Bava Batra 159a (קנט.) — the Talmud in English

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows

It was stated:

it is necessary to say that they transmitted a different ruling:

If a son sold property belonging to his father during his father’s lifetime,

meaning, a son sold his share in his father’s inheritance during his father’s lifetime, and the son died during his father’s lifetime, and afterward the father died, then

his son

the grandson of the grandfather

takes the land from the purchasers

the land belonging to the grandfather that his father sold to them, since when his father sold them the grandfather’s property, the property did not yet belong to him, because the grandfather was still alive at that time.

And this is what is difficult in monetary law.

And the Gemara explains the difficulty:

And let them say to him: Your father sold it, and you are taking it away!

the purchasers should say to the son of the son: Your father sold it to us; why do you not uphold your father’s sale? The Gemara asks:

And what is the difficulty?

Why is this “difficult in monetary law”?

Perhaps he could say: I come by virtue of my father’s father!

The grandson, who is now taking the property from the purchasers, can say to them: I do not come by virtue of my father; rather, I come directly by virtue of my grandfather, and he did not sell you his property!

Know this

as proof of this,

as it is written [

Psalms 45]

“In place of your fathers shall be your sons; you shall appoint them as princes throughout the land.”

That is, the grandson, in place of his father, inherits from the grandfather. It follows that the property did not pass through the father to him at all, and therefore he takes it from the purchasers.

Rather, if there is a difficulty—

this is the difficulty.

The Gemara proposes another possibility.

If a firstborn son sold his birthright share during his father’s lifetime, and he died

the son

during his father’s lifetime,

and afterward the father died,

his son [

the grandson]

takes it from the purchasers. And this is what is difficult in monetary law.

Because

his father sold it, and he takes it away!? Why should the grandson not uphold his father’s sale?

Why should the grandson not uphold his father's sale?

And if you would say

if we wished to resolve the matter,

here too, he said: I come by virtue of my father’s father.

The grandson inherits directly from the grandfather, as stated above; here, however, this is impossible. Because

if he comes by virtue of his father’s father,

if he inherits directly from the grandfather,

what is he doing with the birthright share!?

He has no right to receive a birthright share, since only his father was a firstborn, whereas he himself has no right of the firstborn.

But the Gemara rejects this:

And what is the difficulty!?

For here too, one can make this claim:

Perhaps he could say: I come by virtue of my father’s father,

that he indeed inherits directly from the grandfather,

and I stand in my father’s place,

but he also possesses his father’s rights, and therefore inherits from the grandfather as his father would have, receiving a birthright share as well.

Rather, if there is a difficulty—

this is the difficulty.

The Gemara proposes another possibility.

If he knew testimony concerning him recorded in a document,

when he was initially fit to testify, and he signed a document belonging to another person,

before he became a robber,

when he was still fit,

and he became a robber,

and was disqualified from giving testimony,

he may not testify concerning his own handwriting,

since he is a robber and is not trustworthy.

But others may testify.

The Gemara assumes that others can testify and authenticate his signature.

And this ruling is difficult:

Now,

if

he himself is not trustworthy

to authenticate his signature because he is suspected of lying, why

are others trustworthy!?

Why are others more trustworthy than he is? And why should we not be concerned that perhaps he signed the document only after he had already been disqualified, in which case the entire matter is a lie? What is gained by having others authenticate a signature that was made fraudulently!?

The Gemara rejects this:

And what is the difficulty!?

Perhaps this is not what is being discussed. Rather,

perhaps

the case is one

in which his handwriting had been authenticated in court,

perhaps the court had written an authentication for a document executed while he was still fit. Now the witnesses are not authenticating his signature; rather, they are testifying that they signed the court’s authentication, and this occurred before he was disqualified. Therefore, they are trustworthy. And this ruling is not difficult in monetary law.

Rather, if there is a difficulty—

this is the difficulty.

The Gemara proposes another possibility.

If he knew testimony concerning him recorded in a document before it fell to him as an inheritance,

meaning, he was one of the witnesses who signed a document before he inherited the property concerning which he was testifying in the document, and now he became its heir—for example, the closer heirs died—

he may not authenticate his own handwriting,

since he has an interest in his testimony: he is now an heir, and if the deed of sale is forged, he will not inherit.

But others may authenticate his handwriting.

And this is difficult: Why may others authenticate it? After all, one who has an interest in the matter is disqualified because of the concern that he may lie, and it is possible that the entire document is forged.

The Gemara rejects this:

And what is the difficulty!? Perhaps here too, it is a case in which his handwriting had been authenticated in court,

and the witnesses are testifying concerning the court’s authentication, which had taken place before he acquired an interest in his testimony. And this ruling is not difficult in monetary law.

The Gemara seeks to establish the matter in another way.

Rather, if there is a difficulty—

this is the difficulty:

If he knew testimony concerning him before he became his son-in-law,

meaning, he had signed as a witness on a document before he became related to him,

and he became his son-in-law,

and he was now disqualified from testifying because he was a relative,

he may not testify concerning his own handwriting,

because he is now a relative,

but others may testify,

since they are not relatives.

And this is difficult in monetary law:

He himself is not trustworthy, but others—

are trustworthy!?

If he is not trustworthy because there is a deficiency in his credibility, why are others trustworthy? Perhaps he forged the document, as in the case of the robber and the one who has an interest in the matter.

And if you would say,

and perhaps you would say and resolve that

here too, it is a case in which his handwriting had been authenticated in court,

and therefore they are testifying concerning the authentication, which took place before he became a relative,

but Rav Yosef bar Manyumi said that Rav Naḥman said,

that this ruling is valid

even though his handwriting had not been authenticated in court!

But the Gemara rejects this:

And what is the difficulty!? Perhaps

the reason that a relative is disqualified from testifying

is a royal decree,

a decree of the Written Torah,

and not because he lies.

For if you do not say this,

if you wish to say that a relative is disqualified because of the concern that he may lie, then

Moses and Aaron with regard to their father-in-law,

why could they not testify concerning their father-in-law? Is it

because they are not trustworthy!?

Surely, in that respect they were certainly trustworthy.

Rather,

necessarily,

it is a royal decree that they may not testify concerning him,

their father-in-law, despite their trustworthiness, because the Torah disqualified a relative from testifying.

Here too,

in our case,

it is a royal decree that he may not testify concerning his handwriting for his father-in-law.

But others, who are not relatives, may testify, and therefore there is no difficulty in monetary law.

Rather, in fact, it is as we said initially,

like the first possibility, that a son sold property belonging to his father.

And as for what is difficult for you,

what was difficult concerning

“In place of your fathers shall be your sons,”

since the grandson inherits directly from the grandfather and not by virtue of his father—

That verse is written as a blessing.

It is merely a blessing that the righteous will have sons and grandsons who inherit from them, but the inheritance in fact passes through the father. Therefore, this is “difficult in monetary law,” since the purchasers say to him: Your father sold it, so why are you taking the property away? After all, you come by virtue of your father’s inheritance.

And they transmitted this ruling from the Land of Israel.

Now the Gemara wishes to prove that “In place of your fathers shall be your sons” is not merely a blessing.

And can you really say this?

How can one say that it is written only

as a blessing,