Bava Batra 142b — the Talmud in English

What is the reason?

The explanation for this, ")

for he dies first.

When a pregnant woman dies, the fetus dies first, before its mother, and it is found that he must bequeath to his brothers from the grave,

but the son does not inherit his mother from the grave in order to bequeath to the brothers from the father.

But with ordinary inheritance, it is possible that even a fetus inherits.

The Gemara asks:

Does this mean,

do you wish to say by this

that he dies first,

that the fetus always dies before its mother?

But there was an incident,

and there was indeed an actual case,

and he convulsed

the fetus moved

three convulsions,

three movements after his mother died.

The Gemara answers:

Mar bar Rav Ashi said:

This convulsion does not show a sign of life, rather it is

like the tail of a lizard.

Like the tail of a lizard,

which convulses,

which moves even after the lizard has died, and this is not a sign of life.

And the Gemara brings an additional rejection of the proof above:

Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of

in the name of

Rava said:

In truth, a fetus inherits, and the fetus dies after its mother, and the Mishna comes

to say that

a one-day-old son

reduces the firstborn’s share,

for example, Jacob died and left twelve maneh, and left two sons, Reuben the firstborn and Simeon. The inheritance is therefore divided into three portions, so that the firstborn receives double. Reuben the firstborn takes two portions, which are eight maneh, and Simeon takes one portion, which is four maneh.

And if Levi was also born during Jacob’s lifetime, the inheritance is divided into four portions, and the firstborn takes two portions, which are six maneh, while Simeon and Levi each take one portion, which is three maneh.

And if Levi subsequently dies, Reuben and Simeon divide Levi’s portion equally, because the firstborn has an advantage only in the inheritance of his father, but not in the inheritance of his brother.

But

if Jacob died when Levi was

a fetus, not.

He does not reduce the firstborn’s share; rather, with regard to the firstborn’s share, the matter is considered as though there were only two inheriting brothers, so that the firstborn receives four maneh for his firstborn’s portion, as though they were two brothers, and with the remainder [with the eight maneh remaining, after the firstborn took his firstborn’s portion], all three divide equally.

What is the reason?

From where is it learned that the fetus does not reduce the firstborn’s share?

For in the passage of the firstborn,

“And they bear children to him,” said the Merciful One,

the Torah emphasized the language of birth.

For he said,

as he said,

“Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava: A son who was born after his father’s death does not reduce the firstborn’s share.”

What is the reason? “And they bear children to him,” said the Merciful One, and here there is none.

And a fetus is not considered born.

In Sura they taught thus,

they stated in his name the law above. But

in Pumbedita they taught thus,

they stated another law in his name:

“Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava said: A firstborn who was born after his father’s death,

and this firstborn had another brother, for example, his mother gave birth to twins,

does not take

the firstborn

double

from his father’s property.

What is the reason?

From where is this learned? For it is stated in the passage of the firstborn, “For the firstborn son of the hated one

‘he shall recognize,’ said the Merciful One.”

The Torah emphasized the language of “he shall recognize,”

but there is no ‘he shall recognize’!

A fetus who is a firstborn cannot be recognized by his father, and therefore he does not take double.

And the Gemara concludes:

And the halakha,

the ruling is established as halakha,

is according to all these formulations

like the two formulations

that Mar, son of Rav Yosef, stated in the name of Rava.

The Gemara returns to the previous discussion:

Rav Yitzhak said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who grants property to a fetus does not acquire,

in accordance with the view of Rav Huna,

and if you say,

and if you raise an objection from

our Mishna,

which maintains that it is possible to grant property to a fetus, the answer is:

Since a person’s mind is close to his son,

in the Mishna he grants property to his son, and a person very much wishes to grant property to his son; therefore, he transfers it to him wholeheartedly, even though he is still a fetus. But to an ordinary fetus he does not transfer it with complete willingness.

And the Gemara says as a conclusion regarding one who grants property to a fetus:

Samuel said to Rav Hana,

who was from the city

of Bagdata: Go out and bring me,

go out and gather for me

ten,

ten people,

and say to you in their presence,

and say to you in their presence, so that the matter will become public:

“One who grants property to a fetus acquires.”

But the Gemara does not rule like him; rather,

the halakha is: One who grants property to a fetus does not acquire.

As a continuation of the previous discussion, the Gemara brings an incident:

A certain

man

who said to his wife,

who said to his wife,

“My property is for the sons who I will have from you!”

My property is given to the sons who will be born to me from you. And she was not yet pregnant.

His older son came,

his older son, from his first wife, came,

he said to him,

he said to his father:

“That man

[he referred to himself in the third person],

what will become of him!?”

What will happen to me? Will I not receive any share in the inheritance at all?

He said to him,

the father answered his son:

“Go, acquire like one of the sons.”

Acquire a share in the inheritance like one of the sons who will be born in the future.

And the Gemara explains:

These, certainly did not acquire.

The sons who had not yet been born certainly will not acquire the property,

for they are not yet present,

since his wife was not pregnant. And even according to the one who says that it is possible to transfer property to a fetus who is his son, this applies only after there is a fetus, and not before then.

But the uncertainty is

this one:

whether, after the father dies, and then they divide the property among themselves,

is there a share for the talyah in place of the sons,

whether the older son [called “talyah”] has a share, by virtue of the gift his father gave him, in addition to what is due to him as an inheritance together with the sons who were born. And according to this side, if there are three more brothers, they divide the property into four portions, and he first receives one portion by virtue of the gift his father gave him, and they again divide the remainder into four, and he receives another portion, like his brothers, as an inheritance.

Or does he have no share for the talyah in place of the sons,

and he receives like the other sons from the second wife?

And the amoraim disagreed about this:

Rabbi Avin, Rabbi Meyasha, and Rabbi Yirmeya, who said,

they hold like the position that

there is a share for the talyah in place of the sons,

and he receives more than the others.

Whereas

Rabbi Abbahu, Rabbi Hanina bar Papi, and Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa, who said,

hold

there is no share for the talyah in place of the sons.

He said to him,

asked

Rabbi Abbahu

to

Rabbi Yirmeya: Is the halakha according to us,

is the halakha according to our view, that he has an additional share,

or is the halakha according to you,

according to your view, that he has no additional share?

He said to him

Rabbi Yirmeya answered Rabbi Abbahu:

It is obvious

the matter is obvious,

that the halakha is according to us, for we are older than you.

The halakha is according to us, since we are older than you,

and the halakha is not according to you,

the halakha is not according to your view,

for you are children,

because you are children.

He said to him

Rabbi Abbahu [who did not agree with Rabbi Yirmeya]:

“Does the matter depend on old age!?”

Does the halakha depend on old age!?

The matter depends on the reason,

the halakha is determined according to the one whose reasoning is more plausible.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Abbahu:

“And what is the reason?”

What is your reasoning!?

He said to him

Rabbi Abbahu:

Go

go

to

the one

of Rabbi Avin, for I explained it to him,

for I explained the reason to him,