Bava Batra 147b (קמז:) — the Talmud in English

for the prayer of the High Priest,

so that he would know what to pray for on Yom Kippur.

And Rava said that Rav Naḥman said,

disagreeing with Rabbi Zeira above, and holding that

the gift of one on his deathbed

that can be transferred by declaration is only

by rabbinic ordinance alone,

it is merely an enactment of the Sages,

lest his mind become disturbed

because of the distress caused by his inability to transfer property to whomever he wishes. Therefore, the Sages enacted that he could transfer it easily, without an act of acquisition.

The Gemara asks:

And did Rav Naḥman say this,

that the recipient acquires it only by rabbinic ordinance!?

But Rav Naḥman said: Although Shmuel said,

despite Shmuel’s position that

if one sells a promissory note to another and then forgives the debt, it is forgiven.

The seller may forgive the debt owed by the debtor even after he has sold the debt to another,

and even an heir may forgive it.

Even one who inherited a debt from his father may forgive it to the debtor, thereby causing the purchaser to lose the debt. But

Shmuel concedes that if he gave it

—if he transferred the debt

as a gift of one on his deathbed, he cannot forgive it,

since the debt is no longer in his possession, and therefore he no longer has the right to forgive it.

Granted, if you say

that we hold that a gift of one on his deathbed is

by Torah law, that is why he cannot forgive it,

since if the sale is valid by Torah law, it is a complete sale, and therefore the seller has withdrawn from the debt and cannot forgive it.

But if you say that it is rabbinic,

but if we follow Rav Naḥman and hold that it is only by rabbinic ordinance,

why can he not forgive it?

Even if the Sages enacted that a debt may be sold through the enactment concerning the declaration of one on his deathbed, this is not a complete sale, since a debt is an intangible, and therefore it cannot be sold by Torah law. If so, even after the Sages enacted that the debt could be sold, the debtor’s obligation would remain to the creditor—the seller—and not to the purchaser. It should therefore follow that the creditor should be able to forgive the debt even after selling it.

The Gemara answers:

It is not by Torah law, but they made it equivalent to Torah law.

A declaration by one on his deathbed that effects a transfer is indeed valid only by rabbinic ordinance, but the Sages gave it the force of an acquisition by Torah law. Therefore, the seller cannot forgive the debt.

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

Although one on his deathbed can transfer property by declaration, there are things that cannot be acquired through his declaration. Therefore,

if one on his deathbed said, “So-and-so shall dwell in this house,”

transferring to him only the right of residence and not the house itself, or said,

“So-and-so shall eat the produce of this date palm,”

transferring to him only the produce of the date palm and not the date palm itself,

he has said nothing.

The reason is that it is impossible to transfer a right of residence, since it has no substance and no acquisition can take hold of it; and in the case of the produce of a date palm, it is an object not yet in existence, which the Sages held cannot be transferred.

Unless he says, “Give this house to so-and-so, and let him dwell in it,”

for then he transfers to him an interest in the house itself, or

“Give this date palm to so-and-so, and let him eat its produce,”

transferring the date palm to him for the sake of its produce, in which case he acquires it.

The Gemara analyzes this:

Is this to say

that one may infer from here

that Rav Naḥman holds

that Rav Naḥman’s words teach us that only

a matter that exists in the case of a healthy person

—something that a healthy person can transfer—

exists in the case of one on his deathbed,

as the Sages enacted that one on his deathbed can transfer it by declaration.

But a matter

that does not exist in the case of a healthy person,

which a healthy person cannot transfer, such as an object not yet in existence,

does not exist in the case of one on his deathbed.

One on his deathbed likewise cannot transfer it. The explanation is that the Sages merely added another method of transferring property; they did not include in their enactment something that is not capable of being transferred.

The Gemara asks about this principle: