Bava Batra 159b — the Talmud in English

But

in truth

with regard to the law, no.

The grandson inherits the assets of the grandfather only by virtue of his father, and not directly by virtue of the grandfather.

And did we not learn,

we learned in the Mishna above:

“The house fell upon him and upon his father,”

or

“upon him and upon his inheritors, and his wife’s marriage contract and a creditor’s debt were upon him,”

who wish to collect their debt from the inheritance, and the uncertainty is who died first:

The father’s heirs say: The son died first,

and he did not inherit, and afterward the father died; therefore, the son’s creditors have no right, since the assets were never in his possession.

And the creditor says: The father died first,

and the son inherited him, and afterward the son died; therefore, they can collect their debt.

Is it not,

does this not refer to a case in which

“the father’s heirs”

are

“my sons,”

the father’s sons, such as Enoch son of Reuben, who inherited the grandfather, Jacob, whereas

“his inheritors”

are

“my brothers,”

the brothers of Reuben, who are fit to inherit him, and the uncertainty is who died first?

And if it enters your mind

to say,

he is unable

the grandson

to say: “I come by virtue of my father’s father,”

since

when it is written, “Your sons shall be in place of your fathers,”

it is written only

with regard to blessing.

If so, even

when the son died,

even according to the possibility that the son died first,

and afterward the father died, what of it!?

Why does the creditor not collect?

Let us say to them, the creditor:

that the creditor should say to the son’s sons:

“I am collecting the inheritance of their father!”

I have the right to collect my debt from the inheritance, since he inherits from his father. And the Gemara rejects:

No,

this is not what it refers to, but rather

“the son’s heirs”

are

“brothers.”

The son’s heirs are not Reuben’s son, but his brothers. And if Reuben died first, his brother inherits Jacob not through Reuben, but directly from Jacob, since he too is Jacob’s son. Therefore, there is no proof from the Mishna that they say that the grandson inherits directly from the grandfather.

And according to this,

“his inheritors”

are

“his father’s brothers.”

The house fell upon Reuben and Esau, Jacob’s brother. Therefore, if Reuben died first, Esau’s heirs inherit everything. But if Esau died first, Reuben has the right in Jacob’s place. And then the purchasers collect his share from him.

They asked Rav Sheshet:

A son—what is the law: may he inherit his mother in the grave,

after his mother has died,

in order to bequeath to the brothers from the father,

to bequeath to his paternal brothers? For example, Joseph son of Rachel died during his mother’s lifetime, and afterward Rachel his mother died: does Joseph inherit his mother in the grave, as though he were alive, in order to pass the inheritance onward to his brothers from Jacob, Reuben, who is his brother only from his father?

Rav Sheshet said to them: You have learned it,

this can be resolved from the beraita:

“The father was taken captive, and his son died in the province,”

in his native land, and it is not known who died first.

And

so too,

“a son was taken captive, and his father died in the province,”

and it is not known who died first,

the father’s heirs and the son’s heirs divide.

And Rav Sheshet infers:

What are the circumstances?

How is it that there is an inheritance uncertainty?

If you say as it is taught,

if it is simply as it is written in the beraita, it is difficult:

“Who are ‘the father’s heirs,’ and who are ‘the son’s heirs’!?”

After all, there are not two kinds of heirs here: if the son has sons, they inherit the father; and if he has no sons, the father’s heirs also inherit the son.

Rather, is it not that this is what it is saying,

this is the case:

“A father was taken captive, and his daughter’s son died in the province. Or a son was taken captive, and his mother’s father died in the province.”

And there are now two heirs here: the grandfather’s heirs and the son’s heirs, who are the relatives of his father, who is the husband of the grandson’s mother. Therefore, if the grandfather died first, the grandson inherits him, and after the grandson dies, his father’s family inherits him, which is not the family of his grandfather. But if the grandson died first, he does not inherit his grandfather; rather, the grandfather’s family inherits him.

And we do not know which of them died first,

and we do not know which of the two died first.

And therefore the law is that

the father’s heirs

the grandfather’s

and the son’s heirs divide.

And from here it is proven that the son does not inherit in the grave in order to bequeath to his paternal brothers.

For,

if it is so,

that the son inherits his mother in the grave in order to bequeath to his paternal brothers,

even so,

even if we say

that the son died first,

that the son died first, still

he should inherit his mother’s father,

that he should inherit his mother’s father

in the grave,

while he is in the grave,

and bequeath it to his paternal brothers,

that he should bequeath the inheritance of his grandfather, his mother’s father, to his paternal brothers!?

Rather, learn from this,

it can be proven from here that

the son does not inherit his mother in order to bequeath to his paternal brothers.

And now the Gemara wishes to prove this law also from the Mishna:

Rav Aḥa bar Minyomi said to Abaye: We too have learned it,

we learned in the Mishna:

“The house fell upon him and upon his mother; both these and those,”

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel,

agree that they divide.

And if it is so,

if we say that the son inherits his mother in the grave in order to bequeath to his paternal brothers, then

even so, although the son died first,

even if the son died first,

he should inherit his mother in his grave,

that he should inherit his mother’s father’s inheritance while he is in the grave,

and they should inherit it from him, his paternal brothers,

and his paternal brothers should inherit the assets from him.

Rather, is it not—learn from this,

it is proven from here that

the son does not inherit his mother in order to bequeath to his paternal brothers.

And the Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed,

learn from this!

And now the Gemara explains:

And what is the reason,

what is the source for this law?

Abaye said: “Turning” is stated with regard to a son,

“and an inheritance shall not be turned,”

and “turning” is stated with regard to a husband,

“and an inheritance shall not be turned.”

Just as regarding the “turning” stated with regard to a husband, the husband does not inherit his wife in the grave,

since after death the relationship between them has ceased,

so too, regarding the “turning” stated with regard to a son, the son does not inherit his mother in the grave in order to bequeath to his paternal brothers.

And since we have been occupied with matters of possession of assets, the Gemara now brings another law that concerns possession of assets:

There was an incident involving

a certain

man

who said to his fellow: “I am selling you the assets of bar Sisin!”

Someone who said to his fellow that he was selling him assets that he had purchased from a man whose name was bar Sisin.

There was one piece of land

that was

called “the property of the house of bar Sisin,”

which was named after bar Sisin’s son, and the purchaser also wished to acquire it.

He said to him,

the seller:

“This is not ‘the property of the house of bar Sisin,’”

this land had not belonged to him,

“but it is merely called that,”

and it is only called by the name

“the property of the house of bar Sisin.”

He came before Rav Naḥman

they came before Rav Naḥman for judgment.

He left it in the possession of the purchaser,

Rav Naḥman placed the land in the purchaser’s possession.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

to Rav Naḥman:

“Is the law so!?”

And is this indeed the law!? After all, we have the principle that

“One who seeks to take something from his fellow bears the proof!”

If so, the land should be left in the seller’s possession, since he is the original owner and the land was in his possession.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction:

“Rava’s statement contradicts Rava’s statement, and Rav Naḥman’s statement contradicts Rav Naḥman’s statement.”

Rava and Rav Naḥman contradicted their statements from another place.

For there was a certain man who said to his fellow,

a man said to his fellow:

“What are you doing in this house!?”

What are you doing in this house, which is mine?

He said to him,

he answered him:

“I purchased it from you,”

I bought it from you,

“and I consumed the years of presumptive possession,”

I lived in the house for three years, and through this I have established possession of the house.

He said to him,

the claimant said:

“I was in the inner rooms!”

I lived with you in the inner rooms, and I would pass outside through the outer place where you lived; therefore, you have no presumptive possession against me, since I too lived with you in the house at that same time.

He came before Rav Naḥman,

the possessor came before Rav Naḥman.

He said to him: “Go, prove your consumption!”

Prove that you lived in the house for three years without the claimant.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

“Is the law so!?”

Is this the law that one must decide, when

“one who seeks to take something from his fellow bears the proof”?

The one who lived in the house for three years is now considered to have established possession, and the claimant must bring proof.

Rava’s statement contradicts Rava’s statement.

Here he ruled that the seller, who was the original owner, has established possession, whereas there he ruled that the one who now lives in the house has established possession.

And Rav Naḥman’s statement contradicts Rav Naḥman’s statement.

Here he left the land in the purchaser’s possession, whereas there he ruled that the first person has established possession.

The Gemara answers:

Rava’s statement does not contradict Rava’s statement.

Since there is uncertainty in the matter, the land is left in the possession of the one who is holding the land. Therefore,

here,

with regard to the land of bar Sisin,

the seller is standing in possession of his property,

the seller was holding the land; therefore, it remains with him. But

there,

in the case of the inner rooms,

the purchaser is standing in possession of his property,

the possessor was holding the house.

Rav Naḥman’s statement does not contradict Rav Naḥman’s statement.

Here, since he said to him, “the property of the house of bar Sisin,”

he said that he was selling the lands of bar Sisin,

and it is called “the property of the house of bar Sisin,”

and this is what the land is called, there is an indication that the purchaser is indeed correct; therefore,

“it is upon him to reveal that it is not the property of the house of bar Sisin.”

It is upon the seller to prove that this land did not belong to bar Sisin.

Here,

with regard to presumptive possession for three years,

“let it be no less than one who holds a document,”

this is no weaker than one who has a document in his hand,

“do we not say to him: ‘Establish your document, and stand in possession of the property!’?”

For the purchaser must prove that the document is valid. Likewise, in our case, he must prove that the presumptive possession, which takes the place of the document, is valid.

We shall return to you, chapter “One Who Died.”

There are two types of documents: one, an ordinary document, called a "plain document." And the other, a special document, made in a folded form, because this is how the Sages instituted it, and it is called a "linked document."

The principal institution of the linked document was regarding women's gittin, which the Sages instituted for the kohanim, so that they would divorce specifically with it, because sometimes the kohanim become angry with their wives and divorce them, and afterward they regret it, but they can no longer take them back, since a kohen is forbidden to a divorcee. Therefore, the Sages instituted for them a linked get, whose making involves exertion, so that in the meantime the husband might be reconciled and retract his decision to divorce his wife.

And incidentally to women's gittin, they also instituted this for all documents, so that besides an ordinary document, anyone who wishes may also make a linked document. This was in order not to distinguish between gittin and documents.

And this is the manner of writing a linked document:

The scribe writes one line, leaves after it one blank line, folds the writing over the blank line, and sews it. And he again writes a line, folds it over the empty line beneath it, and sews it. And so he again writes and folds until he finishes writing the entire "substantive body of the document," which includes all the specific details of the matter of this document. And each fold is called a "link." And afterward, he writes the "standard formula of the document" [which is the uniform wording in every document], in the ordinary manner.