Bava Batra 158b (קנח:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that, according to Beit Hillel, the iron-flock property remains in its presumptive possession.

The Gemara discusses this:

In whose possession?

Rabbi Yohanan said: In the possession of the husband’s heirs.

Since the property is acquired by him until the time of the divorce, it is considered to be in his possession, and his heirs receive it.

And Rabbi Elazar said: In the possession of the wife’s heirs.

Since in practice she brought the property, while he receives it on the condition that he return it.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of bar Kappara: They divide it.

And bar Kappara likewise taught —

Since these come to inherit,

the husband’s heirs, since the property is acquired by him in the interim,

and these come to inherit,

the wife’s heirs, since she brought the property from her father’s house, therefore, because of the uncertainty,

they divide it.

Mishna:

If the house collapsed upon him and his mother,

upon Rachel, Jacob’s wife, and her son Joseph,

the son’s heirs, who are his paternal brothers—for example, Reuben, Joseph’s brother—say: Rachel, the mother, died first, and Joseph inherited her; therefore, they inherit Joseph.

And Rachel’s heirs say: Joseph died first and did not inherit his mother; therefore, they inherit her —

Both these and those,

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, who disagreed in the preceding Mishna, here

agree that they divide it

because of the uncertainty.

Rabbi Akiva said

(disagreeing with the first tanna):

I concede in this case that the property remains in its presumptive possession.

That is, Beit Hillel also disagree in our Mishna and maintain that the property remains in its presumptive possession, as the Gemara will explain: who has presumptive possession of it?

Ben Azzai said to him: We are distressed over the dispute,

we are distressed that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed in the preceding Mishna,

but you have come to divide those who are equal,

and you are adding a dispute in a case in which your colleagues say that they are equal.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses this: According to Beit Hillel, who hold that the property remains in its “presumptive possession,”

in whose possession

is the property?

Rabbi Ila said: In the possession of the mother’s heirs,

Rabbi Zeira said: In the possession of the son’s heirs.

As will be explained below.

When Rabbi Zeira ascended,

when he went up to Eretz Yisrael,

he adopted the position of Rabbi Ila,

he conceded Rabbi Ila’s view that it was in the possession of the mother’s heirs.

Rabbi Zeira said: Infer from this that the air of Eretz Yisrael makes one wise.

The air of Eretz Yisrael made him wiser; consequently, he grasped the truth of the matter and conceded Rabbi Ila’s view.

The Gemara explains:

And what is the reason,

what is the reasoning behind the view that the property is in the possession of the mother’s heirs? —

Since

the inheritance had been established as belonging to that tribe

of the mother, it therefore remains in the possession of the mother’s heirs, since she is affiliated with her father’s tribe.

We learned in the Mishna:

And Ben Azzai said to him: We are distressed over the dispute, etc.:

Rabbi Shemlai said: This teaches,

from here we learn that

Ben Azzai was a student-colleague of Rabbi Akiva.

He was both his student and his colleague,

as he said to him

in the second person,

“you have come,”

since he addressed him in the second person, which is the language used between colleagues.

The Gemara now discusses a known matter: there was a particular monetary law that was sent from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, and an objection was raised against it; nevertheless, it was ruled as halakha. The Gemara discusses what that law was that they sent from there and what difficulty was raised against it.

They sent from there: A son who borrowed against his father’s property,

a son who mortgaged his father’s property as security for his loan,

during his father’s lifetime, and died

the son during his father’s lifetime, and afterward the father died,

his son may remove it from the purchasers.

His son, the grandson, may remove the property from the purchasers.

And this is

the

halakha that is difficult in monetary law.

But the Gemara rejects this, saying that this halakha is not correct and is certainly corrupted; it was not stated in this manner, because:

The borrower—what does he remove!?

Why and on what basis would the borrower remove the property from the purchasers to whom he or his father sold it, merely because he was a borrower!?

Furthermore, the purchasers —

what is their relevance!?

After all, it was not mentioned at the outset that there were purchasers when the son borrowed during his father’s lifetime!?