Bava Batra 156a (קנו.) — the Talmud in English

He said to him:

Ameimar resolves:

But according to your reasoning,

according to your approach, Rav Ashi, if he indeed profits from his sale, when

he sells five for six,

selling an item worth five for six,

is the sale likewise valid,

would the sale indeed be valid, since he profits from this transaction?! Yet we have not found such a ruling.

Rather,

we are compelled to say that

the Sages know

it is known to the Sages

that a minor’s mind is drawn toward money,

that a minor is especially attached to money and strongly desires it,

and if you say that his sale is valid,

if his sale is effective when he profits, we must be concerned that

sometimes

at times

they will rattle coins for him

they will offer him money, and then

he will go and sell all of his father’s property.

He will go and sell all of his father’s property at a discounted price. Therefore, the Sages instituted that he may not sell anything at all.

But with regard to a gift,

if he wishes to give a gift, they instituted that he may give it, because

if he had not received benefit from him,

if he had not received benefit from him,

he would not have given him a gift,

he would not have given him a gift for no reason. It follows that the gift is compensation for what they gave him. Therefore,

the Sages said

the Sages instituted,

let his gift be a valid gift,

so that he can give a gift in order

that they will do things for them,

so that people will want to benefit them, knowing that he will repay them in the future.

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said:

Even though a minor or a minor girl has reached the age of majority, one cannot determine on the basis of age alone that they are adults. Rather,

they must be examined,

to ascertain whether they have developed the signs of maturity, and only then are they considered adults. And although we have a presumption that anyone who has reached the age of thirteen has presumably also developed pubic hair, this is effective only for rabbinic laws, such as mi'un; but with regard to Torah laws, it is impossible to determine with certainty that he is an adult without examining him.

Therefore, they examine them

for kiddushin,

and if signs are found, then even if she accepts kiddushin from another man, the second kiddushin is not valid, since she is betrothed to the first man. But if no signs are found now, and they are found only after the second kiddushin, she requires a get from both men as a matter of doubt, since it is unknown when she developed the signs.

And for divorce,

for if pubic hair is not found in the man or the woman, the divorce is not valid [as will be explained below].

And for chalitza,

this refers only to the woman, who may perform chalitza only if she has developed pubic hair.

And for mi'un,

a minor girl whom her brothers or mother married off may perform mi'un as long as she has not matured; once she has developed pubic hair, she may no longer perform mi'un.

And to sell his father’s property until he is twenty years old

and has developed pubic hair.

And the Gemara asks:

And since we examined him for kiddushin,

since we examined him for kiddushin and saw that he was an adult, he is therefore an adult at the time of divorce as well,

why do I need this for divorce?!

Why must he be examined again before the divorce?!

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary only with regard to levirate marriage.

Where there was no kiddushin, but only levirate marriage.

As we learned in the Mishna: If a boy who is nine years and one day old engages in intercourse with his yevama, he acquires her; and he may not give a get until he matures!

And it is thereby established that levirate marriage applies even to a minor. Therefore, he must be examined before the divorce, since he may not give a get until he matures.

The Gemara explains:

For chalitza,

what is the novelty concerning chalitza that he must be examined? It is just like divorce!

Rather,

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yosei,

this teaches that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

who says: “The word ‘man’ is written in the passage,

in the passage concerning chalitza, “So shall be done to the man,” and “man” means only an adult. But

a woman, whether an adult or a minor,

may perform chalitza.

It teaches us

that they come to teach us

that we juxtapose a woman to a man,

that a woman is juxtaposed to a man, so that a woman too may perform chalitza only if she is an adult,

not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara continues to explain:

And for mi'un,

if we found pubic hair, she may not perform mi'un,

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda,

to teach that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who says

that one must examine her for mi'un in such a manner that the length of the pubic hair is

until the black exceeds the white,

until the hairs grow and lie upon the white flesh.

It teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

but even short hairs are a sign of maturity.

And to sell his father’s property until he is twenty years old —

this comes to teach

to exclude the opinion of one who says that he is eighteen

years old.

And now the Gemara rules on the laws stated above:

And the halakha is: within the period, it is as before the period,

and he may sell only after he has completed his twentieth year.

And the halakha is,

the halakha is

in accordance with Giddel bar Menashya,

that if he understands the nature of business transactions, he may sell his father’s property from the age of thirteen.

And the halakha is,

the halakha is

in accordance with Mar Zutra,

that with regard to testimony concerning movable property, he may testify from the age of thirteen.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman, who said in the name of Shmuel, in all of them,

in all the laws stated above.

Mishna:

One who distributes his property by his verbal declaration,

a person who distributes his property by speech alone —

Rabbi Elazar says: Whether he is healthy or dangerously ill,

even a shekhiv mera, one who is dying, requires an act of acquisition. He disputes the enactment that the statements of a shekhiv mera are considered as though written and delivered through speech alone.

And according to him,

property that has responsibility

is land,

is acquired with money, by a deed, or through possession,

one must perform the acts of acquisition specific to land.

But property that does not have responsibility

is movable property

is acquired only through pulling.

For this is the act of acquisition applicable to movable property.