Bava Batra 142b (קמב:) — the Talmud in English

What is the reason?

The explanation for this,

is that he dies first. When a pregnant woman dies, the fetus dies before its mother, and it is therefore necessary for him to bequeath to his brothers from the grave,

When a pregnant woman dies, the fetus dies before its mother, and it is therefore necessary for the fetus to inherit for the benefit of its paternal brothers while in the grave,

but a son does not inherit his mother from the grave in order to bequeath to the brothers from the father.

But with ordinary inheritance, it is possible that even a fetus inherits.

The Gemara asks:

Does this mean

that you wish to say

that he dies first,

that the fetus always dies before its mother?

But there was an incident

in which a case occurred,

and he convulsed

the fetus moved

three times,

three movements after his mother had died.

The Gemara answers:

Mar bar Rav Ashi said:

This convulsion does not demonstrate a sign of life; rather, it is

like the matter of the tail of a lizard.

Like the tail of a lizard,

which convulses,

which moves even after the lizard has died, and this is not a sign of life.

The Gemara brings another refutation of the proof cited above:

Mar, the son of Rav Yosef, in the name

of

Rava said:

In truth, a fetus does inherit, and the fetus dies after its mother; and the Mishna comes

to say that

a one-day-old son

reduces the firstborn’s portion,

as in the case where Jacob died and left twelve maneh, and he left two sons, Reuben the firstborn and Simeon. The inheritance is then divided into three portions so that the firstborn will receive a double portion. Reuben the firstborn takes two portions, which are eight maneh, and Simeon takes one portion, which is four maneh.

And if Levi was also born during Jacob’s lifetime, the inheritance is divided into four portions, and the firstborn takes two portions, which are six maneh, while Simeon and Levi each take one portion, which is three maneh.

And if Levi subsequently dies, Reuben and Simeon divide Levi’s portion equally, because the firstborn has precedence only with regard to his father’s inheritance, but not with regard to his brother’s inheritance.

But

if Jacob died while Levi was

a fetus, not.

He does not reduce the firstborn’s portion. Rather, with regard to the firstborn’s portion, it is considered as though there were only two brothers who inherit, so that the firstborn receives four maneh as his firstborn’s portion, as though they were two brothers; and the remainder [the remaining eight maneh, after the firstborn has taken his firstborn’s portion] is divided equally among the three of them.

What is the reason?

From where is it derived that a fetus does not reduce the firstborn’s portion?

Because in the passage concerning the firstborn,

“and they bear children to him,” said the Merciful One,

the Torah emphasized the expression of birth.

As he said,

as

Mar, the son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: A son who was born after his father’s death does not reduce the firstborn’s portion.

What is the reason? “And they bear children to him,” said the Merciful One, and this is not present.

And a fetus is not considered to have been born.

In Sura they taught it this way,

they stated the above ruling in his name. But

in Pumbedita they taught it this way,

they stated a different ruling in his name:

Mar, the son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: A firstborn who was born after his father’s death,

and this firstborn had another brother, for example, his mother gave birth to twins,

does not take

the firstborn

a double portion

of his father’s property.

What is the reason?

From where is this derived? For it is stated in the passage concerning the firstborn, “for he is the firstborn son of the hated wife,

he must recognize,” said the Merciful One.

The Torah emphasized the expression “he must recognize,”

but there is no possibility of recognition!

When the firstborn is a fetus, it is impossible for his father to recognize him, and therefore he does not take a double portion.

The Gemara concludes:

And the halakha

is decided,

in accordance with all these versions

of what

Mar, the son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava.

The Gemara returns to the preceding discussion:

Rav Yitzhak said that Rabbi Yohanan said: One who grants property to a fetus does not acquire it

in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna.

And if you will say

and if you challenge this from

our Mishna,

which maintains that it is possible to grant property to a fetus, the answer is:

since a person’s mind is especially close to his son,

in the Mishna he grants the property to his son, and a person very much wishes to grant property to his son; therefore, he transfers it to him wholeheartedly, even though he is still a fetus. But he does not transfer property to an ordinary fetus with complete willingness.

And the Gemara states the conclusion regarding one who grants property to a fetus:

Shmuel said to Rav Hana,

who was from the city of

Bagdata: Go out and bring me

go out and gather for me

ten,

ten people,

and I will say to you in their presence,

and I will tell you in front of them, so that the matter will become public:

One who grants property to a fetus acquires it.

But the Gemara does not rule in accordance with his opinion. Rather,

the halakha is: One who grants property to a fetus does not acquire it.

As a continuation of the preceding discussion, the Gemara relates an incident:

A certain

man

said to his wife,

who was not yet pregnant:

“My property is given to the sons whom I will have from you!”

My property is given to the sons who will be born to me from you.

His older son came,

from his first wife,

and said to him,

he said to his father:

“That man

[he referred to himself in the third person],

what will become of him!?”

What will happen to me? Will I receive no share of the inheritance at all?

He said to him,

the father answered his son:

“Go and acquire [a share] as one of the sons.”

Acquire a share in the inheritance like one of the sons who will be born in the future.

And the Gemara explains:

These [sons] certainly did not acquire [the property].

The sons who had not yet been born certainly would not acquire the property,

as they were not yet present,

for his wife was not pregnant. And even according to the one who says that it is possible to transfer property to a fetus who is his son, that applies only after there is a fetus, and not beforehand.

But the uncertainty is regarding

this one:

whether, after the father dies and they then divide the property among themselves,

there is a share for the older son in place of the sons,

whether the older son [who is called “the boy”] has a share by virtue of the gift his father gave him, in addition to what he is entitled to as an inheritance together with the sons who were born. According to this possibility, if there are three additional brothers, they divide the property into four portions, and he first receives one portion as a gift given to him by his father; then the remainder is again divided into four, and he receives one additional portion, like his brothers, as an inheritance.

Or there is no share for the older son in place of the sons,

and he receives the same as the other sons of the second wife.

The amoraim disagreed about this:

Rabbi Avin, Rabbi Meyasha, and Rabbi Yirmeya said

that they hold in accordance with the possibility that

there is a share for the older son in place of the sons,

and he receives more than the others.

Whereas

Rabbi Abbahu, Rabbi Hanina bar Papi, and Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa said

that they hold

there is no share for the older son in place of the sons.

He said to him,

Rabbi Abbahu asked

Rabbi Yirmeya

:

“Is the halakha in accordance with our opinion,

is the halakha in accordance with our view, that he has an additional share,

or is the halakha in accordance with your opinion,

in accordance with your view, that he has no additional share?”

He said to him,

Rabbi Yirmeya answered Rabbi Abbahu:

“Obviously,

it is obvious,

that the halakha is in accordance with our opinion, because we are older than you.

The halakha is in accordance with our opinion because we are older than you,

and the halakha is not in accordance with your opinion,

the halakha is not in accordance with you,

because you are children.”

For you are children.

He said to him

Rabbi Abbahu [who did not agree with Rabbi Yirmeya:

“Does the matter depend on old age!?”

Is the halakha dependent on being older!?

The matter depends on the reasoning,

the halakha is established in accordance with the one whose reasoning is more convincing.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Abbahu:

“And what is the reasoning?”

What is your reasoning!?

He said to him,

Rabbi Abbahu said:

“Go

go

to

to

Rabbi Avin, for I explained the reasoning to him,”

for I explained the reasoning to him,