Bava Batra 143a (קמג.) — the Talmud in English

And he nodded his head at it,

he acknowledged my words

in the study hall,

in the beit-midrash.

He went to him,

Rabbi Yirmeya went to him.

He said to him,

and he explained to him:

“If he had said to him: ‘Acquire like a donkey,’

meaning, one who says to his fellow: “You acquire my property like a donkey,”

would he acquire it?

Would he acquire it at all? Just as a donkey does not acquire, so too the person does not acquire, since the owner did not intend to transfer it to him. And the same is true here: The eldest son does not receive an additional portion, since at the time he transferred it to him, he said that he was transferring it to him in the same manner as he was transferring it to sons who would be born in the future. And just as they do not acquire, because they did not yet exist, so too he does not acquire.

And the Gemara continues to explain the law of “acquire like a donkey”:

As it was stated,

we learned as follows: One who says to his fellow:

“Acquire like a donkey”—he does not acquire

at all, as was explained.

But if he said: “Acquire,

you and a donkey”—

Rav Naḥman said: He acquires half.

Although the donkey does not acquire, he acquires half.

And Rav Hamnuna said: He has said nothing,

and the entire transfer is nullified, since his intention is that the entire acquisition take effect; and if part of the acquisition does not take effect, he has no intention to transfer anything at all.

And Rav Sheshet said

a third approach:

He acquires everything.

His intention is that if the donkey does not acquire, the entire acquisition will belong to the person.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this?

What is the source for my statement that when one says, “You and a donkey acquire,” he acquires everything!?

From this:

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei says: There is no bitter part in a cucumber except its interior.

“Cucumber” refers to a fruit whose inner part is bitter and whose outer part is sweet. The halakha is that one may not separate tithes from the bitter part for the sweet part. And when he separates one cucumber, which is one-fiftieth of all the cucumbers—the measure of teruma—there is concern that this cucumber may contain a greater proportion of bitter material than the other cucumbers.

Therefore, when he separates teruma

from the other cucumbers,

he adds to its exterior,

taking a portion of the sweet part of another cucumber, the volume of an egg, and adding it to the cucumber from which he is separating teruma, so that it certainly contains enough sweet material to exempt the others.

And he separates teruma

from the entire cucumber, saying: “This entire cucumber shall be teruma for the other forty-nine cucumbers.”

And Rav Sheshet analyzes this statement:

And why?

Why is this effective? After all, such an act of separation is analogous to the case of

“you and a donkey”!

He separates the entire cucumber without distinction, which contains both bitter and sweet parts, for the other cucumbers. The bitter part of the cucumber is analogous to one who transfers something to a donkey, since the bitter part cannot exempt the sweet part of the cucumbers; it is as though he is saying: “The bitter and sweet parts in my possession shall be teruma for the sweet part in the other cucumbers.” Nevertheless, this act renders the produce permissible. From here there is proof that if the bitter part cannot effect the correction, the sweet part becomes teruma for all the sweet material.

The Gemara rejects this:

There it is different,

that case is different and is not analogous to “you and a donkey,” since

by Torah law it is valid teruma.

By Torah law, one may separate inferior produce for superior produce—that is, bitter produce for sweet produce—

as Rabbi Ilaa said: From where is it derived that one who separates

that is, one who separates

from inferior produce for superior produce,

from an inferior type for a superior type,

his teruma is teruma,

thereby rendering the produce permissible from the prohibition of tevel? As it is stated:

“And you shall not bear sin because of it when you separate its best part from it.”

If you separate its best part, the superior portion, there will be no sin in your possession. This implies that if you separate from the inferior for the superior, there will be sin in your possession. It follows that the teruma takes effect, since

if it does not become sanctified, why would there be bearing of sin!?

If the teruma does not take effect, there is no bearing of sin here.

It is demonstrated

from here that one who separates from inferior produce for superior produce, his teruma is teruma.

And since this takes effect by Torah law, this is not a case of “you and a donkey.” Therefore, it takes effect.

The Gemara brings proof for Rav Sheshet and a challenge to Rav Naḥman:

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Rav Avya raised

a difficulty,

a tiyuvta,

a refutation of Rav Naḥman, from what we learned:

There was an incident involving five women, among them two sisters. And one man gathered

a man who wished to betroth them gathered

a basket of figs,

a basket full of figs, and betrothed all five women with this basket.

And although

it belonged to them,

there was no theft involved, since

it was produce of the Sabbatical Year,

and the figs were sheviit produce, which was ownerless.

And he said: “Behold, all of you are betrothed to me with this basket!”

The basket was the money of the betrothal.

And one of them accepted it

one of the women

on behalf of all of them,

for all of them.

And the Sages said

they ruled:

The sisters are not betrothed,

since these betrothals are not fit for consummation, as it is forbidden for a man to have relations with his wife’s sister, and he cannot betroth two sisters; therefore, neither of them is betrothed.

And Rav Avya analyzes this: Only

the sisters are not betrothed. The unrelated women,

the other women, are betrothed, and they acquire the entire basket.

And why? It is a case of “you and a donkey”!

After all, he transferred the basket both to the sisters and to the other women. It is proven that if the sisters are not betrothed—the “donkey”—and have no share in the basket, the other women receive everything. And from here there is proof for Rav Sheshet, that in a case of “you and a donkey,” he acquires everything.

Rav Ashi rejects this, and added:

This is why I saw

that

Rav Huna bar Avya in a dream,

in my dream! Since

Rav Avya was raising a tiyuvta,

Rav Avya was raising the difficulty.

And he answers:

Did we not establish

the incident in a manner

that he said: “Whichever of you is fit for consummation,

only the one who is fit for consummation

shall be betrothed to me,”

meaning, that one I intend to betroth? It follows that he did not intend to betroth the sisters at all, and therefore the other women receive the entire basket.

The Gemara brings laws relating to people’s intentions in acquisitions.

There was a certain man who said to his wife,

a man said to his wife:

“My property is yours and your sons’.”

“My property is given to you and to your sons.” The question arises whether he gives her a share equal to that of one son, or more than that, since he intended to equate the individual with the collective. The woman, who is the individual, receives the same as all the sons, who constitute the collective.

Rav Yosef said: She acquires half.

His wife receives half of the property, and the remainder goes to the sons.

And Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this

what is the source of this ruling?

As it is taught in a beraita,

we learned in a beraita concerning the verse:

“And it shall be

for Aaron and his sons,”

the leḥem ha-panim is divided

half for Aaron and half for his sons.

And the same should apply in our case.

Abaye said to him,

Abaye asked him, saying that no proof can be brought from there:

Granted, there,

that case is understandable, because

Aaron is entitled to a share,

Aaron is entitled to a portion of the leḥem ha-panim, like an ordinary kohen.

For this reason the Torah specified him

there,

to the measure of half,

to add that he should receive half.

But

a woman is not entitled to inherit,

and she is entitled to nothing from her husband’s property. Therefore,

it is sufficient for her to take

from her husband’s property

like one of the sons.

There is no proof from there that his intention was to give her half.

The Gemara challenges Abaye, who rejected the proof and holds that the woman receives the same as each of the sons:

Not so!

Is that so!?

But there was an incident in Nehardea,

there was such an incident in Nehardea,

and Shmuel collected half for her,

and Shmuel gave the woman half. And likewise there was an incident

in Tiberias, and Rabbi Yoḥanan collected half,

Rabbi Yoḥanan collected half for the woman.

And furthermore,

there is an additional proof for this ruling:

when

Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef arrived,

he said

he related the incident of

a certain crown-tax fund,

money collected for the royal crown,

which the king’s household imposed

on

the wealthy, on

the wealthy

and on the ministers,

on the ministers.

Rabbi said: Let the wealthy give half,

the wealthy shall give half,

and the ministers half,

and the ministers shall give the other half.

And it is proven that although the wealthy could give more than the ministers, nevertheless Rabbi ruled that when two groups are mentioned, the intention is to equate them.

The same applies when he gives property to a woman and to sons: His intention is that the woman receive half.

The Gemara rejects this:

Can this be compared!?

What is the comparison!? After all, this is not analogous to

! There,

in Rabbi’s case,

originally, when they would write,

at first, when they would write an order to impose the monetary collection, only

the wealthy were written,

they would write only the wealthy,

and the ministers would assist them,

the ministers would assist them,

and the king knew

that

they were assisting,

that they were assisting the wealthy.

Therefore,

now, what they write,

what the king now writes,

“the wealthy and the ministers,”

to the wealthy and the ministers, is

to indicate

that the king’s intention is

, that these shall give half and those half,

that these shall give half and those shall give half. But no proof can be brought from there.

Rabbi Zeira challenged

Rav Yosef from what we learned:

One who says: “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering,”

one who vows to bring a meal-offering consisting of

one hundred esron, to bring it

that offering

in two vessels,

dividing the meal-offering between two vessels, since one may not bring more than sixty esron in a single vessel [because in that case the flour cannot be mixed properly with the oil in the vessel],

brings sixty in one vessel and forty in one vessel.