Bava Batra 148b — the Talmud in English

And concerning these matters of Reish Lakish,

they raised a question before them: a house to one,

he transferred a house to one,

and a diyyota to another—what is the law? Is it a reservation,

did he give the owner of the roof the right to project beams into the courtyard,

or not,

for he did not intend to transfer to him a right in the courtyard.

And if you should say,

if we adopt

a house to one and a diyyota to another is not a reservation,

one must be in doubt when he explicitly said to the first that he was selling him the house,

apart from the diyyota—what is the law?

Since he said “apart from the diyyota,” which is superfluous language, was his intention certainly to give the second a right in the courtyard, to project beams from the roof toward the courtyard, or not?

The Gemara resolves it:

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If you should say that a house to one and a diyyota to another is not a reservation,

if he said

“apart from the diyyota,” it is a reservation,

and he leaves the second a right in the courtyard to project beams,

and this is in accordance with Rav Zevid,

as Rav Zevid explained concerning one who reserves [the right] for himself,

for he said: If he wishes to project

beams into it, he may project them.

Thus,

it is proven from here,

since he reserved the diyyota,

although he need not reserve it explicitly,

he likewise reserved the place for the beams,

he intended to reserve for himself a place for beams. The same is true when he gives a house to one and a diyyota to another: if he makes his language superfluous, his intention is to give the second a place for beams.

The Gemara continues to explain the laws of the gift of a shekhiv mera.

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said: A shekhiv mera who wrote all his property to others,

and the law is that he can retract, since he gave all his property,

we see

what his intention was:

If he was distributing,

that from the moment he began giving, his mind was to distribute all his property, then even if he did not give all his property to one person but to several, this is like the gift of a shekhiv mera, whose law is that if he

dies, they all acquire

even without an act of acquisition. And if he

recovers

from his illness,

he retracts from all of them,

even from the first ones, since from the beginning his intention was to distribute everything.

But

if he changed his mind,

who at first thought to leave part for himself, but in the end changed his mind to distribute all his property, and

dies, they all acquire.

But specifically if he gave to the first ones with an act of acquisition, since this was a partial gift, an act of acquisition is required; except for the last one, since at that point he did not reserve anything for himself, and it is possible to transfer it by speech. But if he

recovers, he retracts only from the last one.

For the gift to them was partial and with an act of acquisition, and therefore he does not retract except from the last one, toward whom there is an assessment that he gave because of death, since at that point he gave everything.

The Gemara asks: Why, when he changed his mind, does he not retract

But perhaps he is considering the matter, and then gives!?

Perhaps he decided to give everything, but he considers to whom to give and then gives; and he should be given the status of a gift of a shekhiv mera.

The Gemara answers:

Ordinarily, a shekhiv mera examines carefully, and then gives.

Ordinarily, a shekhiv mera first thinks to whom to give, and only afterward begins to distribute. And if we see that he stops in the middle, apparently he changed his mind; therefore he does not retract, and at the time of the giving an act of acquisition is required.

Rav Aḥa bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said: A shekhiv mera who wrote all his property to others and recovered

from his illness, and wishes to retract,

does not retract.

And even though he gave all his property,

we are concerned that perhaps he has property in another country,

and it turns out that this is not a gift of all [his property]. And it must be said that the case is one in which he also performed an act of acquisition, for this is a partial gift, and one does not acquire without an act of acquisition.

The Gemara asks:

But then, the Mishna, which teaches,

in which it is said:

“he did not reserve any amount of land”

and recovered,

his gift does not stand,

and he can retract,

how can you find it!?

In what manner is this speaking? For one must be concerned that perhaps he has property in another country, so why can he retract?

Rav Ḥama said: It is when he says, “All my property,”

which emphasizes that he is giving all his property. But here, where he said that he was giving his known property, and did not emphasize “all my property,” he cannot retract. And this is indeed the reason that we are concerned that perhaps he has property that he did not give, for otherwise why did he not simply say, “All my property to so-and-so

. Mar bar Rav Ashi said

so that the Mishna will not be difficult:

when it is established for us that he does not have

property, for it is known to us that he has no more property; therefore we are not concerned.

They raised a question before them

the members of the academy were in doubt:

Retracting partially,

a shekhiv mera who gave all his property to one person, and afterward retracted from part of the property and gave it to another—and he can retract from it, since the gift takes effect only after his death: does

it constitute retraction from all of it,

whether, by annulling part of the gift, there is here a revelation of his intention that he wishes to retract from all of it, with the result that only the second will receive the partial amount, and if in the end he recovers from his illness, he will not be able to retract from it [as is the law of a partial gift of a shekhiv mera; and likewise, the second will acquire only if there was also an act of acquisition].

or not,

or perhaps his entire wish was to retract only from the partial amount, while the remainder remains with the first, and this is a gift of a shekhiv mera of all [his property], so that if he recovers, he retracts.

The Gemara resolves the question from a beraita:

Come and hear:

a shekhiv mera who gave

all of them to the first,

and retracted from giving all his property to the first,

and

gave

part of them to the second,

gave the second a portion of what he had initially given the first,

the second acquires

in every case, whether he dies or whether he recovers from his illness, for this is a partial gift. Whereas

the first does not acquire.

The Gemara infers:

Is it not

the case

in which he died.

That is, the Gemara attempts to establish that the beraita is speaking of a case in which the shekhiv mera eventually died. And since the beraita said that the first did not acquire, this must be because retracting partially constitutes retracting from all of it.

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

The beraita is not speaking of one who died, but

of one who recovered

from his illness. And therefore the second acquired, since this is a partial gift. But the first, who initially received all the property, has his gift entirely annulled, because since the shekhiv mera recovered from his illness, he retracts. But it is still possible that retracting partially does not constitute retracting from all of it,

The Gemara compels this answer:

So too, it is reasonable

that the beraita is speaking when he recovered,

from what it teaches in the latter clause,

a shekhiv mera who gave

part of them to the first and all of them to the second: the first acquired; the second did not acquire.

If you say, it is understandable

it is understandable if the case is

when he recovered

from his illness,

for this reason the second did not acquire.

Since he received the remainder of his property, and nothing then remained for the giver, the second therefore did not acquire, since the giver can retract. But the first acquired, since he received only part of his property.

But if you say that it is when he died,

if the latter clause is speaking of one who eventually died,

both of them should acquire!

Both of them ought to acquire.

And since we have demonstrated that the latter clause is speaking of one who recovered, it is reasonable that the first clause is likewise speaking of one who eventually recovered. And accordingly the Gemara continues: Necessarily, there is a proof from here that retracting partially constitutes retracting from all of it:

Rav Yemar said to Rav Ashi: Let it also be when he recovered,

even though the case is one in which he recovered from his illness,

if you say, it is understandable

it is good if we hold that

retracting

partially constitutes retracting from all of it; this is why, at least, the second acquired.

Therefore the second acquires and not the first, since he retracted from the first, but he cannot retract from the second, since he gave him only a partial amount.

But if you say,

but if we hold that

retracting partially does not constitute retracting from all of it,

and the first giving remains,

let it be like one who distributes,

like a shekhiv mera who distributes his property to the first and the second.

And

since in the end he gave everything, then

neither of them should acquire!

Neither of them should acquire, since he can retract from both of them.

And from here we have resolved the doubt: retracting partially is a revelation of intention that annuls everything, and so it was decided as the halakha:

And the halakha is -

retracting partially constitutes retracting from all of it.

And according to this, the beraita is explained well: in the first clause, [he gave] all of them to the first, and retracted and gave part of them to the second; the second therefore acquires whether he dies or whether he recovers, since from a partial gift he cannot retract.

And the latter clause, [he gave] part of them to the first and all of them to the second, and the second did not acquire, but only the first did, is speaking when he recovered from his illness. Therefore the second does not acquire, since he can retract from it. And the first acquired, since this is a partial gift.

They raised a question before them

the members of the academy were in doubt:

A shekhiv mera who

consecrated all his property and recovered—what is the law?

Can he not retract from the consecration, despite having consecrated all his property?

Do we say: In the case of consecration, he makes a complete decision and transfers,

since when he gives his property to consecration, his intention is that the consecration take effect like the gift of a healthy person and acquire immediately; therefore he cannot retract?

Or perhaps

or let us say,

with regard to himself, he does not make a complete decision and transfer,

for he is concerned also for himself and does not wish to remain without property, even though he gave it to consecration. Therefore his intention was to consecrate only on the contingency that he die, and if he recovers, he retracts.

And the Gemara continues to be in doubt: if we adopt this doubt according to the first side, that to consecration he gives a complete gift and cannot retract, there is still a doubt:

If he declared all his property ownerless, what is the law?

Can he retract?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Do we say: Since [the property is available] both to the poor and to the wealthy,

shall we say that in ownerless property the poor also have the possibility of acquiring it,

he makes a complete decision and transfers,

it is reasonable that his intention is to give a complete gift?

Or perhaps,

or let us say

with regard to himself, he does not make a complete decision and transfer.

With regard to himself, he does not give a complete gift and can retract.

And if we adopt ownerless property according to the first side, that he cannot retract, since by declaring his property ownerless he demonstrates that he is not particular about this property and wishes to remove it from his possession, there is nevertheless still a doubt.

If he distributes all his property to the poor, what is the law?

He gave all his property to charity; what is the law?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Do we say,

shall we say

charity certainly involves a complete decision and transfer,

to charity he certainly gives a gift and cannot retract, and this resembles consecration?

Or perhaps,

or let us say,

with regard to himself, he does not make a complete decision and transfer.

For with regard to himself he is concerned, and therefore transfers it only after death.

And the Gemara remains with

teyku [the matter shall stand unresolved] .

.

And now the Gemara explains the expressions of the gift of a shekhiv mera:

Rav Sheshet said: “He shall take,” “he shall acquire,” “he shall take possession,” and “he shall acquire” -

all of them are expressions of a gift,

even in the case of a shekhiv mera, although there is no additional act of acquisition. But in the case of a healthy person, it is obvious that they are effective expressions [of acquisition] .

In a beraita it was taught

the beraita adds:

also “he shall cause to inherit”

and “he shall inherit,”

also expressions of inheritance are effective

when [the recipient] is fit to inherit him,

if the recipient is fit to inherit him.

And it is [the opinion of] Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka,

who holds that a person can designate as heir whomever is fit to inherit him, according to his will; therefore here as well, the gift is effective through the language of inheritance.