Bava Batra 140a (קמ.) — the Talmud in English

do the daughters take it

the daughters take

all of it,

all the property!? Surely this cannot be reasonable! They are certainly not entitled to more than twelve months or more than the time until they reach maturity, whereas here it emerges that they would receive support beyond those periods.

Rather, Rava said,

indeed, the Mishna does not mean that the daughters receive everything.

Rather, they take out for them support, for the daughters until they reach maturity. And the remainder,

whatever surplus remains in the property, is

for the sons.

It remains for the sons by virtue of the inheritance.

And the Gemara says:

It is obvious,

it is straightforward to say that if the property was

substantial and became insufficient,

if at the time of the father’s death the property was substantial, but afterward the cost of support increased, or the property deteriorated, and now its value is insufficient to support the sons and daughters,

the heirs have already acquired it.

Since the determining time is the time of the father’s death, and at that time the property was substantial, they acquire the property, and the sons and daughters are supported together .

But

if it was insufficient and became substantial,

if at the time of the father’s death the property was insufficient and it subsequently increased in value, whether because the cost of support decreased or because the property increased in value,

what

is the ruling? Who acquires the appreciation of the property? Is it the case that

they remain in the possession of the heirs,

the property is still in the possession of the orphans? Although the Sages instituted that the property be in the possession of the daughters, they did not completely remove the sons’ rights, and it is considered that they still have a connection to the property.

Therefore, the appreciation belongs to the heirs,

the increase belongs to them, since their property appreciated.

Or perhaps

perhaps

the heirs are completely removed from here,

the enactment was that the daughters would have complete possession of the property, with the sons having no connection to it at all. It follows that the property of the daughters appreciated, and the sons have no share in that appreciation.

Come and hear

the Gemara brings a proof to resolve the uncertainty, from that

which Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Orphans who acted first and sold insufficient property,

heirs who hastened to sell it before the daughters brought the sons to court to claim the insufficient property for themselves,

whatever they sold is sold.

The sale is valid even though the property is insufficient. But so long as the matter has not been brought to court, the sons have rights in the property.

It is proven from here that they have a connection to the property, and therefore the appreciation belongs to the heirs. After the matter has been brought to court, however, it is possible to say that, since they can no longer sell it, from that point onward the property is entirely in the possession of the daughters and the appreciation belongs to them.

Rabbi Yirmeya sat

sitting

before

before

Rabbi Abbahu, and asked him,

and he asked him:

What is the ruling concerning his widow: does she make the property insufficient?

If a man died and left sons and daughters, as well as a widow who receives support from her husband’s property [as he obligated himself to provide for her in the conditions of the ketubba, as long as she remains a widow and does not marry another], and there is property intended for the daughters and the widow,

do we say

that

since she has support,

she is entitled to be supported under the conditions of the ketubba,

she makes it insufficient,

the widow’s support obligation is also taken into account in calculating the property? If this causes the property to be considered insufficient [to support everyone], property is set aside for the support of the daughters and the widow, and the remainder goes to the sons.

Or perhaps,

perhaps we should say

since if she were to marry,

if the widow were to marry another man,

she would have none,

she would not receive support,

now too she has none!

Even now she does not receive a share in the property as she would in the case of insufficient property. Since it is possible that she will not need support if she marries, the property is considered substantial, since there is enough for the sons and daughters. Therefore, all are supported equally—the sons, the daughters, and the widow—as is the law with substantial property.

If you would say,

if we adopt the second side of this question,

since if she were to marry,

since if she were to marry another,

she would have none

she would have no support,

now too she has none,

even now she has no special right in the property and no property is designated for her—there is still another uncertainty:

His wife’s daughter,

one whom he undertook at the time of the marriage to support—the daughter of his wife from another man—and it follows that she too must receive support from the father’s property, and there is property intended for the daughters and his wife’s daughter,

what is the ruling: does she make the property insufficient,

does the obligation to support his wife’s daughter count among the obligations of the heirs and cause the property to be considered insufficient?

Do we say,

should we say

since when she marries,

even if she marries another,

she has it,

she continues to receive support, as the father undertook to support his wife; therefore, this is an ordinary debt,

and

therefore

she makes it insufficient,

this obligation reduces the property available to the heirs.

Or perhaps,

perhaps we should say

since if she were to die

if his wife’s daughter were to die,

she would have none,

the obligation of support would lapse,

and

therefore

she does not make it insufficient,

she does not reduce the property, since this is an obligation whose collection is not certain. Rather, everyone is supported, and if ultimately she does not die and there is not enough property, the law will be as in the case of property that was substantial and became insufficient.

And if you would say,

if we adopt the second side,

since if she were to die she would have none

she would have no support obligation,

and she does not make it insufficient,

she does not cause the property to be considered insufficient, there is still another uncertainty:

A creditor,

if the property contains enough only for the daughters and the creditor,

what is the ruling: does he make the property insufficient?

Is this debt like the daughters’ obligation, which causes the property to be considered insufficient, or not?

Do we say,

should we say

since when he dies

even if the creditor dies,

he too has it,

the debt must be paid to his heirs; therefore, the creditor

makes it insufficient

the property, since this is a debt that will be collected in any event, and the sons must go begging from door to door.

Or perhaps,

perhaps we should adopt the other side:

since collection is still lacking,

the creditor still needs to collect his debt, and the debt has not yet been collected, it is not taken into account,

and he does not make it insufficient,

he does not cause the property to be considered insufficient, and everyone is supported together until the creditor collects his debt. Afterward, only the daughters are supported from the property that remains.

And there are those who pose it in the opposite direction,

there is one who raised the same questions above, but in a different order:

A creditor—what is the ruling: does he make the property insufficient?

Does he reduce it, since even if he dies, the debt remains collectible?

And if you would say that indeed he makes it insufficient, there is still another uncertainty: