Bava Batra 144a — the Talmud in English

But did Rav Hanina not say: Even if their father left them nothing

as an inheritance

except ![](pamud.bmp "

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a well,

the well and its covering,

the profit

is divided

in the middle

equally?

But this well, since the

improvement

is on account of itself,

for with a well one must stand all the time and guard it and tend to it, and the adults toil in it themselves; why is the profit divided in the middle?

The Gemara answers:

A well is different,

a water well is different,

for it is made for guarding,

it principally requires guarding,

and even minors too are able to guard it,

and minors too can guard it. It follows that the adults did not invest special labor here; therefore, the profit is divided in the middle, as with improvement of property on account of property.

We learned further in the Mishna: They said,

“See what Father left; behold, we shall work and eat”—the improvement is for themselves.

The Gemara brings an incident from which it is possible to learn that sometimes the improvement is for themselves even without their saying, “See.”

Rav Safra’s father left him money,

Rav Safra’s father bequeathed money to his sons.

He took it,

Rav Safra took the money,

and conducted business with it,

he made a business with it and profited from it.

His brothers came and sued him in court.

His brothers came and sued him in court, claiming that half of the profits belonged to them. This is considered improvement of property on account of property, because even minors know how to conduct business. The claim was

before Rava,

before Rava.

He said to them,

Rava ruled for them:

Rav Safra is a

great man,

an important person whose time is precious to him; therefore,

he did not interrupt his learning

he did not forfeit his learning,

and toil for others,

to toil for the sake of others. Therefore, it is as though he stipulated that everything he does, he does for himself, even though he did not stipulate explicitly.

We learned in the Mishna:

If the woman improved the property, she improved it for the middle:

The Gemara asks:

A woman with the property of orphans—what is she doing there!?

Why should she receive a share in the improvement of the property? If she received her ketuba, she withdraws from the property. And if the orphans provide her sustenance, then her handiwork belongs to them.

The Gemara answers:

It is a woman who inherits.

This concerns a woman who has a share in the property through inheritance. For example, Reuven married the daughter of his brother Shimon, and their father Jacob died; afterward Reuven and Shimon died. It follows that Reuven’s sons inherit Jacob. The woman also inherits Jacob, for she stands in the place of her father Shimon. And she improved the property.

The Gemara asks:

It is obvious!

This is obvious, because just as adults improve for the middle, so too a woman who inherits improves for the middle. Why was it necessary to add another case?

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say,

perhaps I would say:

Since it is not her way,

a woman is not accustomed

to toil

to improve property; therefore,

even though she did not specify,

even though she did not say that she was improving it for herself,

it is considered as though she specified,

as though she had said this explicitly. Therefore, the Mishna teaches us that nevertheless, if she did not specify explicitly, she improves for the middle, also for the orphans.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if she said, “See what my husband left me,”

“behold, I shall work and eat,” the improvement is for herself:

The Gemara asks:

It is obvious!

It is obvious that if she announces that she is improving it for herself, the improvement belongs only to her, just as with the orphans who improved the property.

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say,

perhaps they will say:

She is toiling before the orphans,

she is toiling for the orphans, and because of this

she has waived it,

she waives it for them; and even though she said so, it is plausible that she retracted and is improving it also for their sake, and the improvement will be for the middle. Therefore,

it teaches us

the Mishna teaches us that here too, if she announces it, she does not retract, and she takes all the improvement.

Now the Gemara brings several laws connected with people’s intentions.

Rabbi Hanina said:

A father

who marries off

a woman, who conducts a marriage

for his eldest son in a house, acquires it for him.

The eldest son acquires the house in which the marriage was held, because this is what the Sages instituted.

And specifically the eldest,

for the marriage was that of his eldest son, who is dear to him.

And specifically a virgin,

and specifically that he married a virgin, for then the joy is greater.

And specifically his first wife,

that this was the son’s first marriage.

And specifically that he married him off first,

for this was the father’s first joy. All these things are a reason that he should desire to transfer ownership of his house to him.

It is obvious: If his father designated for him a house and an upper story,

this is obvious, that if the father designated for him for the marriage

a house and an upper story,

a house over which there is an attic,

he acquired the house, but he did not acquire the upper story.

He acquires only the house without the upper story. Since the upper story is a separate thing, if he transfers ownership of the house, he does not intend to transfer ownership of the upper story.

The Gemara is uncertain:

A house and a veranda—what is the law?

A house into which one enters through a veranda, which is a place enclosed by windows. Here there is reason to say that perhaps he transfers ownership of the veranda as well, since part of the uses of the house are performed there; therefore, when he transfers ownership of the house, he also intends the entrance to the house.

And if you wish to say that he indeed acquires it, there is still a question:

Two houses, one inside the other—what is the law?

Two houses, one of which serves as a passage to the second house: does he intend to transfer ownership of both, since the outer house serves as a passage to the inner house, or is this not similar to a veranda, which has no function in itself, whereas the outer house is a separate unit?

The Gemara’s conclusion:

Teyku.

The Gemara remains uncertain.

Meitivi

the Gemara raises an objection against Rabbi Hanina’s ruling from what we learned:

If his father designated for him all the household utensils, he acquired the household utensils, but he did not acquire the house.

And it is proven that even though he designated the house for him, he does not acquire it.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yirmeya said:

For example, his father’s storehouse was placed there.

This concerns a case in which the father used the house as this storehouse; therefore, it is reasonable that he did not transfer ownership of the house, since he was still using it.

The Gemara explains what things he must leave in the house, through which it is proven that he does not wish to transfer ownership of it to his son:

The people of Nehardea say,

the people of Nehardea explain that

even a dovecote,

even if a dovecote of pigeons remained for the father, the son does not acquire the house.

Rav Yehuda and Rav Pappi say,

they add:

even

if the father left for himself

a vessel of fried fish,

a vessel full of fish fried in oil, the son does not acquire the house.

The Gemara relates that

Mar Zutra married off his son,

he married off his son,

and hung a sandal for him,

he hung his sandals in the house, to show that he was not giving it to him.

And likewise

Rav Ashi, when he married off his son,

married off his son,

hung a flask of oil for him,

he hung a can of oil in the house; by continuing to use it, he showed that he did not wish to transfer ownership of it.

Mar Zutra said: “These three matters,

these three laws that will be explained below,

the Sages established them

the Sages instituted them

as halakhot without a reason.

As laws stated to Moses at Sinai, even though there is no complete reason for these enactments.

One is this,

the first enactment is the one explained above: that a person transfers ownership of the house to his son. There is no complete reason here, for this is not so clear, since the father wishes to transfer ownership of it to his son. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that he acquire it.

The other,

another enactment,

as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: “One who writes all his property to his wife,

one who writes all his property to his wife and leaves nothing for his sons, the Sages instituted that

he did not make her,

he did not intend to transfer ownership of his property to her,

but rather a trustee,

to make her a trustee, so that she would be responsible for the property, in order that the sons would honor her.

The other,

the third enactment is what

Rav said: “I have a maneh in your possession,

I have money deposited with you.

Give it to so-and-so,

give that maneh to so-and-so, for I wish to transfer ownership of this money to him.” If he said this

in the presence of the three,

when the depositor, the depositary, and the recipient of the gift were there,

he acquires it,

the recipient of the gift acquires it. There is no reason here for how he acquires it without an act of acquisition, but this is what the Sages instituted. And this is called an acquisition in the presence of the three.