Bava Batra 144a (קמד.) — the Talmud in English

But did Rav Ḥanina not say: Even if their father left them nothing

in the inheritance

except

a water reservoir,

a well and its cover,

the profit

is divided

equally

between them?

But a water reservoir: its

appreciation

is due to itself,

for with a well one must stand there constantly to guard it and tend to it, and the older brothers labor over it themselves. Why, then, is the profit divided equally?

The Gemara answers:

A water reservoir is different;

a well

is made for guarding,

as it primarily requires protection,

and even minors are also capable of guarding it,

so the older brothers did not invest any special labor here. Therefore, the profit is divided equally, as in appreciation of property resulting from the property itself.

We learned further in the Mishna: They said,

“See what Father left; we will work and eat,” and the appreciation is theirs.

The Gemara relates an incident from which it can be inferred that sometimes the appreciation is theirs even when they did not say, “See.”

Rav Safra’s father left him money,

as an inheritance for Rav Safra and his brothers.

He took it,

Rav Safra took the money,

and conducted business with it,

engaging in a business venture and earning a profit.

His brothers came and sued him in court.

They came and sued him, claiming that they were entitled to half the profits. This is considered appreciation of property resulting from the property itself, since even minors know how to engage in a business venture. The case was brought

before Rava,

before Rava.

He said to them,

Rava ruled for them:

Rav Safra is

a great man,

an important person whose time is precious to him; therefore,

he did not interrupt his learning,

he would not forgo his study

and toil for others,

in order to labor for others. Therefore, it is as though he stipulated that whatever he does, he does for himself, even though he did not explicitly stipulate so.

We learned in the Mishna:

If the woman improved the property, she improved it for all of them.

The Gemara asks:

What is a woman doing with orphans’ property!?

Why should she receive a share in the appreciation of the property? If she collected her ketuba, she has withdrawn from the property. And if the orphans provide her with sustenance, then her earnings belong to them.

The Gemara answers:

It is referring to a woman who is an heiress.

The case is one in which a woman has a share in the property through inheritance. For example, Reuven married the daughter of his brother Shimon, and their father Yaakov died; afterward, both Reuven and Shimon died. It follows that Reuven’s sons inherit Yaakov, and the woman also inherits Yaakov, as she stands in the place of her father, Shimon. She improved the property.

The Gemara asks:

It is obvious!

This is obvious, because just as adult heirs who improve property do so for all of them, so too an heiress who improves property does so for all of them. Why was this additional case necessary?

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say,

perhaps I would say:

Since it is not her practice

a woman is not accustomed

to labor

to improve property, therefore,

even though she did not specify,

despite the fact that she did not say that she was improving it for herself,

it is considered as though she specified,

as though she had said so explicitly. Therefore, the Mishna teaches us that nevertheless, if she did not explicitly say so, she improves the property for all of them, including the orphans.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if she said, “See what my husband left me,”

I will work and eat, the appreciation is hers.

The Gemara asks:

It is obvious!

It is obvious that if she announces that she is improving the property for herself, the appreciation belongs only to her, as in the case of orphans who improved property.

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say,

perhaps they would say:

She is laboring before the orphans,

she is toiling on behalf of the orphans, and because of this

she has waived her claim,

she waives her rights in their favor. Thus, despite what she said, it is reasonable to assume that she retracted her statement and is improving the property also for them, so that the appreciation should be divided among all of them. Therefore,

it teaches us

that even here, if she makes the announcement, she does not retract it, and she takes all the appreciation.

The Gemara now cites several laws relating to people’s presumptions and intentions.

Rabbi Ḥanina said:

A father who

marries off

a woman, arranging a marriage

for his eldest son in a house, acquires it for him.

The eldest son acquires the house in which the wedding took place, as the Sages instituted this arrangement.

And specifically the eldest,

because the wedding was that of his eldest son, who is dear to him.

And specifically a virgin,

and specifically when he married a virgin, as the joy is then greater.

And specifically his first wife,

meaning that this was the son’s first marriage.

And specifically when he married him off first,

meaning that this was the father’s first such celebration. All these factors give rise to the presumption that he wished to transfer ownership of his house to him.

It is obvious: If his father designated a house and an upper room for him,

it is obvious that if the father designated for him, for the wedding,

a house and an upper room,

a house with an upper story above it,

he acquired the house but did not acquire the upper room.

He acquires only the house, without the upper room. Since the upper room is a separate entity, when he transfers ownership of the house, he does not intend to transfer ownership of the upper room.

The Gemara raises a dilemma:

If it was a house and a portico, what is the law?

A house that one enters through a portico, an area enclosed by windows: Here there is reason to say that he may transfer ownership of the portico as well, since some of the household uses take place there. Therefore, when he transfers ownership of the house, he intends to include the entrance to the house as well.

And if you would say that he indeed acquires it, it is still uncertain:

If there were two houses, one within the other, what is the law?

If there are two houses, one of which serves as passageway to the other, does he intend to transfer ownership of both, since the outer house serves as passageway to the inner one? Or is this not comparable to a portico, which has no independent function, whereas the outer house is a separate unit?

The Gemara’s conclusion is:

Teyku.

The Gemara leaves the matter unresolved.

Meytivi

the Gemara challenges Rabbi Ḥanina’s ruling from what we learned:

If his father designated for him all the household utensils, he acquired the household utensils but did not acquire the house.

It is apparent that even though the father designated the house for him, he does not acquire it.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yirmeya said:

For example, his father’s storehouse was located there.

The case is one in which the father used the house as a storeroom. It is therefore reasonable that he did not transfer ownership of the house, since he was still using it.

The Gemara explains what the father must leave in the house to demonstrate that he does not wish to transfer ownership of it to his son:

The Nehardeans say,

the Sages of Nehardea explain that

even a dovecote,

even if only a dovecote belonging to the father remained there, the son does not acquire the house.

Rav Yehuda and Rav Pappi say,

they add:

Even

if the father left for himself

a vessel of fried fish,

a vessel filled with fish fried in oil, the son does not acquire the house.

The Gemara relates that

Mar Zutra married off his son,

he married off his son,

and hung a sandal for him,

he hung his sandal in the house, to demonstrate that he was not giving the house to him.

And likewise,

Rav Ashi married off his son,

he married off his son,

and hung a flask of oil for him,

he hung a can of oil in the house. By continuing to use it, he demonstrated that he did not wish to transfer ownership of the house.

Mar Zutra said: These three matters

these three laws that will be explained below

the Sages instituted

the Sages enacted them

as halakhot without a reason.

They are like laws transmitted to Moses at Sinai, even though these enactments do not have a fully understood rationale.

This is one,

the first enactment is the one explained above: that a person transfers ownership of a house to his son. There is no fully established rationale for this, since it is not entirely clear that the father wishes to transfer ownership of it to his son. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that the son acquires it.

The other

is another enactment,

as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One who writes all his property to his wife,

one who writes all his property to his wife and leaves nothing for his sons, the Sages instituted that

he did not make her

the owner of his property,

but rather an administrator,

appointing her as an administrator responsible for the property, so that the sons would honor her.

The other

the third enactment is that which

Rav said: “I have a hundred dinars in your possession,”

meaning, I have money deposited with you.

“Give it to so-and-so,”

give that hundred dinars to so-and-so, as I wish to transfer ownership of this money to him. If he said this

in the presence of all three,

when the depositor, the depositary, and the recipient of the gift were all present,

the recipient acquires it

and there is no apparent rationale for how he acquires it without an act of acquisition; nevertheless, this is what the Sages instituted. This is called acquisition in the presence of all three.