Bava Batra 156b (קנו:) — the Talmud in English

They said to him

the Sages said to Rabbi Elazar: Is there proof for the enactment concerning a shekhiv mera, that he acquires through speech alone, from

the incident involving the mother of the sons of Rokhel

[this was their father’s name], who

was ill and said: Give

the

kavinta

[a piece of jewelry worn around the neck]

to my daughter, and it

was worth

twelve maneh. And she died, and the Sages upheld her words;

the Sages upheld the gift even though it had been made through words alone. This proves that there is an enactment for one who is dangerously ill and tending toward death, enabling him to transfer his property through speech alone, without the need for an act of acquisition.

He said to them

Rabbi Elazar replied to the Sages:

The sons of Rokhel—

may their mother bury them!

The sons of Rokhel were wicked, and the Sages wished to penalize them. Therefore, they said that the gift their mother gave her daughter would take effect through speech alone. But with regard to an ordinary dangerously ill person, there is certainly no such enactment,

Gemara:

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Elazar said to the Sages

proof for his position that a shekhiv mera must perform an act of acquisition, and that speech alone is ineffective:

There was an incident involving a man from Maronia

[he was called this on account of his place of residence] who

was in Jerusalem,

and he was dangerously ill.

He had a great deal of movable property and wished to give it as a gift. They said to him: There is no remedy for it;

there is no way to transfer the movable property to another person as a gift

until he acquires land along with it,

through an acquisition agav: he should acquire land, and along with it the movable property.

He went and acquired a rocky tract of land

land unsuitable for sowing and therefore inexpensive,

near Jerusalem. And he said:

Its northern portion is for so-and-so,

he transferred the northern part of the rocky tract to so-and-so,

and along with it,

by virtue of the land,

one hundred sheep and one hundred barrels. And its southern portion is for so-and-so,

and likewise he transferred the southern portion of the land to another person,

and along with it

by virtue of the land

one hundred sheep and one hundred barrels. And the Sages upheld his words.

This proves that even a shekhiv mera requires an act of acquisition.

They said to him

the Sages: But is there

proof from there!?

That

man from Maronia was a healthy person,

and therefore he required an act of acquisition.

We learned in the Mishna:

He said to them: The sons of Rokhel—may their mother bury them:

And the Gemara asks:

What is the reason

why

does he curse them,

why did he curse the sons of Rokhel?

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They were people who maintained thorns in a vineyard;

they left thorns in the vineyard, even though thorns are animal fodder, and thereby transgressed the prohibition, “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds.” This prohibition is transgressed even if one did not actually sow them, but merely maintained them as kilayim in the vineyard and did not uproot them.

And Rabbi Eliezer follows his own reasoning,

as he maintains that even thorns are considered kilayim.

As we learned

in a Mishna in tractate Kilayim [5:8]:

One who maintains thorns in a vineyard—

Rabbi Elazar says: It is sanctified.

The vineyard is prohibited on account of kilayim.

And the Sages say: It is sanctified only if he maintains something that people maintain,

the prohibition of kilayim applies to something that people customarily use and maintain in the vineyard; but thorns have no use, and therefore one does not maintain them but uproots them from the vineyard.

And the Gemara asks:

Granted,

one who maintains

saffron in a vineyard—it is fit for use,

since saffron is fit to eat, it renders the vineyard prohibited if it grows there.

But thorns—for what are they fit!?

Thorns are not fit for anything, so why should they render the vineyard prohibited?

Rabbi Hanina said: What is the reason for Rabbi Elazar’s—

for in Arabia, people maintain thorns in the fields for their camels.

In Arabia, thorns are used as food for camels, and therefore they have sufficient significance to render the vineyard prohibited as kilayim.

Rabbi Levi said: One may perform an act of acquisition for a shekhiv mera even on Shabbat.

It is permitted to acquire from him through an act of acquisition and not only through speech. And it is unnecessary to say that this applies when he gives all his property, in which case the act of acquisition has no legal effect, since it is unnecessary, as he acquires through speech alone; nevertheless, they permitted performing an act of acquisition. Rather, it applies even to a partial gift, in which case he acquires only through an act of acquisition, and nevertheless the Sages permitted it,

and not to be concerned with Rabbi Elazar’s words.

The reason they required an act of acquisition is not Rabbi Elazar’s position, according to which he disputes the enactment concerning a shekhiv mera, who acquires through speech,

but lest his mind become unsettled

if he is unable to transfer the property through an act of acquisition, because he thinks that without an act of acquisition the gift has no effect. Therefore, they permitted an act of acquisition even on Shabbat.

Mishna:

In the previous Mishna, Rabbi Elazar and the Sages disagreed concerning the enactment regarding a shekhiv mera. This Mishna comes to clarify the words of the Sages: when an act of acquisition is unnecessary.

Rabbi Eliezer says: On Shabbat, his words take effect.

The entire enactment concerning a shekhiv mera, that he acquires even through speech without an act of acquisition, applied only with regard to Shabbat,

because he cannot write;

therefore, they enacted that he could acquire through speech.

But not on a weekday,

when an act of acquisition is required.

Rabbi Yehoshua says,

he disagrees and maintains: If

on Shabbat they said

that he can acquire through speech,

all the more so on a weekday,

since on a weekday he can transfer ownership through an act of acquisition. Therefore, “anything fit for mixing does not have its mixing impede,” and on a weekday he is fit to perform an act of acquisition.

Similarly,

we find a similar dispute between these tannaim:

One may act to acquire property on behalf of a minor,

it is possible to transfer something to a minor through another person, based on the principle that one may acquire an advantage for a person without his knowledge,

but one may not act to acquire property on behalf of an adult.

Another person cannot acquire something on behalf of an adult, since he can acquire it himself. But an enactment was made for a minor, since he cannot acquire something himself,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rabbi Yehoshua says:

If

for a minor they said

that an enactment was made granting him the ability to acquire, even though he cannot acquire something himself,

all the more so for an adult,

they certainly enacted this for an adult. This is analogous to the previous dispute.

Gemara:

And the Gemara asks:

The Mishna—whose opinion is it!?—

It is Rabbi Yehuda’s.

The explanation of the Sages’ words as presented in the Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Yehuda.

As it was taught in a beraita,

we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Meir says

a different formulation of the dispute between the tannaim:

Rabbi Eliezer says: On a weekday, his words take effect,

on a weekday there is an enactment enabling him to transfer ownership through speech,

because he can write,

and they enacted that speech is equivalent to writing. But

not on Shabbat,

when they did not enact that speech should be effective.