Bava Batra 143b — the Talmud in English

And

after the fact,

if he brought fifty in one vessel and fifty in one vessel, he has fulfilled his obligation

.

The Gemara infers:

If he brought them, yes.

If he brought them after the fact, this is effective, but

initially, not

should he bring them in this manner. Rather, initially he must bring sixty in one vessel and forty in the second vessel.

And if it should enter your mind

to say, as Rav Yosef says, that in every

such case,

whenever a person mentions two things,

it is half and half,

meaning that he intends to equate them, then

even initially as well!

He should even initially bring fifty in each vessel, as he intended when making his vow. Rather, it follows that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav Yosef, and likewise in our case his intention is not to equate the woman with the sons.

But the Gemara rejects this:

Can this be compared!?

What is the comparison!? This is not at all similar.

For

there,

in the case of one who voluntarily brings a minḥa,

we are certain

that

this man, from the outset,

initially

intended to bring a large offering,

he intended to bring a large offering,

and the fact that he said it was in two vessels

—that he divided it between two vessels—was because

he knew that it was impossible to bring it

if it could not be brought

in a single vessel.

Nevertheless,

to the extent that it is possible to bring it, we bring it.

To the extent that it is possible to bring a large offering, we bring it. That was his intention; therefore, we allot sixty to one vessel, which is the largest offering that can be brought as a minḥa, and forty to the second vessel.

The Gemara concludes:

And the halakha is in accordance with Rav Yosef.

The halakha is decided in accordance with Rav Yosef, even though Rabba disagrees with him; and although the halakha is always in accordance with Rabba, this is except for these three cases:

in the field, the matter, and half.

The third of these, “half,” is explained here, in our case, in which the woman receives half.

The Gemara continues to explain the laws of division when the donor does not specify to whom he intends the gift:

There was a certain man who sent

a man who sent

pieces of silk garments

pieces of a coat

to his household,

to the members of his household, but did not specify to whom in particular he was sending them.

Rav Ami said: Those suitable for sons

—garments appropriate for sons—are

for the sons;

the sons receive them.

Those suitable for daughters

—garments appropriate for daughters—are

for the daughters;

the daughters receive them.

And we said this

—this ruling applies

only when he does not have a daughter-in-law,

when he has no daughter-in-law married to his son.

But if he does have a daughter-in-law,

if he has a daughter-in-law, then certainly

he sent it to his daughter-in-law,

he sent it to her, since a person honors his daughter-in-law because of his affection for his son.

But

if his daughters are not married,

his daughters are unmarried,

he would not set aside his daughters and send it to his daughter-in-law;

he would not neglect his daughters and send it to his daughter-in-law.

There was a certain man who said,

«

“My property is for my sons,”

“My property is given to my sons,” and he had one son as well as daughters. The question was:

Do people call

a person

who has one son

«

my sons

” in the plural, in which case he alone receives all his property,

or perhaps

perhaps we should say:

people do not call one son “my sons,”

people do not refer to one son in the plural,

and he comes to include the daughter in the gift,

meaning that his intention was to give his daughter a share as well, and all of them divide the property equally.

Abaye said

in order to resolve the uncertainty:

Come and hear:

it may be inferred from the verse: “

And the sons of Dan: Ḥushim,

” which proves that Ḥushim, who was one person, was referred to in the plural.

Rava said to him,

rejecting Abaye’s proof:

Perhaps

it is

as the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught,

as he expounded the verse:

“They were as numerous as the thorns of a reed,”

meaning that Dan had many sons, like the branches of a reed.

Rather, Rava said:

There is another verse: “

And the sons of Pallu: Eliav,

” in which Eliav is referred to in the plural.

Rav Yosef said:

There is another verse: “

And the sons of Eitan: Azariah.”

There was a certain man who said to them,

«

“My property is for my sons!”

“My property is for my sons”!

He had a son and a grandson,

he had a son and a grandson, and the question was:

Do people call a grandson

a grandson

“a son,”

“son,” so that he is included in the gift,

or not,

and he intended only his son, despite having spoken in the plural, as explained above.

The amoraim disagreed:

Rav Ḥaviva said: People call a grandson “a son.”

People refer to a grandson as a son.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: People do not call a grandson “a son,”

they do not refer to a grandson as a son.

The Gemara proves the matter from a beraita:

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Mar bar Rav Ashi: One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from sons is permitted to derive benefit from grandsons.

It follows that grandsons are not included in the term “sons.”

Mishna:

One who dies, if he

leaves behind adult sons and minor sons,

and they have not yet divided the property, then if

the adults improved

all

the property,

including the minors’ share, they

improved it for the middle.

The improvement is divided equally among the brothers, even though the adults improved the property.

This is not analogous to one who enters his fellow’s field with permission, who receives compensation as a tenant farmer; here too, it would have been fitting for the adult brothers to receive a portion of the improvement attributable to the minors, since the adults waive their rights in favor of their minor brothers.

But

if they said

the adults, in the presence of the minors and two witnesses, or they said to the court:

“See what our father left,”

look at our father’s inheritance; we wish to divide it, and therefore

“we will work and eat,”

we wish to consume for ourselves what we improve, rather than share it with others, then if

they improved it,

the entire improvement is

theirs alone.

The improvement belongs exclusively to them.

The case is one in which they did not improve the entire inheritance, but only what would come to them after the division. Here, since they announced that they wished to divide it, it is as though they had already divided it.

And likewise the woman

whose husband died—in a case where she inherits together with the sons, as will be explained below—and she improved the property,

she improved it for the middle,

and they divide it equally.

But

if she said

to the orphans:

“See what he left me,”

look at my husband’s inheritance; I wish to divide it, and therefore

“I will work and eat”

for myself,

she improved it for herself.

Gemara:

Rav Ḥaviva, son of Rav Yosef, son of Rava, said in the name of Rava: We learned this only

—we learned in the Mishna that they improve it for the middle—

when they improved the property

—when the adults improved the property—

because of the property,

from the property itself; that is, they did not pay the expenses of the improvement out of their own pockets and did not labor themselves, but took money from the inheritance to hire workers to improve the property.

But when they improved the property because of themselves,

if the adults improved the property with their own resources or labored themselves,

they improved it for themselves.

The improvement belongs to the adults, and they receive compensation like one who enters his fellow’s field, who receives compensation as a tenant farmer.

The Gemara wonders:

Is that so!?

Do they receive everything when they improved the property because of themselves!?