Bava Batra 148a (קמח.) — the Talmud in English

But Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

If a dangerously ill person said: “Give my loan to so-and-so,”

the loan

shall be so-and-so’s,

the transfer takes effect through his speech.

And although this is not the case with a healthy person,

as a healthy person cannot transfer an oral loan. Everything that we have found can be transferred by a healthy person is only a documented loan, which he can transfer through writing and delivery. Apparently, this contradicts Rav Naḥman’s earlier statement that a dangerously ill person cannot transfer anything more than a healthy person can.

The Gemara offers two answers:

Rav Pappa said: Since an heir can inherit it.

The definition of a gift from a dangerously ill person is that of inheritance: The recipient is considered as though he inherits from the giver. Since a loan can also be inherited, an oral loan can likewise be transferred as a gift from a dangerously ill person. But one cannot inherit an intangible item or an item that has not yet come into existence; therefore, a dangerously ill person cannot transfer such items.

But

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said

in response to Rav Naḥman’s statement:

A loan is transferable by a healthy person,

as we find that this type of acquisition is possible even for a healthy person,

as in the statement of Rav Huna that Rav said, for Rav Huna said that Rav said: “I have one hundred dinars with you,”

meaning, one who says to another: “I have one hundred dinars deposited with you,”

“Give it to so-and-so,”

give the hundred dinars to another person—if this took place

in the presence of all three parties,

namely, the depositor, the trustee, and the recipient,

the recipient acquires it.

The Sages enacted this rule. Therefore, a dangerously ill person can likewise transfer a loan.

There are many interpretations of the passage below; we have explained it according to Rashbam, as the Baḥ explains it in his glosses.

It was raised as a dilemma

by the scholars of the yeshiva:

If one gives a date palm to one person and its fruit to another, what is the law?

If a dangerously ill person transferred a date palm to one person and its fruit to another person, what is the law? Can he retract the transfer or not?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Did he retain “the place of the fruit,”

meaning, when he gave the date palm to the first person, did he retain for himself the branches on which the fruit grows? And even when he gave the fruit to the second person, did the place of the fruit remain his? If so, this is a partial gift from a dangerously ill person, since he retained something for himself, and his gift is therefore a valid gift, and he performed an act of acquisition; consequently, if he recovers, he cannot retract.

Or did he not retain it

for himself, but instead give the entire date palm to the first person, without retaining the branches for himself, and give all the fruit to the second person? If so, if he recovers, he can retract.

If you should say,

if we adopt as the resolution of this dilemma that one who gives a date palm to one person and its fruit

to another has not retained anything,

as he leaves nothing for himself,

(for himself),

if he said to the first person,

“Except for its fruit,” what is the law?

There is room for doubt, because he used a superfluous expression: He said to the first person that he was giving him the date palm, and added, “Except for its fruit.” Apparently this is unnecessary, since a date palm does not include its fruit. Therefore, the question is whether he intended to retain the branches for himself.

The Gemara resolves the dilemma:

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If you should say

with regard to the first dilemma that one who gives

a date palm to one person and its fruit to another has not retained the place of the fruit,

but rather gives everything to the first person, including the branches that are the place of the fruit, nevertheless, if he said

“A date palm to one person, while retaining its fruit for myself,”

that is, he said, “Except for its fruit,”

he retained the place of the fruit;

he intended to retain the branches of the tree for himself. [

(What is the reason? In every matter concerning himself, he retains generously)

Rashbam does not have this sentence in his version, since according to his view, the proof that he retains it derives from the superfluous wording, and not from the principle that one retains generously for himself.]

There are amoraim who raised the same dilemma as above, but with regard to a different case and not in the context of a dangerously ill person:

Rav Abba said to Rav Ashi: In our study hall, we

in our beit-midrash,

teach it concerning Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,

meaning, we raised the dilemma concerning the ruling of Reish Lakish, and it concerns a gift from a healthy person, not a gift from a dangerously ill person.

For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One who sells a house to another,

as we will say below, when one sells a house, the sale does not include the upper story, which is the highest chamber of the house. Reish Lakish innovates that if he explicitly stipulates

and says to him: “On the condition that the upper story is mine,”

he intends to retain for himself the right to extend poles from the roof into the courtyard, and the purchaser cannot prevent him from doing so. This is the meaning of his saying, “The upper story is mine,” since in order to retain the upper story for himself he does not need a special reservation: He sold him only the house, and not the upper story.