Bava Batra 132b — the Talmud in English

And

in every case, both according to Rav, and according to Shmuel, and according to Rabbi Yosei

, they taught here the leniencies of a marriage contract.

But other creditors do not lose their debt through an assessment of the mind, as in the case of a woman; and until they explicitly say, “I hereby waive the lien,” the lien still exists.

And the reason that the Sages were lenient concerning a marriage contract is that just as a man wants to marry, a woman wants even more to be married. But with regard to other creditors, who do a favor for the borrower, they are not lenient with them, to cause them to lose their debt for nothing.

In any event, it has been clarified according to all the amoraim mentioned above that the woman does not need to explicitly waive the lien; and even if she remained silent, silence is like acknowledgment.

And the Gemara raises an objection: Behold,

we learned

in the latter clause of that discussion concerning the corner of the field:

Rabbi Yosei says: If she accepted it upon herself, even though he did not write for her

any amount of land,

, she lost her marriage contract.

The Gemara infers: It follows

from

his words

that the first tanna holds that writing and acceptance

are required.

And the woman’s silence is not sufficient.

For if you say, according to the first tanna, that writing alone is sufficient, Rabbi Yosei should have said: “Even though he wrote for her, she did not lose her marriage contract unless she accepted it upon herself.”

And if you would say that the entire passage is Rabbi Yosei’s,

and in the first clause he taught us that through writing any amount of land she lost her marriage contract, while in the latter clause he taught us that if she explicitly accepted it, even though he did not write for her, she lost her marriage contract.

And

it cannot be explained this way, for

it was taught

in a beraita concerning the words of the first tanna:

Rabbi Yehuda said: When

does the first tanna hold that she lost her marriage contract?

In a case

where she was there and accepted it upon herself.

But if she was there and did not accept it upon herself,

or

she accepted it upon herself but was not there, she did not lose her marriage contract.

And it is explicitly proven that her silence is not sufficient; rather, she must explicitly accept it upon herself.

And from here

a refutation

to

the

words

of all

the amoraim who were cited above.

A refutation.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Here is Rav, here is Shmuel, here is Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Ḥanina, [

we have heard the words of Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Ḥanina ],

what does the Master hold?

He said to him,

I hold in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Ḥanina, that she does not need to be there at that gathering; rather, since he wrote for her any amount of land, she lost her marriage contract.

And I held:

I say that since he made her a partner among the sons,

and gave her land like them, she waived it for them, and

she lost her marriage contract.

It was also stated [

and so it was said in the beit midrash in the name of Rav Naḥman ],

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said: Since he made her a partner among the sons, she lost her marriage contract.

The Gemara is uncertain concerning Rav Naḥman’s view:

Rava asked: In the case of a healthy person, what is the law?

That is, a healthy person who wrote his property to his sons, and wrote for his wife any amount of land, making her a partner among the sons: did she also, in this case, lose her marriage contract?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say

only

in the case of a dangerously ill person

that we say that her silence constitutes evidence that she waived it, since

she knew that he had no

additional property, and she should have protested against his gift,

and

since she did not protest, we say that

indeed

she

waived

the lien that she has on these properties.

But in the case of a healthy person,

her silence is not evidence, since

she thinks, he will acquire again [

he will certainly acquire additional property from which she will be able to collect ], and therefore she did not see a need to protest now. But in truth, she did not waive the lien; and if he does not acquire additional property, she will collect her marriage contract from the property that he gave as a gift to his sons.

Or perhaps,

even in the case of a healthy person, since

at present, at any rate, he has no

additional property, she should have protested against him. And since she did not protest, she certainly waived the lien.

And we conclude with it is unresolved.

The Gemara brings additional discussions concerning the same matter:

The Gemara presents additional cases concerning the same matter:

There was a certain

dangerously ill person

who said to them: “Half for one daughter, and half for another daughter, and a third for my wife from the produce [

half of my property for this daughter, and half for another daughter, and a third of the produce of the property for my wife ]”..

Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura; he entered to [

go in to ]

Rav Ḥisda,

and

said to him: What is the law in a case like this?

Did she also, in this case, where he gave her only produce, waive her marriage contract?

He said to him: This is what Shmuel said: Even if he transferred to her only one palm tree for its produce, she lost her marriage contract.

And here too, where he transferred to her attached produce, she lost her marriage contract.

He said to him: Say that Shmuel said that there,

because

he transferred to her ownership of the body of the land,

but

here, is it only produce

alone

?

That is, are we uncertain concerning detached produce, which is not attached to the land and has no status of land?

He said to him: Are you speaking of movable property?! I certainly am not speaking of movable property.

And certainly she did not lose her marriage contract on account of a gift of movable property that she received from her husband.

Another matter concerning the same subject:

There was a certain

dangerously ill person

who said to them: “A third for one daughter, and a third for another daughter, and a third for my wife [

a third of my property for this daughter, a third for the other, and a third for my wife ] ”.

One of his daughters died,

and her father subsequently inherited the third of his property that he had given her.

And we are uncertain: Can his wife collect her marriage contract from that property? For she collects her marriage contract from property that the husband acquires after giving her the gift, and it must be considered whether the property that he acquired upon the death of his daughter has the status of property that he acquired afterward, or not.

Rav Pappi thought to say:

his wife

does not collect

from it for her marriage contract

except a third. [

that third of the property that he gave her ], and she does not collect from the third that he acquired upon the death of his daughter.