Bava Batra 132b (קלב:) — the Talmud in English

And

in any case, both according to Rav, and according to Shmuel, and according to Rabbi Yosei

, they taught here one of the leniencies of the ketuba.

However, other creditors do not lose their debt merely on the basis of an assessment of intent, as in the case of a woman; and until they explicitly say, “I hereby waive the lien,” the lien remains in force.

And the reason that the Sages were lenient with regard to a ketuba is that a woman desires to marry even more than a man desires to marry. But with regard to other creditors, who do a favor for the borrower, we are not lenient and allow them to lose their debt for nothing.

In any event, it has been clarified according to all the amoraim cited above that the woman need not explicitly relinquish the lien, and even if she remained silent, her silence is tantamount to an admission.

The Gemara raises an objection: But

we learned

in the latter clause of that discussion concerning Pe'a:

Rabbi Yosei says: If she accepted it upon herself, even though he did not write for her

any land whatsoever

, she forfeited her ketuba.

The Gemara infers: It follows

from

his words

, that the first tanna holds that writing and acceptance

are required.

The woman's silence is not sufficient.

For if you say that according to the first tanna writing alone is sufficient, Rabbi Yosei should have said: “Even though he wrote for her, she does not forfeit her ketuba unless she accepts it upon herself.”

And if you would say that the entire passage is Rabbi Yosei,

and in the first clause he teaches us that by writing any amount of land for her she forfeits her ketuba, while in the latter clause he teaches us that if she explicitly accepted it, even though he did not write any land for her, she forfeits her ketuba,

but

this cannot be explained in that manner, for

it was taught

in a beraita concerning the words of the first tanna:

Rabbi Yehuda said: When

does the first tanna hold that she forfeits her ketuba?

In a case

where she was present and accepted it upon herself.

But if she was present and did not accept it upon herself,

or

she accepted it upon herself but was not present, she does not forfeit her ketuba.

And it is explicitly proven that her silence is not sufficient; rather, she must explicitly accept it upon herself.

And from here

there is a refutation

of

the

words

of all

the amoraim cited above.

Refutation.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Here is Rav, here is Shmuel, and here is Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥanina, [we have heard the words of Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥanina],

we have heard the words of Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Ḥanina ],

what is your opinion?

He said to him:

My opinion is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥanina: she need not be present at that occasion; rather, once he wrote any amount of land for her, she forfeited her ketuba.

And I reasoned:

I say that once he made her a partner among the sons,

and gave her land like theirs, she waived her claim against them, and

forfeited her ketuba.

It was also stated [and so it was said in the beit-midrash in the name of Rav Naḥman]:

and so it was said in the beit midrash in the name of Rav Naḥman ],

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said: Once he made her a partner among the sons, she forfeited her ketuba.

The Gemara is uncertain concerning Rav Naḥman's opinion:

Rava asked: In the case of a healthy person, what is the law?

That is, if a healthy person wrote his property to his sons and wrote any amount of land for his wife, making her a partner among the sons, did she also forfeit her ketuba in this case?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say

only

in the case of a person on his deathbed

that we say her silence constitutes evidence that she waived her claim, since

she knew that he had no

additional property, and she should have protested against his gift

, and

since she did not protest, we say with certainty that she

did

waive

the lien

she had on these properties?

But in the case of a healthy person,

her silence is not evidence, since

she reasoned: He will acquire [he will certainly acquire additional property from which she can collect her ketuba],

and therefore she saw no need to protest at present. But in truth, she did not waive the lien, and if he does not acquire additional property, she will collect her ketuba from the property that he gave as a gift to his sons.

Or perhaps,

even in the case of a healthy person, since

at present, at any rate, he has no

additional property, she should have protested against him. And since she did not protest, she certainly waived the lien.

And we conclude with

: teiku.

The Gemara brings additional cases concerning the same matter:

There was a certain

person on his deathbed

who said to them: “Half to one daughter, and half to another daughter, and a third of the produce to my wife [half of my property to this daughter, half to another daughter, and a third of the produce of the property to my wife]”..

half of my property for this daughter, and half for another daughter, and a third of the produce of the property for my wife ]”..

Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura. He entered

the home of

Rav Ḥisda,

and

said to him: What is the law in a case like this?

Does she also waive her ketuba in this case, where he gave her only produce and not land?

He said to him: This is what Shmuel said: Even if he transferred to her only one date palm for its produce, she forfeited her ketuba.

And here too, where he transferred to her attached produce, she forfeited her ketuba.

He said to him: Say that Shmuel said that there,

because

he transferred to her a share in the land itself;

but

here, is it

only

produce?

That is, are we uncertain with regard to detached produce, which is not attached to the land and is not considered land?

He said to him: Are you speaking of movable property?! I certainly was not speaking of movable property.

Certainly, she did not forfeit her ketuba on account of movable property that she received as a gift from her husband.

Another case concerning the same matter:

There was a certain

person on his deathbed

who said to them: “A third to one daughter, a third to another daughter, and a third to my wife [a third of my property to this daughter, a third to the other, and a third to my wife] ”.

a third of my property for this daughter, a third for the other, and a third for my wife ] ”.

One of his daughters died,

and her father then inherited the third of his property that he had given her.

And we are uncertain whether his wife can collect her ketuba from that property. For she collects her ketuba from property that the husband acquires after giving her the gift, and the question must be considered whether property that he acquired upon the death of his daughter is considered property that he acquired afterward or not.

Rav Pappi thought to say:

his wife

does not collect

toward her ketuba

anything but a third. [the third of the property that he gave her], but she cannot collect from the third that he acquired upon the death of his daughter.

that third of the property that he gave her ], and she does not collect from the third that he acquired upon the death of his daughter.