Bava Batra 143a — the Talmud in English

And he nodded his head at it,

he acknowledged my words

in the beit-midrash,

in the beit-midrash.

He went to him,

Rabbi Yirmeya went to him.

He said to him,

and he explained to him:

“If he had said to him, ‘Acquire as a donkey,’

when one says to his fellow, “You acquire my property as a donkey,”

does he acquire?

Does he acquire anything?! Just as a donkey does not acquire, so too the person does not acquire, since the owner did not intend to transfer it to him. And the same law applies here: the eldest son does not receive an additional share, since at the time he transferred it to him, he said that he was transferring it to him as he was transferring it to sons who were destined to be born. And just as they do not acquire, because they did not yet exist, so he does not acquire.

The Gemara continues to explain the law of “Acquire as a donkey”:

For it was stated,

we learned as follows: one who says to his fellow:

“Acquire as a donkey!” He does not acquire

anything at all, as was explained.

But if he said: Acquire

“you and a donkey”—

Rav Naḥman said: He acquires half.

Even though the donkey does not acquire, he acquires half.

And Rav Hamnuna said: He has said nothing,

and the entire gift is nullified, since his intention is that the entire acquisition should take effect; and if part of the acquisition does not take effect, then he has no intention of transferring anything at all.

And Rav Sheshet said

a third position:

He acquires everything.

For his intention is that, if the donkey does not acquire, the entire acquisition should belong to the person.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this?

What is my source for saying that in the case of “you and a donkey,” he acquires everything?!

From this

as it was taught: Rabbi Yose says: You have no bitter part in a cucumber except its interior.

A “cucumber” is a fruit whose interior is bitter and whose exterior is sweet. And the halakha is that it is forbidden to separate from the bitter for the sweet. And when he separates one cucumber, which is one-fiftieth of all the cucumbers, which is the measure of teruma, there is a concern lest this cucumber contain a greater bitter portion than the other cucumbers.

Therefore, when he contributes

for other cucumbers,

he adds to its exterior,

he takes a portion of a sweet cucumber from another cucumber, the measure of an egg, and adds it to the cucumber that he is contributing, so that it will certainly contain a measure of sweet produce sufficient to exempt the others.

And he contributes

the whole of it, and says: “All of this cucumber shall be teruma for the forty-nine other cucumbers.”

And Rav Sheshet infers:

And why?

Why is this effective? Is not such an act of separation in the category of

“you and a donkey”!

For he separates this entire cucumber without specification, which contains both bitter and sweet, for the other cucumbers. And the bitter part of the cucumber resembles one who transfers something to a “donkey,” for the bitter part cannot exempt the sweet part of the cucumbers; it is as though he says: “The bitter and the sweet that are in my possession shall be teruma for the sweet part of the other cucumbers.” And nevertheless, this remedies the produce. And from here there is proof that if the bitter cannot remedy it, the sweet takes effect as teruma for all the sweet produce.

The Gemara rejects this:

The case there is different,

that case is different and is not analogous to “you and a donkey,” since

by Torah law it is valid teruma.

By Torah law, it is possible to separate inferior produce for superior produce—that is, bitter for sweet—

as Rabbi Ila said: From where is it derived that one who contributes

one who separates

from the inferior for the superior,

from an inferior type for a superior type,

his teruma is teruma,

so that this remedies the produce from the prohibition of untithed produce? As it is stated:

“And you shall not bear sin because of it when you raise its best part from it.”

If you separate its best part, the superior part, there will be no sin in your possession. And it follows that if you separate from the inferior for the superior, there will be sin in your possession. And from here it follows that the teruma takes effect, for

and if it is not consecrated, why bear sin?!

If the teruma does not take effect, there is no bearing of sin here.

It is proven

from here that one who contributes from the inferior for the superior—his teruma is teruma.

And since this takes effect by Torah law, this is not “you and a donkey.” Therefore, it takes effect.

The Gemara brings proof for Rav Sheshet and an objection to Rav Naḥman:

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Rav Avya raises

an objection

as a refutation,

an objection against Rav Naḥman, from what we learned:

There was an incident involving five women, among them two sisters. And one person gathered

a man who wished to betroth them gathered

a basket of figs,

a basket full of figs, and betrothed all five women with this basket.

And although

it belonged to them,

there is no theft involved, since

it was produce of the Sabbatical year,

the figs were produce of the Sabbatical year and were ownerless.

And he said: “Behold, all of you are betrothed to me with this basket!”

The basket was the money of betrothal.

And one of them received it

one of the women

on behalf of them all,

for all of them.

And the Sages said

they ruled:

The sisters are not betrothed,

since these betrothals are not fit for intercourse, for it is forbidden for a man to have intercourse with his wife’s sister, and he cannot betroth two sisters; therefore neither of them is betrothed.

And Rav Avya infers: Specifically,

it is the sisters who are not betrothed. But the non-relatives,

the other women, are betrothed, and they acquire the entire basket.

And why? It is “you and a donkey”!

For he transferred the entire basket both to the sisters and to the other women, and it is proven that if the sisters are not betrothed [“the donkey”] and have no share in the basket, the other women receive everything. And from here there is proof for Rav Sheshet, that in “you and a donkey,” he acquires everything.

Rav Ashi rejects this, and added:

“This is why I saw

because of this I saw

Rav Huna bar Avya in a dream,

in my dream! Since

Rav Avya raises an objection as a refutation,

Rav Avya raised this difficult objection.

And he answers:

Did we not establish it

did we not establish the incident in the manner

that he said: “The one fit among you for intercourse

only the one who is fit for intercourse

shall become betrothed to me,”

that is the one whom I intend to betroth; and it turns out that he did not intend at all to betroth the sisters, and therefore the other women receive the entire basket.

The Gemara brings laws connected with people’s intentions in acquisitions.

A certain man said to his wife,

a man who said to his wife:

“My property is yours and your sons’.”

“My property is given to you and to your sons.” And it is uncertain whether he gives her a share equal to that of one of the sons, or more than that, since he intended to equate the individual with the collective. And the wife, who is the individual, receives like all the sons, who are the collective.

Rav Yosef said: She acquired half.

His wife receives half of the property, and the remainder goes to the sons.

And Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this

what is the source for this law?

For it was taught,

we learned in a beraita concerning the verse

“And it shall be

for Aaron and his sons,”

the showbread is divided

half for Aaron and half for his sons.

And if so, the same law applies in our case.

Abaye said to him,

Abaye asks him, for one cannot prove from there:

Granted, there,

there this is understandable, because

Aaron is entitled to a share,

Aaron is entitled to a portion of the showbread like an ordinary koen;

therefore the Torah specified him

therefore the Torah specifies him

to the measure of half,

to add that he should receive half.

But

a woman is not entitled to inheritance,

and nothing is due to her from her husband’s property. Therefore,

it is enough for her that she take

from her husband’s property

like one of the sons.

And one cannot prove from there that his intention was to give her half.

And the Gemara raises an objection against Abaye, who rejected the proof and holds that the woman receives like each one of the sons:

“Is this so!”

Is it so?!

But there was an incident in Nehardea,

there was such an incident in Nehardea,

and Shmuel collected half,

and Shmuel gave the woman half. And similarly there was an incident

in Tiberias, and Rabbi Yoḥanan collected half,

Rabbi Yoḥanan collected half for the woman.

And furthermore,

and there is another proof for this law,

when

when

Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef arrived, he said

he related about

a certain crown-tax fund,

money collected for the royal crown,

which the king’s household imposed

which they imposed on behalf of the king

on the wealthy,

on the wealthy

and on the officials,

on the ministers.

Rabbi said: Let the wealthy give half,

the wealthy shall give half,

and the officials half,

the officials shall give the other half.

And it is proven that even though the wealthy can give more than the officials, nevertheless Rabbi ruled that when two groups are mentioned, the intention is to equate them.

And the same law applies when he gives to a woman and to sons: his intention is that the woman should receive half.

The Gemara rejects this:

“Is this comparable?!”

What is the comparison?! For this is not similar to

that case!

In Rabbi’s case,

at the outset, when they would write,

at the beginning, when they would write in order to impose the collection of money, only

the wealthy they would write,

they would write only to the wealthy,

and the officials would assist them,

the officials would assist them,

and the king knew

the king knew

that they were assisting,

that they were assisting the wealthy.

Therefore,

now, what they write,

now what the king wrote,

“the wealthy and the officials,”

to the wealthy and the officials, is

to say

to say that the king’s will is

, that these give half and those give half,

that these should give half and those should give half. And it is impossible to prove from there.

Rabbi Zeira raises an objection

to Rav Yosef from what we learned:

“One who says: ‘It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering,’

one who vows to bring a meal-offering that contains

one hundred tenths, to bring

it

in two vessels,

so that he divides the meal-offering into two vessels, since it is impossible to bring more than sixty tenths in one vessel [for in that case the flour is not fit to be thoroughly mixed with the oil in the vessel],

brings sixty in one vessel and forty in one vessel.”