Bava Batra 132a — the Talmud in English

Rava raised a question:

In its plain sense, Shmuel’s statement was said with regard to a dangerously ill person who wrote [a document assigning] his property, for we assess his intention as not having been to make a complete gift. But

with a healthy person,

who writes all his property to his wife,

what

is the law? Do we likewise say that his intention is to make her an administrator, or perhaps his intention is for a complete gift?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: perhaps only

with a dangerously ill person

does he concern himself with her honor,

for it is pleasing to him that they heed her words

[that his sons heed her words] after his death

, but with a healthy person,

he does not concern himself with this, for

he himself is standing

[for he is alive],

or perhaps with a healthy person as well it is pleasing to him that they heed her words

[that his sons heed her words]

from now,

and he wrote his property to her only by way of an administratorship, and not with a complete acquisition?

The Gemara attempts to resolve the uncertainty from a beraita:

Come

and

hear

what we learned in a beraita concerning this matter:

One who writes the produce of his property

to his wife,

we do not say that on account of this gift she waived the lien that she has on the land for her ketuba, rather

she collects her ketuba from the land.

And not only this, but even if he wrote to her land and produce

for one-half, one-third, or one-quarter

of his property

, she collects her ketuba from the remainder .

However, if he

And if he wrote all his property to his wife, and

afterward

a promissory note was produced against him,

which preceded that gift, but did not precede her ketuba:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Let her tear up

the document of

her gift, and stand upon her ketuba.

And since the lien of her ketuba preceded the lien of the debt, she collects her ketuba.

And the Sages say: Let her tear up her ketuba, and stand upon her gift, and she is found bald on both sides.

Since at the time she received the gift she removed the lien from those lands that she received as a gift, and consequently the creditor’s lien took effect upon them.

And Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: It happened, and the matter occurred with the daughter of my sister-in-law, and the matter came before the Sages, and they said: Let her tear up her ketuba and stand upon her gift, and she is found bald on both sides.

Until here is the beraita.

The Gemara infers:

The reason is that a promissory note was produced against him,

and then they disputed whether her gift remains valid or not;

but if no promissory note was produced against him, she acquires

according to everyone, even though he gave her all his property.

And in what case?

In what case is this speaking?

If you say it is with a dangerously ill person, but you said: “

One who writes all his property to his wife

has made her only an administrator,”

Rather, is it not with a healthy person.

And it is proven from here that with the gift of a healthy person, his intention is not to make her an administrator, but rather for a complete acquisition.

The Gemara rejects this:

Actually,

it is speaking also

with a dangerously ill person, and

it is speaking of a case in which his intention is certainly for a complete gift, such as the cases brought above, in which Rav Avira and Ravina disagreed, and

Rav Avira establishes it in all of them,

and

Ravina establishes it with his betrothed wife and his divorced wife .

Here too, it can be established as referring to his betrothed wife and his divorced wife, and with regard to them his intention is certainly for a complete gift and not for an administratorship.

The Gemara discusses the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis brought above in the beraita:

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Nahman said: The halakha

is in accordance with the words of the Sages, who said:

“Let her tear up her ketuba and stand upon her gift, and she is found bald on both sides.”

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Does this mean

[it is implied by these words]

that Rav Nahman does not follow an assessment of intention,

and holds that even though we assess the woman’s intention that, had she known that her property would be seized by the creditor, she would not have waived the lien that she has upon it, nevertheless, since in practice she waived the lien, she lost everything and will remain bald on both sides?

And

it is difficult:

Is

it not

taught

in a beraita

, “If his son went overseas, and he heard that his son had died, and he arose and wrote all his property to others, and afterward his son came, his gift is a gift.

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: His gift is not a gift.

Since we assess his intention,

“for had he known that his son was alive, he would not have written them.”

And Rav Nahman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya.

And if so, it is difficult: Why here did Rav Nahman hold that one should follow an assessment of intention, whereas in our discussion he ruled in accordance with the Sages, who did not take an assessment of intention into account?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, generally one should follow an assessment of intention, but

it is different there,

with regard to one who writes all his property to his wife, for she does not desire to annul the gift even when she knows that the creditor will collect it from her, since

it is pleasing to her that publicity go forth concerning her, that he wrote those properties to her

[it is pleasing to her that it become public in the world that she received such an important gift from her husband]. Therefore, the Sages held that she is bald on both sides.

Further in the same matter:

We learned there

in the Jerusalem Talmud, in tractate Peah:

“One who writes his property to his sons, and writes to his wife any amount of land, has forfeited her ketuba.”

That is to say, she cannot collect her ketuba from the property that he gave to his sons. Since she too received land at that same time, she waived the lien that she had on the land that he gave to his sons.

But from property that he acquires afterward she can collect her ketuba. Since the husband places under lien for his wife’s ketuba all property that he acquired and that he is destined to acquire. And she did not waive this lien.

And the Gemara raises an objection: Is it so that

because he wrote to her any amount of land she forfeited her ketuba?!

And the Gemara answers:

Rav said,

it is speaking

in

a case in which the husband

conveys to them

his property

through her.

That is to say, the woman performed the acquisition for the sons.

And since she exerts herself on their behalf, and also raises no objection at all to this gift, we assess her intention as having waived the lien that she has on these properties.

And Shmuel said,

even if she did not acquire the gift on their behalf, but rather

in

a case in which the husband

divides in her presence

his property among his sons

and she remains silent,

we likewise assess her intention as having waived the lien.

Indeed, even according to Shmuel, if he gave her nothing at that gathering, her silence is not proof. Since she remained silent only in order to please her husband.

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina said:

Even if she was not present at that gathering, but rather

in

the hour when he gives her

he says to her, “Take this land in your ketuba,”

and she did not object, she certainly waived the lien that she has on the other properties.