upper chamber” is situated above both of them.

The blood of the chamber is impure blood, for it is the blood of the source. Whereas the blood of the upper chamber is pure blood, since it is not the blood of the source.

And there is a “duct,” which is a small opening, open between the upper chamber and the corridor, and through it blood [pure] sometimes descends to the corridor.

Therefore, if blood is found in the corridor, and it is not known from where it came—whether it is impure blood from the chamber, which is inside, or pure blood from the upper chamber, which is above the corridor, through the duct that is there—this blood is impure as a matter of uncertainty, because its presumption is that it came from the source, from which most of the woman’s blood comes.

And the Gemara infers:

And even though there is an upper chamber that is nearer.

Even though it is possible to say that the blood came from the upper chamber, which is nearer to the corridor than the chamber, nevertheless, we assume that it is impure blood coming from the source, because there is more blood in the source than in the upper chamber.

It is proven from here that in the case of majority and proximity, we follow the majority!

Rava said to him: Are you speaking of a majority and something common!? There is no one who says [to follow] a majority and something common.

Rava argued to Abaye that it is impossible to prove from there [the ruling] like Rabbi Hanina, because there there is also a majority, since there is more blood in the source than in the upper chamber, and it is also more common for the blood to emerge from the source than from the upper chamber. And when there is both a majority and something common, there is no one who would say that in this matter we follow the nearer one. But when there is only a majority by itself and proximity, it is possible to say that we follow the nearer one.

For Rabbi Hiyya taught: Blood that is found in the corridor—one is liable on account of entering the Temple because of it, and teruma is burned on account of it.

One who touched blood found in the corridor and entered the Temple is liable to bring a graduated offering for impurity of the Temple. And if he touched teruma, it is burned, because we certainly regard it as menstrual blood, and we are not uncertain about it. For if we were uncertain, how could one bring an offering because of an uncertainty, since it is possible that it is unconsecrated food in the Temple courtyard? And likewise, how could teruma be burned because of an uncertainty? Necessarily, we are certain that it is menstrual blood.

The intention of the Gemara is to explain the words of Abaye and Rava, both of whom understood that what is written in the Mishna, “for its presumption is that it is from the source,” means as a matter of certainty and not as a matter of uncertainty. Therefore Abaye proved from here that in the case of majority and proximity, we follow the majority. And Rava rejects this, saying that it is because of a majority and something common. In any event, both of them understood that it is as a matter of certainty.

And Rava said: Infer from Rabbi Hiyya three things.

We learn three things from Rabbi Hiyya’s beraita:

A.

Infer from this that in the case of majority and proximity, one follows the majority,

as Abaye proved above from the Mishna.

B.

And infer from this that majority is of Torah status,

We learn further from here that majority is a law of the Torah, even when there is proximity opposing it. For blood found in the corridor entails liability on account of entering the Temple, and teruma is burned on account of it; and this is certainly of Torah status, because if it were only rabbinic, they would not bring unconsecrated food into the Temple courtyard, nor would they burn teruma, even though the blood of the upper chamber is there and is nearer than the blood of the chamber.

C.

And infer from this that Rabbi Zeira’s statement is valid.

For Rabbi Zeira said: Even though the gates of the province are locked.

We learn from here in accordance with Rabbi Zeira, who said that what we learned—that if in a city there are nine shops selling slaughtered meat and one selling animal carcass meat, and meat is found outside, we follow the majority—is so even though the gates of the province are locked, so that it is impossible for the meat to have come here from another place, but it certainly came from the shops; nevertheless, we follow the majority of the shops. And it does not refer specifically to a case in which the gates of the province are not locked.

And the novelty is that there are two types of majority: A. the majority of shops; B. the majority of butchers around the province who are Israelites, whose meat is meat from an animal slaughtered according to law.

And Rabbi Zeira said that one majority of shops is sufficient.

And Rabbi Zeira’s words are supported by Rabbi Hiyya’s words,

for a woman, which is analogous to the gates of the province being locked,

for with regard to a woman’s blood, it is analogous to the gates of the province being locked, since the blood cannot come from another place, but only either from the source or from the upper chamber,

and even so, we follow the majority.

Even so, with regard to a woman we follow the majority; if so, the same is true in Rabbi Zeira’s case.

And the Gemara asks:

But it was Rava who said, “A majority and something common—there is no one who says [to follow them]!”

But Rava said above to Abaye that with regard to a woman there is a majority and something common, and in such a case there is no one who would say that one does not follow a majority and something common, but follows the nearer one. If so, how did Rava say here that we learn from Rabbi Hiyya that in the case of majority and proximity, we follow the majority? There too, after all, there is both a majority and something common.

And the Gemara answers:

Rava retracted that statement.

Rava retracted what he had previously said to Abaye. Rather, if one follows the nearer one when there is a majority opposing it, the same law applies when there is a majority and something common opposing it.

It was stated:

we learned:

A barrel

of wine

that floated in the river, Rav said:

If

it was found opposite a city whose majority are Israelites, it is permitted

to drink the wine. And if the barrel was found

opposite a city whose majority are gentiles, it is forbidden.

A barrel that is floating in a river, and we do not know whether it belongs to an Israelite, in which case the wine in it is permitted, or whether it belongs to gentiles, in which case the wine in it is forbidden because of wine of libation: Rav said that if the barrel was found in the river opposite a city whose majority are Israelites, we assume that the barrel came from there and it is permitted; and if it is opposite a city whose majority are gentiles, we assume that it came from there, and it is forbidden.

And Shmuel said: Even if it was found opposite a city whose majority are Israelites, it is forbidden; perhaps it came from that place called Dekra.

Even though it was found opposite a city whose majority are Israelites, it is forbidden, because we are concerned that it came from the district called Dekra, which is on the Euphrates, where Israelites are not common, and the barrel could have come from there to us.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say that they disagree concerning Rabbi Hanina’s [law]:

Can it be said that they disagree about Rabbi Hanina’s law,

that one master accepts Rabbi Hanina’s [view], and the other master does not accept Rabbi Hanina’s [view].

For Rav does not hold like Rabbi Hanina; rather, in his view one follows the nearer one, and therefore if the barrel is found opposite a city whose majority are Israelites, it is permitted. And Shmuel holds like Rabbi Hanina, that one follows the majority and not the nearer one; therefore the barrel is forbidden, since we are concerned that it came from another, distant place, for the majority of places there contain a majority of gentiles.

But the Gemara rejects:

No. Everyone accepts Rabbi Hanina’s [view],

It is always possible to say that both of them hold like Rabbi Hanina,

and here, they disagree about this:

Here they disagree over these arguments:

One master holds: If it is so that it came from Dekra, the bends and whirlpools would have drowned it.

Rav holds that if it had come from the place called Dekra, it would not have arrived here, because in the middle of the route there are places where the waters bend and roll like a wheel in one spot, on account of long rocks found within the river; this is called akulei. If the barrel had been there, it would have rolled and sunk there. There are also places in the river where thawing snow gathers by the river, and if the barrel came there, it would stop, since the river would not carry it. Therefore, it is impossible to assume that the barrel came from there; rather, we assume that it came from the city nearest to it, and therefore, if it is opposite a city whose majority are Israelites, it is permitted.

And the other master holds: It took the force of the river and came.

Shmuel holds that we assume perhaps it fell in the middle of the river, at the place of the river’s force and strength, where there is a strong current that could seize it and bring it here. Therefore he forbids it even when it is found opposite a city whose majority are Israelites.

That wine jar that was found in an uncultivated orchard belonging to a forbidden planting,

there was a jug of wine that had been stolen, and afterward it was found concealed in an orchard of orla, which was ownerless or belonged to another person.

Ravina permitted it.

Ravina permitted the wine in the jug.

The Gemara asks:

Let us say [that this is] because he agrees with Rabbi Hanina,

Is it possible to prove from here that he holds like Rabbi Hanina, that one follows the majority and not the nearer one? Since most orchards are not orla, he permitted the wine.

The Gemara rejects:

There it is different, for if it had been stolen from it, they would not conceal it within it.

There it is different, because it is impossible to follow the nearer one: if he had stolen the wine from this orchard, he would not have concealed it there, because he feared that the one treading the grapes might find it. If so, necessarily it came from another place. And since most orchards are not orla, Ravina permitted it.

And these words apply to wine, but grapes they do conceal.

It is specifically wine that thieves do not conceal there, but grapes they do conceal there.

Those wineskins of wine that were found among the vine branches,

they found wineskins concealed among vines in an Israelite’s vineyard.

Rava permitted them,

he permitted them for drinking and was not concerned on account of wine of libation.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say that he does not accept Rabbi Hanina’s [view],

Is it to be said that Rava’s reason is that he does not hold like Rabbi Hanina, but rather follows the nearer one? Here, in this place, Israelites were more commonly found than gentiles, and one does not follow the majority of the world, who are gentiles.