Bava Batra 148a — the Talmud in English

But Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman: ![](pamud.bmp "

Precise page-column location")

A dangerously ill person who said, “Give my loan to so-and-so!”

it shall be

his loan to so-and-so,

the giving is effective through his speech.

And even though it does not exist in the case of a healthy person,

for a healthy person cannot transfer an oral loan. And everything that we find can be transferred in the case of a healthy person is only a documented loan, which he can transfer through writing and delivery. And apparently this contradicts the words of Rav Naḥman above, who says that a dangerously ill person cannot transfer more than a healthy person.

The Gemara gives two answers:

Rav Pappa said: Since an heir inherits it.

The definition of a gift of a dangerously ill person is the definition of inheritance, for the recipient is as though he inherits the giver. And since inheritance is possible even with regard to a loan, it is therefore also possible to transfer an oral loan through a gift of a dangerously ill person. But it is impossible to inherit something without substance, nor something that has not yet come into existence; therefore, a dangerously ill person cannot transfer them.

But

Rav Aḥa son of Rav Ika said,

he answers the words of Rav Naḥman:

A loan does exist in the case of a healthy person,

we find such an acquisition even in the case of a healthy person,

as Rav Huna said in the name of Rav, for Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “I have a hundred zuz in your possession,”

one who says to his fellow, “I have a hundred zuz deposited with you,”

“Give it to so-and-so,”

give the hundred zuz to another person, if this was

in the presence of the three parties,

namely, the depositor, the depositary, and the recipient,

he acquires it

the recipient. Thus the Sages enacted. And therefore a dangerously ill person can also transfer a loan.

Many interpretations were given for the passage below, and we have explained it according to the Rashbam, as the Baḥ explains him in his glosses.

Ibayyu lehu

the members of the academy were uncertain:

A palm tree to one person, and its fruit to another—what is the law?

A dangerously ill person who transferred a palm tree to one person and the fruit to another person—what is the law? Can he retract the gift or not?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Did he reserve “the place of the fruit,”

when he gave the palm tree to the first person, did he leave for himself the branches upon which the fruit grows, and even when he gave the fruit to the second person, did the place of the fruit remain with him, and therefore is this a partial gift of a dangerously ill person, since he left something for himself, and his gift is a gift, and he performed an acquisition; therefore, if he recovered, he cannot retract?

Or did he not reserve

anything for himself, but rather gave the entire palm tree to the first person, without reserving the branches for himself, and gave all the fruit to the second person; therefore, if he recovered, he can retract?

If you should say,

if we adopt as the conclusion of this uncertainty that one who gives a palm tree to one person and fruit

to another, it is not a reservation,

for he leaves nothing for himself,

(for himself)

if he said to the first person,

“except for its fruit”—what is the law?

There is room for uncertainty, since he said a superfluous expression: he said to the first person that he gives him the palm tree, and added “except for its fruit.” Apparently this is superfluous, since a palm tree does not include the fruit; therefore, it is uncertain whether he intended to leave the branches for himself.

The Gemara resolves the uncertainty:

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman: If you should say

in the first inquiry, that one who gives

a palm tree to one person and its fruit to another, it is not a reservation of the place of the fruit,

but rather he gives everything to the first person, including the branches that are the place of the fruit; however, if he said

“a palm tree to one person, and he reserved its fruit for himself,”

that he said, “except for its fruit,”

he reserved the place of the fruit,

he intended to leave the branches of the tree for himself. [

(What is the reason? Everything that concerns himself, he reserves generously)

This sentence is not included by the Rashbam, since according to his view, the proof that he leaves it is from the superfluity of the expression, and not because he leaves something for himself generously].

There were amoraim who were uncertain about the same uncertainty as above, only concerning another case, and not concerning a dangerously ill person:

Rav Abba said to Rav Ashi: We,

in our beit-midrash,

we learned it concerning Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,

we were uncertain about the ruling of Reish Lakish—and concerning a gift of a healthy person, not a gift of a dangerously ill person.

For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One who sells a house to his fellow,

as we will say below, if he sells a house, he does not include in it the upper loft, which is the uppermost story of the house. And Reish Lakish innovates that if he explicitly says

“on the condition that the upper loft is mine,”

his intention is to retain for himself the right to insert beams from the roof into the courtyard, and the purchaser cannot prevent him. And this is the meaning of his saying, “the upper loft is mine,” for in order to leave the upper loft for himself he does not need a special reservation, since he sold him only the house, and not the upper loft.