Bava Batra 23a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara relates:

Rav Yosef had certain palm trees,

Rav Yosef had small palm trees,

which were ![](pamud.bmp "

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visited by craftsmen, and they sat beneath them.

Bloodletters would come and sit on the ground beneath the foliage of his palm trees, and bleed blood there,

and ravens would come, eat the blood, ascend the palm trees, and ruin the dates.

Ravens would come and eat the blood that had been spilled there beneath the palm trees, and afterward ascend the palm trees and wipe their mouths, which were soiled with blood, on his dates, thereby ruining his dates for him.

Rav Yosef said to them: Take the ravens out of here,

remove the ravens from here, which resembled by their cries as though they were calling “kor-kor.” That is, he requested that they no longer bleed blood beneath the foliage of his palm trees.

Abaye said to him: But this is merely indirect causation!

This is only grama, for they merely cause the ravens to come and soil the dates!?

He said to him

Rav Yosef to Abaye:

Thus said Rav Tovi bar Matana: This is to say that indirect causation with regard to damages is forbidden!

But Abaye again asked him:

But they have established a presumption concerning it!

They already have a presumption of three years regarding bleeding blood there, and if so, how can you protest against them now?

Rav Yosef answered him:

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: There is no presumption with regard to damages.

A presumption is not effective regarding something that causes damage, for although he remained silent until now, it was because he thought that he would be able to tolerate it; but now he is no longer able to tolerate it.

And Abaye asked him:

And was it not stated concerning it,

did we not learn concerning these words of Rav Naḥman in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha that the matter refers specifically to severe damages, for

Rav Mari said: With regard to smoke,

the absence of a presumption concerning damages stated by Rav Naḥman applies only to damage resembling the smoke of a furnace, which is great and exceedingly harmful, and a person cannot tolerate it.

And Rav Zevid said: With regard to a privy.

Damage such as a privy situated on the ground and visible to the eye, which produces an especially bad odor.

But here, with ravens, the damage is not so severe as smoke and a privy. And if so, a presumption should be effective in this case.

He said to him

Rav Yosef to Abaye:

These, for me, since I am delicate in my sensibilities, are comparable to smoke and a privy.

For me, since I am an istenis, what the ravens do disturbs me like smoke and a privy; therefore they do not establish a presumption regarding damages.

Mishna:

One must distance a dovecote fifty cubits from the city.

One must distance the dovecote fifty cubits from the city, because the pigeons damage the seeds of the gardens and the grain that the inhabitants of the city spread out on the roofs of the city.

And a person may not make a dovecote within his own property unless he has fifty cubits in every direction.

He may not make a dovecote within his field, far from the city, unless there are fifty cubits in every direction, so that the pigeons of the dovecote should not damage other fields adjacent to his field.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Four kor of the flight of the pigeon.

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the first tanna and holds that fifty cubits are not sufficient; rather, one must leave one kor in every direction, which is approximately 273 and six-sevenths cubits, so that altogether there are four kor. This is the measure that the pigeon travels and eats, namely, “the flight of the pigeon.” “Flight” is like “sending forth,” for they send forth the pigeon and it travels.

The first tanna also agrees that it travels as far as this measure; however, the first tanna holds that it eats only within fifty cubits.

And if he purchased even a quarter-kor, it remains under its presumption.

If one purchased from another person land on which there was a dovecote, and the first owner maintained it in this manner for three years, even if only one quarter-kor surrounded it—which is approximately ten and one-fifth cubits by ten and one-fifth cubits—he need not distance it, because since the first owner maintained this, we claim that the first owner acquired the right to maintain a dovecote there; therefore, the second owner, who came through his power, also need not distance it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One must distance the dovecote from the city

fifty cubits.

The Gemara is astonished:

And no more!?

Is it sufficient to distance it only fifty cubits and no more?

And we raise a contradiction,

a contradiction is raised against this from a beraita, in which we learned:

One may not spread traps for pigeons unless it is thirty ris from the settled area.

One may not spread traps to catch pigeons unless the trap is thirty ris from the settled area, so that he should not catch the pigeons of the settled area. A ris is 266 and two-thirds cubits. It follows that thirty ris are four mil, which are eight thousand cubits, whereas in the Mishna we learned that a distance of only fifty cubits is sufficient.

Abaye said: They fly very far, but their stomachs are filled within fifty cubits.

They travel a great distance, up to thirty ris; therefore, one must distance the trap up to thirty ris so that he should not catch the pigeons of the settled area. But when the pigeons travel, they eat from what they find, and within fifty cubits they already fill their stomachs; afterward, when they travel farther, they no longer eat. Therefore, one need not distance the dovecote from the city by more than fifty cubits, since the pigeons do not cause damage, as they do not eat beyond this distance.

The Gemara asks:

And do they travel thirty ris and no more?

Do they travel only thirty ris and no farther?

But it was taught: And in a settled area, he may not spread it even one hundred mil.

This is the continuation of the preceding beraita, which says: One may not spread traps for pigeons unless it is thirty ris from the settled area. When does this apply? In the wilderness; but in a “settled area,” he may not spread it even one hundred mil.

The Gemara now understood that the meaning of “but in a settled area” is a place where there are seeds, to which they travel more than thirty ris in order to eat the seeds, unlike the first clause, which says that one must distance it thirty ris from “the settled area,” meaning from the city.

And if so, we have learned from here that the pigeons eat even beyond fifty cubits; therefore, when there is a settled area in which there are seeds, they travel even more than thirty ris.

Rav Yosef said: In a settled area of vineyards.

That is, according to Rav Yosef, what the beraita said, “but in a settled area,” means “a settled area of vineyards,” where there are many vineyards. The pigeon first travels to the first vineyard, and afterward from there to a second vineyard, and so it travels from vineyard to vineyard, until it is found to travel more than thirty ris. Therefore, it is forbidden to spread traps there; however, it eats only up to fifty cubits.

Rava said: In a settled area of dovecotes.

What the beraita said, “but in a settled area,” means “a settled area of dovecotes,” where there are many dovecotes, and the pigeon flies there from dovecote to dovecote, thereby traveling a great distance.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

Let him derive it from the dovecotes themselves!

If it is as Rava says, that the matter concerns a place where there are many dovecotes, why is it necessary to say that one must distance it because of the pigeons of the city, which travel from dovecote to dovecote? But even without this, one must distance it because of the pigeons of the dovecotes that are near his trap, since Rava established that the matter concerns a settled area of dovecotes. Whereas from the language of the beraita, which says, “even one hundred mil he may not spread it,” it is implied that one must distance it because of the pigeons of the city.

And the Gemara answers this question in three ways:

If you wish, say: They are his,

it is possible to answer that the dovecotes near his trap are his dovecotes; therefore, he need not distance it on their account.

And if you wish, say: They belong to a gentile.

It is possible to answer that the dovecotes belong to a gentile; therefore, he need not distance it on their account.

And if you wish, say: They are ownerless.

It is possible to answer that the dovecotes are ownerless.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Up to four kor, and so on;

And if he purchased even a quarter-kor, it remains under its presumption.

Rav Pappa said, and some say:

and some say that

Rav

Zevid

said this:

This is to say: We make claims on behalf of a purchaser, and we make claims on behalf of an heir.

We learn from the words of this Mishna that one who purchased a field with a dovecote, or one who inherited a field with a dovecote, and the first owner maintained it for three years, the court makes a claim on his behalf that the first owner acquired this right to maintain a dovecote within his field.

But the Gemara asks:

An heir—we already learned it!

For the law that we make claims on behalf of an heir was taught in the Mishna below.

As we learned:

One who comes by virtue of inheritance does not require a claim.

One who received the field by virtue of inheritance, and another person challenged his father’s right to the land, while his father had maintained it for three years, the heir need not claim that his father, who bequeathed the land to him, purchased the field from the one who now comes to claim against him that the field belongs to him. This is so even when the latter brings witnesses that the field formerly belonged to him or to his father, because we make the claim on his behalf that his father purchased the field from the challenger, since his father had already maintained it for three years.

And since we already learned the law that we make claims on behalf of an heir, why did the Mishna need to teach it here as well? And the Gemara answers:

It was necessary for the purchaser.

Rav Pappa explains that the tanna needed to introduce the law that we make claims on behalf of a purchaser, which we learned only from our Mishna; and incidentally he also said that from here there is proof that we make claims on behalf of a purchaser.

But the Gemara asks:

A purchaser too—we already learned it!

For the law that we make claims on behalf of a purchaser was also taught in the Mishna below.

As we learned:

If one purchased a courtyard containing projecting beams and balconies, it remains under its presumption.

If a person purchased a courtyard containing zizin, small beams projecting outward from the house, or guzoztraot, large beams on which one can stand, projecting outward from the house, although the law is that it is forbidden to extend zizin and guzoztraot from the house outward toward the public domain, because the inhabitants of the public domain may stumble over them, nevertheless, if the seller had maintained them—meaning that he had possessed the zizin and guzoztraot for three years—and afterward sold the house and courtyard to another person as they were, with the zizin and guzoztraot, we claim that the first person, who sold it to him, acquired this right to extend zizin and guzoztraot. Therefore, the purchaser need not remove them.

It is thus explained from here that we make claims on behalf of a purchaser.

And if so, how did Rav Pappa say that this matter is to be learned from our Mishna?

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary,

the tanna needs to inform us of both our Mishna and the Mishna below.

For if he had informed us of that one, concerning the public domain,

with regard to zizin and guzoztraot that he extends into the public domain,

one might say that he set the building back within his own property.

It could have been said that he set the building back within his own area: he did not build the house to the edge of his area, but set it inward, and extended the zizin and guzoztraot to the end of his area and no farther. Afterward, he allowed the inhabitants of the public domain to walk through his area up to his house. In such a case he need not remove the zizin and guzoztraot, since they extend within his area. And since the seller maintained this for three years, it is possible to assume that this was indeed the case, that he set the building back within his own property.

Alternatively, the inhabitants of the public domain waived their rights to him.

There is another possibility to assume: the inhabitants of the public domain waived their rights regarding what he extended, namely, the seven prominent men of the city, in the presence of the inhabitants of the city, who have the right to waive their rights, waived them for him.

The reason we assume one of these two possibilities is that if this had not been so, it would not be reasonable that he succeeded in extending the zizin and guzoztraot into the public domain and maintained this for three years, for surely the public would have prevented him.

But here, no.

But here, in our Mishna, where the matter concerns a case in which his dovecote is within fifty cubits of his fellow’s field, and the fellow is one individual, there is no proof from the fact that the seller maintained it for three years that the second person waived his rights for him. For it is possible to say that he was a violent and powerful person, and the second person was afraid of him; therefore, he succeeded in maintaining it for three years. If so, it is possible that the purchaser must remove the dovecote. Therefore, the tanna needs to inform us in our Mishna that here too we assume, on the basis of the fact that the first owner maintained it, that it is reasonable to say that the second person waived his rights for him.

And if he had informed us of this case,

if the tanna had informed us only in our Mishna,

that since he is an individual, one might say that he appeased him,

since the owner of the dovecote appeased his neighbor by giving him money so that he would agree that the dovecote should be there.

Alternatively, he waived his rights to him,

or the second person waived his rights for him without taking money for this.

But the public—who appeased him and who waived their rights!?

In the Mishna below, where the matter concerns zizin and guzoztraot projecting into the public domain, who has the authority to be appeased by him in exchange for money or to waive their rights for him without money? Although this can be done through the seven prominent men of the city in the presence of the inhabitants of the city, nevertheless, such a matter is not common. If so,

one might say: No,

let us say that we do not assume that the seller appeased them or that they waived their rights for him. Therefore,

it is necessary.

The tanna needs to inform us in the Mishna below that nevertheless we make claims on behalf of the purchaser, that he has the right to continue with the rights of the seller.

It follows that both these Mishnayot need to inform us that we make claims on behalf of a purchaser.

We learned in our Mishna:

It remains under its presumption:

The Gemara asks:

But Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: There is no presumption with regard to damages,

and if so, how is there a presumption here with regard to damages?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Mari said: With regard to smoke; Rav Zevid said: With regard to a privy:

Both of them say that Rav Naḥman spoke only about a type of damage that is extremely difficult to tolerate, such as the smoke of a furnace and an exposed privy; unlike a dovecote, which is not so harmful, where a presumption is effective.