Bava Batra 139b (קלט:) — the Talmud in English

Rava said to him: And now that he has stated this, do we know

that the husband is an heir?!

And

behold

:

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina said: In Usha they instituted: If a woman sold

the

property

of

melog

that she brought to her husband at the time of the marriage on the condition that he consume its produce, and the woman sold it

during

her husband’s lifetime,

on the condition that if her husband dies during her lifetime, the purchaser will acquire it.

And seemingly, if the husband is an heir and does not acquire the property until the time of death, then the purchaser preceded him; and even if the woman dies during her husband’s lifetime, he will not inherit from her, but the purchaser will acquire it.

However, in Usha they instituted that if

the woman dies

during her husband’s lifetime,

the husband takes

the property

from the purchasers.

And it is evident that the husband is considered a purchaser from the time of the marriage, and not an heir. For if not, why does he take the property from the purchasers? And if so, this is difficult: Why, with regard to inheritance, is he considered an heir, whereas with regard to the sale of the property is he considered a purchaser?

Rather, Rav Ashi said: With regard to a husband,

there are places where

the Sages deemed him [

made him ]

an heir, and

there are places where

the Sages deemed him a purchaser, and wherever it benefits him, they acted for him [

they instituted it for him in a manner beneficial to him ].

Therefore,

with regard to the Jubilee, the Sages deemed him [

left him according to his legal status , to be ]

an heir, because of his loss,

for if he were a purchaser, he would have to return the property in the Jubilee year.

But

with regard to the

words of

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina,

concerning the law of a woman who sold usufruct property during her husband’s lifetime,

the Sages deemed him a purchaser,

and he takes it from the purchasers,

because of his loss.

However,

with regard to Ravin,

where a widow is sustained from the property even after the death of her daughter,

because of the widow’s loss, the Sages deemed him [

left him according to his legal status, to be ]

an heir.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But with regard to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina, where there is a loss to the purchasers, and

nevertheless

the Sages deemed him a purchaser,

why did they take greater concern for the widow’s loss?

The Gemara answers:

There,

in the case of a woman who sold usufruct property during her husband’s lifetime, they did not take concern for the purchasers’ loss, because

they brought the loss upon themselves: Since there was a husband, they should not have purchased from a woman who was married. [

they should not have purchased from a woman living under a husband’s authority ].

But in the case of a widow, they took concern for her loss and instituted that she should consume the produce of her husband’s property.

We shall return to you, chapter “There Are Heirs.”

Introduction

By Torah law, when a person dies and leaves sons and daughters, the sons inherit all the property, and the daughters have no share in their father’s property. However, one of the conditions of the ketubba to which a man obligates himself to his wife at the time of their marriage is that the father undertakes to provide for his daughters’ needs until they reach maturity [twelve years and six months], or until the time of their marriages.

This obligation includes food, clothing, and the other needs associated with marriage.

Therefore, when the sons inherit their father’s property, they must provide for the daughters, as their father undertook to do, because the father’s property is liened for the daughters’ support.

When does this apply? When the father left

substantial property,

sufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters. But if he left behind only

insufficient property,

which is not sufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters [until the daughters reach maturity, or, according to one opinion in the Gemara, is not sufficient to provide for both of them for twelve months], in this case the Sages instituted that the daughters are to be supported from their father’s property, while the sons must go begging from door to door.

This enactment contains two elements: a. The daughters are supported from the property, and not the sons. b. The property is placed in the daughters’ possession, and not that of the sons, so that the sons will not use the property for themselves.

Indeed, the Rosh adds that if the court sees that, even where there is substantial property, the sons are consuming the inheritance in an abnormal manner, it removes the money from the sons’ possession.

Mishna:

One who died,

and left property behind,

and left sons,

who inherit their father’s property,

and daughters,

who have a lien upon the property for their support until they reach maturity or marry, then

when the property is substantial,

when it contains enough to provide for the support of the sons and daughters [and the Gemara disputes the definition of substantial property, whether the property contains enough to provide for their support until the daughters reach maturity, or whether it contains enough to provide for both of them for twelve months] —

The sons shall inherit,

and the property shall be in their possession,

and the daughters shall be supported

by the sons.

But if he bequeathed to his sons only

insufficient property,

which does not contain enough for the support of the sons and daughters—

The daughters shall be supported,

they receive the property for their support, and the property is now placed in their possession. The Sages instituted this so that the sons would not be able to deprive them of the property.

And the sons shall go begging from door to door.

Since the property has been removed from them and transferred into the possession of the daughters.

Admon says:

Why,

just because I am male, have I lost out!?

That is, Admon disagrees with the Rabbis and maintains that, since a male has precedence over a daughter—for according to Torah law he is the heir to his father’s property, whereas a daughter is not—it is unreasonable to give precedence to the daughters over the sons.

Rabban Gamliel said:

I see the words of Admon as correct!

The words of Admon appear more convincing to me, and therefore I hold that the halakha follows him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that there is a distinction between substantial and insufficient property.

The Gemara asks:

And how much is substantial,

what quantity of property is required for it to be considered substantial?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Enough that they can be supported from it

from the property,

these

the sons

and these

the daughters

for twelve months.

Rav Yehuda added and said:

When I stated this before Shmuel,

when I came before Shmuel to study Torah from him after Rav’s death, and told him what Rav had said concerning substantial property,

he said to me,

Shmuel replied to me:

This is the statement of Rabban Gamliel the son of Rabbi,

who holds that the property must contain enough for twelve months of support.

But the Sages say,

disagreeing and maintaining:

Enough that these

the sons

and these

the daughters

can be supported until they reach maturity.

Until the daughters reach maturity, since until that time the father undertook in the conditions of the ketubba to support them.

It was also stated:

There is likewise proof that Rabbi Yohanan holds that the measure is until the daughters reach maturity:

When Ravin came,

when Ravin came from Babylonia to the Land of Israel,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan; and some say

that it was

said

by Ravin in the name of

Rabba bar bar Hanna, who said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Any property from which they can be supported

if the property contains enough to support

these and these until they reach maturity,

is substantial property.

Less than this,

if the property does not contain enough to support the sons and daughters until that time, it is insufficient property, and the property is in the possession of the daughters.

It may be inferred from the Mishna that if the property does not reach the measure of substantial property, everything goes to the daughters.

And regarding this the Gemara expresses astonishment:

And if there is not enough for these and these until they reach maturity,